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The thesis is a study of the effect of socio-cultural factors upon 
business organisations. The study attempts to test a wide range of 
hypotheses about the differences between British and American manufact­
uring organisations by comparing a sample of British businesses with 
some comparable American firms operating in the United Kingdom, The 
study begins by examining the validity of the dominating analytical 
framework of industrialism that has frequently been used to investigate 
the effects of cultural variables upon business behaviour. The analysis 
points to the logical and empirical weaknesses in the industrialism 
thesis, and attempts to show how industrialism has almost always been 
confused with capitalism. The advantages of viewing both societies and 
both groups of firms from the perspective of the capitalist mode of 
production is emphasised. The use of culture as an explanatory variable 
in economic analysis is analysed along with a range of conceptual 
problems in such analyses. The third chapter attempts to trace the 
growth of the capitalist economic order in the context of the pre-existing 
socio-cultural structure in both societies. It is from this section that 
the majority of the study1s hypotheses are drawn, although further 
hypotheses are taken from a study of American executives working in 
Britain which is also reported. The major findings are reported in 
three chapters: The first of these concentrates upon the organisational
structures and processes of the firms studied; the second examines some 
aspects of the ubhanaoteristics and behaviour of the managers employed; 
the last presents some data on the organisational climates of the two 
groups of firms. In the final chapter the findings of the whole study 
\are discussed in terms of their effect upon economic performance, both 
at the level of the society and the individual firm.
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INTRODUCTION
Ralph Dahrehdorf, giving the opening address at the British 
Sociological Association*s annual conference in 1974, complained about 
the lack of interest amongst British sociologists in the problems of 
political economy. I Think his accusation was broadly correct, but 
in many ways it was a surprising one. The founding fathers of sociology 
on whom so much respect is usually lavished, had traditionally interested 
themselves in such problems, and three of them, Marx, Weber and Durkheim 
had made outstanding contributions to our stock of knowledge about 
political economy. Furthermore, inside British sociology, there has 
been a long tradition of concern with practical, social problems. And 
what problem could have been of more concern in the last two decades 
than the structure and performance of the British economy? I think 
there are several factors which account for the 1 silent sociologists’, 
as Asher Tropp has dubbed them, and it is worthwhile to briefly enumerate 
these, because they form an important reference point for this particular 
study.
One can begin to account for the lack of serious sociological 
work on the economy by simply noting that, since the days of the founding 
fathers, the social sciences have fragmented, and a very considerable 
academic division of labour has arisen. As a consequence economic 
problems are now regarded as being firmly within the province of the 
discipline of economics. Furthermore, the type of economics that has 
been dominant in Britain for a generation, has been one that has placed 
a very high premium upon deductive models that are capable of quanti­
fication. Sociologists have been dissuaded from breaking this line of 
demarcation, because it would have been difficult for their contribution 
to have been cast in suitable terms, i.e. the sorts of variables that 
sociologists could have concentrated upon, like cultural constraints on 
economic behaviour, are ones that, by and large, defy meaningful calcul­
ation. Secondly, although 1 modern1 economists have regarded their 
discipline as being positivist rather than normative, in fact almost all 
modern economics has been strongly related to the analysis of the 
competitive phase of modern capitalism, and what attempts that have been 
made to integrate either non-competitive capitalist structures, or even 
non-capitalist structures into a comprehensive system of economic 
equilibrium have not been particularly successful. Sociologists have 
been much more conscious of such meta-theoretical issues, and have been 
anxious to reveal the assumptions underpinning the work of all social 
scientists. When this interest in the problems of meta-theory was 
coupled with the resurgence of interest in Marxism within British 
sociology, from about the I960’s onwards, sociologists have been largely
disinclined to get involved in debates about the British economy, except 
to point out that: (a) it was a capitalist economy, and (b) any problems
were probably due to the 1 contradictions of capitalism1. Like Anthony 
Wedgewood Benn, British sociologists have not regarded it as part of 
their task to explain how capitalism might be run more efficiently, even 
supposing that they knew the answers.^ Finally, one of the difficult­
ies in looking at some of the ’problems’ within the field of political 
economy is their wide ranging complexity. This particular study, which 
sets out to explain some aspects of the structure and behaviour of 
British as compared to American manufacturing firms, has considered 
material drawn from the work of economists, economic historians, histor­
ians, anthropologists, political scientists, management theorists and 
accountants, as well as that from the traditionally broad area of 
sociology itself. It is a truism of course, that the problems of the 
’real world’ do not neatly fall into traditional academic areas, even 
so the problems of adequately assimilating contributions from such a 
wide range of disciplines is formidable.
The problem that I have chosen to examine is one that is drawn 
right from the centre of the popular debate about the Britain’s economic 
crisis. To phrase the question in the way it is usually encountered in 
the popular literature: Why does Britain not perform as well as other
countries in the economic league tables of performance? Or to rephrase 
the question at the micro-level : Why do British firms not perform as 
well as some foreign firms? In order to make the research project a 
manageable one it was decided to concentrate the analysis at the level 
of the individual firm, whilst recognising the fact that the structure 
of the society, including of course the structure and management of the 
macro economy, would be intimately related to the structure and perform­
ance of individual firms inside the society. The second decision that 
was made, was to limit the comparison to just One other country, and one 
other set of foreign firms. The choice was made to compare British and . 
American manufacturing firms, and there were a number of reasons for that 
decision. Firstly, as I will show in chapter 2, America and American 
firms have been the traditional reference point for economic comparisons 
with Britain; this is particularly true at the level of the firm, where 
almost from the time of F.W. Taylor, American management methods have
been looked up to as the ’market leader’. Secondly, there is a very
large amount of secondary data about the general characteristics of 
British and American firms, which is easily available and which provided
a useful source both of hypotheses and data checks. Thirdly, I wanted
to make a study of the firms from the two societies by frequent visits
to those firms and their managers, and time and money did not permit
expensive trips abroad. The only solution to this problem was to
select foreign companies operating inside the United Kingdom. Once this
decision was made, the comparison with America rather than any other
society began to look even more attractive because of the very large
(2)
number of American companies operating in Britain. I have enumerated
all the advantages of comparing British firms with their American counter­
parts, but I am aware that there are some disadvantages - three are worthy 
of mention. In the first place it could be argued that if one wished 
to compare Britain and British firms with a really high performing 
economy, then one would not choose America, rather countries like Japan 
or Germany should be chosen. Secondly, it can be argued that America 
represents a poor comparison, because the non-social factors are 
obviously so poorly matched, eg. natural resource endowment, geographical 
position, size etc. On these grounds also Japan or Germany might have 
been a better choice. Finally, as one of the focal points of this 
research was to the effect of cultural factors upon economic performance, 
then arguably societies like Japan or Germany might have been better 
choices because, on the face of it, their cultures do appear to be 
distinctively different. Conversely, 'American culture' could be said 
to be largely in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. These arguments represent 
a powerful theoretical case for research into Japanese or German industry, 
but they were outweighed by the practical considerations of research.
The problems of research access and language were felt to be overwhelmingly 
against choosing such societies.
Once the choice was made to investigate British and American 
organisations, one final decision was necessary about the type of organ­
isation to be studied. It was decided to restrict the investigation to 
manufacturing companies for a number of reasons. Firstly, the previous 
debate about the relative efficiency of British and American firms had 
largely been cast in terms of manufacturing industry, and furthennore,
manufacturing industry occupied a dominant position in the economies of
(3)the two societies. Secondly, a very large number of studies of 
manufacturing firms existed in the literature which attempted to trace 
the relationship between external environmental variables and internal 
organisational variables, and it was felt that sufficient was known to 
allow theoretically adequate matching to take place. In other words, 
the study design could deliberately exclude the possible effect of 
contextual variables like size, product and ownership on the firms, and 
concentrate on the effects of socio-cultural variables on the structure 
and process, and hopefully the performance of the selected firms. It
was felt that this would have been very difficult to do with organis­
ations operating in the tertiary sector of the economy.
A comment is necessary on the fact that the study design led 
to a comparison of British and American manufacturing firms both 
operating in Britain. The majority of studies which have attempted to 
investigate the effect of socio-cultural factors on business behaviour 
have tended to compare indigenous firms operating in country A with 
indigenous firms operating in country B. In two distinct ways this 
particular study design is a more rigorous one. Firstly, the operating 
environment of the companies is held relatively constant, and this is of 
vital importance. I have only discovered one study in the whole area 
of cross-cultural business research that has managed to match adequately 
all the contextual variables in order to investigate the effects of 
socio-cultural factors (Richardson (1956)). Secondly, if it can be 
shown that the American firms, despite operating in England and employing 
English nationals, still exhibited the effects of American culture upon 
their structure and operation, then it can be safely assumed that 
cultural variables are relevant in the explanation of business behaviour. 
In fact, none of the American companies employed any American nationals. 
This finding had been anticipated, as most of the relevant literature 
had reported a tendency for American firms to replace American national 
managers with indigenous managers, where this was at all possible. It 
was felt to be important to interview some American managers working in 
England however: Firstly in order to tap their ideas on the differences
between American and British business behaviour, and secondly, to try to 
explain why it was that some American firms employed American nationals, 
and others did not. A separate sample of American executives working 
in England was generated for this purpose.
One consequence of the decision to match up rigorously the 
companies on a range of contextual variables, was that almost inevitably . 
the size of the sample suffered: this study reports a comparison of five
British manufacturing companies with six closely matched American manu­
facturing companies. The industries covered were pharmaceuticals, 
printing machinery, furniture, electronic instruments and consumer goods. 
It was felt that the study design was of far greater importance than 
sample size, indeed I believe that Richardson’s (1956) study of just two 
organisations, one British and one American, teaches us far more about 
the effects of cultural variables on such organisations than all the 
other generally much larger but less well matched studies. In some areas 
I was able to supplement the data from my own study by some material
obtained from the British Institute of Management. That organisation
(4)
kindly made available to me two studies, one on selecting managers,
(5 )
and one on fringe benefits that had been carried out on their 
member companies. I was able to reanalyse the data, and compare the 
results of American manufacturing firms included in their sample with
those of British manufacturing firms of a similar size.
’ •>
Before I go on to describe the content of each chapter, a 
note is needed on the terminology used in this study. I have generally 
used the terms United Kingdom and Great Britain/Britain interchangeably 
for stylistic variation; where the term England is used the reference 
is to that country only. The firms in the study are variously referred 
to as the British firms or the American firms, or occasionally ’the firms 
in the main sample*. Each firm has been given a realistic but 
fictitious name, and is always prefixed by the nationality of the owning 
group. The real identity of the firms is included in the restricted 
appendix. The managers working for the British firms are referred to 
throughout as the ’British managers’. The managers working for the 
American firms are referred to for convenience as the 'American' managers 
despite the fact that they are not American. The separate sample of 
American businessmen working in Britain, who were all American citizens, 
are referred to as the American executive sample. The two reanalysed 
studies of the British Institute are referred to as the B.I.M. studies.
The first chapter of this study examines the validity of the 
dominating analytical framework of industrialism that has usually been 
used, particularly by management theorists, to investigate the effects 
of cultural variables upon business behaviour. The analysis points to 
the logical and empirical weaknesses in the industrialism thesis, and 
attempts to show how industrialism has almost always been confused with 
capitalism. Finally, the advantages of viewing both societies and both 
groups of firms from the perspective of the capitalist mode of production 
is emphasised. Chapter 2 analyses the other major variable used in 
this study, that of culture. The importance given to cultural explan­
ations of economic and business behaviour by ’practical' businessmen is 
observed and traced back well into the eighteenth century. At the same 
time the relative neglect of such cultural explanations by academic 
writers, at least until the 1950's, is noted and an attempt is made to 
explain this phenomenon. The greater weight given to such explanations 
since that period is also analysed, and explained. The conceptual 
problems of the category of culture, and the need for a classification 
scheme are both emphasised towards the end of the chapter, along with 
certain suggestions for operationalising and measuring the effect of
cultural variables on business structure and behaviour. Finally, the 
importance of historical factors in cultural analysis is emphasised, 
and it is suggested that the culture of a society is shaped by particular 
historical events and forces which become institutionalised in certain 
structural features of the society* Chapter 3 attempts to bring 
together the concepts of culture and capitalism, and to marry them 
together in an analysis of British and American society from about 1770 
onwards. Very few studies that have attempted to investigate the 
importance of cultural factors upon economic structures have made an 
adequate analysis of the culture of the society or of its historical 
origins and development. Cultural values and themes are often taken 
for granted. This chapter attempts to trace the growth of the capitalist 
economic order in the context of the pre-existing socio-cultural structure 
in both societies, and particular emphasis is placed on the interplay of 
culture and capitalism at the level of business organisations in both 
societies. At the end of the chapter an attempt is made to assess to 
what extent the values of capitalism are imposing similar patterns upon 
the two societies. Chapter 4 begins the presentation of the research 
data by reporting on the sample of American executives. An attempt is 
made to explain why some American companies employ American managers, and 
others do not, and an examination is made of the reasons why these part­
icular men were working in the British subsidiary of their American firm. 
This part of the study was also able to throw some light on the control 
relationships between American parent companies and their subsidiaries, 
as well as provide an additional source of hypotheses about the 
differences between British and American manufacturing companies. In 
chapter 5 I report the first of the findings on the main sample of firms. 
This chapter concentrates upon the organisational structure and 
processes of the British and American companies, and gives the results 
of the tests that were made of a considerable number of hypotheses.
Chapter 6 turns to the analysis of the characteristics and behaviour of 
the managers employed by the British and American manufacturing companies, 
and reports on the differences that were found. Chapter 7 attempts to 
combine some of the data on the structure of the organisations with that 
on the characteristics of the managers, and presents data on the organ­
isational climates of the two groups of firms. Finally in chapter 8, 
the findings of the whole study are discussed in terms of their effect 
upon economic performance, both at the level of the society and the 
individual firm.
NOTES
1. There have of course been some exceptions. Lupton (1966) for
example, appeared to be quite happy to display his value position
and to declare unequivocally that the basic problem was a lack of 
fit between the demands of the capitalist economy and the 
cultural system. His article is entitled simply, ’The Culture 
is Wrong'.
2. Dunning (undated) estimates that in 1970 there were over 2000
American affiliates operating in the U.K. (p.4 ).
3. It has been argued that manufacturing industry is becoming 
increasingly less important in the economies of the two societies, 
as they both move towards the state of ’post-industrialism',
(cf. Bell (1974), Tourraine (1974) etc.). By 1967 the service 
sector in the United States was employing over 50% of the 
employed population (Source: Fuchs, V.R. (1968). 'The Service 
Economy*. New York: Columbia University Press). Great Britain
reached this point in 1971 when 50.9% of the employed population 
were working in the service sector. (Source: Social Trends No. 3
H.M.S.O., Table 17, p.72).
4. Kingston (1971)
5. British Institute of Management (1970).
CHAPTER 1.
The Economic Framework: Industrialism or Capitalism?
One of the dominant perspectives in analysing British and
American societies, and the dominant perspective in the analysis of the
economic subsystems of the two societies has been that of industrialism.
The theme of industrialism has of course been one of the most pervasive
themes within sociology, indeed the perception that the industrial
revolution had caused a major change in the nature of society may be
seen as one of the prime movers of the discipline.^ In the 1950's
the industrialism thesis came to new prominence with the proponents of
(2)
the logic of industrialism or convergence thesis. There are several
(3)distinct versions of this particular theory, but it would not be 
unfair to characterise the common elements of most of the varieties as 
follows: There is a central logic to industrialism that flows from the
imperatives of machine technology and economic development. This logic 
manifests itself in every society utilising the new technology regardless 
of its historical background or current political orientation. The 
imperatives of industrialisation constrain societies towards a common 
institutional pattern. The implications of this analysis for a study 
comparing British and American manufacturing organisations are clear.
One should expect to find few differences in the style and mode of 
operation of the companies under investigation. Economic and technolog­
ical imperatives would directly impinge upon the operation of industrial 
organisations, and so one would expect to find fewer differences between 
the two societies in the economic sector than in any other.
It might be argued that even if the industrialism thesis was 
broadly accepted, one might still expect to find certain differences 
between Britain and America, even in the economic subsystem, and thus 
perhaps even at the level of the individual firm. The reason for this 
would be the different historical trajectories of the two societies. 
Proponents of the thesis often argue that societies begin to industrialise 
from very different starting points, and this can influence the rate and 
course of industrialisation in the short run. Kerr et al. (1960 a) for 
example, argue that industrialisation is usually ushered in by an elite 
group, and the strategy can vary quite considerably with the character of 
the elite group (compare the strategy of the middle class in England with 
the revolutionary intellectuals in the Soviet Union). Kerr et al. also
(4
refer to the potentially distorting effects of the ’culture of a nation’; 
the ’ special character of the basic resources and central industries’ of 
a society, (compare textiles and coal in England with oil in other 
societies), and finally, 'the demographic aspects of a nation’ (compare
'empty' Australia with densely populated India). These important 
caveats lead Dunning and Hopper (1966) to argue that ’’one must be careful
to take a long enough time span, and also be aware that societies change
(5 )
at different rates". It is for failure to take these points into
account that they accuse Goldthorpe (1964) for example, of misuse of the 
comparative method, in particular that he compares societies in periods 
of historical time rather than in'terms'of comparable stages of industri­
alisation. The idea that there exist stages of industrialism is an 
important one, because it is often argued that the United States, and in 
particular American firms, are more ’advanced’ that Britain or British 
firms. One way in which.this claim could be understood would be to 
argue that American society was more industrialised, that is, has gone 
further along the developmental path Of industrialisation. On this 
arguement one could still maintain the crucial significance of the 
industrialism thesis, but expect to find significant differences between 
British and American firms, because the latter would be more highly 
developed. The ’first industrial nation’ has been overtaken by the 
'first new nation’, and, so the thesis holds, it is America that now 
shows us the image of our own future, indeed the future of all industrial 
and industrialising nations. The industrialism thesis is above all a 
theory of development, a theory which sets out to expound the logic of 
industrial development; Kerr and his followers claim to have found, like 
so many before them, the key to societal development - or at least the 
key to the development of industrial societies. If industrialism is 
defined as the dominance of machinery and factory organisation in the 
productive capacity of the society, then the convergence theorists claim 
that the technology will, in the long run, constrain the economic, 
social and political arrangements of the society into a certain pattern. 
Armed with this theory of development it is then logically possible to 
talk of advanced and less advanced stages of industrialisation, and to 
claim that America represents a more advanced stage. A good example of 
this approach can be seen in Theodorson (1953) who uses Parson’s pattern 
variables as check marks of industrial society. He writes, "The re­
organisation of society (from non-industrial to industrial) can be 
analysed in terms of four of Talcott Parsons’ pattern variables. The 
thesis advanced here is that an increase in universalism, achievement,
suppression of immediate emotional release (affective-neutrality) and
ffi V
specificity all accompany industrialisation in the long run". From
here it is but a short step to giving these analytical categories 
empirical referents and thus comparing, in our example, British and 
American society. One would perhaps find that although both societies 
were heavily located towards the industrialised end of the continuum,
i.e. the values of universalism, achievement etc. dominated over their
opposites, even so American society could be shown to be more universal- 
istic, more achievement oriented etc. At the same time however, one 
could see just how far away from the present American position that 
Britain was. It is important to stress the present pattern, because 
several writers are now arguing that America is beginning to reach, if 
she had not already done so, the structural state known as post-industri­
alism, a society based not so much on the output of machinery and
(7 )
factory organisation, as upon ■’knowledge’.
There are a number of difficulties and confusions in the thesis 
which render it unacceptable as the theoretical framework of this study.
I find it very difficult to see why certain structural changes should 
necessarily occur in a society and its subsystems, because of the 
adoption of certain industrial technologies. In short the question 
must be asked, what, if anything, actually follows from industrialisation? 
Most sociologists, even those not wedded to the industrialism thesis in 
its extreme fonn, appear to think that a large number of social phenomena 
do necessarily follow industrialisation. The list generally includes 
urbanisation, changes in the occupational structure and consequently in 
the stratification system, as well as in rates of social mobility, 
changes in the role of the state etc. Exactly why must these changes 
occur under industrialisation?
A variety of arguments have been used by different writers to 
try and demonstrate a necessary connection between industrial manufacture 
and certain other features of social structure. Firstly, one has the 
argument that the criterion of techne is efficiency, that is that in the 
technology of industrialism the ends and the means have become fused 
together such that the logic of efl'iciency dominates the whole society.
One can see this argument most clearly in Bell (1974), but its origin 
can be traced back to Weber. Two questions are immediately raised by 
this claim: Firstly, does industrialism necessarily have to display any
more zweckrational than any other form of productive activity? Secondly, 
does the formal rationality that it is alleged is built into the industrial 
process, necessarily have to spread to other features of social structure? 
Both of the questions have to be answered in the negative. In the first 
case I do not see why industrial production in a factory should 
necessarily be more oriented towards efficiency than say agricultural 
production; and in the second case, surely there is no necessary connec­
tion between the industrial sphere and the other institutions of society.
As Marcuse (1971) has argued, "Technique is a historical and social
project: in it is projected what society and its ruling interests decide
(8)to make of men and things". (This thesis is also brilliantly
attacked by another member of the Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas 
(1972)). I am denying the necessary truth of the industrialism thesis 
on essentially logical grounds. There is also empirical support for 
the view that 1 am advancing. Firstly, Nash (1966) in his classic 
study of Cantel has shown how few changes necessarily occur when 
factory technology becomes the dominant method of production in a 
formerly peasant economy. He concludes his study by noting that "Cantel 
teaches the general lesson that the upheavals in people* s lives which
often go along with industrialisation are not built into the process
(9) “ -----
itself1*(my emphasis). In a more general review of such studies
Blumer (1960) in an earlier article concluded, ’*1 think the evidence
points clearly to the conclusion that industrialisation, by its very
make-up, can have no definite social effect. It is neutral and
indifferent to what follows socially in its wake".^0 ^
It would be foolish to deny that there are great similarities 
to be found in the social structures of many industrialised societies, 
but this is not to admit that the reason for this are the imperatives of 
industrialisation. Once Britain industrialised a model was created, 
every other country that later followed the path of industrialisation had 
British experience and techniques,before them. This is not of course 
to argue that the British model was necessarily consciously copied, 
although the techniques certainly were, but merely to point out that 
once one country had industrialised, subsequent industrial revolutions 
could never be quite the same. What does seem clear to ine is that one 
society can serve as a pattern of industrialisation which other societies 
can,. and clearly often do imitate, or in some cases are persuaded to 
imitate by varieties of ’colonialisation’, 'foreign aid* etc. The 
results, in social structural terms, would be consistent with the conver­
gence thesis, but would not have been brought about by the conomic system 
imposing certain organisational and institutional constraints on the 
social structure. I believe that this argument lias particular salience 
in the case of America, which has, for a very large number of countries, 
long superseded Britain as the industrialising model. Indeed as early 
as 1850, the British themselves were So impressed by the 'American 
system of manufacture* that they sent men over to investigate and report 
to Parliament.^ ^  American management has long been the model of 
management in the world of business, one even finds Lenin as early as
1919 finding words of praise for F.W. Taylor, the American engineer who
(12)m  some ways could be said to be the founder of management theory.
The puzzling question is why should industrial technology be
thought to cause convergence? If we examine some of the writings of
the convergence theorists, I think it does become clear, why they think
there is a Causal mechanism* Take this quotation from Richman and
Farmer (1965), which typifies the type of argument under examination.
"There are only a limited number of rational ways to make steel and a
country does not get output in this sector by using prayer rugs,
doctrinnaire slogans, or wishful thinking", (my e m p h a s i s ) O r
again from Theodorson (1953), "Industrialisation means the introduction
of machinery.......because machines are very expensive they necessarily
must be used economically. In the early days of industrialisation
labour is far less scarce than machinery. This means that there is a
strong constraint on the part of those related to the industrial process
to adjust labour to the machines. It is very difficult to tolerate
inefficient use of the machines, in so far as this can be avoided. The
necessity of teaching and enforcing these modes of adjustment demands a
certain type of social organisation. This social organisation centred
about the need to adjust to the machines in the factory system engenders
(14)certain unique social relations" (my emphasis). It should be clear
from these two quotations that whilst purporting to talk about the 
demands of industrialism, the writers in fact smuggle in an entirely 
different set of arguments and assumptions. Simply, instead of talking 
about industrialism, they are talking about capitalism. There is no 
mechanism within industrialism that causes a strain towards ’efficiency1, 
or ’rationality’, and yet the model needs such a driving force to account 
for the hypothesised changes in the social structure which are deemed to 
be part of the logic of industrialism. The mechanism is to be found in 
the economic system of capitalism, the key features of which are that 
production is primarily oriented towards profit accruing to privately 
owned capital, and the whole process is organised in terms of a market 
in which all commodities are bought and sold according to the standards 
of monetary exchange. My view is that almost all the debates about 
the logic of industrialism have managed to confuse industrialism with 
capitalism.
The crucial analytical difference between industrialism and 
capitalism from my point of view is that capitalism as a system possesses 
a goal, profit, which gives the system a dynamic; this dynamic allows 
one to talk about the logic of capitalism. Industrialism lacks such a 
dynamic, there is no inherent goal in the system which would cause it to 
go in one direction rather than another. To emphasise this point let 
me return to my quotation from Richman and Farmer (1965). How one goes 
about the production of steel depends upon what one’s objectives are.
These objectives may include the desire to create jobs, or to make work 
socially satisfying and meaningful in itself, or to make the maximum 
amount of profit. . Industrial manufacture can be consistent with any 
one of these objectives, and the resulting organisation of production 
would look very different whichever objective was pursued. Under capit­
alism however, the goal of profit is built into the very system, and the 
production of steel will tend to look very similar within the frame work 
of such a system.
Why have industrialism and capitalism been so often confused?
Historically Of course they have gone hand in hand. The industrial
revolution, the phrase that was invented retrospectively to represent
the transformation of the economic order that had taken place in Western
Europe and America, took place in countries that had, by and large, had
('15)their feudal economic order transformed by capitalism. It should
also be noted that even Marx and Weber, the two theorists who have 
contributed most to our understanding of capitalism, suffered from some 
conceptual confusion between capitalism and industrialism. It is easy 
to understand why Marx managed to blur the distinction between the two. 
Any theorist’ who regarded tool-using and production as the basic quality 
of human as opposed to animal life, and who therefore distinguished 
types of societies on the basis of their mode of production was bound to 
have problems in distinguishing the two concepts. At an empirical level 
it was even easier for Marx to negl ect the distinction, for it was clear 
to tiim that there was a strong connection between the paratechnical 
relations^0^created by mechanisation (a function of industrialism), 
and the class structure (a product of capitalism). Thus class conflict 
in capitalism stems, for Marx, from the incompatibility of an existing 
productive technique, industrial manufacture, with other aspects of the 
mode of production, namely the organisation of the capitalist market.
It is of course true that the emergence of the capitalist market vastly 
expands the degree to which industry influences the general range of 
human conduct in society. I certainly agree with the analysis made by 
Giddens (1963), one of the few writers to develop this point, that Marx 
seemed uncertain about what actually sprang from technique, and what from 
the operation of capitalism. This is best exemplified in Marx’s 
writings on the division of labour as a source of alienation. Marx 
argued that the division of labour fragments man in that it promotes 
occupational specialisation, this is a function of technology, but the 
expansion of the division of labour also fragments man by dividing human 
society into classes, and this is a function, not of technology, but of 
the social relations generated by the economic system of capitalism.
This dilemma is finally manifested in his views on socialist society,
where, according to Marx, alienation will be transcended, and the division
of labour, in the sense of occupational specialisation, will disappear
along with social classes. Yet it is not at all clear how these para-
technical relations could be done away with in socialist society, except
of course by total automation. Giddens notes that it is significant
that, in those places where he offers more than cryptic allusions to a
future society, in which the division of labour will be abolished, Marx
(17)tends to give prominence to pre-industrial occupations, an indication 
perhaps of his difficulties over the imperatives of industrialism on the 
one hand and capitalism on the other.
For Weber, the distinction between industrialism and capitalism 
is not crucial. For him Western industrialisation and capitalism are 
both definite reifications of occidental rationality, and it is the 
concept of rationality that is central to an understanding of the work of 
Weber. Whereas in Marx it sometimes seems possible to separate the 
rationality of technique, manifested in industrialism, from the ration­
ality of capitalism per se, for Weber these are inevitably tied together 
in the general process of rationalisation exemplified by the spread of 
the capitalist order. Weber agreed with Marx that the central social 
problem of capitalist society was alienation, the major difference 
between them was that although Weber clearly recognised the alienation 
resulting from the expropriation of the worker from the means of production 
in industry, he wished to extend the notion to other institutional 
contexts. Thus we find Weber also talking of the citizen in capitalist 
society being separated from the ’means of administration*. Bureaucracy, 
which exemplifies the spirit and form of rationality, with its emphasis 
upon calculability, pervades both the industrial and the non-industrial 
sphere. Using this analysis Weber does not face the same problems as 
Marx when it comes to discussing the future of socialist society. Weber 
believed that even socialist society would not alter the basic fact of 
the separation of the workers from the means of production, because this 
arises simply as a form of technical progress, which is industrialisation. 
The same would be true for the ’means of administration’, far from 
withering away, the bureaucracy of the state would increase under 
socialism because of its increased reliance upon planning in the economic 
sphere after the market mechanism had been dispensed with.
In trying to account for the fact that industrialism and 
capitalism have not been cleariy distinguished, I have noted that 
historically they have often been associated, and that both Marx and
neoer ia i ie c i  to  c ie a n y  e iu c ia a c c  u ie  u m e r c n c e s .  to th ese  two
reasons one can add a third, and at the same time locate the debate in
its proper socio-political context. The logic of industrialism thesis
is inextricably bound up with the debate, begun in the 1950's, about
the 'end of ideology'. Technology and the forces of industrialisation
are imposing a similar pattern upon all industrial societies, it is
argued, irrespective of their differing political ideologies. The
ultimate goal of all industrial societies is taken as given, as Goldthorpe
(1971) puts it, ”To maintain economic advance on the basis of a dynamic
science and technology, while adjusting the existing social system ad hoc,
as the requirements of the consequences of this advance unfold, and
sufficiently to contain social dissenters and conflict to a manageable
(18)
level". The problems of all industrial societies are thus seen as
largely technical problems, to be solved by the correct application of
science and technology. Science and technology are canonised, raised
to the status of ultimate values and thus freed from challenge. The
effect of this is to replace the discredited doctrine of laissez faire.
associated with the 'old days' of capitalism with the new doctrine of 
(19)laissez innover - letting the experts decide. Ideology is regarded 
as dead, killed by the inexorable logic of industrialism. It should 
also be noted that the 1950's was the decade when functionalism was the 
dominant paradigm in American sociology, and the industrialism thesis is 
essentially a functionalist one: the social structure adapting to the
’needs' of society, or in its more evolutionary and ideological fonn, of 
the Western capitalist democratic model being best adapted to the 
universal economic and technological demands.
Capitalism, this thesis informs us, has been transformed so that 
it is now unrecognisable in its old classical form. The transformation 
takes various forms at the hands of different writers. Galbraith (1952) 
and to a certain extent Robinson (1964) give us the theory of counter­
vailing power whereby, "private economic power is held in check by the 
countervailing power of those who are subject to it".^2^  Alternatively, 
those that subscribe to the view that there has been a managerial revo­
lution, have often argued that one of the consequences of this transform­
ation has been that modern corporations no longer seek to maximise
(2 1)profits, but instead act as trustees for the whole community. 7 
Finally, the proponents of the ’ new competition' within capitalism
relegate price competition to a relatively minor role and argue that the
new competition is in terms of service and quality as well as in technical 
(22) .
innovation. Despite the differences, the general thrust of all
these arguments is clear enough; Miliband (1969) summarises the dominant
view, "Why speak of. capitalism at all, with its emotive and propagandist
evocations of a system which no longer really exists, and which has been
replaced by an industrial system in which private enterprise, though still
the essential motor of the economy, is now much more ’responsible’ than
in the past, and whose purposes are now in any case supervised by the
(23)
democratic state?’1 It is then a relatively simple matter to
(24)
replace capitalism with industrialism, or even with post-industrialism.
Yet capitalism is by its very nature a highly dynamic system, as Marx
and Engels put it in the Communist Manifesto, "The bourgeoisie cannot
exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production,
and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole
(25)relations of society". On these grounds of course capitalism is
always, in one form or another, ’new capitalism’. The central question
is, does this new order still warrant being termed capitalism, is it
still based on the same fundamental principles? It is worth noting that
there is also a certain paradox in the ’post-capitalist1 argument. The
structure of their argument may justly be called historicist (or even as
Goldthorpe (1971) calls it, ’crypto-historicist' ) in that, as I have
already argued, they claim to lay bare the mechanism of historical
movement. This mechanism turns out to be a form of. economic/technological
determinism. This description parallels almost exactly what the 'post-
capitalists’ see as the worst feature of that ideology of ideologies,
Marxism. Indeed, Kerr et al. (1971) openly state that their approach
is, in some respects, directly modelled on that of Marx in seeking to
apply deductive methods to long run economic and social processes, as
well as in their stress on technology and economic organisation as deter-
(27)
minants of social structure and culture. The convergence theorists
also share with Marx two crucial assumptions: Firstly, that the charact­
eristic nature of any given society is primarily governed by Its level 
of technological and economic development; and secondly, that the most
economically developed society, however defined or measured, represents
(28)a model to which other societies will eventually approximate. The
reasons why Marx believed these two propositions to be correct are 
embedded in his general theory. One can deduce why the second propos­
ition is held by the convergence theorists, in that it can be shown to 
follow from their technological determinism, but it is less clear why 
the first is held. Two reasons suggest themselves, both of them import­
ant for my general analysis. Firstly, one should observe that securing 
high rates of economic growth does seem to be a dominating item on the 
agenda of most societies. Secondly, and not unconnected with the first 
point, one should note that all the leading convergence theorists are 
economists by training.
Let me attempt to explain the significance of the last of
these two points first. One of the problems with the dominant paradigm
in economics is that when the economists adopted a model of 'man’ from
their philosophe predecessors, which accepted the possibility of making
universal statements about human behaviour, they neglected entirely the
possibility that these assumptions might be culture-bound. As
Weinberg (1969) has pointed out, "In one sense they were right, the
reason why economics managed to outdistance all the other social sciences
(31)was that it was not bothered by cultural relativism". This success
has amounted to the ability to build very powerful economic models within
which deductive reasoning can be used to determine the exact relations
(32)
between the elements of the model. One should note how influential
has been the work of economists like Leontief (1966) and Rostow (1962). 
Leontief's analysis of the patterns of economic exchange between 
different sectors of European society on the one hand, and the equivalent 
internal patterns of exchange in American society on the other, has noted 
the striking similarity, both in quantitative, and in relative or 
proportional terms, between the European and the American pattern.
Rostow, in a rather different tradition has attempted to stress the 
universal patterms of economic growth. These influential economists 
both stressed the similarity of economic patterns in all countries, and 
their work provided an important background framework for those economists 
who were to advance the convergence thesis. I am arguing that there has 
been a strong tendency within economics to argue that modern industrial­
ised societies are somehow 'beyond culture1, and are organised by purely 
'rational' standards. If the industrialism theorists were working 
within an economic model of capitalism, it might be possible to under­
stand their position. After all even Marx argued that there was a sense 
in which capitalism had a universalising effect, which broke down the 
particularities of traditional cultures, and which generated its own 
money morality. He wrote in the Grundrisse, "Capital develops 
irresistebly beyond national boundaries and prejudices....it destroys the
self satisfaction confined within narrow limits and based upon a
(33)
traditional mode of life and reproduction". This argument is plainly
not open to the theorists of industrialism however, who wish to argue 
that capitalism has been completely transformed, if indeed it can be said 
to still exist.
There is another similarity with the Marxian mode of analysis 
which might also be thought to explain why the industrialism theorists 
have tended to neglect cultural and political variables. The dominant 
paradigm within economics today is to work within certain ideal-typical
models of the economic world. Marx also for much of the time, worked 
with an abstract or ’pure* model of capitalism,, which he sets out in the 
first volume of Capital. Here he attempts to give an abstract treatment 
to the generic principles of the capitalist mode of production, by 
’ disregarding’ all those specific, historical factors which 1 hide the 
play1 of the ’inner mechanism' of capitalism. The 'laws’ so established 
by this analysis would have to be "like all other laws, modified in 
(their) working by many circumstances".^3 ^ It could perhaps be argued 
that the industrialism theorists were working within the confines of an 
abstract model of ' industrial society'. If this is the case, one must 
immediately say that the model has never been made explicit, certainly 
not in the way that Marx's model of capitalism was. Secondly, as I have 
argued above, it is impossible to discover an adequate 'driving force' 
for the model that would explain the changes that are allegedly 
occurring.
It is not difficult to see why the industrialism theorists 
should have believed that they were describing a universal phenomenon.
One can hardly doubt the view that the manifest desires of the citizenry 
of most of the industrialised countries have included a desire for 
economic growth. The ruling groups in most industrialised societies 
have , as Habermas and others have argued, attempted to maintain consensus 
in society by expanding production and thus making consumption and 
leisure available in significant quantities for all. Conflict has been 
successfully confined to economic questions. The resulting demands of 
the citizenry have therefore been cast in terms of wholly legitimate 
claims made within the framework of the capitalist economy. Although 
economists have claimed a 'positivist* status for their discipline, they 
have largely been unable to see that such a society betrays an obvious 
value system, and the acceptance of such a system as unproblematic has 
made their discipline essentially nonnative. The discipline has managed 
to appear non-partisan merely because of the nature of the 'liberal' 
society, where ends are not decided upon and priorities made in any 
obvious way, but merely 'emerge'. The goals of such societies have very 
largely been those of growth, of an ever higher U.N.P., and decision 
making within the society has thus been in terms of a homologous language, 
the grammarians of which have been the economists. Yet if the ultimate 
direction of the economy is provided by the value system of the culture, 
which is ultimately commanded by the rulers of society, and economics is 
the science of the allocation of goods and services within the framework 
of that value system, then economics has necessarily become the hand­
maiden of the political elite.
The logic of industrialism thesis has been attacked most
strongly for its failure to take into account historical, cultural,
social and political factors, and I have argued above that one of the
reasons for this has been the fact that there has not apparently been
that much diversity in a wide range of industrial societies, because
of the prominence that the goals of growth have had. More recent and
careful studies of a variety of societies have begun to cast considerable
(3 5)
doubts upon this alleged uniformity. Even within American society
there were signs that part of the edifice was crumbling, when substan­
tial numbers of students in the I9601s began to question the goal of 
growth. It is because this goal has been so fundamental to the thesis,
that Kerr et al. (1971) devote so much space in their postscript to
Industrial Man. to what they call the 1 new humanism’ • This movement
attempted to revive the Renaissance ideas of work, work viewed not as a
means to an end, but as an end in itself. One feels that it is almost 
with relief that Kerr et al. conclude that, "the evidence to date 
indicates that wage earners everywhere are still so interested in 
increased consumption that they are now not likely to be significantly 
affected”. Although Kerr et al. still hold firmly to their view
that "our doctrine of convergence does imply that economic forces for
relative similarity are more powerful in the long run than political
(37)
forces for absolute diversity”, some of the other adherents to the 
theory have modified their views. Feldman and Moore (1962) suggest 
that there might indeed be a greater role for the political in industrial 
society than was at first thought. They go as far as to suggest that 
convergence may only be limited to the ’core1 elements of the industrial 
system. They write, "This core would include the factory system, a 
stratification system based on a complex and extensive division of labour 
and hierarchy of skills, and extensive commercialisation of goods and 
services and their transfer through the market, and an education system
capable of fulfilling the various niches in the occupational and strati- .
(38)
fication system". Even this more modest formulation seems to me to
go much too far. Even something as apparently politically neutral as
technology must still pass through a cultural filter, and it is not 
exempt merely because of its peculiar reliance upon abstract scientific 
principles, its consequences for social organisation can therefore be 
very diverse.
The theorists of industrialism have attempted, in the style of 
economics, to universalise their models in the best historicist 
tradition. I must insist with Goldthorpe (1971) that "the objectives 
of scientific enquiry may properly be either theoretical or historical -
(39)
but not both simultaneously". The primary unit of societal and
hence sociological analysis is the administratively bounded nation state, 
which means, amongst other things, that the role of unique historical, 
political and socio-cultural factors must be given considerable importance. 
As Giddens (1971) points out, "one of the most important weaknesses of 
sociological conceptions of development, from Marx onwards, has been the 
persistent tendency to think of development as the ’unfolding’ of 
endogenous influences within a given society (or, more often, 'type' of 
society)". This does not mean to say that it is illegitimate to
talk about patterns or trends within history, or even to point to certain 
key variables which tend to have universalising influences, ceteris 
paribus, but it does mean that the form of historicism emanating from the 
convergence theorists is illegitimate.
One of the problems for projects which set out to examine 
particular issues within the broad framework of political economy, such 
as this research does, is that one is often caught between two rather 
unsatisfactory approaches. On the one hand there are the obvious 
attractions of working within the confines of ideal-type models, like 
those of 'industrial society' or 'capitalist society’. These models, 
or at least the model of capitalism, manage to specify the major 
variables to be considered, as well as the mechanism of change. Their 
disadvantage lies in the fact that the models themselves are historically 
so improbable as to be almost worthless for any project that wishes to 
examine actual configurations of economic units and social structure.
On the other hand, the type of approach adopted by many historians, which 
often involves a scrupulous examination of the detail of economic 
constellations, often manages to lose sight of the overall mechanisms at 
work, and makes no contribution to any overall theory of change. The 
strategy that I intend to adopt will hopefully attempt to merge the two 
approaches.
I find no merit at all in pursuing the dominant perspective 
that has been used in explaining the differences between British and 
American society and their respective economic subsystems - that of 
industrialism. I Would go so far as to argue that there is no 'logic' 
to industrialism. The same cannot be said of capitalism, clearly 
capitalism does possess a logic in the sense that the system does set 
up certain pressures in the social system to move in one direction 
rather than another, and one can see this most clearly within the economic 
subsystem. Despite some arguments to the contrary, there seems little 
doubt that both Britain and America can be termed capitalist countries.
In terms of my previous definitions both clearly possess an economic 
system whose key features are.that production is primarily oriented 
towards profit accruing to privately owned capital, and the whole 
process is organised in terms of a market upon which all commodities 
are bought and sold according to the standards of monetary exchange.
To accept such a proposition as correct need not tell us very much, at 
least in the short run, about the structure of the society and the 
operation of the business enterprises within the society. In any 
particular case, capitalism does not automatically dictate the ’goals’ 
of the society or the individual business enterprise. Even economists, 
who are after all the guardians, if not the inventors, of the concept of 
the ’trade-off’ cannot pretend that the only choices open to political 
or business leaders are between purely economic objectives, so that one 
can ignore the possibility of wider trade-offs between economic and 
social objectives.
It is this tension between cultural or social objectives on the 
one hand, and the ’demands’ of capitalism on the other, that I wish to 
use as the basic framework of my analysis. This framework is useful at 
the level of the total society, where the leaders can be seen to be 
confronted with a variety of social objectives as well as economic 
constraints, and where sometimes there is considerable tension between 
the two. It must be stressed that in a strict sense, there never has 
been such a thing as a laissez fa ire capitalist economy, in which the 
mysterious 'hand* directed all the choices. The state has always 
perfonned various functions which have either 'aided' or 'hindered' the 
system. At the level of the individual firm the choices and constraints 
have probably been even more clear cut, as the organisation is more 
obviously dominated by economic forces. It is because there is no 
mechanical relationship between the demands of capitalism and the social 
structure of the society, or the organisational structure of the firm, at 
least in the short run, that it is fruitful to investigate to what extent 
Britain and America, and within these two societies, particular sorts of 
business organisations, have conformed to the economic demands of the 
capitalist mode of production. In particular I wish to focus attention 
upon the strength of the cultural system in aiding or resisting such 
forces in the two societies, and as the cultural system, like the 
capitalist mode of production, is the product of the historical process, 
it will be necessary to analyse the emergence of these two elements in 
British and American societies.
Before I go on to analyse the concept of culture in the next 
chapter, there is one particular problem that needs to be raised. I
have taken the view that, in the long run, capitalism does tend to push
the socio-cultural structure in certain directions* I shall argue for
example, that capitalism tends to constrain action in that it stresses a
particular pattern of values. These can be represented in tenns of
Parsons’ pattern variables by suggesting that the values of affective
neutrality, specificity, universalism, achievement and self orientation
are the cultural values of capitalism. One objection to this view, that
can be found in some Marxist writers for example, is that there are
contradictions inside capitalism, which make it wholly illegitimate to
suppose that the above values will dominate. On the contrary, it is
argued, it is just as likely that the opposite pattern of values will
dominate. Thus to accept that the values of affective neutrality,
specificity, universalism, achievement and self orientation will dominate
is to accept the ideology of capitalism, not its practice. There are
several important points to make here. Firstly, it seems generally
agreed, even by the Marxist critics, that capitalism has fostered the
pattern of values that 1 have referred to above. For example, Gunder
Frank (1971) argues that role assignment by achievement rather than
ascription in the underdeveloped countries, came with the penetration of
(41)capitalism into these societies. Secondly, I will attempt to argue
(4 9 )
that these values do represent a strain towards ’efficiency1 inside 
the economy. By examining how much stress is placed upon such values 
inside British and American societies, and inside British and American 
firms, one can thus measure how efficient the capitalist mode of 
production actually is. In other words, far from accepting the ideology 
of capitalism it will be possible to offer some sort of test of its 
claims.
NOTES
1. One of the main tasks which the founders of sociology set for them­
selves was that of distinguishing the 1 rules of the game’ of 
industrial society from that of other societies. The categories 
they evolved of mechanical and organic solidarity, geineinschaft and 
gesellschaft, primary and secondary groups and also the different 
types of social action distinguished by Weber are all clearly related.
2. There are many exponents of this thesis. 'Hie fullest and clearest 
statement is made by Clark Kerr and his associates, and it is to these 
writings that I shall largely refer.
Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1960 a, 1960 b, 1971).
3. The different versions of the industrialism thesis are brought about 
because of different views about the concept of industrialism.
Nettl and Robertson (1966) for example, have described the concept as
"something resembling a Portugese Man-of-War; a small, fairly 
easily distinguishable body trailing a scries of highly colourful and 
’dangerous’ strands behind it", (p.280).
4. Kerr et al. note in their ’postscript to Industrial Man’ (1971) that, 
"The forces of industrialism have appeared in many countries to be 
stronger, and cultural factors somewhat less of a force, than we 
thought in I960" (p.520).
5. Dunning and Hopper (1966). pp. 167-8.
6. 'I’heodorson (1953). p.481.
7. Cf. Bell (1974).
8. Marcuse (1971) p.149.
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19. Blumer (1960 p.9.
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in 1854.
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Proletariat’. Cited in Bell (1974). p.354. Note 14.
13. Richman and Farmer (1965). p.41.
14. Theodorson (1953). p.481.
15. It is of course true, as Weber and others have pointed out, that one 
can find individual examples of capitalism throughout history. I am 
referring to the situation where capitalism becomes hegemonic, i.e.
15. where the whole.economic system is ordered by the central 
principles of capitalism.
16. The term ’paratechnical relations’ is taken from Giddens (1973). 
p.86, and it is defined as the relations created between men as a 
result of a specific technique of production.
17. Note for example Marx’s statement describing a society which "makes 
it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to 
hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without 
ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shephered or critic". Marx 
(1968 b). p.22.
18. Goldthorpe (1971). p.275
19. This'-phrase is taken from McDermott (1969)
20. Galbraith (1952). p. 125.
21. This position is now also espoused by Galbraith, (Galbraith (1967)) 
.who has abandoned his old views on countervailing power. The
managerialist thesis can be traced from Berle and Means (1932).
For a modern review of the debate see Nicholls (1969) and Pahl and 
Winkler (1974).
22. The best example of this view is to be found in Fortune, the 
Editors of (1951).
23. Miliband (1969). p.73
24. The post-industrialism thesis has a number of exponents. For a 
summary of all the different arguments see Kumar (1976).
25. Marx and Engels (1968 a), p.38
26. Goldthorpe (1971). p.265. The reason for the phrase ’crypto- 
historicism' is that, although there is choice built into the 
model, it is epiphenomenal.
27. There is probably a stronger parallel with Thorstein Veblen for 
those convergence theorists who stress almost exclusively the role 
of technology, particularly with Veblen’s view that man’s command 
of technology is the measure of man's evolution.
28. It must be stressed however, that although the convergence theorists 
do in my view have these features in common with Marx, they do 
differ in certain fundamental respects. Thus an important aspect 
of dialectical materialism, which is not found in the convergence 
theories, is the idea that man is capable of ’making his own history’.
28. In other words, although Marx pointed to the overall importance of 
technological and economic development in the history of mankind, 
he did at the same time stress that this relationship need not, in 
the future, be a necessary one. Once men realise the forces at 
work, they will be able to change the existing social order, 
according to Marx. Thus although the convergence theorists can 
justly be called economic/technological determinists, I do not 
think that this can be said of Marx.
29. Kerr, Dunlop, Ilarbison and Myers are all economists by training.
30. As a broad generalisation this seems to me to be unquestionably 
true, although there have always been groups of economists who 
rejected this, e.g. the ’institutional school1 in the 1920’s in 
America. This point is developed in chapter 2.
31. Weinberg (1909). p.3.
32. There is a move within sociology to develop a similar type of 
explanatory paradigm. The Willers (1973) and Hindess (1973) for 
example, have botli offered telling critiques of positivist sociology, 
stressing that most sociologists have confused science with 
empiricism. Empiricism attempts to make observations, to classify 
and order what is observed, and to make general statements about 
observed or calculated relations between observables. Science, it 
is argued, is rational and abstractive, and scientific concepts are 
not direct references to observed entities and events, but are 
defined in their relationship to one another in terms of the theories 
of which they form a part. It is unlikely that the Keynesian 
model of macro-economic theory, for example, would have arrived at
by interviewing actors in the economic system about their 
motivations’.
33. Marx, K. (1953) . ’Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen (taonomie’• 
Berlin, p.313. Quoted in Giddens (1971). p.214.
34. Marx (1958). p.644.
35. A small number of examples must suffice to illustrate this point.
In the field of social mobility Miller (1960) amongst others, has 
challenged the widely accepted thesis that industrial societies 
have very similar mobility rates. Garnsey (1975), in a study of 
the Soviet Union, has challenged the view that industrialism 
imposes a common occupational structure upon the industrialised 
societies. Finally, there has been increasing interest in the 
question of whether Japan represents a deviant case in terms of
35. the logic of industrialism. Writers like Abegglen (1958) and 
Ayal (1963) have been inclined to argue that it does, whilst 
Karsh and Cole (1968) have argued that Japan has merely been 
slow to develop.
36. Kerr et al. (1971) p.357
37. Kerr et al. (1971. p. 534,
38. Feldman and Moore (1962). p.64.
39. Goldthorpe (1971) pp. 276-7.
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CHAPTER 2.
The Cultural Framework.
The e a r ly  v e rs io n s  o f  the  lo g ic  o f  in d u s t r ia l is m  th e s is  s tre s s e d  
th e  s ta n d a rd is in g  e f fe c ts  o f  economic and te c h n o lo g ic a l fo rc e s  a t  th e  
expense o f  s o c io -c u ltu r a l  d iv e r s i t y ,  a rg u in g  th a t  in  th e  lo n g  run  such  
d iv e r s i t y  would d is a p p e a r under th e  w e ig h t o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l fo rc e s .
Such arguments were confronted from their inception by a long tradition 
of academic and popular literature that insisted upon the importance of 
cultural factors in analysing the economic performance of various 
industrialised countries. The literature which compares the economic 
performance of Britain and America, or British firms with American firms, 
is particularly rich in references to these cultural influences as 
explanatory factors.
The tradition of noting cultural differences between the two 
societies and of offering them as explanatory hypotheses of economic 
behaviour goes back at Least as far as Tocqueville. Comparing America 
with Europe in the 1830’s he noted of America'that, "The sole interest, 
which absorbs the attention of every mirid, is trade. It’s the national 
passion....the American people is, I said, a merchant people. That is 
to say it is devoured by the thirst for riches which brings in its train 
many honourable passions, such as cupidity, fraud and bad faith. Thus 
they appear to have but one single thought here, but one single purpose, 
that of getting rich".^ Even these observations were not entirely new, 
Crevecoeur as early as 1782 was attempting to probe the cultural distinct­
iveness of America with his famous question, "What, then, is the American, 
this new man?". These ’professional observers’ were supplemented, by 
the 1850's, by a large number of Europeans specifically interested in 
industrial and economic matters. Their interest had been greatly 
stimulated by the American exhibits at the Great Exhibition of 1851.
These exhibits were sufficiently distinctive to merit the title of 'the 
American system of manufacture', and were sufficiently competitive.to 
send large numbers of worried European industrial commissioners across 
the Atlantic to report on the 'American system’. The British team, 
the British Ordinance Committee, reported back to the House of Commons 
in 1854, and they acknowledged the distinctive achievement of American 
manufacturing,^ Surveying the nineteenth century one is struck by 
the enorinous consistency amongst the general travellers, official and 
other specialised reports of various industrial commissions, all 
supporting the cultural themes familiar from the classical accounts of 
Crevecoeur, Tocqueville and others. This continuity continues into 
the twentieth century; it is striking to contrast for example, the 
reports of the sixty-six teams representing the Anglo-American Council 
on Productivity, who went to America after the 1939-45 war under the
auspices of Marshall Aid, to see what could be learned and usefully
applied in Britain, with the reports of the 1854 Commissioners. If
anything, the later visitors put a greater stress upon cultural
differences than did their predecessors almost a century before. Few
of the reports, no matter how technical their starting points, fail to
turn to social and cultural themes. Indeed Sawyer (1954) reports that,
"Socio-cultural categories of explanations are given a major place in
two thirds of the British reports and an absolutely crucial role in about 
(3)h a l f " .  . These f in d in g s  both  r e f le c te d  and encouraged th e  more p o p u la r
literature on the importance of cultural differences between the two
(4) ,,
nations, for the analysis of economic behaviour. ihe report of the
Hudson Institute on Britain's economic situation in 1974, which again 
stressed the importance of socio-cultural factors, was merely the culmin­
ation of a very long line of similar reports. This tradition of 
cultural explanation could be accommodated in a modified form of the 
logic of industrialism thesis, either by stressing the nature of the 
long run, or by admitting as Kerr et al. (1971) do in their revised view 
of the thesis, that indigenous cultures could be major sources of 
diversity in industrial societies. In grudgingly admitting this fact, 
these academic theorists are only affinning what practical industrial­
ists visiting America, and popular journalism had always believed, that 
is, that the cultural differences that strike one on visiting Britain 
or America are not imaginary, and must be relevant in explaining economic 
behaviour. This point is amply borne out by Crozier (1964), who notes, 
"Intuitively, however, people have always assumed that bureaucratic 
structures and patterns of action differ in the different countries of 
the Western world and even more markedly between East and West. Men of 
action know it and never fail to take it into account. But contemp­
orary social scientists.....have not been concerned with such compari­
sons".^ Whilst this was probably a reasonably good summary of the 
amount of interest in cross cultural work by social scientists at the 
time (1964), looking back one can now see that from the early I960’s 
there has been increasing interest on the part of many social scientists 
in culture as an explanatory variable, culminating in cross cultural 
studies emerging as a major field of study by the 1970's. The reasons 
for the social scientists' original wariness in using culture as a 
variable, and their increasing interest in its explanatory power, form 
a useful backcloth to the previous research on the economic performance 
of Britain and America, as well as to the use of culture as a variable 
in this study.
The relative neglect of the effect of indigenous culture on
economic behaviour is surprising in view of.the part that this factor 
played in the work of writers like Marx and Weber. These writers were 
after all the intellectual precursors of much of that part of the social 
sciences that is interested in the social explanation of economic behaviour. 
Although Marx clearly operates within a general heuristic framework of 
historical development, he also pays scrupulous attention to the 
particular configurations of historical and cultural factors in the 
societies which he examines, and allows these factors to influence, 
although not to determine totally, the societies1 general development.
Weber presents an even clearer case of a social theorist'who took 
cognizance of the 1 character structure1 of each society, indeed most of 
his work can be viewed as an attempt to trace the genesis of the culture 
of various societies, and to analyse its relationship with capitalism.
In particular he utilises the role that specific historical events have 
had in creating particular national systems of beliefs, and he operates 
with the concept of the ideal type, which attempts to link the general 
features of a situation with unique configurations. Thus lie works in
'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism', not with a general 
concept of capitalism, but with a historically specific ideal-typical 
form of capitalism which he calls 'rational bourgeois capitalism'. The 
work of Marx and Weber highlights a major.and continuing dilemma for the 
social scientist however, which can be presented by the traditional juxta­
position of the ideographic and nomothetic sciences. More specifically, 
the problem is whether historically anchored observations should be 
treated as specific to particular social systems or whether general 
theoriesj free of spatio-temporal parameters, can be developed and 
tested. Marx is often criticised for taking the nomothetic side and 
for being historicist, whilst Weber is often castigated, for example by 
Parsons, because it is argued that ideal types inhibit the formation of 
theoretical systems. .This fundamental dilemma has proved to be a real 
stumbling block for the use of cultural configurations in the explana­
tion of economic behaviour. In some senses this dilemma was ' solved' by 
the expansion of the division of labour in the academic world.
Encyclopedic scholars like Marx and Weber, who took the whole field of 
political economy as their territory, declined in number, and the 
academic world of the social sciences gradually fragmented into separate 
disciplines. Some disciplines, like economics, largely turned their 
backs upon the problems of particular societies and worked on the basis 
of certain universal assumptions about human nature. It was left to 
disciplines like history, and certain schools of thought inside anthro­
pology, to embrace the ideographic approach and concentrate upon the
distinctiveness of particular societies. The different paths that 
these disciplines took goes a long way to explain the relative absence, 
at least up until about the 1960's, of studies which emphasized the 
importance of cultural values in explaining economic behaviour.
In the studies of the anthropologists after the turn of the 
century one finds a strong emphasis upon cultural explanations of behaviour. 
Reacting against nineteenth century unilinear evolutionism the anthro­
pologists systematically went about challenging almost every generally 
accepted 'universal' concerning the psychological nature of man, and 
the basic elements of social, economic and political life. The cultural 
anthropologists in particular stressed the unique features of particular 
societies and operated with concepts like those of culture, and national 
character. Early Anglo-Saxon sociology also found such concepts of 
interest, Sumner (1906) in America talked of the 'ethos' of nations, and 
in Britain Ginsberg (1961) attempted to utilize the concept of national 
character. In a rather different tradition one might even note 
Durkheim's concept of 'collective representations'. After the Second 
World War, and following these developments in the social sciences, 
historiography, particularly in America, attempted to utilise concepts 
like national character in explaining the course of historical events.
David Potter (1954), for example, in his book People of Plenty; Economic 
Abundance and American Character, spends the first half of his monograph 
castigating his fellow historians for their superficial understanding of
national character and praising through explication the contributions of
(f)
the social scientists. Of course cultural analysis can be traced
back well beyond the turn of the century. If one includes the search 
for the spirit of an age, the genius of a civilisation, or for the 
Zeitgeist as an effort by historians and social scientists to understand 
a culture as a patterned whole in terms of its leading ideas or ethos, 
then such analysis can be traced, through the KulturKeschicte of the 
nineteenth century back to Voltaire.
Despite the long ancestry of culture and its allied concepts a
number of conceptual and methodological problems remained. Tylor's
original definition of culture in 1871, probably the first to be cast in ,
anthropological terms, was enormously wide, doubtless reflecting the
(7)complexity of the reality it was attempting to mirror. By 1962
Kroeber and Kluckholm were able to analyse 160 definitions that had 
appeared in English by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, 
psychiatrists and others, yet still the unwieldy complexity remained.
How difficult it is to work with a concept which, according to Kingsley
Davis’s (1966) attempt to define it, "includes art, music, architecture,
literature, science, technology, philosophy, religion, and a million
(8)
other things”. Some attempts were made to systematise the enormous
body of exhaustive descriptions that comprised the traditional method of 
ethnology. These attempts to create some sort of order out of the mass 
of cultural data resulted in the birth of the concept of national 
character or the ’culture-personality' concept. These studies can be 
dated from 1934 with the publication of Ruth Benedict's Patterns of 
Culture, which Gorer (1956) claims marks the birth of the ’scientific 
study of national character1• The influence of psychology on the 
writings of these cultural anthropologists was very strong, which has 
meant that the dominant interpretation of national character has been in 
terms of the concept of personality. Thus national character studies 
have used the individual personality concept as a model for the 1 character1 
of a nation - seeking something connotatively comparable to the 
individual personality, but at the level of the nation state. The 
dominant theory of personality used was the psychoanalytic one with the 
consequent stress being placed upon child-rearing practices as the
(9)
ultimate explanation of national character. The psychometric
tradition in psychology was also represented however, with Cattell (1950) 
attempting to run a factor analysis on cultural traits as a reflection of 
personality traits.
It was the unsatisfactory nature of these culture-personality 
writings, rather than the loose definition of culture that ultimately 
brought this whole area of social science into disrepute. Many national 
character studies have certainly suffered from at least some of the 
faults enumerated by Smith (1966), "Highly subjective modes of data 
collection and other ’fuzzy1 measurement techniques, small and non­
representative samples, lack of systematic theory and specific articu­
lation of concepts, simple analysis of tremendously complex phenomena, 
and little verification of r e s u l t s " . T o  these could be added the 
problems of the researchers being influenced by the prevailing Zeitgeist; 
compare for example the studies of England or America written in the 
heyday of Victorian optimism with those written in the depression.
Finally, one should note the considerable problem of intercontamination 
between sources; very few studies of America fail to mention the 
pioneering work of 1’oqueville, and it is a rare study of England that 
leaves out Bagehot, In summary then, one has a situation where nobody 
is questioning the existence of differences between cultures, but nobody 
has satisfactorily evolved a method for dealing with the potentially 
useful concepts of culture and national character. In view of these
observations it is hardly very surprising that many authors interested 
in accounting for differences in the business world between Britain and 
America should have been reluctant to enter such a battleground.
Economics, that discipline principally concerned with economic 
behaviour and performance, must have found itself particularly reluctant 
to enter such conceptual confusion. By the 1930's the Anglo-American 
tradition of economics had largely ceased to be interested in the effects 
of cultural and institutional factors on economic activity. The great 
debates about method in economics, of historical induction versus 
deduction, individualising versus generalising, descriptive economics or 
an economics that searches for laws and patterns, raged in the 1880's, 
particularly in Germany, but were largely over by the end of the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. Although the institutionalist school, 
led by men like Veblen, still stressed the importance of institutional 
factors in economic analysis, the majority of professional economists had 
turned their back on these factors and stressed the benefits to be gained 
by ignoring such non-economic variables, at least for the purposes of 
analysis. The success of this approach compared with the performance of 
some of the other social sciences has been notable. In particular 
Keynes showed how useful an analysis which based its reasoning upon very 
small amounts of primary data about human existence could be. The 
theoretical elimination of such cultural factors allowed a rigorous 
definition of purely economic concepts, and paved the Way for the intro­
duction of some very powerful mathematical techniques.
My argument above hais been that economics did not for a variety 
of reasons find itself turning to socio-cultural explanations of economic 
behaviour. Instead, economics concentrated upon constructing theoretical 
models of a very high degree of genera!ity. There were other areas of 
study interested in the analysis of business behaviour however; by 1990 
management studies had more or less established itself as a field of 
knowledge at least in America. No one could of course accuse 
managerial theorists of constructing theoretical models of a high degree 
of generality, but there are some parallels to be found with economics. 
Firstly, one should note that classical management theory in the hands of 
men like -Taylor and FayoL was conceived of having universal applicability. 
There was no thought that the management principles elaborated by these 
theorists were anything but'universal truths that could be applied to all 
organisations irrespective of their purpose or social setting - notwith­
standing Follett's 'law of the situation'. Classical management theory, 
like economics, was based on a simple and minimal, view'of human nature,
that man seeks pleasure and avoids pain, indeed this view of man was 
drawn indirectly from the work of the English nineteenth century 
economists and appropriately named, ’economic man*. The view of man 
in management theory that replaced this strange perversion of human 
nature was just as energetic in claiming universal applicability. The 
assuinntions about human behaviour underpinning the Human Relations 
movement, pioneered by Elton Mayo and his collegues in the 1930’s, still 
left very little room for the intrusion of cultural or institutional 
variations. In view of the respect that Weber’s theory of bureaucracy 
is always given in management theory, this neglect of cultural variat­
ions is perhaps slightly odd. Weber's theory of bureaucracy was an 
ideal type constructed for a particular purpose that was itself 
historically and culturally bound. When Weber’s theory of bureaucracy 
was utilised in the development of management theory it should have led 
to an appreciation of historical and cultural diversity. In fact the 
opposite happened. Serious comparative work in organisation theory can 
be said to begin with the work of Udy (1959) and his study Organisation 
of Work: A Comparative Analysis of Production among Non-Industrial
Peoples. Udy’s study can be seen as an operationalisation of many of 
the elements of Weber’s bureaucratic model, in the sense that he recast 
them as variables and then attempted to see to what extent they were or 
were not associated with each other in a variety of different settings. 
This work laid the foundation for an approach that has become of central 
importance in organisation analysis - contingency theory. In particular 
one should note the work of Hall (1963) in'America, who has also attempted 
to see whether the elements of bureaucracy vary together, and the work of 
the Aston School in Britain, which has researched the same problem in a 
more elaborate way and on a much wider scale. To recast the
Weberian elements of bureaucracy as variables is, of course, to do 
considerable violence to the concept of the ideal type, which as I have 
argued above was specifically designed to fit a particular historical 
set of circumstances. The above writers however, have cast considerable 
doubts on the value of such ideal-typical analysis and instead have 
attempted to devise schema for the measurement of the structure of an 
organisation, which can then be related up to various environmental or 
’contextual' variables. There is no question that if it is possible to 
devise culture-free measures of organisational structure, that could be 
applied to business organisations situated anywhere in the world, then 
this would represent a considerable advance, and allow one to test much 
more rigorously the effect of culture variable upon organisational 
structure. There must however, remain much doubt about whether this
result has been attained.
Jo concentrate upon the Aston School for a moment, one should
note that their dominant academic background in British psychology, with
its emphasis upon positivistic methods, has led them to believe that the
variables of organisational structure should, wherever possible, be
capable of numerical transformation and measurement to allow them access
(12)to the powerful mathematical procedures that would then be possible.
This methodological position has clearly influenced the way in which they
have gone about measuring organisational structure, and raises very
considerable doubts about the meaningfulness of their measures. These
criticisms have been there from the outset of this approach, one has only
to look, for example, at the savage review of Udy’s work made by the
anthropologist Edmund Leach (1960), who unequivocally concluded, ’’In
(13)short, I value the content of this book as nil”. Leach’s criticism
is partly directed against careless use of the Human Relations Area Files, 
but also at the assumption made by Udy, that particular measures of 
organisational structure can be interpreted in the same manner from 
society to society. In Leach’s view such analysis is a clear example of 
what C. Wright Mills called ’abstracted empiricism*. One can only have 
the same doubts about the work of the Aston School. ' For example, the 
Aston researchers have shown that the same relationships between organ­
isational structure and context hold for organisations in Britain, The
(H)
United States, Canada, Sweden and Japan. If one singles out Japan
from the rest one is clearly faced with a problem, because there is 
clear evidence from researchers like Abegglen(1958) and Dore (1973) that 
Japanese business is in fact run on very different lines from that in 
say Britain or America. It is notable that these latter studies, 
particularly the one by bore, are based upon more ’ anthropological’ 
methods and considerable account is taken of the meaning of particular 
organisational forms, placed in the context of historical and socio- 
economic position of Japanese society.
The serious charge of abstracted empiricism implies that the 
phenomena which are being measured and correlated are not clearly deduced 
from a theory. 'Is . this, a fair criticism of the work of the Aston 
researchers? It seems to me that the answer must be in the negative. 
There is an implicit theory in the Aston research, and the theory is 
drawn from their interpretation of Weber. The Aston researchers seem to 
interpret Weber's work as an attempt to delineate the conditions of 
organisational efficiency, interpreting Weber’s stress upon rationality 
as meaning efficiency. Despite Albrow’s (1970) view that this inter­
pretation is mistaken, this does not appear to be an unreasonable view 
of Weber1s theory of bureaucracy. After all, the language which Weber 
uses in his discussion of the advance of bureaucracy fairly glows with 
notions of the high achievement of this form of administration. I would 
wish to argue then that the contingency theory of the Aston school is 
based on ideas about organisational performance, set in the context of 
the capitalist economic order. Only by making certain assumptions 
about company goals in terms of profitability, can one understand why 
the company structure is likely, in their view, to adapt to the environ­
ment in certain ways. The fact that the contingency theorists seem to 
have difficulty in accurately predicting structure from contextual fact­
ors, and their general failure to clearly link performance with organ­
isational structure does show that the operation of market forces is
always constrained by cultural and political forces, both at the level
(16)
of society and the individual firm.
I have argued above that perhaps the major reason why the 
undoubted influence of the Weberian model of bureaucracy has not led to 
an appreciation of the role of historical and cultural factors in 
organisation theory, is that the ideal type model of Weber’s methodology 
has been rejected in favour of a different type of theoretical analysis. 
While this is unquestionably correct there does exist another rather less 
charitable reason. A hybrid subject like management theory, drawing 
its succour from a variety of different disciplines, always runs the 
risk of taking a contribution from a context that is not entirely under­
stood. It could be argued that this has happened with Weber’s theory 
of bureaucracy. Some influential theorists seem to believe that the 
theory was a universal statement about organisations. As late as 1974 
Hickson could still write, with presumably unintended irony, "So when 
researchers fail to emphasise the countries in which their organisations 
are situated they may be not so much foolish as optimistic. Weber’s 
vision swept from East to West as well as across the centuries, and we 
may yet find that this pioneer of comparative organisation theorists knew
(17)
what lie was doing".
There were other factors in management theory that also led in 
a similar direction, that is towards the belief in its universal applic­
ability. Although both the scientific management theories of Taylor, 
and the rather different gospel of Human Relations theory were developed 
in a particular American context, by 1950 there was little reason to 
doubt their general applicability. On a practical level, various 
international conferences, for example the conferences held under the
auspices of the International Congress for Scientific Management, and 
the post-war productivity teams that had visited America, had success­
fully spread the theories and practices to many countries. More 
importantly, American business enterprise was overtly successful and 
was universally looked up to as the ’market leader', pointing the 
direction where others should follow. It is interesting to note 
that even today most literature surveys of European managerial
practices on performance still take America as their measuring rod rather
(18)
than other European countries. The apparent practical success of
American management methods also found convincing theoretical backing 
in the shape of the logic of industrialism thesis. As early as 1941 
James Burnham had suggested some universal tendencies in management in 
his influential treatise, fhe Managerial Revolution. Harbison and 
Myers (1958), co-authors of Industrialism and Industrial Man in 1960 
had, six years previously, laid the foundations for such a view in their 
study of management in the international context. After surveying 
management practices in twenty-three countries they came to the conclusion, 
"Organisation building has its logic....which rests upon the development 
of management...and...there is a general logic of management development 
which has applicability both to advanced and industrialising countries
(19)
in the modern world". A diverse range of other studies ranging
from Inkeles’ (1960) apparent finding that the institutions of 
industrial society, notably the factory system, produced a relatively 
homogeneous ’industrial rnan’,-2^  to the much quoted and misunderstood 
study by Ilaire, Ghiselli and Porter (1966), which attempted to answer 
the question, "When managers think about managing, are their ideas all 
pretty much the same, or does managerial thinking differ from country 
to country?",^2^  all led in the same direction, and supported the view 
that the logic of industrialism was indeed a fact, and a fact which 
legitimated the development of a universal management theory.
My argument has been that up until about the 1950’s, there had 
not been a great deal of interest in utilising socio-cultural factors in 
the explanation of business behaviour. The potentially useful concepts 
of culture and national character had largely fallen into confusion and 
disrepute at the hands of the cultural anthropologists. Economics as'a 
discipline had found that enormous progress could be made by adopting a 
highly rigorous and positivistic methodology that left no room for the 
relatively ’soft’ measures of socio-cultural factors. Finally manage­
ment theory believed that all the evidence pointed in the direction not 
of cultural diversity but of a convergence - the basic principles of
management were universal; By the 1950’s, the universalist stance in
(22)
economics and management theory began to come under sustained attack.
There were a number o f  reasons f o r . t h i s ;  F i r s t l y ,  one shou ld  n o te  th a t
the Second World War had seen the necessity for some social scientists
engaged in war duty to concentrate their attention upon the culture of
the enemy societies in order to try and make strategic predictions.
These studies, which became known as ’the study of culture at a distance’,
(23)
were not without their successes, and thereby encouraged the view
that socio-cultural explanations of behaviour did have some validity.
The aftermath of war brought with it a large number of American backed
agencies to help with the process of reconstiuction, and although in
many ways they could be said to be successful by their own standards,
they were not without their problems. Many of those problems arose
because the assumptions about behaviour that were common in American
society were not found to hold so easily in every other country.
Economists who found themselves involved in aid programmes to the so
called underdeveloped countries, soon found that their stock of economic
knowledge, which they had taken to be culture free, turned out to be
(24)
largely restricted to the competitive phase of modern Capitalism.
During this period there was also increased interest, in international 
league tables of economic performance, and by the mid 1950’s Japan, which 
apparently had a very different cultural system, which was in turn 
reflected in her economic organisations, was managing to outperform most 
of her European and American competitors. The performance of this 
country thus served to increase interest in the role of cultural factors 
in economic performance. By the late 1950’s large numbers of American 
multinational companies were beginning to operate systematic comparisons 
of the performance of their various plants. Ibis exercise revealed a 
variety of difficulties that were being encountered in introducing and 
applying American managerial techniques and philosophies. For example, 
a large study undertaken by the American National Industrial Conference 
Board reported that the most common problem in American companies operat­
ing abroad was that local national managers were unfamiliar with American
(25)
business methods and philosophy. Finally there began to appear in
the managerial literature a series of careful studies, of which 
Richardson’s (1956) study of organisational contrasts on British and 
American ships is probably the best known, which seemed to show beyond 
all doubt that cultural factors could, and indeed did, influence 
economic organizations.
I have already argued that economics, of necessity a major 
contributor to any debate about comparative economic performance, had
not shown any great interest in the role of cultural variables in 
business performance. Yet the changes that 1 have described above 
that were occurring by the 1950’s did provoke some interest in cultural 
factors, broadly understood, within the discipline. Of primary signif­
icance was the setting up in the late 1940's of the research center in 
entrepreneurial history at Harvard. The inspiration for this centre, 
and for many years its mentor, was Joseph Schumpeter, one of the few 
economists who still believed in the usefulness of the notion of political 
economy. Schumpeter of course had always laid considerable stress on 
the role of the entrepreneur in economic analysis, and to talk of 
entrepreneurs is necessarily to widen the discussion and to admit the 
contribution of non-econoinic factors to economic analysis. This was 
not an easy task for economists schooled in the paradigm of positive 
economics. Even members of the Harvard Center felt uneasy with 
cultural factors. Aitken (1965) for example, recalling the early days 
of the Centre, noted how strange it was to be dealing, "with values,
witli perceptions, with social sanctions and social definitions....with
(26)
all sorts of seemingly ’soft’ and ’subjective’ variables". Despite
these difficulties this group of scholars went on to produce some out­
standing pieces of research, which stressed the crucial role of socio­
cultural factors in economic analysis. In particular one should note 
the work of David Landes (1965) and his analysis of French business, 
where he attempted to account for the slow growth of the French econoiqy 
up to the time of the Second World War by reference to largely non­
economic factors. Similar developments to those at Harvard took .
place in the University of Chicago. At this centre economists like 
Bert Horelitz and W.E. Moore also concentrated upon the non-economic 
barrier to economic development and, like their colleagues at Harvard, 
founded a journal, Economic Development and Cultural Change, to further 
their analyses.
It would be wrong to give the impression however, that this 
style of analysis became dominant even in economic history. For example 
both Habakkuk (1968) and Gerschenkron (1962), two leading economic 
historians both argued, in their different ways, that economic progress 
in various countries could largely accounted for by reference to such 
factors as population, capital, technology and market characteristics.
They both seemed to have enormous difficulty in knowing exactly how to 
handle socio-cultural factors within the normal paradigm of econometric 
history. Habakkuk (1968), for example, writes, "It is often argued 
that some countries had more venturesome entrepreneurs for such reasons
as n a t io n a l  c h a ra c te r , C u ltu r a l  background and in s t i t u t io n s ,  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c ia l  a t t i t u d e s ,  i . e .  fo r  non-economic re a s o n s .. . . i t  is  e x tra o rd ­
i n a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  to  know how much w e ig h t to  a t ta c h  to  t h is  f a c t o r  s in c e
it is impossible to test entrepreneurial ability except by achievement
(28 )
and this begs the question". The methodological scepticism of this
school of ..thought was further encouraged by the fact that no sooner had
Landes ’explained' the long standing socio-cultural reasons for French
backwardness, when the French economy began to revive. Not only did it
revive, but as Landes ruefully admitted in a later paper, the economy
went through, "what may be the most rapid growth France has even known,
(29)
almost as rapid as the German ’miracle’ and possibly more sustained". 
Although Landes attempted to explain this growth rate in terms of his 
major explanatory variable, Gerschenkron In particular took these failed 
predictions as prima facie evidence of the poverty of this explanatory 
approach.
Despite the. problems of an analysis which focusses upon socio­
cultural factors as contributory causes of economic performance, it seems 
to me that there is a growing recognition inside economic science of the 
value of such an a n a l y s i s . S u c h  a recognition has been spurred On 
by the gradual realisation that, when the data of national accounts, 
fitted to various production functions, are used to attempt to account 
for economic growth only a fraction of the resulting growth can be 
explained in this way. Even the so called ’heavy’ economic factors 
like population, capital and technology are after all ultimately determined 
to a large extent by forces generally considered to be outside the realm 
of economics. There exists a considerable amount of work on the 
economies of both Britain and America which attempts to show, in an 
illuminating way, the role of socio-cultural factors in the economies of 
the two societies and this material will be examined in the next chapter.
Just as more economists and economic historians began to 
include socio-cultural variables in their analysis so too with management 
theorists. Management theory, in the hands of Taylor or Mayo, had 
largely believed that organizational efficiency lay in manipulating 
variables inside the organisation, like the formal structure or the style 
of supervision. By the I960's the experience of American firms abroad 
was beginning.to supply evidence that was to cast doubts about the 
universal applicability of such findings. These doubts, doubts on the 
part of the’men of action’., were supported by the more rigorous testing 
of these propositions by the academic world. As early as 1947 Simon 
had cast considerable doubts on the value of the ’ management principles',
and by the I9601s evidence was beginning to emerge that suggested that
the principles of the Human Relations school probably did not. apply even
throughout the Uni ted States. In I960 French, Israel and As
attempted to replicate the famous Coch and French (1948) participation
experiment in a Norwegian factory, and found that the participative
approach did not elicit the same responses that had been found in the
American experiment. From the 1960’s onwards a great flood of work
within the general framework of management studies testified, with
varying degrees of certainty, to the culture bound nature of management
theory. The general dilemma was aimmed up in the title of an article by
Negandhi and Estafen published in 1965, ’A Research Model to Determine
the Applicability of American Management Know-How in Differing Cultures
and/or Environments’ . The problem was indeed to find out whether the
principles of management, largely developed in the United States, were
generally/applicable-, and to devise a methodology that would permit
reasonable hypothesis testing. An acceptable methodology was crucial
because, as Nath (1968) had shown in his methodological review of cross-
cultural management research, the methodological quality of many of the
s tu d ie s  l e f t  a l o t  to  be d e s ire d . The most common type o f  study
reported was that into the operations of American companies operating
abroad. These studies testified to the problems that American companies
faced in getting local managers and workmen to adapt to American 
(32)
methods. Alternatively, there was the investigation in depth of one
culture, through a long-term stay in the country by the researcher, who 
then compares it with his native c u l t u r e . T h r e e  basic problems 
stood out: Firstly, researchers had difficulty in getting adequate
samples of managers, workers, or organisations in the foreign culture to 
compare with their own culture. Too many studies did not even both 
bother with the niceties of sampling, and were quite happy to ’gain an 
impression’ of the foreign culture and its business organisations, just 
as they had ’gained an impression* of their own country. The second 
problem was one of knowing exactly what factors to control for and treat 
as independent variables, and what factors to treat as dependent 
variables. For example, did one control for organisational structure 
on the grounds that it was culture free, or did one treat it as a 
dependent variable on the grounds that it must be influenced by cultural 
variables? Thirdly, there was what is known in anthropology as Galton’s 
problem, that is the.problem.of diffusion. When similarities are 
observed i.n two distinct societies in the area of say, business organ­
isational structure, are these to be explained in terms of similar 
structural constraints, as the contingency theorists argue, or could
uie.y »e m e  resuxb 01 one process or (iiinision or. managerial methods?
The diffusionist argument, which is rarely ever mentioned by the 
contingency theorists, is a very powerful one in the area of management 
theory, because as I have already shown, management theory is largely 
an American artifact and has been heavily exported throughout the world 
by management consultants, American run or inspired management education 
institutes, and most powerfully of all by successful American companies. 
Finally, there was the still unresolved problem of how to handle the 
multi-dimensional phenomenon of culture, and of determining what features 
of the business it effected and how it effected them.
An influential attempt to try to determine what the most 
relevant features of the external socio-cultural environment of a firm 
were was devised by Farmer and Kichman (I960). They largely appeared to 
concede that managerial efficiency did not reside in adherence to univer­
sal management principles or in individual efforts. They stressed 
instead the importance of external factors constraining managerial 
endeavour, and concluded that management theory needed instead to concen­
trate upon those crucial environmental variables, rather than on what 
went on inside tire managerial ’black box'. Tire environment was concep­
tualised as consisting of economic, legal-political,.sociological and 
educational constraints, and an attempt was even made to assign a 
mathematical weight to each variable, and then-by empirical investi­
gation assign each variable a score in any particular country under 
investigation. Despite this interesting attempt to come to grips with 
the socio-cultural environment in cross cultural management research, a 
fundamental problem remained which Kichman (1965) acknowledged. Thus 
he notes, "In undertaking cross-cultural research of this type, one
must also have a common denomination or classification scheme which can
(34)be used for comparing the management process in different countries".
It was for failure to solve this particular problem, that I suggested at 
the beginning of this chapter, that culture became a very difficult and 
unattractive concept with which to work. One can see the desperate 
need for some organising principle in some of the national character 
writings. Daniel Bell (1965), for example, commenting upon the 
attempts of Max Lerner to capture the spirit of American character in 
his book, America as a Civilisation, writes, "Like all of us Lerner is 
trapped by sheer inability to capture a definition which will not fall 
apart on close analysis. One can see him, year after year, desperately 
mulling over the questions, reading all the previous answers, spot­
lighting their deficiencies; yet, in the end, like a mountain climber 
unable to gain a foothold on the slippery rock face, he suddenly, lets
go, and says: ’ There is no single talisman to th e  secret of American
(35)civilisation’, there is no single organising principle”• This is
not to argue however, that organising principles were totally lacking 
in the national character literature, clearly those that were organised 
around some psychological theory possessed organising principles, and 
as early as 1934 Ruth Benedict attempted a rudimentary form of 
categorisation of cultures, albeit in the form of metaphor, when she 
wrote of the Apollonian and the Dionysian cultures. Yet this and other 
similar attempts at comparative work, carried out in literary-metaphorical 
terms, were hardly the comparative schema that were required. The ideal 
type was also seen as of little value in empirical work; as a method 
Heydebrand (1973) claimed that it, "remains essentially as a device for 
’intellectual comparisons', for conceptual rather than empirical
testing, and for the establishment of comparative histories and
.. . . „ (30)e t io lo g ie s  .
What c r i t e r i a  must a c la s s i f ic a t io n  scheme have i f  i t  i s  to
serve  as a v e h ic le  f o r  co m p arative  research? There seems a c e r ta in
measure of agreement that the goal is to substitute names of variables
for the names of social systems, in other words, a metalanguage is
required whichvvill allow the researcher to refer not to England or
America, or to organisation X or organisation Y, but to certain patterns
or combinations of variables that can preferably be measured. In one
of the most stringent formulations Sjoberg (1970) argues that genuine
comparison is possible only if nonculture-bound units have been
is o la te d .  He a rgues , " C e r ta in  in v a r ia n t  p o in ts  o f  re fe re n c e  o r
universal categories are required which are not merely reflections of
(37)the cultural values of a particular social /. system". Human
behaviour cannot be infinitely variable, limits are imposed upon it by 
biological, geographical and socio'-cultural factors, and as a result 
only a limited number of stable patterns can arise. Yet even admitting 
this proposition still makes the task of isolating 'nonculture-bound 
units' an extremely difficult one. None of the social sciences for 
example have attained the level of sophistication reached in linguistics, 
where the development of universal categories, i.e. phonemes and 
morphemes, has made possible the development of general linguistics, 
notwithstanding the fact that each individual language presents a unique 
structure. Similar, though rather less successful attempts, have made 
in anthropology by the structuralist school, who have drawn upon the 
work of the structural linguists as well as developments in semiology.
At the level of organisation theory, the contingency theorists,
particularly those associated with the Aston school , clearly believe that
their studies have isolated culture-free units of analysis. Heydebrand
(1973) in his review of comparative organisational research, commenting
on the Aston studies, writes, "It is studies of this kind that constitute
the most significant advance over the organisational case studies of the
1950's, and promise to contribute to a general theory of organisation11
(38)
(my emphasis). At the societal level little progress has been
made in the development of universal categories, indeed the old classical
generalised distinctions of mechanical - organic, gemeinschaft —
gesellschaft, sacred - secular, folk - urban, still seem to be used
despite their obvious deficiencies. The sociologist who has given
this matter most attention is Talcott Parsons, and in particular he has
been interested in developing universal categories for the analysis of
culture. It must be remembered that Parsons began his academic career
by studying the theories of Sombart and ^eber on the emergence of
capitalism. Both Sombart and Weber, in contradistinction to the works
of Marx, gave a greater amount of autonomy to the role of values in
social action, and in his The Structure of Social Action (1937), Parsons
saw this emphasis as the distinctive focus of social theory in the late
nineteenth century. Parsons himself adopts the view that a crucial
element in the explanation of social action must be the value system to
which individuals refer when making choices in social life. As Parsons.
(1960) puts it, (that)."...a system of value-orientations held in common
by the members of a social system can serve as the main point of
reference for analysing structure and process in the social system
itself may be regarded as a major tenet of modern sociological theory.
Values in  th is  sense a re  th e  commitments o f  in d iv id u a l  persons to  pursue
and support certain directions or types of action for the collectivity as
a system and hence derivatively for their own roles in the collectivity.
Values are, for sociological purposes, deliberately defined at a level
of generality higher than that of goals - they are directions of action
ra th e r  than  s p e c if ic  o b je c t iv e s , th e  l a t t e r  depending on a p a r t ic u la r
character of the situation in which the system is placed as well as its
(39)values and its structure as a system". ' It is important to note two 
points of difference from Weber’s position. firstly, in Weber social 
relations are ultimately reducible to inter-subjective relations, but it 
is not clear that this is true for Parsons. In Towards a General Theory 
of Action Parsons goes to considerable lengths to explain the ontological 
position of culture and stresses that it is not an empirical system.
He writes, "A cultural system is a system which lias the following
characteristics: la) the system is constituted neither by the organ­
isation of interactions nor by the organisation of the actions of a 
single actor (as such), but rather by the organisation of values, norms 
and symbols which guide the choice made by actors and which limit the 
types of action which may occur among actors, (b) Thus a cultural 
system is not an empirical system in the same sense as a personality 
or a social system, because it represents a special kind of abstraction
(do)o f  e lem ents from  th ese  system s". D e s p ite  t h is  le n g th y  e lu c id a t io n
(41)
and other similar ones, it still is not clear what the logical
status of culture is. At times it appears to be more like the
agelecism of Durkheim1s ’collective conscience’, and Parson1s liking for
(4 2)the elaborate metaphor in expostion does not always aid clarity.
The second way in which Parsons differs from Weber, in terms of his 
analysis of the place of values in social explanation, is that Parsons 
is critical of Weber’s ideal type methodology. In Weber there can be 
as many types as there are appropriate value positions to produce ’one­
sided accentuations of reality’. These types exist independently of 
one another and do not permit the formulation of a general theoretical 
system. Parsons is manifestly interested in this latter task, at 
least in the sense that he is anxious to build a complete set of concepts 
that Will permit the analysis of all social action, all societies and 
all social systems. These interests have led to what Gouldner (1970)
lias rather disparagingly called his ’taxonomic zeal’.
One can see this ’taxonomic zeal' at work when Parsons 
attempts to classify the values which guide men’s choice of action. Man 
explains Parsons, is always faced with ’ dilemmas of choice’ in social 
situations. These choices are dichotomized by Parsons into five 
fundamental alternatives and they constitute the pattern variables: 
affectivity/affective neutrality; diffuseness/specificity; 
particularisn/universalism; ascription/achievement; collective orient­
ation/self-orientation. Although the pattern variables apparently use
the unit act as their building block, Parsons is not much interested in 
this level of analysis, for him the important point is that practically
all action occurs in systems. The pattern variables should permit
analysis of the culture of a society in terms of a certain pattern of 
value choices, although Parsons does also stress that as the society 
becomes more complex and structurally differentiated, different sub­
systems within the society emerge to deal with different functional 
tasks. Thus, while it is possible to talk of the general pattern of 
values at the societal level, there may well be sub-patterns in the 
different sub-systems of the society. Parsons argues, for example,
that the family system will stress a different pattern of choices from 
the business system. It is for this reason that-when various researchers 
have utilised the Parsonian pattern variables they have not necessarily 
used all of them. Burrage (1909) for example, in his comparative 
analysis of British and American business practices, only utilises the 
variables of achievement/ascription, universalism/particularism and 
difPuseness/specificity. Although Burrage does not explain why he 
neglects the other two patterns, it is presumably because he does not 
think that they are relevant for the analysis of the business world.
I have discussed two analytical schema-which claim to make 
comparative analysis possible by providing culture-free comparative 
categories. At the level of the firm, the Aston researchers’ categories 
for measuring organisational context and structure claim to make 
possible a comparative analysis of organisational structures. Talcott 
Parsons makes similar culture-free claims for his pattern variables, 
and if these claims are correct, the use of these categories should 
permit an analysis of organisational structures as well as an analysis 
of societal structure. The fundamental question is whether the claims 
on .'the part of the Aston school on the one hand and Parsons on the other, 
to have isolated the ’invariant points of reference’• that Sjoberg refers 
to as being necessary for comparative analysis, have been met. I have 
already expressed some reservations on the measures used by the Aston 
researchers in examining organisational context and structure (see p.34 ). 
In brief, the arguments were that it is not at all clear what the 
meaning of their findings are, and Secondly, that their implicit theor­
etical framework is one based upon the foundations of a market society. 
These are not serious drawbacks for this particular study. Firstly, 
the use of the Aston measures will be supplemented by a small case study 
of each company investigated so that the meaning of these measures will 
hopefully become clear. Secondly, the implicit assumptions of a 
capitalist market society are not ones that matter in this study as all 
the companies being investigated are profit oriented-firms operating 
within a market economy, In short, although there are considerable 
reservations about the claim made by Hickson (i974) that the Aston 
researchers have probably managed to construct 'world measures’ of 
organisational structure, theirs is probably the most successful attempt, 
within the boundaries of profit oriented business organisations, to 
formulate categories of organisational structure. It must be stressed 
again, that without some set of categories of organisational structure, 
comparative research is not possible. The Parsonian pattern variables 
again do not constitute the culture-free universal categories that 
Sjoberg referred to as being necessary for cross-cultural analysis.
On the contrary, one can see their origin in the specific historical
situation which saw the rise of capitalism. Durkheim, Sombart and
Weber, those theorists who were the centre of attention in the early
work of Parsons, were all interested in the development of the
capitalist economic order, and the pattern variables reflect the
(43)transformation of the old socio-economic order to the new. In the
ideal-typical model of capitalism it is indeed necessary to relate to 
people on the basis Of their achievements rather than on their ascribed 
qualities. Furthermore, decisions cannot be made on the basis of 
emotional considerations (affectivity), but rather on the basis of 
rational calculation (affective neutrality). Relations inside the 
ideal-typical capitalist economy are dominated not by ill defined obli­
gations to people (diffuseness), but on the basis of the specific roles 
they play in the division of labour (specificity), and a response is 
made to people on the basis of their membership of specific categories 
(universalism), like employee or consumer. Finally, the ideal-typical 
model stresses self-orientation for its harmonious working. I have 
stressed above the nature of the ideal typical model, the model if you 
like that the owners of capital would subscribe to. It is necessary 
to point out once more however, that in the actual working of capitalist 
societies there appear to be contradictions which set up counter forces 
to these value patterns (cf.p.22). Whilst the fact that the pattern 
variables reflect the dichotomy between capitalist and non-capitalist 
economies may make their use unsuitable for some comparative research, 
this fact positively recommends them for this research. The pattern 
variables can be used to measure the extent to which the society, and 
particularly business organisations, have embraced the values of 
capitalism. This will involve abandoning the view, which Parsons 
explicitly holds, that the value patterns are dichotomies and not 
continua; in other words, it does not seem inconsistent to argue that 
there can be degrees of commitment to the values of universalism, achieve­
ment orientation etc. In holding this view I am l oll owing the work of 
Lipset (1963),: who argues that the pattern variables, "...make it possible 
for us to establish differences in value structures between two nations 
that are at the same end of the gemeinschaft - gesellschaft continuum,
(4 4 )
or are at similar levels of economic development or social complexity .
My broad hypothesis is that American society has embraced the values of 
capitalist society much more strongly than has British society, and the 
pattern variables provide a convenient schema for testing this. In 
other words, if this hypothesis is correct, one should expect to find a 
greater emphasis upon the value patterns achievement, affective-neutrality,
specificity, universalism and self-orientation in American society and 
in the American economy, than in British society and the British 
economy.
This formulation is still ambiguous however, because two 
fundamental questions are left unanswered, or at least are unsatisfact­
orily answered in the Parsonian framework. Firstly, one has to ask if 
the pattern variables are causal factors, i.e. is it enough to assert 
that a stress on certain value patterns is itself a cause of certain 
types of business behaviour? Secondly, and closely related to the 
first problem, one has to ask why a particular combination of values, or 
a particular stress on certain values, should occur in one society and 
not in another. The answers Parsons provides to these questions cannot 
be considered as in any way satisfactory. It is not really clear 
whether Parsons is interested in explaining social action with the 
pattern variables, or whether lie is only interested in creating a taxonomy. 
Max Black (1961) and Gouldner (1979) for example, both accuse him of 
only analysing social statics, or of mere formalism. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that even his static equilibrium model does assume 
that the cultural values are holding relations in place inside the 
system,^ and furthermore, in his work Societies (1966) a much more 
dynamic role is spelled out for culture in social relations. Here
Parsons even admits that, at the level of general social development,
(46)
"...I am a cultural determiuist, rather than a social determinist".
If culture influences action, how does it do it, and how are we to 
verify its influence? It is tautologous to observe human conduct, 
deduce value structures from this, and then go on to use these cultural 
variables to explain human conduct. Aspects of the social structure 
cannot'be-used as an index of cultural values in the Parsonian system, 
because Parsons specifically separates out the social structure as a 
separate element. Neither can one argue, within the Parsonian frame­
work, that culture is that which is internalized in the individual, 
because again parsons has a separate category for this in the personality 
system. Thus culture affects (lie social structure and the personality 
system and yet it is ontologically separate from both of these. IJow 
does Parsons explain the particular pattern of values in a sub-system of 
society or a society in general? His answer is a typically functionalist 
one, thus the normative pattern arrived at is one that is relevant for 
the effective functioning of the system or sub-system. This is why the 
normative pattern is different in the family compared to the economic 
sector in capitalist society, and why capitalist societies differ from 
non-capital 1st societies.
The answers Parsons offers -to the two problems that were 
posed above is then as follows. Firstly, in answer to the question 
of whether the pattern variables are to be considered as causal factors, 
Parsons would appear to argue that value orientations are to be 
considered as factors in the causal chain although their precise ontol­
ogical status is not made clear. Parson1s answer to the second 
question, about how particular normative patterns in sub-systems and 
systems are to be explained, is in terms'of system needs. The first 
answer does not seem to be satisfactory because it does not seem to be 
a particularly useful exercise, at least at the empirical level, to 
separate out the cultural system, social structure and the personality 
system as Parson does. In other words in order to avoid talking of 
something which resembles Aristotelian essences it is necessary to 
conceive of cultural values as being manifest in the social structure, 
particularly in the institutions of society e.g. the education system, 
as well as potentially being internalised in the personality system of 
members of that society. Thus to argue that a society has a commitment
to a particular normative pattern must be to argue that this is mani-
(47)fested in the institutions and members of that society. The
Parsonian argument that normative patterns are a reflection of system 
needs is also an inadequate one in many ways. Although it may be 
legitimate for anthropologists, working in pre-literate societies, to 
utilise functionalist schema in explaining social phenomena, because 
those societies possess no reliable historical records, to ignore 
historical processes in more ’modern1 societies cannot be considered as 
a legitimate step. History, as C. Wright'Mills once observed, is, and 
must be, the very shank of sociai science. Historical contrast is the 
classic method of comparative studies. Social structures emerge out of 
the historical process and it is a travesty of reality to see them 
merely as reflections of system needs. Weber in particular recognised 
the importance of explaining differences in national sociai systems by
specifying the importance of key historical events and processes in
creating particular constellations of values and structures (Weber 
(1949)). The pattern variables are invaluable as analytical concepts 
which allow one to classify these structures and allow precise 
description. The pattern variables do not permit a causal analysis
however because of the inherent circularity of the argument referred to
above.
The historical analysis of the growth of the capitalist economic 
order in Britain and America, which follows in the next chapter, will 
attempt to show that in Britain the social structure has tended to
constrain the economic system to a greater degree than has been the case 
in the United States. This formulation-might lead one to think that 
primacy is being given to social structural forces, but this is not in 
fact the case. Even Parsons, I would argue, does in places recognise 
the prinacy of the economic subsystem. For example, in spelling out 
the normative pattern of the economic system in what he calls modern 
societies, as revealing a stress upon affective-neutrality, universalism, 
achievement and specificity, he also concedes that this is also the 
pattern for modern societies in general. In other words, the dominance 
of the economic system in societal analysis is recognised at least 
covertly. The general view being advanced here is of a determining 
economic base and a determined superstructure, to put it in the more 
familiar terms of Marxist theory* Yet the analysis of historical 
material is never as simplistic as this formula might imply, and indeed 
Marxist theory, stripped of its vulgarisations, does not embrace such a 
simplistic view. Although Marxism unquestionably does contain within 
its labyrynth the view of a determining base, Marxism is also the home 
of the view that the origin of determination lies in men’s own activities. 
Raymond Williams (1973) has lucidly argued the qualifications and amend­
ments to the three key concepts in the Marxist theory of the super­
structure. He argues that the idea of an economic base must be seen not 
as a fixed economic or technological abstraction, but as the "...specific 
activities of men in real social and economic relationships, containing 
fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore always in a
(48)
state of dynamic process". Similarly, the superstructure is to be
seen not merely as a set of structures and values which are a total
reflection of, and dependent upon the economic infrastructure. Finally,
the idea of determination must be revalued away from the mechanical
process that it has become at the hands of the vulgar Marxists. Williams
correctly notes that it is, "...one of the central propositions of Marx’s
sense of history that there are deep contradictions in the relationships
of production and in the consequent social relationships. There is
therefore the continued possibility of the dynamic variation of these 
(49)
forces". These complex formulations recognise the complexity of
the real historical situation, and it is perhaps reasonable to point out 
that Marxist cultural theory is much more at home in distinguishing the 
large features of different epochs of society than in dealing with the 
complexities of any particular historical process, like the capitalist 
period. It must be recognised that the hegemony of a particular class, 
like the landed aristocracy in Britain, is not swept away over night to 
be replaced by a social structure that reflects the interests of the new
capitalist class. The process is complex and subtle, and at any 
particular moment in time is reflected in considerable contradictions 
in both the infrastructure and the superstructure. The next chapter 
will attempt to chart the emergence of capitalism in Britain and 
America, and to show how the economy and the social structure inter­
acted together to produce two distinctive socio-economic systems.
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2. Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers (21).
1854-1855. Quoted in Sawyer (1954) p.372.
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18. This fact is noted for the case of Britain by Lewis and Steward 
(1958), and for France, Italy and Spain by Ferrari (1974).
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groups.
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27. Interest in the role of the entrepreneur in economic growth came 
from another quarter as well. The work of the psychologists Hagen 
(1962) and McClelland (1961) attempted to elaborate the psychological 
mechanisms whereby certain individuals became motivated to put all 
their energies into economic activity. McClelland*s studies in 
particular, of the relationship between * need achievement* and 
economic activity, have revealed some surprisingly high 
correlations (of the order of .4-.5 depending on the study in 
question), and the relationship appears to pre-date the rise in 
economic activity by about the right time interval. Hagen and 
McClelland both stress the crucial role of child rearing practices
in their analysis, although neither of them offer very satisfactory 
explanations of what causes the child rearing practices. Several 
writers have suggested that perhaps this work explains in more 
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CHAPTER 3.
Culture and Capitalism: A Historical Analysis
of the Emergence of Capitalism in Britain and America.
j l  nave ui&ueu unau m e  uemanus ui one economic system are
always mediated through the cultural fabric of the society. As
Schumpeter (1947) persuasively put it: "Sociai structures, types and
attitudes are coins that do not readily melt: once they are formed
they persist, possibly for centuries; and since different structures
and types display different degrees of ability to survive, we almost
always find that actual group or national behaviour more or less departs
from what we should expect it to be if we tried to infer it from the
dominant forms of the production process" .^\ In other words, although
it is analytically possible to talk about the ’Logic of capitalism’ as I
have done in chapter 1, the ’rational imperatives’ of this system are
(2)
never unreservedly met. Hie history of each society deposits a
residue of institutions, conventions and assumptions, and the political 
elite, at least in Britain and Anerica, has had to work within the 
respective historical frameworks of the two societies. I shall attempt 
to show in this chapter how the rulers of these two societies adapted to 
the demands of the capitalist economic system in different ways, because 
of the different socio-cultural frameworks within which they worked.
There are several problems in embarking on an historical 
analysis of Britain and America to demonstrate the key role that histori­
cal factors have played in setting the socio-cultural framework within 
which capitalist economic enterprise has had to work. Firstly, there 
is the vexed question of where in historical time to begin the analysis. 
History is indeed a lleraciitean flux, the historian interupts the flow 
'by'the imposition of ’periods’ and 'stages’ merely for his own 
convenience: the historical process does not divide itself up in this
way. Yet if one is to make use. of historical material for the purpose
of understanding a particular phenomenon, then one must do a certain 
amount of violence to the continuity of the historical process anil break 
the flow. 1 have decided to begin the historical analysis of Britain 
and America at the time when America began to exist as a separate entity, 
1776, although some brief reference will be made to the preceding period 
under English rule. This date approximately marks the beginning of the 
period of industrial capitalism in English society and thus would appear 
to be a suitable starting point for the analysis of both societies.
Just as the unending flow of events and processes in historical
time presents the researcher with problems in knowing quite where to
begin, it also presents a more general problem of analysis in attempting 
to assess such a general proposition as the effect of socio-cultural 
factors upon the development of the capitalist mode of production. The 
procedure I have adopted follows directly from my conceptual analysis of
the concept of culture in chapter 2. The historical process in both 
societies -will be analysed in terms of the pattern variables. The extent 
to which the socio-cultural structure Can be shown to stress the values 
of achievement, affective-neutrality, specificity, universalism and self- 
orientation rather than their opposites will be taken as evidence that
the society is more attuned to the needs of' the capitalist economic
. (3)system.
The final problem that has to be contended witli in an histor­
ical analysis of Britain, and America is one of methodology. When one 
is dealing with such complex relationships between variables like social 
class, the development of particular institutions, entrepreneurial 
recruitment, the value system of a society, and attempting, to relate all 
these up to the economic system, then the best that one can do is to 
present as much validating evidence as possible in support of the view 
that the socio-cultural structure, so conceived, either on balance 
supports the economic system or detracts from its efficient working. 
Whatever the merits of Popper’s view that the scientific method essent­
ially proceeds via falsification, this strategy is not possible in a 
project such as this.
Before the relationship between particular aspects of the
socio-cultural structure and the economic order can be investigated there
is a prior task. The task is to observe the manner in which the
capitalist economic order emerged in the two societies. To take the case
of Britain first, the most important general historical fact to take
into account when considering the structure of British society towards
the end of the eighteenth century was the fact that Britain was emerging
from a feudal past. The central features of feudal society, from the
point of view of this analysis, are in marked contrast to those of the
(4)new order of capitalism that was gradually to follow. Inside the
feudal structure there was a tendency for economic actions to be adjudged. 
according to their contribution to the ’health’ of society, production 
was for use, not profit. The feudal system controlled social relation­
ships as well as economic ones, all members of the society, from the 
nobility at the top to the humble serf at the bottom, were bound to 
each other in mutual obligation.^ The hierachical feudal structure 
was still reasonably intact in England by the beginning Of the fourteenth 
century, yet during that century there were several signs pointing 
towards the increasing importance of the principle of capitalist 
enterprise, production for personal gain rather than.use. These 
probably emanated from the townsalthough they spread rapidly to the
countryside. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the land and 
tenurial relations based on it had largely ceased to be the cement 
binding together lord and man. Barrington Moore (1973) argues that 
the Tudor peace and the continuing stimulus of the wool trade together 
generated a "powerful stimulus to the growth of a commercial and even 
capitalist outlook in the countryside".^ By the sixteenth century 
land enclosures were being utilised by the lords of the manor to 
increase the profits that could be made by selling wool, or by leasing 
their lands to those who did, and thereby increasing their rents.
These enclosures were not solely the work of the landed upper classes 
either, the yeomen, "a class whose boundaries shaded off into the 
smaller gentry at the top and the less prosperous peasants at the 
bottom", were the chief force behind peasant enclosures. The whole 
movement has been aptly described by Barrington Moore as ’agrarian 
capitalism’. The Crown, for a variety of reasons, found itself in 
opposition to the commercial interests in both the countryside and towns. 
The greatest conflict was generated by the fact that the commercial 
interests represented, in embryonic form at least, the rights of 
individual property, against the multiplicity of rights and obligations 
claimed by the Crown. The Crown could no longer call upon quite the 
same symbolic backing offered by the Church after the damage done to it 
by Henry Vlll. Stuart policy, in attempting to check the spread of the 
autonomous rights of property, tended to weld commercially minded 
elements in town and countryside together into a coherent opposition to 
the Crown. These forces combined witii the consequences of the break­
down of the feudal system for those lower down the social order to 
produce the Civil war, and its symbolic destruction of the ancien regime 
with the beheading of Charles I. The puritan revolution involved a 
combination of economic, religious and constitutional issues and yet it 
would be a misconception to see it as a bourgeois revolution, heralding 
the transformation of the feudal mode of production by the capitalist. 
Capitalist influences had penetrated and transformed much of the country­
side long before the Civil war, as I have indicated, and the revolution 
merely marked the symbolic triumph of money over birth. The enclosure 
movement continued with renewed vigour, and together with the rise of 
industry, broke the back of the English peasantry and the old social 
structure.
The eighteenth century saw the consolidation of the power of 
the landed aristocracy and, as Barrington Moore notes, "The strong 
commercial tone in the life of the landed upper classes, both gentry and
titled nobility, also meant that there was no very solid phalanx of 
aristocratic opposition to the advance of industry itself.... the most 
influential sector of the landed upper classes acted as a political
(y)
advance guard for commercial and industrial capitalism". By 1750
then in no sense could English society be described as feudal in either 
an economic or a social sense, yet neither would it be satisfactory to 
describe the society as firmly capitalist. From a purely economic 
point of view, the mode of production was predominantly capitalist, yet 
in terms of social relations, the society lay half way between the 
stress upon ascription, affectivity, diffuseness, particularism, 
collective orientation and their opposites. The society was an arist­
ocracy, a hierarchical society in which men took their places in an 
accepted order to precedence, and yet it was also a society in which 
there was a good deal of social mobility: it was not yet a society
marked by social classes. This society, perched between ideal-typical 
feudalism on the one hand, and ideal-typical capitalism on the other, 
was based firmly on the twin principles of property and patronage. One' 
place in that society was wholly determined by the amount and kind of 
one’s own property. After property, and emanating from it, the most 
important factor in determining status was patronage. As Perkin (1969) 
notes, "At all levels, patronage, the system of personal selection from 
amongst one’s kinsmen and connections, was the instrument by which
property influenced recruitment to those positions in society which were
(9)not determined by property alone". The system represented a half
way house between the formal and inescapable structure of feudal homage, 
and the contractual relationships of the wage system of capitalism. A 
society based as much on the values of ascription and particularism as 
upon achievement and universalism.
The social system was also cemented together by symbolic means, 
the Church of England legitimated the position of the landed aristocracy. 
This it did by demonstrating the Christian backing to the social 
structure, ("The rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate”), as 
well as by making the pursuit of the landlord’s religion an important 
symbolic act of loyalty, and one that was not easily evaded in the rural 
or quasi-rural setting. This was why Dissent flourished in just those 
groups which both wished and could afford to be somewhat independent of 
the paternal hierarchy. This then is part of the explanation of the 
connection between Dissent and capitalism. The new entrepreneurs would 
never be wholly legitimate in the social and political world, at least in 
their lifetime, and they were therefore forced to make their way in the 
world in that one area of activity that was not the province of the
landed aristocracy, trade and industry. They showed their dissent from 
the old structure, from which they were barred, not just in their 
occupations, but symbolically in their religion. Once successful of 
course, they were happy to slip out of the Dissenters' camp and become 
converts to Anglicanism. This explains the familiar progress from 
Anglicanism to Dissent and back again to Anglicanism, which usually 
accompanied social mobility from the labouring poor through the middle 
ranks to a landed estate (Halevy (1950)). This social connection 
between religious dissent and capitalism further reinforced the undoubted 
economic advantages, which Weber demonstrated, between capitalism and 
Puritanism.
In this society, the values associated with the efficient 
running of the capitalist mode of production made very slow progress.
The landed aristocracy were by no means opposed to the development of 
capitalism. As I have already show), in many ways they could be said 
to be the pioneers of agrarian capitalism on their own estates. Many 
also took an interest in what Ashton (1955) has described as the,
1 impulse to contrive', to solve practical problems by rational experiment, 
that was an important feature of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
Such activities in applied science led many of them directly into the 
world of trade and business. Another reason which drew the landed 
aristocracy into closer contact with the expanding world of the business; 
entrepreneur, came as an unintended consequence of their maintenance of 
the feudal principle of primogeniture. Neither the land, the title, 
nor the status of the father normally descended to the younger sons, who 
were sent out into the world, often into business, to fend for themselves. 
This created a tie between the business world and the domain of the 
landed aristocrat, which certainly had beneficial consequences for the 
latter, and prevented that group from falling into the state of penury 
that many of their continental counterparts found themselves in.
The triumphant landed aristocracy that emerged from the struggle 
with the Crown also created, albeit unwittingly, the doctrine of laissez- 
faire, which became such an important condition, in the English context, 
for the development of industrial capitalism. It should be stressed 
that the new landed rulers of England did not deliberately choose such 
a policy. On the contrary, they continued to hold the view, common to 
all their European contemporaries, that it was the duty of a nation's 
rulers to take positive action to increase its wealth and power relative 
to its n e i g h b o u r s . T h e  paradox is to be explained in the fact that 
although the landowners had defeated the old monarchy and replaced it by
one more to their liking, they still had no wish to rule in its place.
The effect of their opposition to effective governmental interference 
with themselves, led to the system of laissez-faire, and certainly 
promoted, the initial development of industrial capitalism.
As one can see, it would be quite wrong to argue that the 
landed aristocracy, as a class, stood implacably opposed to the 
increasing power of the industrial owners of capital. What they largely 
did stand opposed to however, was the acceptance of the full social and 
political consequences of the capitalist economic order. Their reaction 
to the French Revolution, which in some respects at least was a symbolic 
affirmation of that pattern of values which I have argued are the 
natural concomitants of ideal-typical capitalism, was significant. They 
closed ranks against the threat that such a value system would have had 
on their system of privilege. They still held very tightly on to the 
levers of political power as well. Up until about 1815 the distribu­
tion of political power between various interest groups was hardly an 
issue, only very gradually was the political power of the landowners 
challenged by the rising bourgeoisie. One of the most distinctive 
features of English history has been the way that the ruling class has 
always accommodated the claims of the rising group rather than risk
outright confrontation. The passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, which
effectively gave the industrial capitalist the vote, and the striking 
down of the Corn Laws in 1846 showed that the landed aristocracy was 
prepared to give way when it mattered.
The manner in  which th e  owners o f  lan d  g ra d u a lly  l e f t  th e
centre of the political and social arena is itself of quite crucial
significance. There was no sudden handover of power, no symbolic
incident which heralded the dominance of the bourgeoisie, rather the
process was one of a gradual transformation.^^ In that transformation
it was as much a change on the part of-the urban business class as it
was on the part of the rural landed class. I have already indicated
that there was a downward movement from the ranks of the aristocracy
to the world of business via the sons of the former, but of much
greater significance was the movement from the business and trade into
the ranks of the aristocracy. The English landed aristocracy in the
19th century was above all an 'open aristocracy1, their ranks were open,
"to all who could acquire the one necessary qualification, the purchase
(12)price of an estate". Initially, this was probably done with a
certain amount of distaste, but not only did it ensure the survival 
for almost a whole century of the political power of the landed
aristocracy as a ciass, inucn more importantly it meant that the values
of the landed aristocracy were substantially maintained for an even
longer period of time. They accommodated the demands of the rising
bourgeoisie by allowing them entry to their group and converting them,
more or less, to landed aristocrats. Thus the commercial and
industrial elites in Britain, rather than developing their own
distinctive culture, accepted and adopted those of the old governing
class. As Barrington Moore (1973) argues, "All accounts of England
prior to 1914, and to some extent even beyond that date, give the
strong impression that rolling green acres and a country house were
(14)indispensable to political and social eminence". Of course there
were some, like the brewer Bass, who preferred to be, 1 First in the 
beerage rather than last in the peerage’, but the central point is that 
the values of the ’old world1 were not quickly swamped by the values of 
the new entrepreneurs, who by the end of the nineteenth century were 
clearly the new governing class. Because of the accommodating tactics 
of the landed aristocrats, the value structure that should have been 
reflected by the economic base, still bore the strong marks of the 
past era.
Why were th e re  no s tro n g  p ressu re  em anating from  th e
capitalist infrastructure to work upon the institutions and values of
the society pushing them in the appropriate direction? The answer to
this question is to be found in the economic position of British society
up until at least the end of the'nineteenth century. As the first
co u n try  to  in d u s t r ia l is e  B r i t a in  n a t u r a l ly  reaped a l l  th e  advantages o f
b e ing  th e  w o r ld 's  f i r s t  ’ in d u s t r ia l  w o rksh o p '. T h is  tem pora l
advantage clearly wore off as other countries industrialised, and indeed
became something of a handicap as Gershenkron (.1.962) and others have 
(15)argued. Yet Britain was cushioned from many of the later economic
effects'of being first in the field by her colonies. The colonies, by 
initially supplying cheap raw materials, and later providing a protected 
market for British manufactured goods, allowed British business to 
operate within a social and cultural milieu which was by no means entirely 
favourable to business success. Only when the cushioning effect of the 
colonies was removed, coupled with the effects of the second world war, 
did Britain finally pass from being a creditor to a debtor nation. Once 
this happened, as I shall later show (see p.116 etsoq.), the demands of the 
economic system bit deep into the incongruent superstructure, and put 
enormous pressure upon the ruling group to effect superstructural 
changes. Yet given the socio-cultural structure of British society 
which I have described, it does require sustained pressure from the
economic sphere to promote such changes, indeed it very often requires 
something of the order of a crisis to promote radical change. To 
choose an example from the nineteenth century to illustrate this point; 
it took the crisis of the Crimean War to expose the crass inefficiency 
that the system of patronage and the purchase of commissions had 
bequeathed to the armed forces. After this was exposed, army reforms 
based largely on the values of achievement rather than ascription, 
and universalism rather that particularism, were not long in coming.
The Crimean debacle had a similar effect upon the principles of 
recruitment and administration inside the Civil service and hastened 
the implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.
I have argued that in order to understand the structure of 
British society at the end of the eighteenth century it is necessary 
to take cognisance of the fact that she was emerging from a feudal 
structure. If one turns to America a t ’the same period of time, 
perhaps the single most important point to note is that the country 
possessed no feudal past - at least not in anything like the fully 
developed form Urnt had existed in England. Certainly one can find 
evidence in parts of New England in the seventeenth century, that the 
combined power of the English aristocracy and the Puritan clergy did
(16
utilise the medieval doctrine of justurn pretium to regulate commerce. 
But by the middle of that, century, these regulations had been success­
fully opposed by the Boston merchant class, and the influx of 
immigrants had begun to kick over the remaining traces of feudalism.
By the end of the seventeenth century the prestige and power of the 
capitalist businessman was growing apace, the merchants in the seaports 
of the Atlantic coast were challenging the traditional elite of the 
manorial lords who had founded their great estates on the rivers and 
bays of New England. Cochran (1962) notes that even in Charleston,
S. Carolina, centre of a proud plantation aristocracy, planters 
apprenticed their younger sons and married their daughters to the men 
of the counting houses.
The early ascendancy of business in American society should 
not be surprising. America was a British colony and the colonies 
were regarded primarily as a source of trading wealth. Thus the early 
settlements were soon conceived of as enterprises for private profit 
by entrepreneurs, rather than as objects of the imperial purpose by 
government. From the beginnings of modern America then, capitalism 
was the central feature of the society, a system of production that was 
to become the most important factor in moulding the new society1s
institutions and, perhaps of even greater importance, in attracting 
immigrants with congruent value systems.
There are many features which contributed to the formation of
a cultural system that was very largely well adapted to the needs of
capitalism. One has only to observe, as Weber did, the relationship
between religious puritanism and capitalism, to appreciate this point.
I have already examined the connection between religion and the origins
of the business class in British society (see P.59 ), and showed in
particular the relationship between religious dissenters and business
as an occupation. Since dissent was stronger in the larger English
cities many of the merchants interested in the American colonies were
men of Calvinist persuasions. It seems to me incontestable that the
religious ideas and values of ascetic protestantism are pretty well
attuned to the ideas and motives ’required' for disciplined, rationalised,
persistent capitalistic effort. The debate, I would suggest, is more
over the weight to be given to such a factor, and whether such values
proceed or follow the capitalist mode of production in any particular 
(17)
case. It is not difficult to find plenty of examples of men who
taught American businessmen to serve God by making money. Cotton
Mather, who was writing in Boston in 1700, was probably one of the first
to preach this message, and certainly influenced Benjamin Franklin, whom
Weber chose as his example to illustrate the Protestant Ethic thesis in
(18)
the American setting. By the beginning of the nineteenth century
there were a formidable number of clergymen who appeared as eulogisers
(19)or apologists of the free economy, of capitalism and capitalists.
Yet I think that it is significant that the vast majority of these 
religieux grew up, lived and worked in districts experiencing industrial­
isation and brisk economic growth. Their congregations and churches 
were largely dependent upon the donations of industrialists and merchants. 
Wylie (1966) does not succeed in finding a single clergyman from the 
rural districts of America, from agricultural or lumbering regions, 
preaching the gospel of economic success. This evidence strongly 
suggests that these rei.igi.ous doctrines were shaped by the desires of 
the businessmen of the rising commercial centres for their own ends, 
legitimating the new economic and social order. Such doctrines could 
be used against the waste and extravagance of the Old World, that were
symbolic representations of a social structure that was not attuned to /
(20)the needs of trade and industry in the capitalist context. J
Even before 1776 America was a country where business was of 
quite central inportance to the whole society. Whilst it was probably
true that there were no great cultural impediments to the demands of the 
economic infrastructure, there was one considerable impediment to the 
development of indigenous American capitalism - the colonial power of 
Great Britain. British trading and manufacturing interests opposed 
many developments in the colonies simply because they were not in their 
interests. The reaction to colonial rule on the part of the American 
merchants is well known. Goaded in particular by British taxes, they 
began to devise substitutes ('or British trade and credit, signed non­
importation agreements and planned strategies for the defence of their 
own trading position.
This defiance of the colonial ruling class became ever easier 
as 1776 approached* because the character of the colony was gradually 
changing. One of the forces bringing about that change was the 
increasing number of immigrants who were coming to the New World.
Although'it was certainly true that many of these people had been ’pushed’ 
from the Old World, as the result of persecution or discrimination of one 
sort or another, it is equally true that many were also pulled by the 
attraction of America. These immigrants, drawn preponderantly from the 
poorer classes* shut out from wealth and privilege in their own 
societies, savoured the chance to get on in a society that, by contrast, 
placed few restrictions upon a man willing to work hard for his own 
profit. These people, sufficiently brave and adventurous to make tlve 
Atlantic crossing, who had given up their stake in European society, 
were naturally not to be easily frustrated in their labours by the hand 
of Europe that stretched out across the Atlantic from'the shores of the 
British Isles. British colonial rule represented the decadent, 
oppressive and restrictive society which many of them had left. Many 
of the immigrants in the eighteentli century were not English anyway, the 
German pietists and the Scots-lrish rebels could hardly be expected to 
have much respect for the", authority of English colonialism.
liven in this hastily drawn picture of the pre-revoLutionary 
immigrant,/ one can see how easily the doctrines of Calvinism fitted.
A group devoted to the virtues of success by their own labours found an 
easy home in the Calvinism that Tawney (1921) described as, "the first 
systematic body of religious teaching which can be said to recognise 
and applaud the economic virtues". From Calvinism to the secular 
philosophy of natural rights is but a short step. Particularly in 
the communities bordering on the wilderness in the back country away 
from the Eastern seaboard, the illusion of man’s pre-existence in a 
state of nature was one that found a ready acceptance. Thistiethwaite 
(1955), in his aptly named book, The Great Experiment, elegantly teases
out the connecting links: “The existence of natural rights which,
antedate the State, the idea of' the State created as the result of a 
compact among free men for certain specific purposes, came naturally to 
men who regarded the bonds of society as limited commitments. Above 
all, in the writings of Locke, Americans found a brilliantly explicit 
formulation of what they regarded as common sense; and his doctrine of 
the right of revolution against arbitrary rule provided a completely 
satisfying basis for opposition.to the new colonial policy. The Two 
Treatises of Government gave Americans an ideology for revolution to 
be revealed plainly in the Declaration of independence and in Paine’s 
’Common Sense’
In essence then, the revolution was a contest between the 
commercial interests of England and America/although more elevated 
issues played their part as well. There is some dispute among the 
historians of the American past about whether the resulting American 
Constitution and new administration represented directly the interests 
of the business class or not. It is possible to point to certain 
provisions of the Constitution that were directly favourable to the
(22)
promulgation of business, although it is equally possible to show
that.the men who gathered in Philadelphia in the spring and summer of
1787 were an elite overwhelmingly composed of the gentleman class, whose
(23)
main frame of reference was the land. The truth of the matter
probably lies somewhere in between; the groups that had come together
in the desire for American independence had diverse interests apart 
from their determination to see a free America. In particular, the 
upper class leaders of the revolution were divided into two basic 
groups, Northern capitalists and Southern plantation owners, and the 
Constitution represented not a victory of one over the other, but a 
-compromise between them. In one sense, whichever side one takes in the 
debate over the Constitution, is not of great significance for this work 
Even the values enshrined in what Lipset (1963) calls the’anti-urban,
agrarian utopia of the Jeffersonians’, embraced a set of values which
were clearly supportive of the capitalist system - cither in its urban 
or agrarian form. These values derided unearned privileges, stressed 
the equality of all to get on in the market place, praised the values of 
frugality and hard work, and above all elevated the material rewards 
that were the prizes for the successful. So powerful were these values 
at least in the North and West, so readily do they reflect the stress 
upon achievement, affective-neutrality, specificity, universalism and 
self-orientation that many of the old aristocracy fled to the privileged 
shelter of Canada, where the values of the Old World were still largely
preserved. In America the true ground work was laid for a society 
based on the idea of contract - the essence of capitalism.
I have already argued that this value system was partly to be
understood in terms of the experiences of the immigrants that crossed
the Atlantic to form American society. A prime attraction was the
desire to achieve the economic success that was largely denied them,
(24)
because of the structure of their own native societies. It has
also to be argued however, that at the very least, the experience of 
America provided a very fertile soil on which this value system could 
develop. The individualism that is to be found in the Constitution 
was clearly fostered not only by the selective effects of migration 
from the Old World, but also by the conditions of life in what was to 
be known as the ’Frontier*. The Frontier, it is often argued, must 
have further heightened the exercise of individual resourcefulness, for 
the conditions there constantly confronted the settler with circum­
stances in which he could rely upon no one but himself, and where the
capacity to improvise a solution for a problem was not infrequently
(25)
necessary to survival. Such conditions also stimulated the values
of hard work and those of practical ingenuity. As Schlesinger (1970)
puts it, "The complicated nature of the farmer’s job, especially during
the first two and a half centuries, afforded an unexcelled training in
mechanical ingenuity. These ex-Europeans and their descendants became
a race of whittlers and tinkers, daily engaged in devising, improving
and repairing tools and other utensils until, as Emerson said, they had
(9C)
'the power and habit of invention their brain” '. The Frontier
was also a moving frontier; rates of geographical mobility were
spectacularly high in 19th century America as the new immigrants pursued
their fortunes in new jobs, new settlements, new farms. Failure in a
particular venture or place did not necessarily mean a permanent failure,
the inherent optimism of the immigrants at Least ensured that most would
(27)
try again, probably m  another location. The effect of this
constant movement can be related up, I believe, to the importance of 
money in the American value system. On a journey, or in a new community 
money was one of the few things that could be easily transported. More 
than that, money also demonstrated, in the context of American society, 
the presence of admirable qualities in the man who attained it. Cash 
took the place of pedigree in the new society. Thus, as early as 1836 
Washington Irving coined his classic phrase concerning ’The almighty 
dollar, that great subject of universal devotion throughout the land’.
In summary, as Thistlethwaite (1955) argues, "The westerner, whatever his 
occupation, was fundamentally concerned to make money, and where so much
around him was uncertain, so much awaited exploitation and men felt free 
of the restraining hand of custom the cash nexus increasingly governed
his social transations and capitalism fround a uniquely fair field to
. „ (28) grow m  .
Few men desire money lor its own sake of course, eventually 
some invest in some form of property. The private ownership of 
property became an important value in the American state from its 
inception. It was Jefferson, following Locke, who enunciated the 
principle that, ''Who would govern himself must own his own soul. To 
own his own soul he must own property, the means of economic security". 
Jefferson's view of the optimum society for the fulfillment of the 
American ideals was a society composed of independent farmers, and to 
some extent this form of society was probably attained in the West 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. These Jeffersonian 
ideals and their practice, provided a wholly appropriate set of values 
for the later emergence of the industrial market society. After all, 
if one imagines a subsistence farming community, in Which each family 
receives each year exactly what it produces, and each family is thereby 
perfectly free to make its own choices concerning the 'trade off' between 
goods and leisure, then these are the classic conditions of the market 
society expounded by Adam Smith.
Finally, one might note how the different conditions of the
NewWorld led to a greater stress upon the value of achievement rather
than that of ascription. One can illustrate this point by considering
the role of women in American society. In the migrating stream, whether
from Europe or from the Eastern seaboard, young and unmarried men 
(29)predominated. Women had scarcity value, but this scarcity value
was not just as wives or sweethearts but also as workers. In the West, 
where the demands for labour were greatest, the Old World attitudes were 
ground away by the forces of economic necessity, as women laboured 
alongside the men, albeit often doing different tasks. This new position 
in the society, particularly in the Western states, allowed women to 
become independent ami self .confident, and this eventually led to them 
demanding, at a very early period, formal rights for their sex.
Let me now turn to the role of the state in early American 
society. I would suggest that the popular view of the state’s role in 
economic life in America up to say, 1850, was one of the vigorous pursuit 
of a laissez-faire policy. Many commentators have in fact argued this 
particular proposition. The origins of the policy, it is argued, can 
be traced back to the hostility felt by the colonists for the regulations
imposed by the mother country. Bcndix (1964) notes, that "among the 
complaints of the colonies against the ’repeated injuries and usurpations* 
of the King of Great Britain is the declaration that ’he has created a 
multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harrass 
our people and out their substance"’. 11115 hostility to govern­
ment, it is argued, was perpetuated beyond the Alleghanies. The enormous 
resources of empty land, with accompanying minerals and other materials, 
demanded a minimum of social discipline. Instead, authority rested on 
the isolated individual, who, owing no obligations to any wider
corporate unity, carried so much of the responsibility for ordering his
(31)life. This account, which is put forward by a large number of writers,
fits in well with the dominant cultural values in American society, which
I have attempted to expound in the previous pages. And yet despite this
’goodness of fit', the thesis is, in some ways, a mistaken one. Shonfield
(1965), is one of the few writers who correctly notes that, ’’Historically,
American capitalism in its formative period was much readier to accept
(32)intervention by public authority than-British capitalism". One of
the major reasons for this is that an interventionist policy was vastly 
beneficial to the needs of the embryo capitalist economy at that time.
In particular, the state had a considerable role to play in providing 
the essential services of the economy, like those of transport (canals 
and railways), and banks, which were largely beyond the means of 
private enterprise as it then existed. Clear evidence of the role of 
the state governments during 'this period is provided in llartz’s (1948) 
study of the development of economic policy in Pennsylvania. Hartz 
finds a total of over 150 ’mixed corporations’, in which state govern­
ment and private enterprise were partners, in the records of the year 
(33)
1844. *■ Why have so many historians apparently been mistaken?
The problem can be solved by clearly distinguishing between the powers 
of individual state legislatures and Federal power. The opposition 
to government'interference'-in the economy which so many writers have, 
quite correctly, picked up as a distinguishing feature of the American 
value system, is an opposition to Federal power. The opposition was 
not to the use of public power in the economic system where this was 
thought to be beneficial to the development of private enterprise, but 
only to any reinforcement of central power wielded through the Federal 
authority. As Shonfield (1965) writes, "The fear was only of the 
potential Leviathan in W a s h i n g t o n " . I t  should be noted however, 
that once private enterprise had grown in power and size by the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, public enterprise, even at the level 
of the state was deemed to be interference with the natural operation
of the private enterprise system.
What 1 have attempted to do in the'-proceeding pages is to try
and show'the historical origins of the American cultural system. In
doing so I have stressed the ways in which the pattern of the values was
largely congruent with the needs of the capitalist economic order.
What I have described however, although largely true I believe of the
North and West, was not true of the South. Certainly the Southern
economy was capitalist in the sense that it Was production for private
profit, yet it was not bourgeois; the capitalist economic order existed
inside a social structure which reflected the value structure of the Old
World. It reflected the values of ascription over achievement, of
affectivity over affective-neutrality, of diffuseness over specificity
and of particularism over universalism. It is doubtful whether it
can be argued that the Southern economy was dying out for internal
reasons, or that it was an economic fetter upon industrial capitalism 
(35)
in the North. The real divide between the South and the North was
the symbolic one of culture. In the North and West were to be found
the development of essentially bourgeois values, and these values were
strengthened as industrial capitalism got more and more of a hold in
the North. In the South, if anything the landed wealthy inhabitants
appeared to look around to discover and emphasize whatever aristocratic
and pre-industrial traits they could find in their own society to
distinguish them from the men of money in the North. The clash was
essentially over the issue of what type of society America was to be,
as Barrington Moore (1973) notes, "Labour-repressive agricultural
systems, and plantation slavery in particular, are political obstacles
(36)
to a particular kind of capitalism, at a specific historical stage". 
Striking down slavery therefore was an important symbolic step, it 
represented the end of the uneasy.compromise.that had lasted since 1776, 
and a victory for bourgeois capitalism. The victory of the North meant 
that the Southern whites would have to conform to the value system of 
industrial capitalism, as General W.T. Sherman put it after the war,
"At last the Southern whites would have to earn an honest living".
The victory that came in 1865 was not a total victory for that 
side of the pattern variables that I have designated capitalist'or 
bourgeois. This should hardly be surprising because the complete 
acceptance of such a set of values would be a partial contradiction of 
the relations of production inherent in such a society. For example, 
although there was a movement inside Northern capitalism, the Radical 
Republicans, that wanted to totally revolutionize the South, even to
the extent of confiscating all plantation estates over 200 acres in 
size and giving each negro household *40 acres and a mule1, they were 
not successful. Ultimately, Northern capitalism was in no mood to 
tolerate an outright attack on property, even the property of the 
plantation owners. To have done so would have been to have 
symbolically attacked one of the fundamental principles of the 
capitalist economic order itself - the protection of private property.
The preceeding historical analysis of the emergence of 
bourgeois society,in Britain and America, although of necessity hastily 
drawn, should provide a sufficient background for the more detailed 
analysis of those elements of social structure that can be directly 
reJated to the operation of business enterprise in the two societies 
under discussion. I intend to consider those aspects of societal 
superstructure, like the polity, the system of social stratification, 
the educational system, and the system of public administration, which 
provide the social setting within which business operates. This will 
be l'ollowed by a comparative analysis of the way in which these factors 
have affected the structure and operation of business organisations in 
Britain and America.
1 will begin by making some observations on the political 
structure of Britain, and America, and in particular noting the relation­
ship between the political rulers and the power of capital. But first 
a note of caution. As Giddens (i974) observes, the theoretical 
literature dealing with elites and power, "wallows in a sea of ineffable 
confusion - a situation which results from variation in terminological
convention, conceptual ambiguity, and profound divergences in the
(3 7)
theoretical standpoints of different authors". One might also add,
th a t  th e  a rea  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power is  a ls o  n o t one th a t  Is  p a r t i c u la r ly
rich in empirical studies. This is doubtless partly a function of the
confusions referred to above, although this lias not usually proved to
be a bar to sociological research’., but it is also because of intense
problems of research access, and, related to this last point, because
of considerable differences of opinion about the appropriate investi-
(38)g a t iv e  m ethodology. Th is  is  indeed fo rb id d in g  t e r r i t o r y  to  e n te r ,
b u t one w hich n e v e rth e le s s  must be e n te re d  because o f  th e  im p o rta n t  
r o le  p o l i t i c a l  power can p la y  in  s o c ie ty .  The p o l i t i c a l  s tru c tu re s  
do in  m y  v iew  have a c e r ta in  degree o f  autonomy, th a t  i s ,  those in  
p o l i t i c a l  power do to  some e x te n t  have th e  means to  change th e  s o c ie ty .  
T h is  is  n o t o f  course to  argue th a t  p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n  making is  
u n in flu e n c e d . The e x is t in g  in s t i t u t io n s  and p ra c t ic e s ,  as w e l l  as
all the pressures emanating from a large number of goups in society all 
help to constrain-the powers -of the ruling group.
'The'crucial question for this thesis is the relationship 
between the owners of the means of production and the political rulers. 
The relationship is not a simple one in either society, but it is my 
contention that the powers of the capitalist economic order have been 
relatively greater in American society than in British society.
Britain, I have argued, became a capitalist society only very 
gradually, and not without considerable opposition from the class it 
dispossessed of power, the landed aristocracy. The two groups 
confronted each other on every issue in the nineteenth century. In 
politics the capitalists demanded the abolition of patronage and 
corruption and their replacement by competition. In commerce they 
demanded the abolition of protection and monopoly, as symbolised by the 
Corn Laws, and the completion of the system of free trade. In 
industrial relations they mostly demanded the abolition of all state 
interference between employer and employee (except for children), and 
the substitution of the contractual relations of employer and employed 
for the paternal relations of master .and servant. All this and more 
was conceded despite the fact that the landed aristocracy held on to
the formal positions of power until around the turn of the twentieth
. (39)century.
Although the battle for control of the legislature was won 
with relative ease by those representing the interests of capital, they 
did not always use their power as effectively as they might in 
furthering their own interests. One can see this quite clearly in the 
development of the education system in the nineteenth century. Instead 
of ending up with a system directly geared to the needs of industrial 
capitalism, a system at least as much in keeping with the ideas and 
values of the landed aristocracy was instituted (sec below p. 86 et scq). 
Arguably of equal importance in winning ’the battle for the mind’, was 
the battle for the control of the media - papers and periodicals in the 
nineteenth century to be joined by radio and television in the twentieth . 
century, by which time one could truly speak of the mass media.
Ucrtainly one can chart the gradual infiltration of the aristocratic 
press in the nineteenth century by middle class notions supportive of 
the bourgeois worid - in particular the spread of that corrosive
doctrine of the ’self made man’. Yet at the same time it is clear 
that the triumph was by no means complete. One has only to examine 
the development of the B.B.C. under Lord Reith, whose doctrine of
’education by stealth’ owed as much' to the values of the old aristoc­
racy as it did to the values of commercialism. Indeed the fact that 
commercial interests were rigidly excluded in the early days of radio 
and television in England compared with their fate in the United States 
is itself of some significance.
The reasons why some of these ’victories' on the part of the 
bourgeoisie were rather less than complete is not so difficult to 
understand. Firstly, and of quite crucial significance, it must be 
realised that the English aristocracy had an acute sense of history.
They recognised an irresistable force when they met one, and so rather 
than provoke an open confrontation with the rising bourgeoisie, they 
accommodated to their demands and in so doing they managed to preserve 
many of their old values, as well as their hold on many of the insti­
tutions of English society. Even losing the battle over free trade, 
for example, was not disastrous to many landowners. They realised that 
with improved methods of high farming, free trade need not be ruinous. 
Towards the end of the century, many of the greater landlords drew an 
increasing proportion of their incomes from the artifacts of trade and 
industry anyway. This did not make them industrialists, far from it, 
but it did give them an appreciation of the world of capital, and made 
it easier for them to absorb successful capitalists into their inidst.
By accommodating in this manner, they managed to retain their values 
and style of life to an extent that the rising bourgeoisie at worst 
felt ambivalent towards them, and at best wished to emulate them.
The ideals and values of the landed aristocracy, in particular
the twin pillars of property and patronage were not entirely lost in the
battle. Patronage, representing the values of ascription and particui-
arism rather than achievement and universalism, certainly found survival
difficult, yet it did not entirely disappear, merely because money could
(41)always purchase certain clear advantages in the competitive race.
The doctrine of self help, powerfully spelt out by Samuel Smiles in his 
treatise of the same name, that "vVhat some men are, all without 
difficultyinight be. Employ the same means, and the same results will 
follow”*42* was a justification for the ’new’ society which not 
surprisingly found widespread acceptance, despite being largely 
fictitious, as a statement about the possibilities of social mobility. 
Yet even such a doctrine as this began to look tired and weary by the 
end of the century. Its major work, of clearing away some of the more 
outrageous uses of patronage had been accomplished, and now it stood 
almost as something of a threat to the new ruling class, the successful
capitalists, who were just as anxious to resist its implications of an 
attack from below, as the old ruling class had been. The other pillar, 
property, was much easier to preserve. Although one can juxtapose 
active capital as against passive property, the profit earner against 
the rentier; ultimately, capitalism as a system rests upon the private 
ownership of property. The attack on property can easily lead to an 
attack on capital, .and so the attack was never seriously mounted.*4 *^
Finally, it should be realised that even if it could be 
clearly shown that the middle class entrepreneurs were the real ’govern­
ing class', at least by half way through the nineteenth century, and 
that the institutions which they created and largely controlled were in 
their own long term economic interests, one still has to contend with 
the sociological fact that institutions tend to take on a life of their 
own. It seems to me that this was the case in many institutions that 
went to make up the British welfare state. Capitalists demanded cheap 
and efficient government, and their ideal was undoubtedly as little 
government as was conducive to the profitable running of the economy.
The end result, a relatively bureaucratic, centralised and intervention­
ist state that emerged by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
can be seen as partly a reflection of the increasingly complex needs 
created by the capitalist economy. Certainly there was considerable
dispute, as there still is, about what the needs of such an economy 
(44)
might be. Yet one cannot explain the development of the Victorian
state merely by arguing that eventually the owners of capital realised
(45)
that it was in their own interests, although this is partially true.
The institutions of the welfare state needed to be staffed by men and 
women selected on merit who would acquire a certain amount of expertise 
in their area. Once expert, these administrators began to see the 
social conditions that confronted them through ’ professional’ eyes, 
they developed policies and administrative mechanisms that were as 
much a reflection of their own autonomous position as of anything else. 
In short the administrators of the welfare state developed a certain 
independence. This was possible because their ’professionalism’ could 
find links with both the ideals of capitalism as well as those of the 
landed aristocrats. In the first case, professional expertise and 
selection by merit linked arms with capital and competition in 
opposition to property and patronage. In the second, the obvious 
paternalism of the welfare state fitted well with the old paternalism 
of the landed aristocrats.*46*
In Britain capitalism has always competed with other ideals,
the aristocratic ideal and the socialist ideal to name but two. In 
the United States, although this competition has not been entirely 
absent, it has never reached the level of a-full confrontation. The
(47)
promises which capitalism offered have never been seriously challenged.
In one sense it could be argued that the political elite in American 
society has been a rather less important group that its counterpart in 
British society. The American Constitution was drafted with a vivid 
sense of the dangers of strong government. This has resulted firstly, 
in a Federal structure, With less power concentrated in a centralised 
political elite. Secondly, it has meant, as I have already noted, a 
comparative lack of government compared with Britain. In other words, 
it has influenced both the type and quantity of government in the United 
States. This peculiar American heritage, of government viewed merely 
as a service agency with certain limited regulatory functions, made it 
easy for powerful groups in American society to see themselves as the 
real locus of power. Business capitalism, as such an interest, had few 
rivals in this society. The absence of an established church, the lack 
of an hereditary aristocracy of landowners, or of competing careers in 
the civil service or the army, made it easy for business to become the 
dominant ethos and thus the dominant political group.
Business men have certainly been important in the Federal 
government itself, even Mills (1956), who believed that there was a 
separation of the business and political domains, noted that up to his 
time 60^ of the members of American cabinets had 'business backgrounds'. 
Even Lasswell (1952), a political scientist of very different 
persuasions from Mills, claims that businessmen were the largest single 
occupational group in cabinet between 1889 and 1949. This is in 
considerable contrast to the position in Britain, where for roughly the 
same period of time rather less than 3Q& were businessmen.*4^* The 
evidence from 1949 is just as strong. Schecter (1968), reports that in 
the eighteen years Of government from 1949 to 1967 businessmen accepted 
almost 180 appointments at the level of assistant secretary or higher.
If one concentrates on just four areas of government, defence and 
military services, the Treasury, the Commerce Department and the Post 
Office, then one finds that under Truman one third of the total number 
of appointments went to businessmen, under Eisenhower two thirds, and 
under Kennedy and Johnson about one quarter. Yet in the American 
political system, because of the constitutional separation of powers 
and the loose structure of the two major political parties, pressure 
groups are of fundamental significance. Some commentators have even 
gone so far as to refer to them as the 'fourth branch of government'#*^9*
It is at this political level .that business is really powerful in the 
United States.*0^*
The dominance o f  business in  th e  p o l i t y  was supported by th e
cultural traditions I have already described. Take for example the
self-help philosophy of.Samuel Smiles, which crossed the Atlantic in
the form of Horatio Alger. The early American sociologist, Sumner,
popularised the Social Darwinist philosophy that is embedded in the
self-help ethic. The belief in the ’survival of the fittest',
"encouraged- a. belief in divine right among the nouveau riche, a faith
that the concentration of business had created a ruling class with the
(51)
power and the duty of controlling the destinies Of the Republic".
Such powerful doctrines were perhaps necessary for many ex-European 
peasants, who found themselves initially bound to a new kind of 
feudalism in which the new business lord apparently had rights but no 
duties.
One can note the same differences between Britain and America 
even at the local political level. In an interesting study in the 
'sociology of leadership' tradition, Miller (1958) investigated the 
community power structure in two American and one British city, all 
matched for Size, economic, demographic and educational characteristics. 
His results, he claims, show "a striking difference between G.B. and 
U.S.A.......Businessmen do exert a predominant influence in community
decision making in Pacific City and Southern City" (U.S.A.).
"However, in English City the hypothesis is rejected. The key 
influentials come from a broad representation of the institutional
(52)
sectors of community life". He also notes that business pressure
groups are active even in community politics in America, whilst such 
organised lobbying is condemned in Britain.
The argument that I have been attempting to demonstrate has 
shown that there has been greater political support for industrial 
capitalism in America than in Britain. Both are clearly capitalist 
countries, in both the political leadership has given large scale 
support for the demands of such an economy, but there are detectable 
differences between the two examples that have important historical 
antecedents. And yet what of the argument that wishes to deny the 
essential proposition in the above view, i.e. that the economic 
interests of capital are the fundamental interests in the political 
structures of the two societies? I refer of course to what can be called 
the pluralist-democratic view, classically espoused by Dahl (1958).
This model of the political process takes the view that the state is
independent of any particular interest, but responds to the different 
lobbies according to the pressures exercised.
It would be difficult to apply this model of the decision-
making process to the last quarter of the nineteenth century in America,
a period which has colourfully, and not inaccurately, been described as .
the ’age of the robber barons’. It is possible to agree with Ilobsbawm
(1975), that many of the great American capitalists of this period were
great creative innovators. Their wealth was therelore due, at least
in part, not to economic banditry, but to the generosity with which
society rewarded its benefactors. Yet such arguments cannot be
applied to the majority of such men, who operated in a society without
any control over business dealings, and where the scope for the powerful
and the unscrupulous rich was virtually unlimited. Here, if you like,
was rule by capital. Those days passed however, and in 1890 the first
piece of anti-monopoly legislation was passed, the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. The Act represented a triumph of the agrarian Midwest and South
against the dominance of the finance and industry of the Eastern seaboard.
It was to be followed by the Clayton Act (1914) and the Federal Trade
Commission Act (1914), both aiming, ostensibly, at the monopoly powers
of big business. One can add to this much of the legislation
associated with the New Deal, in particular the Wagner Act (1935), which
vastly increased the bargaining power of labour. Finally one can note,
as Parsons (1960) does, the continued complaints made by American
businessmen against what they call ’ state interference’ . Parsons finds
such business opposition to government, ’impossible to understand’,
unless one assumes "genuine, and in some cases effective government
(5 3 )
control of business". ' In view of all these observations surely 
it can be argued that Dahl's pluralist model does account for a 
considerable range of observations? This is not really a question to 
which there can be any absolute clearcut answers, but on balance I would 
reject the pluralist view-of ‘American society. Firstly, the ’evidence’ 
in favour of Dahl's proposition, which has been briefly alluded to above, 
is capable of yielding wholly contrary conclusions. Take Tor'example 
the anti-trust legislation. Hie traditional view has been that such 
legislation was passed to check the power of big business. In fact 
this argument has come under considerable attack from writers like 
Kolko (1963), and Pierce (1973). They argue that it was not in fact 
true that big business was gaining at the expense of smaller rivals.
In fact the very reverse was true; there was a significant decline in 
the relative strength of the trusts from 1902-1914 and the sponsors of 
the 1914 legislation were aware of this decline. In industries such as
automobiles, agricultural implements, steel, copper etc., vigorous new
firms entering on the basis of- technological innovation or new consumer
tastes were badly cutting into the markets of the old established firms.
The 1914 legislation was passed not because of the inadequacy of the
Sherman Act, which was perfectly capable of attacking monopoly, It was
aimed not in fact at the giant monopolies at all, but at the vigorous
competitive methods employed by those firms beyond the reach of the
(54) ,
Gherman Act because of their smaller* size. Some writers have
constructed a similar argument for the New Deal programme, including
the Wagner Act. Prewitt and Stone (1973) argued that the key to the
whole New Deal programme was the ceaseless searching for new means to
preserve capitalism and to restore prosperity to business. The Wagner
Act, by increasing labour1s bargaining power, put more consumption
(55)power into the economic system, and at the same time regularised 
management-labour relations thus preventing labour unrest from 
exploding and endangering the social system.
If the argument can be made that much of the legislation that 
appeared, at first sight, to be inimical to the interests of business, 
was in fact in their long term interests, then how does one account for 
the constant protests on behalf of capital against government? This,
I would suggest, is not difficult to comprehend in the American context, 
where because of its low general status, government provides a conven­
ient personification of the obscure forces which cause the outcomes of 
business decisions to differ from expectations. Anyway, at one level 
of analysis, business interests are obviously divided, a policy 
favourable to the interests of one industry may be positively detrimental 
to the interests of another. It would be foolish not to concede the 
point that, as Miliband (19G9) puts .it, "Governments.... have in fact been 
compelled over the years to act against some property rights, to erode 
some managerial prerogatives, to help redress somewhat the balance 
between capital and labour, between property and those who are subject 
to it". } Two facts remain: firstly, the fact that a wealthy
business class which makes concessions remains a wealthy business class - 
it stoops to conquer. Secondly, it is difficult to see that the key 
institutions of capitalist society in America, those of profit, property 
and the market, are in any sense withering away. Business may indeed 
be tactically divided, but it is strategically cohesive in the sense 
that the system itself has never come under any form of sustained attack. 
It is this fact, above all others, that demonstrates that Dahl’s 
position is fundamentally untenable.
In the case of England, business interests have never reached
the dominating heights that the ’robber barons’ reached in American
society. Business behaviour has been constrained by the contact it has
had with the aristocracy, and those groups which have been fundamentally
opposed to the capitalist economic system, although relatively weak,
have certainly been stronger in Britain than in the United States. Yet
having noted this, it is difficult to avoid the conclusions of a
sociologist like Rex (1974), who concludes that, "Britain is a country
characterised by a form of class rule and (that) there is a good prima
facie case to be made out both that the class which rules, when it comes
to the crunch, is the bourgeoisie, and that there survives a more
(57)historic aristocratic class".
The differences that I have described in the character of the
political elites in Britain and America are crucial, because of the
potential power of such groups to determine the structure of their
societies. One fundamental feature of social structure, which can
have marked effects on the running of business, is the stratification
system. Some writers appear to take the view that the broad dimensions
of the stratification system are determined by the needs of the economic
structure itself, without any reference to the character of the political 
(58)
elites. ' This view I take to be untenable. The real issue, it
seems to me, is the nature of the interplay between cconoinjg/occupational 
forces and the political superstructure in determining the nature of the 
stratification system. Given that I have argued that there are 
differences in the nature of the political elites in the two societies, 
it follows that one should expect to find differences in their strati­
fication systems.
In broad terms I have a rgued that America has placed greater 
emphasis upon the pattern variables that I have associated with capital­
ism, than Britain. The stress upon the value of achievement rather than.
ascription in particular, should be reflected in the stratification
(59)system, other things being equal. Certainly it can be argued that
subjectively, class and status distinctions have been less 
important in the United States than in Britain. Probably the majority 
of the immigrants who-moved across the Atlantic in the nineteenth 
century welcomed the move into a society which was more 'open*, and 
where achieved wealth was much more important than ascribed rank. The 
relative lack of status distinctions inside the American population had 
profound effects upon the structure of the population as a consumer 
market. Observers from De Tocqueville to the present day have found
American consumers less distinguished’ as individualistic judges of 
quality than as anxious conformists to remarkably uniform and stand­
ardized patterns. There are a number of reasons why this should be 
the case. Firstly, the consuming public in America was more 
homogeneous in terms of income distribution than Britain. Secondly, 
since consumption patterns reflect social status distinctions, in a 
society where those distinctions are fewer and less important, the 
market is more likely to accept relatively standardized products. In
Britain on the other hand, the consuming public was more heavily 
stratified, and, because of Jess geographical mobility, more localised.
In brief the stratification system was itself partly a cause of the 
fact that America was much further advanced in mass production 
techniques than was Britain. In the latter, the small firm, which 
existed to supply products with individual character, reflecting highly 
differentiated status distinctions, occupied a much more important 
place in the British economy than in its American counterpart. Although 
these differences have probably narrowed, there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that there is still a difference which materially effects the 
business environment of firms operating in the two economies.
Whilst I have argued above that the nature of the stratification 
system, as it affected the structure of the consumer market, undoubtedly 
effected the operation of business in the two societies, it is also 
necessary to examine the effect that the nature of stratification had 
upon inputs to the business firm''as .well as outputs. Considerable 
evidence has been accumulated that suggests that the existence of large 
numbers of unskilled immigrants in America in the nineteenth century also 
encouraged the early development of mass production techniques. The 
existence of liberal land policies, westward expansion, and the demand 
for such-men in transport and construction, kept this type of labour 
relatively scarce in the manufacturing sector. There was thus an 
economic incentive to replace such labour by more capital intensive 
methods of production, and this economic reasoning was encouraged by 
the fact that the work performed by the unskilled was relatively easy
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to adapt to machinery. * It has also been argued that the relative 
absence of slyJLled craftsmen in the United States also led to a 
general tendency to mechanise industrial processes wherever possible.
The structural conditions influencing the manufacturing process in 
nineteenth century Britain and America are probably no longer operable, 
but much popular literature still testifies to similar important 
differences in the manufacturing sectors of the two economies that 
undoubtedly have their origins in these antecedent historical 
conditions.
The full institutionalisation of a value system that stresses 
affective-neutrality, specificity, universalism, achievement, and self 
orientation would set up considerable social strains. The potentially 
fragmenting, effects of a gcsellschaft society have been noted as far back, 
as the eighteenth century, and of the founding fathers of sociology, 
Durkheim devoted much of his attention to the potential anomic nature of 
such societies. American social structure, although firmly committed 
to this potentially anomic value set, appears to have developed a 
coping mechanism. I am referring to the fact that status differences 
appear to be far less important in the United StatesJ personal
(6 3 )relations, for example, are not so much affected by status reference. 
Sutton et al (1962) phrase the point nicely, "If ’capitalism' is still 
respectable in the United States, the fluidity of 'informal' social 
relations has greatly contributed".^6^  In Britain the problem has 
been partially surmounted by the fact that the potentially anomic value 
set has not been so firmly grasped, vestiges of the value system of the 
aristocracy, of paternalism and deference, still have some hold on 
British society. That such differences between America and Britain are 
still manifest is testified to by numerous writers including Lipset
/ r* f  \
(1963). these differences in the stratification of the two
societies will almost certainly be reflected in the economic system, a
more informal business style is likely in American business organisa- 
(66)
tions.
The widespread belief in the possibilities of upward social 
mobility, the ’log cabin to White House' ideology, is a potent reason 
tor the relative lack of a well developed system of status consciousness 
in the United States. To what extent there actually has been a greater| 0 y I
degree of vertical mobility 1 in the United States than Britain is a 
difficult question to determine. Certainly the 'popular' view of the 
contrast between America and Britain in this area seems to support the 
idea that America, particularly in the nineteenth century, was a land 
where anybody with talent could make their way right to the top. In 
contrast, Britain has been viewed as a more 'traditional' society, 
where social mobility rates have been held back. This view would fit 
in well with the general thesis that is being advanced. The full 
thrust of capitalism should encourage the movement of labour in defiance 
of inherited privilege and handicap, and ideally opportunity and 
corresponding risk should be renewed, as it were, in each new generation. 
Such a situation would be impossible in a capitalist society of course, 
because wealth and power accumulated in one generation, in the form of 
private property, would inevitably be transmitted to the next generation,
who wornci cnen start the race with considerable advantages. Despite 
this contradiction, embedded in the very nature of capitalism, it is 
not unreasonable to hypothesise that a society with a value system 
more in keeping with the needs of capitalism should have higher rates 
of mobility than a society with a value system less committed. Social 
mobility data are so fraught with methodological problems, particularly 
when one wants to make historical comparisons, that no easy test, of the 
hypothesis is possible. Official records, for example, rarely contain 
the information from which social mobility in the population at large 
could be reconstructed, and so one has to rely on specialist studies 
which are almost solely the province of the twentieth century. If 
once considers more localised studies of the nineteenth century in- . 
particular areas of Britain and America, the conclusion that America 
had markedly higher rates of mobility than Britain is not upheld. 
Thernstrom's (1964) impressive study of social mobility in Newburyport 
does not support the view of America being a highly socially mobile 
society in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, British studies 
tend to refute the view that there was relatively little social 
mobility in nineteenth century B r i t a i n . T o  come up to date, although 
there is considerable controversy surrounding the interpretation of 
comparative mobility data made by Lipset and Zetterberg (1956), even 
such a critic as Miller (1960), concludes that the data show that 
probably Britain had rather more inter-generational mobility across the 
manual/non-manual line than the United States. Recruitment to the 
small elites at the top however, was probably tighter in Britain than in 
America (This data refers to survey material ca. 1950). On the face of 
it, the hypothesis that, a society with a value system more in keeping 
with the needs of the capitalist infrastructure should have higher rates 
of social mobility would appear to be refuted. It is difficult however, 
to know just how much reliance can be placed upon such a conclusion. 
Firstly, it is known that a lot of other factors, not directly related 
to the value system of a society, can affect mobility rates.
Secondly, it is admitted that the national mobility studies themselves 
are not directly comparable. Thirdly, the data for the United States 
naturally enough include the black population, whose existence, as a 
sort of 'underclass' in America unquestionably have an influence upon 
the data. It should also be noted that the data refer only to the 
male population while there is good reason to believe that the 
opportunities for the mobility of women are comparatively higher in the 
United States (cf. p.68 ). Finally, an interesting comparative study 
by Marsh (1963) concludes with the timely warning that "universalistic-
achievement values, while professed by some industrial societies, may 
not be strongly institutionalised in mobility channels, and without 
effective institutionalisation these values cannot affect mobility any 
more in societies that profess them than in societies that do n ot".^^
If the general comparative social mobility data for Britain
and the United States remain somewhat inconclusive, the more specialised
data for recruitment into business in the two societies is more certain.
In the United States the general picture is that business and industry
have always been relatively high status occupations, which have
attracted people from all ranks of life. Habakkuk (1962) notes that
the general belief in an open avenue to wealth was one of the main
reasons for the amount of ability devoted to business enterprise in
that country. lie also argues that in the United States, "there were
few competitors to business success as a source of social prestige.
There was no large and powerful bureaucracy, no hereditary aristocracy.
There was no professional military class and soldiers were not held in 
(71)high esteem". Various colourful examples of the high prestige of
business abound in the literature. Kroos (1970) mentions the fact 
that in the middle of the 1920*s, the Swedish Immanuel Congregational 
Church in New York City offered an engraved certificate of preferred 
stock in the Kingdom of God to all who would contribute 100 dollars 
to its building fund. In so doing, the churchmen did not mean to be 
blasphemous. In the mood of the day, they were merely recognising 
the supremacy of business in the American cultural hierarchy. Perhaps 
the zenith was reached in 1925, when Bruce Barton wrote his best 
selling novel, The Man Nobody Knows, which portrayed Christ as a great 
businessman, with all the qualities that would have made him''-a successful 
member of Rotary. Not only did the relatively high prestige of 
business encourage recruitment into its ranks in America, once there, 
successful men were encouraged to stay. Unlike many of their English 
counterparts, whose ambition was to rise-in the social scale by acquiring 
landed estates, marrying their daughter into country families or 
sending their sons into Parliament or the professions after they had 
been through public school, successful American businessmen largely 
stayed with their business and encouraged their sons to follow them.
In spite of the widespread evidence that America was a 
’business society’ and businessmen were, as a consequence, high prestige 
members of that society, high esteem did not totally flow in their 
direction. The business journalist, John Chamberlain, complained in 
Fortune .that American novelists have consistently done rank injustice
to American businessmen. 7 This view is supported by Sutton et al. 
(1962), and llobsbawn (1975) provides examples of American communities 
failing to support businessmen in particular situations. All this is 
a useful antidote to the belief in the total dominance of business 
values in American society. It should also be realised that, for the 
majority of Americans, business is valued not so much as an end in 
itself, but as one of the broadest and shortest avenues to an enormously 
important goal in American society, money. Once this is comprehended 
one can readily understand why the heroes of American business tend not 
to be those who have behaved most graciously and scrupulously in terms 
of ’traditional’ standards, but those who have shown initiative and 
been materially successful. It is this fact-which would.appear to 
explain the widespread finding that Americans revere business leaders, 
but do not trust them.
The high relative prestige of business and businessmen in 
America stands in marked contrast to the situation prevailing in England. 
This was probably not always the case. Wilson (1965) argues that,
"for nearly a century after the inauguration of the industrial revolution, 
industry and trade floated on a tide of-social, even intellectual'..approval. 
It reached its peak round about the mid-century and the Crystal Palace 
Exhibition". In that early period, as 1 have already argued, even
the aristocracy became interested in the novelty of invention or the 
glamour of a great adventuring or plantation company. The structure of 
English society was also one where the counter tradition to business ran 
deep, and by mid-century there was a formidable body of opponents to 
challenge industrial capitalism. The opponents were drawn from many 
traditions, from literature Dickens, Carlyle, Ruskin and Scott mercilessly 
attacked the philistinism of business and the appalling social consequen­
ces or the system of industrial capitalism. The Christian socialists, 
led by men like Kingsley, accused them of being ungodly, the conserv­
ationists accused them of destroying the countryside. Finally, romantics 
like Blake and Morris pointed to-the type of society that could have been. 
This great counterblast was joined at the end of the century by the
Fabian intellectuals, who by the 1920’s, so it is claimed, "had turned
(7 4)
the sacred word of profits into an obscenity".
This opposition to industrial, capitalism had very severely 
dented the prestige of the entrepreneur by the 1870’s. Yet this was by 
no means the only reason for waning prestige. As I have already 
indicated, in Britain many took the path to business merely to gain 
enough money to enter the ’ leisured classes’, or at very least the 
professions. 'The. literature readily testifies to the fate of the third
generation who looked for a calling outside the world of trade and 
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industry. Alternatively, the business itself could be run along
lines that would gain the; approval of the aristocracy. Numerous
commentators claim that the City has long been marked by these feature!?^
and Coleman (1973) produced some very interesting evidence which
suggested that some large British companies are almost run like
(77)’gentlemen’s clubs’.
To what extent is it still true that the prestige of business 
in the United States is relatively high, whilst in Britain it is 
relatively low? One way in which it was hoped to answer this question 
was to compare the occupational prestige of business with other occupa­
tions in both Britain and America. Occupational prestige studies 
appear to date from 1947 when the American National Opinion Research 
Centre carried out its first study. Further studies have largely been 
modified replications of this initial study. One of the first studies 
to make an international comparison of prestige scales constructed lor 
various countries, Inkeles and Rossi (1955), noted the extensive simil­
arity from nation to nation, and concluded that their findings were 
essentially the result of industrial convergence. There are considerable 
problems in utilising such data on occupational prestige however.
Firstly, one should note that a similar ordinal position on such a scale 
need not mean a similar social distance between two specified occupations. 
Secondly, the one category that is of real interest in this study, that 
of businessman, is too heterogeneous a category to be represented on 
such scales. Finally, there is the persuasive argument advanced
by Goldthorpe and Hope (1974), that claims that such scales do not 
measure any specifically sociological characteristics such as prestige 
anyway. Instead they argue that the scales measure prestige character­
istics only insofar as they are correlated with such ’objective’ 
attributes as .job rewards or requi remen is. It clearly is difficult to 
isolate and tap the prestige dimension itself, although some more limited 
occupational prestige studies probably have been successful,(79) 
unfortunately I have been unable to locate any that directly compare 
Britain and America. If the C.oldthorpe/llope hypothesis is accepted 
however, then some of the 'objective' attributes of the occupations 
under analysis can themselves be taken as crude measures of prestige. 
Wooton (19G2) for example, forcefully argues that social prestige is 
a factor influencing wage and salary levels independently of market 
forces. It is not difficult to show that those working in manufacturing 
industry in Britain are comparatively worse off financially than those
working in other sectors of the economy. The case of engineers in
British society is a particularly good one to illustrate this point.
It is argued that the relative low status of the profession, because of
its intimate connection with trade and industry, affects both the
(81)
quality of the personnel entering the profession, as well as the 
low pay and status which jobs like production engineering attract within 
industry.
The prestige and esteem of particular occupations can also be 
assessed in a more indirect way. The political elite can symbolically 
domonstrate its set of values by the bestowing of honours of various 
sorts. If one accepts this argument, it becomes instructive to compare 
the sorts of people who get invited to White House dinners with those 
who have had honours bestowed upon them by British Prime Ministers of 
the day. By and large White House dinners have been well attended by 
businessmen whilst artists, scholars, poets, etc. have been pretty thin 
on the ground. Exactly the opposite has been the case with British 
honours lists.
It is impossible to discuss, in a meaningful way, the difference 
in the prestige and recruitment patterns of particular occupations without 
reference to the educational system of the society in question. As the 
majority of studies of occupational choice have shown, the educational 
system is intimately connected to the occupational structure. Certainly, 
the differences in the prestige of business as an occupation that I have 
noted between Britain and America, cannot be readily understood without 
an examination of the education systems of the two societies. Education 
in the early days of the newly independent state of America bore the 
strong mark of the former British presence. Initially, the educational 
ideal of the gentleman, so strong in the English background, was 
cultivated, particularly in New England and the antebellum South. This 
after all was the type of education that the majority of the early 
political leaders in America had received. This elitist form of 
education was more a reflection of the Old World rather than the new 
however, and although it has never disappeared from the American educa­
tional scene, in many ways it can be considered as ’ uncharacteristic15®°^
The elitist features of the system of education, bequeathed to 
America by the British colonialists, could not long survive the influx of 
immigrants with their very different ideals. For these early Americans 
education was their religion, and Hofstadter (1964) notes that the 
Americans were the first other people in modern history to follow the 
Prussian example in establishing free common-school systems. Among
their earliest statutes were land ordinances setting aside a portion 
of the public domain to support school systems. The reasons for this 
passion include the following. Firstly, the early dominance of 
sectarian Protestantism in America, with its reliance upon individual
access to religious truth as revealed in the Bible. This created a
predisposition for education as well as providing, in certain cases, 
the actual institutions. Secondly, the early establishment of 
political democracy and a wide suffrage in America created a need for
an educated electorate. Thirdly, Americans were quick to see education
as a route to rapid upward social mobility, a route that was largely 
denied them in their countries of origin. Fourthly, there was a need, 
particularly after the turn of the nineteenth century, to Americanize 
the immigrants and replace their Old World culture with that of the New. 
Finally, there was a growing realization on the part of the majority of 
businessmen, but particularly those who were engaged in funning the 
corporations, that education at all levels was necessary for the 
efficient running of their organisations. The American educational 
system is more marked by what Turner (1969) has called ’contest mobility* 
than is the British system. In other words, the values of achieve­
ment are stronger in American society and are more deeply entrenched in 
the educational system. An indication of this can be seen in the fact
that a larger proportion of the relevant age cohorts are enrolled in
(85)
higher education in America than Britain. Access to education
however, is probably not the most distinctive difference between Britain 
and America in the area of education. One of the biggest differences 
lies in the content of the knowledge that is transmitted within the 
system. American education has nearly always concentrated upon the 
transmission of essentially practical knowledge. The prime questions 
about the curriculum have always been, ’What use is it?’, 'What can you 
do with it?’. The view developed that classical education, or a 
liberal education in the humanities, was suitable only to the leisured 
classes, to the European past. Even pure science as a subject of study 
had its dessenters whilst few denied the obvious relevance of applied 
s c i e n c e . ■ Ilofstadter (1964), a noted critic of the curriculum in 
American schools and colleges, sums the situation up by observing that 
it is, ’’deemed important that the pupil learn, not chemistry, but the 
testing of detergents; not physics, but how to drive and service a car; 
not history, but the operation of the local gas works; not biology, but 
the way to the zoo; not Shakespear or Dickens, but how to write a 
business letter.
The stress upon the practical in the content of education is
not difficult to understand. Firstly, it reflected the needs and 
interests of the new arrivals to America. Contemplative or speculative 
thought were of little use on the frontier or in building up a business, 
and the intellectual was not a revered figure in American culture. On 
the contrary there was widespread distrust of an intelligentsia, a class 
marked off,from the rest by virtue of a superior education. Secondly, 
one needs to take cognisance of the influential ideas of the American 
philosopher John Dewey. Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism, which 
stressed the importance of uniting theory and practice, gave a strong 
intellectual backing to the pragmatic view of life already held by most 
Americans. These two influences, those of the ideas and values of the 
inunigrants and those of Dewey and his followers, also influenced what 
might be termed 1 educational method’ in America. In contrast to .
Europe, American schools have tended to stress a more ’democratic’ 
pedagogic organisation. Teacher-student relationships, for example, 
are less marked by status distinctions. This undoubtedly contributes 
to the relative lack of importance status distinctions have in 
American society in general, (cf.pp.79-83 in text). The most important 
spur to the stress upon practical knowledge in education in America, is 
to be found in the importance of business interests in the development of 
education. The businessman’s interest in education, even of the 
practical American variety, came slowly. Initially, the self-help 
philosophy of this group preferred 'the ’school of hard knocks’ to the 
more formal attempts of the schoolroom. Yet the very success of the 
self made man, in transforming the family business into a company and 
later a corporation, soon made his type virtually extinct. However 
reluctantly, businessmen began to appreciate the value of formal instruc­
tion, particularly for the more stable careers now being followed in 
bureaucratic business.
The businessmen, at least in the early years, were as much 
interested in elementary education as they were in anything more directly 
related to the business enterprise. After the Civil War, Northern 
capitalists were particularly anxious to impose the ideas and values of 
their economic order upon the South and West. Education was seen as the 
main weapon in this attempt, and the ideas of' the business class were 
purveyed via two main channels. Firstly, businessmen largely controlled 
the educational publishing houses, and as Cochran and Miller (1961) 
note, "Standard textbooks, written to a large extent by people associated 
with city schools and distributed by publishing houses in New York,
Boston and Philadelphia were bound to convey urban mores and business 
ideas, and it early became a matter of policy for educational agencies
to see that contrary ideas were shut o ut".^^ Secondly, as Baron
and Tropp (19G1) have pointed out, in America the local community is
crucially important in determining what is taught in the schoolroom.
Now 1 have already shown'that .the local community in America is more
likely to be dominated by business interests (see p. 76 above) and so
business was able to exercise considerable control over education by
■ (99) ■ ’being the dominant force on the lay boards of control. ' It was
not just at the ideological level that business interests wished to 
win the battle of course, they had a more direct interest. Thus in 
the late nineteenth century business led the drive for the training
of skilled artisans and mechanics in the public schools and at the
public's expense. Their objective was education for industrial 
efficiency.
The same story can be repeated as far as the universities are
concerned. In his classic study of university control, Beck (1947)
clearly stated his findings. "Altogether, the evidence of major
university-busihess connections at high levels seems overwhelming.
The numerous high positions of power in industry, commerce and finance
held by at least two thirds' of the members of the governing boards of
those thirty leading universities would appear to give a decisive
majority more than .ample grounds for identifying their personal interests
(i)l)
with those of business”. ‘ Businessmen themselves are quite unequiv­
ocal about the relationship. Uomhoff (1967), quotes the Chairman of 
the Board of the University of Rochester, who is also President of Xerox, 
on the reason for heavy business involvement in university affairs.
”To put it as crassly as possible, it's a matter of sheer self-interest -
(92)collars and cents. Xerox will live or die by technology”.
In view of the stress on practical subjects in American 
education, and of the strong influence of business interests in the 
control of education, it should not be surprising to find that America 
has a very well developed system of business and management education. 
America possesses a well developed system in support of business at all 
levels. At the level of the manual worker, it must be remembered that 
America did not have the tradition of apprenticeship that existed in 
England. Indeed many of the immigrants into the United States, 
especially those from Southern Europe, did not even possess an industrial 
background. This of course, is the correct context in which to under­
stand F.W. Taylor's revolutionary ideas on scientific management - it 
was an efficient solution to the problem of the ill educated immigrant. 
Today there are special training schools for workers relating to
particular types of industry and these stand in marked contrast to the
(93)almost pre-industrial system of apprenticeship that operates in Britain. 
At another level there are business colleges (what in England would be 
called commercial colleges) that have been developed from the trade 
schools of the nineteenth century. In These schools secretarial and 
accounting skills are taught. Then there are junior colleges, 
offering non-degree courses of up to two years duration and leading to 
supervisory and junior management positions. The most common educat­
ional rcwte for someone aiming at a management career however, is through 
the university system.
Vocational or 'professional1 education has always occupied an
important place in the American university system compared with the
British. Undergraduate teaching of business was present even by 1900
although it was a relatively small proportion of all undergraduate 
(94)
teaching. By 1971 however, approximately one in seven of all
bachelors degrees were in business, and this figure rises to one in
five if one takes the figures for men only. Only social science and
(95)education can produce bigger figures. ' Even these figures are 
probably underestimates because of the'vast amount of 'business’ that 
is taught in the context of other degrees, especially engineering. 
Graduate programmes in business can also be traced back a long way, 
in fact almost as far as the founding of the first business school 
itself, the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce in 1881. Although 
at one time the proportion of master's degrees to bachelor's degrees 
was relatively low, by 1971 only master's degrees in education were 
more numerous.
The English education system represents an altogether different 
tradition. These differences are particularly marked when one examines 
the stated goals of the system, access to education, and the content of 
education. One of the most important points to grasp about education 
in England in the nineteenth century is that it is very difficult to 
talk of a national system of education for the whole of the population.
It was inconceivable in such a hierarchical society that the different 
social classes should receive a similar form of education when they had 
such different stations in life. Education very largely followed status 
distinctions rather than being a determinant of them.
For the mass of the working class there was no effective 
elementary education before 1870. Certainly there were debates about 
whether there should be education for the lower orders, and about what 
form that education might take before that date. -The debate was cast
in terms of whether education for the workers would act as an antidote 
to revolutionary propaganda or as a dangerous incentive to insubord­
ination and possibly revolution. Before 1870 elementary education, 
apart from the Dame schools, was dominated by the charity schools 
organised chiefly by the Church through the auspices of the ’Society 
for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge’ until 1811, and thereafter 
by the 'National Society for the Education of the Poor in the 
Principles-of'the Church of England'. This educational provision was 
largely controlled by the aristocracy, whose main motive it would 
appear, was to encourage the deference and passivity of the masses to 
the accepted orders of society. The rising bourgeoisie appeared to 
concur with this purpose because it very largely suited their own
goals. The maxim that, 'the Devil finds employment for idle hands',
wus one that both landowners and entrepreneurs could easily agree 
u p o n . ^ ^  Neither group doubted the view that the children of the 
labouring classes would themselves become manual workers and that they 
should receive an education appropriate to their station in life.
One would have thought however, that teaching children to
read the Bible and to be industrious were not enough to fire the
increasing complexity of the industrial revolution. ■ llow does one
explain the lack of a technical and vocational education for the .
working classes? It is not enough to answer that the control of this
sector of education was in the hands of a class who did not have the
interests of industrial capitalism at heart, although this is partially
true. Perhaps the most important reason one can offer is the fact
that, by and large, the owners of industrial capital were not persuaded
of the importance of education in the profitability of their own firms
(97)
or of the nation at large. ihe explanation of this rather myopic
view is to be partly found in the origins of these 'men of capital'.
They were essentially, 'practical tinkerers' to use David Landes' 
celebrated phrase. Their own businesses had been successfully built 
up, not by the systematic application of scientific techniques, but 
by the age old techniques of 'rule of thumb'. These men were in no 
position to appreciate the possibilities of a scientific or technical 
education. Few of them probably appreciated what was really happening 
in the industrial revolution that they had created. Coleman (1973) 
suggests that, "the majority probably saw innovation as a once-and-for- 
all event rather than the beginning of an era in which invention and 
innovation were to be built into the whole process of business life."^9^  
It is true one can point to the Mechanics Institutes, which, with the 
help of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, helped to
educate the working classes in scientific principles, and which were 
largely run by the middle classes. Yet these members of the middle 
ciasses were .rarely the practical men of industry, they drew upon a 
rather different tradition, the tradition of pure science rather than 
its practical application. For this reason, plus the fact that the 
lack of elementary education made it exceedingly difficult for many 
members of the artisan class to benefit from them, the Institutes made 
no real contribution to the needs of the industrial economy. Indeed 
by 1850 the Institutes’ clientele was no longer largely the skilled 
workers of industry, but members of the middle classes, and science 
had been largely abandoned in favour of more ’fitting’ subjects for 
their new members, namely literature and philosophy.
There were other impediments to the development of technical 
education amongst the mass of the work force. Firstly, not only were 
the entrepreneurs not in a position to appreciate the potential 
contribution of scientific and technical education and research as I 
have argued above, but they really did not see the need for it. They 
had been successful without it , as Aldcroft (19(5-4) puts it, "Fifty 
years of industrial pre-eminence had bred contempt for change and had 
established industrial traditions in which the basic, ingredients of 
economic progress, science and research, were notably absent. .And the 
longer this change was deJayed the more difficult it became for manu­
facturers to sanction and their workers to accept a break with established 
(9 9)
tradition". Another reason for the apathy ami even active hostility
to the technical education of workers in industry can be related back
to the class system. Simply put, some manufacturers believed that
technical education for their workers might give them ideas above their 
(100)
station. Finally, one might note the fact that British manufact­
urers were, and arguably still are, very secretive. This is partly a 
reflection of general cultural traditions in British society (see pp113) 
and partly a reflection of the dominance of the family firm in the 
British economy, at least in the nineteenth century. The connection 
between this and technical education is reported in evidence given to 
the Royal Commission on Technical Instruction in 188d. The employers 
argued, "that they were not going to encourage something which would 
bring all the workmen from the different works together to discuss 
matters in which trade secrets were involved" (my emphasis). The
education of the children of. the aristocracy and the rising middle class 
in the nineteenth century was naturally rather different from that of 
the working classes. Although a little pure science had been taught in 
the Mechanics Institute, very little was taught in the grammar and
public schools. The reason was that science, particularly applied 
science, had strong connections with the world of trade and industry.
JJy contrast Classical education, divorced from such a world, became 
a sign of social privilege, denoting connection with the leisured 
classes.*102*
The public schools did not totally escape the influence of the 
world of business. Initially, such foundations were only for the sons 
of the well connected, and the studies they offered have been acidly 
described as ’the dry husks of ancient learning1. But above all they 
were inefficient, competent only at paying the salaries of those that 
ran them. One consequence of this inefficiency, and their exclusionist
policy, was that the rising middle class began to set up rival insti­
tutions, and by 1864 Perkin (1969) estimates that there were probably 
10,000 private schools in existence. The aristocracy met this challenge 
as they met most challenges in the nineteenth century - by accommodating
it. Arnold and his followers rejuvenated the public schools and
embraced some of the features of these new ’joint-stock schools1, in 
particular the principle of academic competition, itself a reflection 
of bourgeois ideals. Yet the public schools retained much of their 
aristocratic tradition, they still excluded many ’sons of tradesmen’, 
and they refused to abandon classics as the foundation of their curricula 
and substitute science and modern studies.
Businessmen were happy to send their sons to these schools, if 
they could, because this was their route to real social respectability.. 
These schools acted like a club, to use Turner’s metaphor, which 
conferred status and prestige upon its members. The education these 
schools offered was primarily fitted to the traditional faculties of 
Oxford and Cambridge, the Church, the Army and the higher professions. 
Some certainly went into business, particularly some of the grand 
companies that were engaged in business in the colonies,*103* and indeed 
Reader (1966) has shown that by about 1900, considerable numbers of
public school boys were entering business. Yet perhaps above all, the
public schools were a route out of business for the sons of successful 
businessmen.
The universities followed a similar path to the public schools. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the two English universities 
at Oxford and Cambridge were small, expensive, closed to Dissenters for
all practical purposes, and very largely the preserve of the aristocracy.
The curriculum was antiquated in the extreme, being largely dominated by 
the constituent parts of a classical education (in 1834 even a proposal
to teach mathematics was turned down). A little pure science was 
taught, hut no applied science, and certainly no commercial subjects. 
Reform in the universities came at about the same time as it did in the 
public schools: Dissenters were admitted, modern subjects including
science were encouraged, and examinations and open scholarships given a 
new emphasis. Yet the universities were still chiefly intended for 
the landed classes and the older professions. The shock of the 1867 
Paris Exhibition, which once more demonstrated that England was falling 
behind in the application of science and technology to manufacturing 
industry, led to renewed pressure for the establishment of institutions 
to teach science and technology at a high level. The outcome was the 
creation between 1871 and 1881 of seven new colleges, ultimately to 
become universities, in which science, technology, and in most of them 
economics and commerce came to be taught in the same institution as 
the traditional arts subjects. Several of these colleges owed their 
foundation to the energy and munificence of provincial businessmen.
This account of certain aspects of the English education system 
in the nineteenth century does not denote a very strong adherence to the 
values of achievement when compared to America. Yet in a way the system 
fitted in with the perceived needs of the business community. British 
industry seemed to value loyalty and certain ascribed qualities rather 
than more universalistic achieved qualities. Many writers for example, 
have mentioned the British business tradition of vertical mobility - 
promotion to various supervisory and managerial levels of those who have 
begun on the shop floor. Such individuals are thus free of other 
loyalties and can learn the particular ways of the firm. Public schools 
contributed to this selection process, because the school background 
hopefully guaranteed the presence of certain sorts of qualities, among 
them loyalty, which made early selection safer. At the other end of 
the scale, the apprenticeship system performed a similar function, via 
the personal tutelage of an old established company employee.
In short, I have argued that the English education system in 
the nineteenth century was not the system that one might have deduced 
from the fact that the bourgeoisie were the effective ruling classi Yet 
as I shall later argue (p. 115), there is no reason why any particular 
aspect of social structure should * fit* the needs of a capitalist economy, 
providing that the economy is believed to be performing well. Up until 
the middle of the nineteenth century, few doubted that the British 
economy was a bouyant one. 1851, the year of the Exhibition probably 
marks the turning point, and the realisation, drawn from the foreign 
exhibits that were there for all to see, that there was indeed a
connection between technical and scientific instruction on the one hand, 
and industrial prosperity on the other. From that point onwards the 
jolts to British complacency became increasingly severe. The 
depression of 1870, the war of-1914—18, (significantly called the first 
scientific war or even more tellingly by Lloyd George, the engineer’s 
war), the great depression of 1924-5 and 1930-2 and the war of 1939-45, 
were all matched by an increasing number of government reports and 
commissions. They nearly all pointed to the need for more and better 
scientific and technical education.
Cotgrove (1958) provides clear evidence of the fact, that at 
least by the beginning of the first world war, the political elite were 
convinced that there was not sufficient attention being paid to 
scientific and technical education or research. Yet Britain’s poor 
economic performance could not solely be put down to deficiencies in the 
education system, other culprits, like the war itself, the universal 
nature of some of the depressions, problems over the gold standard etc., 
were all indicted as major causes. Thus, although there was consistent 
government pressure towards a system that was more suited to the needs 
of the economy, the pressure was by no means overwhelming. There were 
also considerable impediments to any such change. I have already 
mentioned the fact that institutions tend to develop their own rules and 
logic, and educational institutions are no exception. The universities, 
which largely controlled the public examination systems and thus the 
curricula of schools and colleges, were controlled by men who believed 
in the supremacy of the classics and natural science as the most 
appropriate training for the able minds of the young. Certainly subjects 
like engineering were eventually admitted into the universities, even 
into Oxbridge, but this did not change the value system of these insti­
tutions, or of the society at large, which still tended to devalue
(104)subjects connected with the world of trade and industry. The
training of technicians in England (up to O.N.I). and H.N.D. levels) is 
still largely done in the least prestigious part of the tertiary 
education system - the technical colleges, and this training is still 
predominantly of a part-time character. Yet despite the obvious 
importance of the technical colleges in providing industrial technologists, 
Cotgrove (1958) notes that because of their low status in the academic 
hierarchy, "at no time have the technical colleges been represented on a 
committee* which had made frequent recommendations on the training of 
scientific manpower. Nor is there any evidence of consultation with
*National Advisory Council on Education for Industry and Commerce.
representatives of the technical colleges before 1955".^105  ^ Finally, 
there has been the impediment of business itself. Perhaps because they 
were partially mesmerised by the world of learning of their social 
betters, perhaps because their own education and experience never really 
allowed them to appreciate the potential of science and technology - the 
businessman never systematically pressed for an education system that was 
closely tied to the needs of the capitalist econoiny.^^^
It is perhaps in the area of business and management education 
however, that one finds the greatest differences between England and the 
United States. The English universities have always been exceptionally 
wary of entering a field so very close to the world of trade and 
industry, and the progress of business related courses has made very slow 
and sporadic progress. The universities situated in the heart of 
industrial England, and therefore subject to more business pressure and 
patronage, admitted some form of degree level teaching at an early 
period. By the beginning of the Second World War however, one could
still only find a handful of courses in business/management studies in 
the university sector.
After the War interest in management education increased, and 
Rose (1970) charts a number of reasons for this. Firstly, there were 
changes within the structure of British business which.led to a more 
favourable view being taken of management education. For example, the 
increasing scale of business operations and the concomitant decreasing 
importance of family businesses paved the way for more 'professional1 
managers. Further, within the business world the promotion of men 
with a certain amount of professional training gained by study, like 
accountants, chemists etc., meant that those in positions of executive 
power were more likely to appreciate the benefits of managerial 
education. Thirdly, the post-war emphasis upon productivity, and the 
increasing use of international comparisons of economic performance, 
particularly with the United States, pointed up Britain's relatively 
poor performance and also noted her lack of investment in management 
education. The interest in education as a form of human capital 
investment was further heightened by the passing of the 1944 Education 
Act. Finally, Rose (1970) notes the effect that returning ex-service­
men more interested in business than many 'ordinary1 undergraduates, 
had on the universities themselves.
Despite this greater interest in business/management education, 
the amount of educational provision in the area did not greatly increase. 
The universities were still somewhat reluctant to teach subjects which
they did not regard as being wholly academically respectable, 
whilst on the other side, business was not wholly convinced that any 
form of training that was not firmly industry based could be of any 
value. As a consequence of these barriers very little headway was 
made in the universities by the beginning of the I960’s and there were 
no undergraduate degree courses at all. The private sector had made 
some provisions with the creation of a number of independent management 
centres, notably, the Administrative Staff College at Henley, which 
together with management consultants (mainly American), provided courses 
for various levels of existing managers. The most significant feature 
of the whole system of management education however, was that the main 
support for such education came from the lowest status colleges in the 
tertiary sector, the technical colleges. It was in these colleges, 
for example, that the National Scheme for Management Studies was 
launched in 1947, following the publication of the Urwick Report.
When the scheme was rejuvenated in 1964, and the old National Diploma 
replaced by the Diploma in Management Studies, it still remained in the 
technical colleges.
Since 1960 the only major change in the field of management 
education that has occurred in England, the establishment of two post­
graduate business schools, has been the result of American influence.
In 1963, the National Economic Development Council, in its report on 
economic growth in Britain called for a growth in management education 
and this initiated a discussion about the need for a ’British Harvard'.
A subsequent enquiry culminated in the ’Franks Report’ (1963), which 
recommended the setting up of two British business schools attached to 
the universities of Manchester and London. A third has subsequently 
been added at Strathclyde.
One can also detect a slight shift in the attitude of companies 
in favour of more business and management education. Partly this has 
been spurred on by the increasing indictment of the English education 
system as one of the causes of slow g r o w t h . P e r h a p s  the most 
important influence however, has been the rapid extension of certain 
logical and mathema tical techniques for planning and controlling 
business enterprise. Linear programming, operational research etc., 
are not things, management has realised, that can be learned very 
efficiently from the ’school of life’ or even by ’sitting next to Nellie1 
apart from anything else they require a firm foundation in basic math­
ematics. The extension of these techniques then, has given an 
indisputable role to formal education institutes in business and manage­
ment training in England/1
The development of the system of management education in 
America has, I have argued, been increasingly the subject of attention 
by those students of the British economy who believe that such a system 
contributes to economic growth. The majority of the commentators are 
also aware however, of the old adage, that educational systems are not 
easy to export. The vast development of business related education 
in America reflects the American value system. It is fair to say, I 
think, that the same caution has not been exercised by all those who 
have surveyed the American industrial relations system from across the 
Atlantic. Just as the American education system has been regarded as 
more ’efficient’, from the point of view of the needs of business, so 
too the American industrial relations system has been similarly so 
regarded/111  ^ Yet just as the education system in America reflects 
certain central features of American society, so too with the American 
industrial relations system.
The nature of the stratification system is perhaps one of the 
most crucial variables affecting both the amount and the type of trade 
union activity. In the United States, before the turn of the 
twentieth century, the conditions were not those which have generally 
fostered the development of labour movements. Firstly, the relative 
shortage of labour meant that employees were, by market forces, in a 
relatively good bargaining position. If a man did find it difficult 
to get a job he could always move west, where labour was scarcer. Of 
even greater importance was the strength of the value system which 
stressed the possibilities of advance for every man. Failure was to be 
countered not be stressing the collective situation of all labourers in 
a similar position, but by the pursuit of an individualistic 
orientation, which urged the individual to drive himself forward above 
his fellows. Thirdly, it should be remembered that the mass of the 
proletariat in the United States were first generation immigrants, from 
a variety of different backgrounds, speaking a variety of different 
tongues. This fact, coupled with the agrarian background of many of 
them, made this heterogeneous group notoriously difficult to organise. 
One can also ask the question, to organise for what ends? Many of the 
wider social goals that were important objectives for the British 
labour movement in the nineteenth century, like the franchise and the 
extension of education, had already been won by Americans without 
organising, and I have already argued that in terms of symbolic status, 
the American worker did not, in general, believe that he was in any 
way inferior to the owners of capital/11^  To these ’internal’ 
hindrances to unionisation one can add two powerful ’external’ ones.
Firstly, at the turn of the century business was all powerful in America, 
and business was intolerant of any interference by trade unions in the 
conduct of its affairs. Unions and union men were opposed in every 
conceivable manner, and often with a considerable degree of violence^*3  ^
Business was aided in these shady endeavours by the government, which it 
completely dominated. Thus the Federal Anti-Trust legislation of 1890 
and 1914 was more frequently and effectively invoked against trade 
unions than it was against the trusts.
In England during the same period, a rather different set of 
social conditions prevailed. In a society where class lines were more 
clearly drawn, and the hierarchical ordering of society gave the great 
mass of workers a clear feeling of their status in society, then a 
collective orientation, which fostered an ’us and them1 view was always 
likely to provide a fertile soil on which trade unionism could grow. 
Although there is some debate about the influence of the feudal guilds 
upon British trade unionism, what does seem reasonably clear is that in 
every Western European country the tradition of collective grouping and 
collective action in social and economic life was thoroughly implanted 
and part of the old feudal and guild influences. In this sense, trade 
unionism was a more ’natural' development and more ’naturally’ accepted 
by the workers and, ultimately, by employers, than was to be the case in 
the United States. The result of these structural differences are 
vividly shown up in the density of trade union membership in the two 
societies, which has persisted right up to the present day.
Not only does the density of trade unionism differ between 
Britain and America, but so also does its character. It has been 
traditional to focus upon the relative politicization of the British 
labour movement compared with its American counterpart, and to stress 
this as a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e . ^ I n  the case of America, the 
arguments of the Wisconsin School of labour historians, most notably 
Commons and Perlman, have stressed the fact that American unions have 
largely rejected the wider concerns of socialism, for the more limited 
objectives of the economic improvement of union members. Thus, this 
view stresses the idea that American unions are essentially 'business 
unions', concerned not so much with the social status of the worker as 
with his job and the terms under which it is held - the capitalism of 
the proletariat, no more, no less. With a labour force substantially 
committed to the capitalist system, and a constitution ostensibly 
pledged to, ’health, happinesss and the pursuit of liberty’, the lack 
of political commitment on the part of American labour should not 
appear surprising.
This view of the American labour movement, although substan­
tially correct, does tend to gloss over some rather different tendencies 
in the early days of the movement. From 1860 to around 1880 the 
European tradition of socialist and even anarchist influences were 
paramount, although admittedly few workers were organised.* In the 
years to 1920, business unionism in the shape of Samuel Gompers and the 
A.F.L. was faced by the almost equal ranks of the socialist labour 
groups, 'including the famous ’Wobblies’ (I.W.W.). Gompers won the day, 
the socialists could not agree upon a programme of action, and Gompers 
convinced members that political lobbying was of little use.
Certainly then one can argue that business unionsism might fit better 
with the American value system, but its institution was closely fought.
In Britain, there has been an organisational link between most 
British trade unions and the Labour Party for almost 70 years. Yet this 
fact also hides a series of historical events that could have resulted 
in something like business unionism. The collapse of the Grand National 
Consolidated Trade Union in 1834 was an enormous setback to the 
socialist tradition inside the trade union movement. The New Model 
Unions of the 1850's and later were not unlike the craft unions that 
formed the bulk of Gompers* A.F.L. They represented the ’labour 
aristocracy’, recognised capitalism as a fait accompli, and by their 
tacit acceptance of the economic individualism of the entrepreneurial 
class, led the Webbs to believe that they had to all intents and 
purposes abandoned the cause of the working class in exchange for a 
privileged position within it for themselves. The initial attempts of 
the T.U.C. to invite affiliations to the Labour Representative Committee 
were not particularly successful. Then came the laff Vale and Osborne 
judgements in 1901 and 1909 respectively. It was clear that the ensuing 
fight would be a parliamentary political one and the Parliamentary 
Labour Party was born.
The one important thing that this analysis reveals is that one 
can really only appeal to cultural values to help explain the persistency 
of particular patterns of behaviour, it is nearly always necessary to do 
an historical analysis to explain the origin of particular phenomena. 
Although it is still true that the majority of trade unions are 
affiliated to the Labour Party in Britain, whilst the A.F.L. - C.I.O. is 
not formally linked to the Democrats, Banks (1974) has argued that the 
differences between what he calls welfare unionism in Britain and 
business unionism in America are not that marked. He argues, for example,
* In 1900 only 4% of the labour force were organised.
that in America trade union leaders sit regularly on advisory committees 
set up by aJmost every agency of the Federal government just as members 
of the T.U.C. do in Britain. As pressure groups, both the T.U.C. and 
the A.F.L.-C.I.0. are forced to work with all political parties and 
indeed do so. As pressure groups both also increasingly concentrate 
their attention upon the executive arm of the state rather than the 
political parties. In answer to the question of how American trade 
union leaders can interest themselves in general matters of social 
policy, when their membership has a very much narrower conception of 
their role, Banks argues that "Irrespective of their private political 
views, trade union leaders in America, like their counterparts in 
Europe, cannot avoid being concerned with more general aims of national 
policy and welfare once they are appointed to serve on such committees 
and other government agencies'1.^ Banks also wishes to argue that
just as American unions are somewhat less business oriented than is 
commonly believed, so British unions are somewhat less welfare oriented 
than is commonly believed - at least if one considers that attitude of 
the rank and file. lie cites Goldthorpe et al. (1968) for the view that 
trade unionism for the mass of members is business unionism, concerned 
like that of any other business philosophy with the single-minded pursuit 
of gain.
Banks' observations are important because too many writers have 
attempted to draw too sharp a distinction between trade union organisation 
in Britain and America. I doubt at the political level whether the 
distinction has ever been that great, Hardman (1964) for example, claims 
that the old A.F.L. injunction, 'no politics in the union' was one which 
"no one in the A.F.L., beginning with Samuel Gompers himself, ever took 
seriously, except as a means to oppose the brand of politics they didn't 
choose to p l a y " . ^ ^  Yet when one comes down to the actual operation 
of the unions in the setting of the industrial relations system, some 
fundamental differences do remain, which reflect differences in socio­
cultural structure between the two societies. The biggest difference 
between Ameiica and Britain in industrial relations probably lies in 
the area of collective bargaining. Firstly, one should observe the fact 
that in America collective bargaining takes place within a well defined 
legal framework, whilst in Britain, although there is some legal 
regulation, custom and practice tends to prevail. The prevalence of 
legal regulation in trade union affairs and collective bargaining merely 
reflects a more general recourse to legal provision in American society.
It can be argued, following Lipset (1963} that this is because in 
British society the importance of membership of certain groups
(collective orientation), where behaviour is controlled by unwritten 
codes of conduct, is of crucial significance. In the United States 
on the other hand, the stress upon individualism (self orientation) 
that I have already discussed, can only be held in check by external, 
legal means. One can also add, I think, that in the case of labour 
relations, the fact that many union leaders did not feel any fundamental 
difference of interest between themselves and the owners of capital, 
permitted the transformation of 'political1 issues into legal ones.
This is not the only reason for the'difference between America and 
Britain in this area. One should also note the fact that British trade 
unions have managed to accomplish more for their members by putting 
pressure upon government to enact universal legal measures for the 
benefit of employees. In America the relative failure of unions on 
this front has meant that they have concentrated their efforts on 
improving the position of union members at the level of the individual 
e m p l o y e r . E m p l o y e r s  have therefore concluded much broader agree­
ments with unions in America, and having reached agreement on complex 
packages have been happy to see that agreement given the status of 
legal provision. Such agreements fit more easily into the laissez- 
faire ideology of employers and also contribute in general terms to 
America’s system of welfare capitalism, which arguably brings certain 
benefits to employers as well as e m p l o y e e s . A g a i n  however, one 
must be careful in not giving too much prominence to purely cultural 
explanations. Trade unions became an established part of the American 
industrial structure only in the 1930’s, by which time the dominant 
feature of the American economy was the corporation. Now corporate 
bureaucracy is largely forced to utilise universalistic rationalistic 
methods (pace Weber) which give a degree of certainty to planning.
The legal regulation of collective bargaining then fits in neatly with 
the needs of the corporation - it also happens to fit well with the 
cultural structure or American society. In other words, at least as 
important as any cultural variables in explaining legal regulation is 
the so called ’late development effect’.
I have argued above that the more heterogeneous nature of 
American society which, via the stress on individualism, led to a value 
structure which stressed self orientation, is an important strand in the 
explanation of the greater prominence of the law in American society.
This pursuit of self interest has also led to a greater degree of violence 
in American industrial life, because action has not been held in place 
by an ingrained normative system. Employees have insisted on their 
rights to maximise their income, having greater regard for the ends
rather than the means. ^ 2^  On the other side, employers have been
equally strident in insisting on the ’right of a man to run his own
business as he thinks fit1. In Britain, on the other hand, where
norms derived from a pre-industrial and even pre-capitalist social
system still retain a certain force, and where they have often been
partly accepted by the new ruling class, the bourgeoisie, industrial
relations, although not quiet, have not been marked by the violence of
America. Finally one should note the differences in the bargaining
strategy of American unions compared with their British counterparts.
In America bargaining tends to be rather more localised than in Britain,
reflecting the greater geographical diversity in the United States as
well as the presence of more large key companies in the mass production
industries. This partly explains the American union strategy of
attacking the most efficient and most profitable firm in the industry
or locality, and then attempting to ’spread1 the bargain. One should
also note however, the consequences of this strategy: because the
leading bargain is set at the level of the most efficient, this puts
considerable pressure upon the marginal firm. The result is that,
although it will probably guarantee higher wages for the employees of
the efficient firm, it could cause the employees of the least efficient
to lose their jobs. In Britain, on the other hand, negotiation at the
level of the industry represents protection for the marginal firm, perhaps
reflecting the British trade unions preference for maintaining work for
(122)all its members rather than attempting to maximise wages for some.
The less aggresive British bargaining undoubtedly has other causes, of 
which two are probably worth mentioning. Firstly, the combination of 
a greater stress upon applied science and an ability to accept change 
more readily, has meant that pushing up the price of labour in America 
has very often been met by the substitution of labour by capital.
Secondly, and arguably of greater importance, America is a much more 
self sufficient country than Britain, and this has meant that the price 
of her exports has not been so .'crucial. In Britain, trade unions have 
almost grown up with a balance of payments problem accompanied by the 
rnotto of ’export or die’. This has acted as a moderating influence on 
bargaining strategy.^23^
The bargaining strategy of American trade unions has resulted 
in other differences between Britain and Anerica, of which the most 
notable is the fact that wage differentials between skilled and unskilled 
workers are larger in America than in Britain. This result reflects in 
part the more narrowly self interested orientation of Anerican unions, 
which allows the more powerful groups of workers to maintain, or
occasionally even improve, a relatively privileged position at the
expense of the less powerful. Stunnthal (1957) argues that this
difference related to the historical origins of the two societies,
"The absence of feudal concepts of the place in society to which
a worker may properly aspire may have played a part in allowing the
larger wage differentials to arise in the United States, just as the
heritage of the feudal concepts, may have helped maintain the highly
(124)
compressed wage structure in Europe.u Again one needs to stress
a note of caution in not overemphasising the differences between the 
two societies. Even in Britain, ’to each according to his deeds' is 
a more accurate rendering of the trade union slogan than, ’to each 
according to his needs’. Recent government pay policies in Britain 
have only tended to underline how important differentials are to 
ordinary trade union members. . Despite this reservation however, clear 
differences do remain between Britain and America in the structure of 
wage differentials. Indeed, one can even see such differences if one 
examines the remuneration of trade union officials within the respective 
unions of the two countries. Lipset (1963) notes that American labour 
unions offer financial rewards to their officials comparable to those 
of industrial executives, whilst in Britain the salaries of such 
officers are little higher than those of the workers they represent.
The explanation of this difference follows the arguments I have been 
pursuing above. As business unions, American unions bargain in the 
market place along with industrial companies for the most talented 
negotiators. In Britain, ’loyalty to the cause’ is at least as 
important as any other qualification, and fear of embourgeoisement helps 
keep salaries down. In line with this argument, Lipset also observes 
that American unions have approximately seven times as many officials 
as the British. This cannot be explained by differences in their 
wealth, because something similar was noted when American unions were 
small and impoverished. British trade unions rely very heavily for 
support upon voluntary service and this can certainly be connected with 
the historical background of British society. As Lipset (1963) 
observes, ’’The conception that public and social service is performed 
best when a leader is not paid, or is paid an honorarium, is basically 
an aristocratic value linked to the concept of noblesse oblige”.
Before I turn to a consideration of business administration, 
let me finally note some significant differences between Britain and 
Anerica in the field of public administration. In a sense there was 
no civil service in Britain until after the middle of the nineteenth 
century. There were lots of public officials, but there was no common
system of recruitment or control, and it is doubtful whether the 
officials themselves would have regarded themselves as belonging to 
a common service. In the early part of the century the aristocratic 
system of patronage permeated the whole system from top to bottom, even
clerkships went to ”the sons of people of rank and influence, brought
. ... „ (126) up in idleness .
This aristocratic system was gradually changed in the twenty 
years or so before the famous Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854. The 
change resulted in a switch from the values of affectivity, particularism, 
ascription and diffuseness at least in the mode of operation of the 
service. The system of patronage was largely replaced by selection on 
merit; probationary appointments; promotion chiefly by merit, and 
different classes of officers inside the service performing different 
levels of work. The basic cause of this change was the demands made 
upon the state by the system of industrial capitalism. Of course these 
structural demands did not automatically ’cause* such a system to come 
about, they merely set up certain pressures for such a system, the 
pressures emanating from the drive towards efficiency that is present 
in most forms of industrial capitalism. It was these structural 
conditions that provided the incentive for the evolution of the principles 
and procedures of the service that Northcote and Trevelyan were to 
generalise and apply to the serivce as a whole. The implementation of 
the ensuing report was greatly aided by a timely crisis - the admin­
istrative mismanagement of the Crimean War that was revealed to the 
public gaze by the Times’ correspondent, W.H. Russell.
The Northcote-Trevelyan reforms clearly changed the British
civil service in the direction of that side of the pattern variables that
I have designated as capitalist; yet as with so many British institutions
the transformation was by no means total. To take but one area as an
example, that of the selection process, although selection by merit
replaced patronage, in so many ways it was an odd sort of merit. The
essential features of the selection philosophy, which still largely hold
today, such is the power of institutional inertia, was clearly stated in
the words of the Report on the Indian Civil Service: ’’We believe that
men who have been engaged up to twenty-one or twenty-two in studies which
have no immediate connection with the business of any profession, and of
which the effect is merely to open, to invigorate, and to enrich the
mind, will generally be found, in the business of every profession,
superior to men who have, at eighteen or nineteen, devoted themselves to
1127)
the special studies of their calling”. In India the tasks for which
the civil servants were responsible were almost infinitely various, but 
it would be difficult to argue that the same is true in Britain today.
The system still reflects some of the dominant themes in the English 
educational system, that I have outlined above, in particular the stress 
upon general rather than specialist, technical education.
Just as the modern British civil service may be dated from the
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of 1854 so the modern American system can be 
dated from the passing of the Pendleton Act in 1883. This act, like 
its British equivalent, instituted the open competition system of 
selection in place of a system of patronage called the ’spoils system'. 
This system had rather different roots than the English system of 
patronage. The patronage was essentially political patronage, and its 
rationale was that important federal positions should not be left in the
hands of career bureaucrats, who had little if any connection with the
popular democratic will. This and the device of rotation of office, 
reflected the deep seated fear of strong central government that I have 
already described. The basic cause of the change in the system was very 
similar to the situation in Britain, the dominance of the idea of free 
trade and perfect competition intruded as far as the system of public 
administration and led to a system of open competition on the basis of 
merit. The precipitating cause of the new system was also inspired by 
an incident, the murder of President Garfield by a disappointed office 
seeker, which had a similar effect upon America as the debacle of the 
Crimean War had on Britain.
Although the structure of the American civil service resulted
from a similar economic infrastructure to that of Britain, there were,
and are a number of important differences. Firstly, the system of
political appointments to the civil service still remains, reflecting the
American fear of a closed Bureaucracy and the desire to maintain the
democratic tradition in the service.* Secondly, emanating from the same
cultural tradition, the American system of public administration is by
no means such a closed bureaucracy as it is in Britain. Entry to the
service is not only or even largely at the bottom, with the career
stretching on and upwards for the lifetime of the appointee. There is
a great deal of movement in and out of the service; in some post Second
World War years as many as -100,000 civil servants per annum have been 
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moving in or out. Thirdly, the educational requirements for
♦These constitute less than 15% of the total service however, and have 
been steadily declining.
potential entrants are rather different from those required in Britain.
When Congress passed the.Pendleton Act it added an instruction that the 
entrance examination should be practical in nature and related to the 
duties to be'-performed.. One can see how the major features of the 
curriculum in American schools and colleges are reflected in this policy 
statement. In short, the American civil service is composed of 
technically qualified men and women recruited to perform particular 
tasks and assignments.^2^
In the previous sections of this chapter I have been concerned 
to observe differences in the superstructures of Britain and America and 
to show how these differences can be expressed in terms of the pattern 
variables. The explicit assumption in the analysis has been that super- 
structural relations, whether dependent or independent Of the economic 
base, influence the operation of business enterprise. It is now necessary 
to focus attention more closely upon the historical development of the 
business enterprise itself in England and America, because differences 
that had emerged by 1900 are still important today.
By 1860 the industrial structure of both societies consisted 
largely of Marshallian type single function firms, with a greater 
preponderance of family firms in British society than in America, but 
the difference was probably not marked. From this point on however, 
the two countries began to diverge, so that by the beginning of the 
First World War there was a significant difference in the two structures. 
Even before 1860 there were embryo differences between the two 
societies in tenns of business structure. The most important of these 
was the greater preponderance of the business corporation, perhaps the 
dominating feature of modern industrial capitalism in America. The 
corporation was a device that certainly fitted the American situation 
in the nineteenth century. The business tasks, particularly in trans­
portation, were large, and the American people relatively poor, and the 
corporation helped solve these twin problems by gathering moderate sums 
from many investors. One can also see how the growth of freely 
marketable ownership shares in these corporations suited the needs of a 
migratory society, which needed some liquidity in its investment. In 
later years many American corporations attempted to sell their shares 
to as wide a public as possible, not so much to raise capital, but to 
create a symbolic link between the private enterprise system in general 
and their company in particular and the p u b l i c . C e r t a i n l y  
securing a charter for the corporation was an easier business in America 
than in Britain, in that it was easier to lobby a charter through a
state legislature than through the British'Parliament,
The significance of the corporation in the American economy at 
the dawn of the century cannot, in my view, be overestimated. Its mode 
of arrival was perhaps as significant as its inode of operation. Many 
of the corporations were created in the 1880's and 1890's by mergers, 
mergers which were often promoted by Eastern financiers, eager to seize 
the opportunities offered by the creation of a truly national market 
by the railways. The significance of this is that the merger promotors 
often tended to replace the existing high level managerial personnel, 
many of them relatives of the founder, with managers chosen solely on 
the basis of the abilities to bring a quick return on the investment.
Payne (1967) argues that the drag exerted by family influence and 
managerial 'deadwood' was probably not so great in America to start with 
compared with Britain. Firstly, he notes that the merger movement came 
after a period of exceptionally fierce competition when many of the less 
efficient firms would have been driven out of business anyway. lie adds, 
secondly, that the relative youtli of many American companies at this 
time meant that familial control had not yet become so deeply embedded 
in their organisational structures.
The size and geographical spread of these corporations was
considerable by British s t a n d a r d s , a n d  they provided a real challenge
to those men put in charge of administering them. The challenge was
first met by the railways and public utilities, the first really large
corporations, and, in the case of the former, the first organisations
that really stretched right the way across the United States. These
enormous problems forced these organisations to develop forms of control
that did not need the constant attention of the top men - in short the
problems fostered the development of bureaucracy and the discipline of
management. It was in this situation, for example, that the American
corporation began to develop accounting as a control over efficiency
rather than as a mere device for balancing the books that was to remain
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its lot in England for many decades. These new managerial ideas
and concepts were initially transmitted inside the corporations them­
selves via management meetings and occasionally by the odd article 
published in magazines like the American Railroad Journal. The greater 
openness of American society and American business helped the dissemin­
ation of such ideas in a way that British society and business never 
could (see below p. 112). Later, American business schools were to 
promulgate further the ideas and discoveries of the Anerican corporation 
within formal taught courses on management. Not only did the Anerican
corpoi ations develop an arguably more effecient system of management, 
but because of the widespread acceptance of the democratic principle 
that one man was as good as another, this meant that capable persons 
were prepared initially to accept a fairly lowly status in the organ­
isation, because they were aware that the possibility existed of their 
rising tp the executive suite. The corporation, once it had set the 
pattern for management and organisational structure continued to lead
it as Chandler (1962) had shown in his seminal work on American
( l 3 3 )
industrial enterprises. In this sense the corporation has remained
almost as important as the university in disseminating management ideas 
in the United States. Abroad, particularly perhaps in England,
American companies have often performed the function of business schools 
in propagating new ideas.
■The American corporation also reaped all the benefits of its 
relatively large size. Not only did its large size necessarily 
promote the development of management techniques as I have argued above, 
but it was sufficiently big to train and send out overseas travellers 
to develop the company’s export market. As early as 1900 Europeans 
were beginning to talk about the ’American invasion’.^ O f  greatest 
significance however, is the fact that large firms are in a much better 
position to fund and organise research and development of their products. 
Already ahead in techniques, methods of production and the creation of 
new products, American firms in their corporate form took an even 
greater lead. It was certainly the American corporation, for example, 
that realised that consumer goods go through a life-cycle, growing 
rapidly when they are first introduced and more slowly later, according 
to Engel’s Law.^'^ To meet the challenge of the constantly 
changing market demanding new products, the American corporation evolved 
the multidivisional structure. The new form was originated by General 
Motors and Du font shortly after the First World War, and followed by 
a few others during the 1920's and 1930's. It was widely adopted in 
the boom following the Second World War.
Not only were there important structural differences between 
business in Britain and America by the turn of the century, but there 
were also important differences in what, can be termed the style of 
business. As Merton (1938) lias argued, the structure.of American 
society is such that there exists a greater accent in certain sectors 
on the goal of success than on the means of attaining it. Certainly 
this observation fits the American businessman at the turn of the 
century - the so called age of the robber barons. None of these men
had any notable scruples, or, as Hobsbawm (1975) observes, could afford 
to have in an economy and an age where fraud, bribery, slander and if 
necessary guns were normal aspects of competition. Beard (1963) has 
argued that the lack of any form of moral propriety in business dealings 
can be traced back to the time of the British, Before the revolution 
the Americans were largely barred from legitimate enterprise and were 
thus, "forced into speculative channels, compelled to engage in such 
risky, not to say violent, trades as that in fur and ruin......retarded
in development in the early period, kept back to a more primitive stage 
of methods, the American businessman began as a gambler in commodities,
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instead of a producer of goods tamed to 'toil”. There is doubtless
a good deal of merit in this account, in particular it attempts to 
stress another distinguishing fact of American business, that is that 
most of its successful practitioners, unlike so many of the great entre­
preneurs of the Old World, who often seemed enamoured with their 
products and obsessed with technological construction as such, seemed 
uncommitted to any special way of making money. Horatio Alger
had urged them to ’get ahead’, and that is just what they were doing.
The American public appeared to accept them as well, in that the heroes 
of American business are not those who have behaved most graciously and 
scrupulously, but those who have shown initiative and struck out on new 
paths which have paid off. There was no ’moral' regulation of business 
behaviour, or any other behaviour come to that, in America in the same 
way that such normative regulation existed in English society at the 
same period. Fraud in England did not just bring legal penalties, but 
moral disapproval as well, whereas in America an admonition or at most 
an investigation was all that threatened the robber barons. Several 
features of this situation are claimed to have remained in the American 
business community which distinguish it from the British. Many 
commentators still claim that striving for monetary success and taking 
risks to attain it are more characteristic of American than British 
business behaviour(dranick (1962), Shonfield (1965}, whilst the accent 
on contro] by legal means remains the defining mark of American
business practice against a greater reliance on informal moral control
. ■ n' . (138)m  Britain.'
In analysing both the structure and the style of business as it
developed in England from around the turn of the century, one is struck
by a series of marked contrasts. Firstly, there were differences in
the structure of firms. Despite the fact that Britain possessed a
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national market by the 1860’s, owing to rapid urbanisation and the
expansion of the transport system some decades earlier, company structure
did not reflect this. Although there no legal limitations to large
public corporations after the 1860’s, such firms were few and far
between. The British industrial structure was still dominated by the
relatively small private family firm. (In 1914 80?o of British
companies were still private). one of the reasons for this was
that British firms were able to exploit the imperfections existing in
the British market and still remain relatively small. After the 1860's
the same firms could continue with their old practices by doing the same
thing in Britain's overseas markets. Payne (1967) reports that, MBy
increasing specialisation designed to exploit marginal differences in
quality, and by creating the impression that the differences were
greater than they were in reality, many British firms were able to secure
a degree of oligopoly power and to make sufficient profits to encourage
them to resist the attractive offers of the promotors of combines later
in the c e n t u r y " . H a v i n g  performed successfully for a long period
of time, and one might add, having been nourished in the belief of
British industrial supremacy, the family firms were reluctant to change
from their old and successful ways. They were especially reluctant
to raise new capital through procedures that might have ° weakened
their control over their own firms, and such was the-magnitude of their
accumulated sources of capital, that the majority of firms were long
able to keep pace with the demand for fixed capital investment without
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recourse to the domestic capital market.
The smail family firm in Britain suffered a number of increasing
disadvantages in the increasingly competitive world market. Firstly,
such firms did not encourage the supply of outside talents into the
business, and no family business could expect that after several.
generations it would still automatically be capable of producing from
family talent a flow of competent managers. Secondly, the small firm
will always find it difficult to compete on the basis of research and
development. The fact of smallness only compounded the considerable
disadvantages that Britain already had in this area(see p. 95). Thus,
Aldcroft (1964) reports that, "Generally speaking, by 1914 there was
hardly a basic industry in which we held technical superiority except
perhaps pottery."^^) Finally, it can be argued that the family firm
structure is an inherently conservative one. The owners of such firms
are usually anxious for a satisfactory living for the members of their
family, and they are anxious to retain control. Stability and order
are the hallmarks of such firms, rather than the more risky goals of
(144)innovation and profit maximization. This fact is probably of
far greater importance than arguments about the structure of demand.
Demand can be stimulated from the supply side, as it clearly was in the 
United States, by the initiative of manufacturers through the intro­
duction of new products Or by energetic selling methods.
It would be quite wrong to give the impression that there 
were no English giant companies by 1900, or that there had not been a 
series of mergers in the decade up to the turn of the century. Yet 
both the character of the merger movement and the resulting corporations 
were not generally characterised by the same features as their American 
equivalents. In Britain, numerous firms reluctantly coalesced under 
the spur of falling prices and profit margins, there was no Eastern 
financier to buy them all out as in America. One consequence of this 
was that the majority of the old personnel, often with family loyalties 
to the constituent parts of the new company, remained to jealously 
guard their old interest. Given this situation it is not surprising 
that many of these large British firms had severe organisational problems. 
The gentlemen at the top, still steeped in notions of patronage, 
ascription rather than achievement, were reluctant to promote outsiders 
on merit, or to develop a functional hierarchical mode of organisation 
that was altogether alien to the spirit of the gentlemen1s club to which 
most belonged or aspired.
What new organisational ideas and product innovations that 
there were in individual finns made very slow progress inside the 
business community. The reason for this was the considerable stress 
upon secrecy that persisted in a relatively closed society like Britain 
compared with the more open nature of American society. This cultural 
pattern even impeded British firms from banding together for the foreign 
sales campaigns, that many groups of American firms were conducting by 
the start of the First World War. The evidence for this particular 
feature of British business is widespread. Lewis and Stewart (1958) 
in their study of the British businessman note that the business community, 
"preserves the secrecy which so hampers the economist, the biographer, 
the historian, the novelist and the social research worker....privacy 
is the key note of British business character; any invasion of it is
intensely resented and instantly attacked as injurious to the national
(145)interest". This attitude was at least partly to blame for the
failure of the Development Councils, set up in certain industries after 
the Second World War,-to provide common services like research and 
export promotion, in an effort to help the average firm to a higher 
level of efficiency. The response from industry was almost uniformly 
negative, and two of the Development Councils were in fact boycotted 
from their inception. Even when management itself calls in assistance,
as in the case of hiring management consultants, Fanner (1968) reports 
that they are often excluded from some managerial matters and are also 
often asked to concentrate on the factory floor rather than management. 
Ibis accent upon secrecy by the business community should be understood 
as the manifestation of certain tendencies in British society as a 
whole. The classic analysis of this fundamental difference between 
Britain and America was made by Shils in 1956. Shils argues that the 
hierarchical nature of British society remains despite its democratic 
and pluralist political form, and that the populace are, in general, 
still deferential to the society’s rulers. The ruling group in British 
is, by and large, relied upon, even expected to conduct its own affairs 
away from the glare of publicity. Following Bagohot, he believes that 
this is what allows the English Constitution to work so well; the small 
group of rulers are trusted to act in the interests of the whole society. 
Shils argues that this leads to a situation where, "the British ruling 
class is unequalled in secretiveness and taciturnity. Perhaps no 
ruling class in the Western world, certainly no ruling class in any
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democratic society, is as close-mouthed as the British ruling class."
The recent case of the Crossman diaries would appear to provide a good 
illustration of this argument. In sharp contrast the United States has 
been committed to the principle of publicity since its origin. As I 
have already argued, the sweeping out of the British was also a symbolic 
sweeping out of the traditions of aristocracy, and with it the ethos of 
the small ruling class working on trust and in secret. The new America 
was decidedly populist in tone and this helped lower the barriers to 
publicity on the government’s side. Once this was institutionalised 
in the formative years of the Republic, by the usual process of insti­
tutional inertia it persisted, helped along by the gradual emergence of 
a special professional custodian in the institution of the mass media, 
which had vested interests in the ’open society’. This analysis of 
the relative closedness of the British business coiiununity compared with 
the American, is an additional factor which helps to explain the slow 
progress of business and management education in British society. Such 
education is unlikely to thrive in a situation where each firm regards 
itself as being unique with problems that are not shared with other 
firms. Similar arguments can be advanced about business attitudes 
towards science and scientific discoveries. The ethos of science is 
universalistic, it hardly thrives in a situation where the values of 
particularism are well to the fore as was clearly the case in British 
business around1900.
The differences between the structure of business in America 
and Britain that I have already enumerated, should be enough in them­
selves to indicate that American firms were probably more efficient and 
competitive than compa rable British firms in 1900. Further evidence 
on the operation of business in Britain only serves to reinforce this 
conclusion. Firstly, British firms tended to compete on the basis of 
product differentiation, claiming that their products were unique, 
rather than on the basis of price and delivery. Partly of course this 
reflected the structure of the market. The size of the American 
market was able to support a much greater number of large, efficient, 
competing producers. Yet this is not the whole story. America had, 
and arguably still has, a much greater symbolic commitment to compet­
ition than Britain. One can see an indication of this if, following 
Kaysen (1956), one examines anti-monopoly policy in the two societies.
In America the anti-monopoly laws, (the first of which was passed in 
1890), whatever their actual effect, are an important symbolic statement 
of the commitment to competition. In Britain on the other hand the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission was not created until 
1948, and then .its major terms of reference was not to do with the 
importance of competition per se. but were rather concerned with the
notion of the ’ public interest’ • More recently, several observers
have commented upon the style of business practice in Britain, which 
appears to lack the ruthlessness that is characteristic of America. 
Shonfield (1965) for example, writing about the Conservative Party’s 
return to power in 1951 on a manifesto stressing the importance of 
private enterprise and competition, observes, ’’The fact that the compet­
ition so carefully nurtured was often of a kind which involved only a 
handful of contenders, ending with a gentleman’s agreement rather than 
a fight to the finish".-(147) Q business community long dominated by
gentlemen, or at least by persons aspiring to be gentlemen, this should
not be wholly surprising. For those that transgressed the informal
rules of the game the penalties could be high.^^^*
This historical analysis of the origins and development of 
British and American capitalism should be sufficient to indicate the 
importance of considering the socio-cultural environment within which the 
dominant mode of production operates. I have shown that capitalism 
grew up in very different social structures in the two societies, and 
these two structures inevitably modified the working of economic 
forces. In Britain, the long political dominance of the landed aris­
tocracy, and the even longer dominance of the social values of the 
landed aristocracy, effected not only the political and social structure
within which capitalistic business had to operate, but also the 
structure and operation of business itself. In America, on the other 
hand, the political and social structure was dominated almost from the 
beginning either by business or by values that were clearly in keeping 
with the demands of a capitalist economy. I have tried to express the 
differences between the two societies by showing how different aspects 
of social structure could be symbolised as stressing certain values in 
the pattern variable structure rather than others. I have argued that 
the variables of affective-neutrality, specificity, universalism, 
achievement, self-orientation, rather than their opposites, reflect the 
demands of a capitalist economy.
An important question for this research is to wfyat extent the 
differences that I have described between Britain and America have 
survived into the 1970’s. Social structures rarely stand still and even 
the mode of production ’ develops’ . As 1 have previously noted, 
capitalism is by its very nature a constantly changing phenomenon. In 
the next chapter I will consider in detail to what extent it is still 
possible to detect differences between British and American companies 
operating in similar environments. It is necessary at this juncture 
however, to consider in very general terms the changes that have occurred 
in British and American societies. The values and ideals of the 
political elite are created by historical circumstances and the values 
and ideals may or may not be congruent with the ’needs' of the economy. 
There is no simple, mechanical relationship between the economy needs 
and the socio-political structure, indeed, under certain circumstances 
there can exist considerable incongruence. British society is probably 
a particularly good example of this as I have attempted to show. In 
many ways the social structure and the cultural system were incongruent 
with the demands of the economy, although pretty much in keeping with 
the ideals of the political elite. It was possible to maintain this 
incongruence because there was initially very little economic pressure 
to do otherwise. In other words, the economic advantages that Britain 
received as the first industrial nation protected her socio-political 
structure. It is true that by about 1900 Britain had lost most of her 
early advantage to some of the later industrialising nations, America 
included. Yet a certain amount of protection still remained. Firstly, 
Britain was a great colonial power and she gained enormous economic 
advantages from cheap raw materials and a protected and guaranteed 
market for her finished manufactured products. Even when the economic 
system did begin to experience serious trouble it was by no means 
absolutely clear to the political and economic leaders that one of the
troubles was a incongruent social structure. Businessmen, as I have
already shown, are not always able to diagnose economic malaise with
particular accuracy, particularly when there are numerous potential
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candidates for the cause of the illness.
Veblen was undoubtedly correct when he observed way back in 
1915 that ’gentility’ was economically costly for British society/100  ^
yet Veblen also realised that British society up to that time could 
afford it- for the reasons that I have already outlined above. There 
is an important general point to be made here. Just as micro 
contingency theory at the level of the firm makes the erroneous assumption 
that the economic demands of the firm .always push its structure and 
policies in a certain direction, ensuring that they are congruent with 
the economic demands of the company (see pp.54—35 ), so too macro 
contingency theory, at the level of the society, is equally erroneous 
in making similar assumptions. It is only when the society experiences 
a profound crisis, particularly but not necessarily an economic one, 
that certain pressures are exerted upon the stiucture to bring it into 
line with economic o b j e c t i v e s . T h i s  is exactly parallel to the 
case of the firm, when it experiences an economic crisis a very hard 
look is taken at its management and its structure.
Arguably Britain has had some form of economic crisis since 
the turn of the century, but it is really only since the Second World 
War that it has become particularly acute, and a link made between her 
economic performance and her social structure. This economic
crisis also has strong ideological importance, because it has led some 
observers to call into question the system itself, or at the very least 
to compare the performance of the British capitalist system with the 
performance of other types of economic system. A good example of this 
is the 'Woodford' speech made by Churchill in 1955. Here'he noted the 
performance of the Russian economy compared with the British and 
significantly noted the way in which the Russian education system had 
supposedly contributed to Russian economic performance. The editorial 
comment in the Times Educational Supplement made the issue clear, "We 
are at war.....what started as a conflict of ideologies has now developed 
into an economic battle of the first magnitude". The editorial went on 
to mention the reaction of the political leaders, "Now that the full 
implications of these figures are properly understood, there is an 
anxiety approaching panic in high p l a c e s " . T h e  British industrial 
relations system was researched by a Royal Commission and the findings 
published in 1969. .The whole tenor of the report was that the system
was outdated, it was formed during a different economic period and 
needed drastic modernising. Many of its recommendations bore the strong 
mark of the American industrial relations system, which was obviously 
thought to have greater relevance to modern capitalism. The British 
education system has also been increasingly indicted for its lack of 
economic relevance. Although the Robbins Report on higher 
education concluded that the supply of places should be based on the 
demand for places from potential entrants, rather than on the demand in 
the economy for the products of higher education, there have been sub­
sequent indications that the government may well change its mind. The 
Civil Service has also received considerable government scrutiny, just 
as it did after the crisis of the Crimean War. In the Fulton Report
(1963) the diagnosis was made that the civil service was not meeting 
the needs of a complex economy such as Britian. The Committee detected 
the 'philosophy of the amateur' inside the service, which they saw as 
running counter the need for civil servants to be skilled managers 
Finally, one should note that the falling rate of profit of British 
companies combined with a high rate of inflation inside the economy has 
led to a severe liquidity crisis in British industry. The British 
banking system, never closely tied to industry anyway, was completely 
incapable of coping with this situation, and the only road from economic 
ruin was government salvation. The state therefore, via the National 
Enterprise Board and Planning Agreements, has begun to play an ever more 
crucial role in the economy, both in terms of managing the infrastructure 
and the superstructure.
It must be said that the economic crisis was not the only force 
making for a rexamination of British social structure in the I960's. 
Britain's negotiations to enter the E.E.C. must also be counted as an 
important incentive. As Shonfield (1965) notes, "The effect of being 
required to state as precisely as possible the doctrine behind some 
British administrative practice in order to defend it against some 
alternative favoured by members of the European Common Market, was to 
prompt a wide-ranging review of the apparatus of British economic 
administration and law".^^^ Even here however, one can argue that the 
major impetus behind Britain's application to the E.E.C. was an economic 
one - the economically successful market was seen by many as a potential 
solution to many of Britain's economic problems.
The superstructure of American society, I have argued, has 
historically been much more congruent with the needs of the capitalist 
economy. Only in the area of the welfare state has there possibly
been a significant gap between system needs and actual provision*
The ’fit’ between the economy and such institutions as the education 
system, the industrial relations system etc., -evolved.in part at 
least because the structure of such systems reflected the values of the 
political elite. Similarly, the lack of a well developed welfare 
state also reflected the values of such an elite. The performance of 
the American economy, although not particularly good by international 
comparison since the 1920's, has rarely reached the crisis situation 
that the British economy has found itself in since the 1950’s. One 
consequence of this is that there has been no economic pressure to 
create a more extensive welfare state to counteract the strong ideolog­
ical distaste for such a measure on behalf of many members of the 
political elite. The American capitalist system has, of course, had 
its crises. The world wide depression of the 1930's was probably as 
catastrophic in America as in any country in the world. It did not 
however, with one major exception, lead to any great remodelling of the 
superstructural institutions in America, merely because they were all 
largely in keeping with the economic needs of the system. The major 
exception vvas the industrial relations system, which was substantially 
restructured following the passing of the Wagner Act in 1935. The 
other significant result of the crisis was the attempt by the New Deal 
administration to foster a more active role in the economy for the state 
itself. The creation of the National Recovery Administration, whose 
job it was to compel industry to reorganise itself, fix prices, allocate 
quotas of production etc., met considerable opposition despite the 
economic crisis. Yet its creation shows how economic crises can compel 
the political elite to take decisions which cut right across important 
ideological considerations, providing of course that the decisions 
maintain the system itself in one form or other. Such corporatist 
policies did not last beyond the worst of the depression however, and 
in 1935 the N.R.A. was wound up, after the Supreme Court had declared it 
unconstitutional. It could be that the strong belief in individualism 
in the United States, that supports some version of laissez-faire 
capitalism, may yet prove to be the biggest social hindrance to economic 
prosperity that- the United States possesses. The ideology that was 
appropriate to the early days of capitalism is arguably an enormous 
hindrance to the very different sort of capitalism that his developed 
some two hundred years after the founding of the Republic.
America has suffered some crises since the depression, but 
these have been of a relatively minor nature and certainly nothing severe
enough to shake the system as such. To return to the remark by
Schumpeter which opened this chapter, one can only but agree with his 
observation that the ’coins of social structure' do not readily melt 
once they are formed, and that the socio-economic conditions prevailing 
at the time of their formation leave their mark upon them. A severe 
economic crisis in capitalist society often presents the ruling elite 
with a choice, and if the crisis is long enough and severe enough the 
decision can easily be made to melt the coins of social structure and 
remould them. The.remoulding is likely to be in the direction of a 
greater congruence between superstructure and infrastructure, but one 
should never commit the error of taking political choice for material 
necessity; the range of 'solutions' that are logically open to the 
elite are very large indeed, only history narrow the choice in practice
There is one final historical legacy that has a bearing on 
the research findings which needs to be mentioned. Whatever the 
validity of the partial historical analysis that I have conducted on 
Britain and America, one thing is certain. Businessmen in the two 
societies, like other men, have a conception of their own society's 
historical past and of the past of other societies. These national
images are powerful spectacles through which present day reality is 
observed, constantly reinforced by the media.(161) In partiCuiar one 
must mention that image of America and American firms that many British 
businessmen possess, as well as the image of Britain and British firms 
that many Americans possess. Although these images are interesting 
and important data in themselves, it is important not to confuse them 
with the real world which they purport to reflect.
NOTES
1. Schumpeter (1947) pp. 12.-13.
2. It would certainly be logically possible for a society to be
perfectly attuned to the requirements of the economic system,
I am merely suggesting that there are no empirical cases of this 
occuring.
3. The fact that a society’s socio-cultural structure is or is not in 
harmony with its economic mode of production need not be the result 
of conscious policy making by the leaders of the society, nor need 
it reflect, in the short term at least, the strength of the 
economic demands. The polity may not understand the relationship 
between socio-cultural structure and economic performance, and even 
if they do, the society may be in a sufficiently powerful economic 
position to ignore such relationships, at least in the short run.
4. The concept of feudalism means something different depending on
whether one is concentrating upon social, economic, legal or 
constitutional problems, and these different aspects change at 
different rates, cf. Cam (1940).
5. This is the traditional picture of feudalism, and it is almost 
certainly overdrawn. Hirshler (1954) has presented some 
interesting evidence to suggest that there was a good deal of 
competitiveness in medieval economic life, and attributes the 
stress upon collectivistic social and economic institutions to 
the effects on scholars of nineteenth century romanticism and 
the hardships caused by capitalist individualism.
6. Barrington Moore (1973) p.6.
7. Campbell (1960) p.23.
8. Barrington Moore (1973) p.30
9. Perkin (1969) p.45.
10. These g o a ls  were la r g e ly  pursued by c o n tro l o ver e x te rn a l t ra d e  
which was e f f e c t iv e ly  re g u la te d  by p ro fe s s io n a l o f f i c i a l s .
11. It is significant, as Perkin (1969) notes, that there is no 
English word for bourgeoisie, because it is difficult to find, 
at least until late into the nineteenth century, a permanent, 
self-conscious urban business class in opposition to the 
landed aristocracy.
12. Perkin (1969). p.57.
13. Pitt, always lavish with his peerages, did not dare tor a long 
time to bring the business community into the Mouse of Lords.
In 1797 however, he made Banker Smith the first exception.
As Namier sourly observed in his Structure of Politics: "Smith-
Carrington was the first man actually engaged in trade whom George 
III, with much repugnance, was persuaded to make a British peer11.
14. Barrington Moore (1973) p.37.
15. Societies which join in the industrialisation process after
its initial development naturally benefit from the great backlog 
of technological innovation which can be taken over wholesale 
from the initiating countries, usually, without the retarding 
effects of institutions and customs which have grown up around 
them. For a further development of this point see Gershenkron 
(1962) p.8. For an even earlier account see Veblen (1915) p.86.
16. Miller (1961) p.37.
17. There do not seem to me to be any good reasons for supposing 
that the relationship between protestantism and capitalism, 
assuming that it exists, must be the same in all historical cases.
18. Poor Richard’s Almanac is Franklin’s celebrated publication. It
is Poor Richard who sings the loudest praise of industry. Luck, 
he says, is of no account. Americans need only work hard and 
never trouble themselves about luck, for "Diligence is the Mother 
of good luck, and God gives all things to industry”. Poor 
Richard likewise, knows all about the calling: "He hath a trade
hath an estate, and he that hath a calling hath an office of 
profit and honour”. It should also be noted that Franklin was a 
publisher by trade, and that Poor Richard’s Almanac was, as much 
as anything else, a money-making venture. Franklin knew that 
the sentiments in Poor Richard would find a sympathetic ear in 
many Americans.
19. See for example the evidence presented in Sammuelsson (1961). 
pp. 67-69.
20. Newcomber’s (1955) study of big business executives seems to 
bear out the potency of the religious factor even today. In 
1950 in her sample of executives only 8.9% were Roman Catholics 
compared with 32.9% in the population in general, (p.48).
21. Thistlethwaite (1955) p.27.
22. For example, those clauses forbidding the kinds of action
22. threatened by ’radical’ politicians, as well as the provisions 
prohibiting taxes on interstate trade, those forbidding federal 
taxes except in relation to population. No state was allowed 
to issue its own currency or interfere with contracts or refuse 
to recognise the legal actions of other states.
23. For a detailed case that the new Republic was not business 
oriented see Beard (1963) p.70.
24. For many of the European immigrants America was fabled for the
promise of her riches. Seagull, a character in Marston1 s play,
Westward Ho, showing in London in 1605, said of Virginia: ”1
tell thee, gold is more plentiful there than copper is with us... 
Why man, all their dripping pans and chamber pots are pure gold; 
and all the chains with which they chain up their streets are 
made of gold...and for rubies and diamonds they goe forth on 
holy days and gather them up by the seashore”. (Quoted in Cochran 
(1968). p.9.) Many took a more sanguine view of the situation 
on arrival, but in the end few would deny that the opportunities 
at least were greater in America, for men of their social 
position, than they were in European society. Tocqueville's 
observations over two centuries later illustrate, I think, the 
truth of this proposition.
25. The most celebrated exponent of this view is Ihrner (1920)
26. Schlesinger (1960) p.109.
27. The amount of mobility is probably overstated in most accounts,
at least in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is
probably not true, for example, that the Western frontier acted
as a ’safety valve’ for the unemployed in the East. These people 
were not able to buy the waggons and the supplies to go West, and 
even after the railroad was completed it was still primarily the 
school teachers, marginally successful shopkeepers and farmers 
who could save enough to make the trip and start afresh.
28. rhistlethwaite (1955) p.115.
29. The population of the United States in 1850 contained half a 
million more men than women, and the predominance of men was even 
more marked in the Western states which contained 529men per 1,000 
population compared with 504 for the Eastern seaboard. (United 
States Bureau of the Census (1969) p.93).
30. Bendix (1964) p.118.
31. A very similar line of argument can be found in Checkland 
(1975) p.177. Bendix (1964) pp. 118-119, Thistlethwaite 
(1955) pp. 127-130.
32. Shonfield (1965) p.301.
33. Hartz (1948) pp. 290-291
34. Shonfield (1965) p.303.
35. Both these arguments are examined and rejected by Barrington
Moore (1973). For a more modern analysis see Fogel and
Engermann (1974).
36. Barrington Moore (1973). p.152.
37. Giddens (1974). p. ix.
38. In particular one should note the debate between at least three 
competing methodologies. These may be termed the ’reputational1 
method, the ’issue’ method, and the ’positional’ or ’sociology 
of leadership' method. For a full discussion of all these 
methodologies see Rose (1967).
39. Perkin (1969) observes that, "The landed classes possessed a clear 
majority of the House of Commons until 1885, of the Cabinet until 
1893, if not 1905, and of the House of Lords until long after the 
Parliament Act of 1911 drastically reduced its powers. It 
effectively controlled recruitment to the Civil Service until at 
least 1870, to the Army until 1871, and to the Church for as long 
as it cared to exercise it. It dominated local government until 
at least 1888, and in some counties for much longer. Yet neither 
contemporaries nor historians have doubted that the capitalist 
middle class were the ’real' rulers of inid-Victorian England, in 
the sense that the laws which were passed and executed by Landed 
Parliaments and Governments were increasingly those demanded by 
the business men", (p.272).
40. See for example the discussion in Perkin (1969) pp. 302-308.
41. In particular one should note the apparent power of the public 
schools in British Society. In so far as people who have 
attended these institutions are favoured in the competitive race 
then this can be considered as a form of collegiate patronage.
42. Samuel Smiles Self Help. Quoted in Perkin (1969) p.225.
43. This point was certainly appreciated by those M.p's with business 
connections in the Parliament of 1880. Although land reform was 
started as an instrument of entrepreneurial antagonism towards the 
landed class its potential consequences were soon realised and 
helped frighten a great many businessmen as well as landowners out 
of the Liberal Party and into the arms of the Tories. There they 
contributed to that amalgamation of land and capital which was to 
dominate the social structure in the succeeding period.
44. A good example of this in the nineteenth century was the controversy 
surrounding Chadwick's report On the Sanitary Conditions of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain (1842). In it he attempted 
to cost the social and economic consequences of ill health and 
showed that it was more cost effective to spend money on improving 
sanitary conditions. He lost the initial battle, because he 
failed to convince the owners of capital of the long run gain of 
his measures, but his approach was later to triumph.
45. One example of this realisation must suffice here. In 1864, the 
world's largest calico printer told the Social Science Association, 
"The Factory Acts were opposed by many of us as economically 
unsound, and as an unjust interference with the rights of labour 
and capital. They have been soundly beneficial". Quoted in 
Perkin (1969). p. 450. For an analysis of why many large 
businessmen supported the Factory Acts in the nineteenth century, 
see Carson (1970).
46. It is interesting to observe that the ideal of 'service' is central 
both to the idea of being a professional and to the aristocratic 
ideal.
47. The only qualification one might want to offer to this statement 
is that in the late 1960's there were certain signs of discontent, 
particularly among the young. 'Hie phrase, 'The military - 
industrial complex', curiously enough first used by Eisenhower, 
took on a new meaning during the later stages of the Vietnam War 
for many young people. Anti - capitalist rhetoric began to grow 
in both quantity and quality and left its mark, albeit temporarily, 
on business recruitment. For an interesting collection of 
American anti-capitalist literature of this period, see Perrow (1972).
48. The best analysis is to be found in Guttsman (1974).
49. Sutton et al. (1962) p.290.
50. There really is no British equivalent in power and prestige to 
the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of 
Commerce with its more than 1700 local units.
51. Thistlethwaite (1955) p.250.
52. Miller (1958) p.13.
53. Parsons (I960) pp. 213-214.
54. Similar arguments have been used to explain various pieces of 
legislation seemingly aimed at certain sectors of the business 
community. For the Food and Drug Amendment Act (1938), see 
Jackson (1970). For legislation ostensibly against the meat 
packing industry, see Prewitt and Stone (1973) p.37-.
55. Galbraith (1955) for one argues that the lack of consumption power
in the American economic system was one of the main causes of the
American depression.
56. Miliband (1969) p.77.
57. Rex (1974).
58. This I take to be the view, in broad terms, of the functionalist
theory of social stratification, see for example Davis and Moore
(1945).
59. Assuming a roughly similar economkyindustria1 structure, and 
assuming that the value structure has been effectively 
institutionalised,
60. That is, seen from the standpoint of the participants.
61. Numerous studies still attest to the existence of these differences.
For example, Alford’s (1964) study of voting behaviour notes that 
Britain has a much greater degree of class cleavage in voting 
compared with the United States. Studies also show that these 
differences affect the operation of business. Note lor example 
the findings of Starbuck (1966), who in a study comparing British 
and American retail stores, found that the importance of 
specialised customer service in Britain leads to a greater number 
of salespeople being employed. In general terms it is perhaps 
interesting to note that the idea of the self-service store 
originated in America, where the ideas of personal service did not 
have such strong historical roots.
62. For a full development of these arguments, see Habakkuk (1967).
63. The explanation of the phenomenon should be clear from the 
previous analysis. In particular one should note that 
consciousness of class differences are minimised in America by 
the following:
(i) The tendency not to give clear recognition to invidious 
distinctions.
( i i )  The marked d if fu s io n  o f  e q u a l i t a r ia n  s o c ia l  manners th rough  a 
w ide range o f  o ccu p a tio n s , income le v e ls  and p o s it io n s  o f  
a u th o r i ty .
(iii) The wide accessability of such symbols of ’respectable’ 
position, e.g. automobiles, clothing.
( i v )  The r e la t i v e  ease o f  access to  p u b lic  e d u c a tio n .
(v )  The p e r s is te n t  d is s e m in a tio n  o f  th e  id e o lo g y  o f  equa l
o p p o rtu n ity  and th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a c la s s le s s  s o c ie ty .
64. Sutton et al. (1962) p.315.
65. "In America, a well-educated member of the upper middle class will
discuss politics or other such topics with a cab driver, a hair­
dresser, and others at that occupational level; but in Britain, a 
person from the upper middle class still finds it difficult to 
interact informally with people that far below him in the social 
scale". Lipset (1963) p.319.
66. The problems that are likely to be encountered in those parts of 
American society where there exist more rigid hierarchical 
distinctions are well illustrated by Stouffer’s (1949) classic 
study of American soldiers. This research showed that soldiers 
wanted privileges to be ’earned’ rather than to be categorised, 
and that the rigidity of military deference requirements was 
probably a major cause of the resentment of enlisted personnel 
towards officers and towards the system of military rank.
67. By vertical mobility is meant the intergenerational movement from 
manual to non-manual occupations.
68. One point that must be emphasised about mobility in Britain in the 
nineteenth century is that it has to be compared to mobility in 
previous centuries. Perkin (1969), for example, notes that "there 
is no doubt that there was a considerable amount of upward mobility 
in mid-Victorian England, as in all periods of modern English 
history", (p.424) (My emphasis). This point must be born in mind 
when considering the evidence from studies like those of Erickson 
(1959), which suggests that there may well have been a contraction 
of opportunities for social climbing by the mid-Victorian age.
69. To enumerate merely the obvious there are the following:
(i) Changes in the proportion of the population in each stratum,
(ii) Changes in the rank order of each.stratum or sub stratum.
( i i i )  Changes in  th e  b i r t h  r a te  w ith in  each s tra tu m .
( i v )  Changes in  p o p u la tio n  g row th .
70. Marsh (1963) p.177.
71. Habakkuk (1962) p.190.
72. In the entire body of American fiction, he claimed, the businessman 
is almost always depicted as crass, philistine, corrupt,, predatory, 
domineering, reactionary, and amoral. Chamberlain (1948).
73. Wilson (1965) p.195.
74. Lewis and Stewart (1958) p.49.
75. "The third generation makes the gentleman", and "From furnace to 
field in three generations". (Aldcroft (1964)). "Shirt sleeves to 
bishop’s gaiters or barrister’s wig in three generations". (Jervis 
(1974)).
76. See for example Sampson (1962V Ch. 21.
77. Coleman (1973 notes that Reader (1970) talked about the ’management 
club’ atmosphere that existed in the early days of I.O.I. His own 
investigation into the Courtauld Archives demonstrated that it still 
existed. He quotes a memorandum from the Chairman to four of his 
senior directors. "There has been a Gentleman* s club atmosphere
in the Board Room, and I believe it is true to say that over the 
years this has spread to all the departments of our business. It 
is, in fact, part of the goodwill of the company which we must 
safeguard. On the other hand great care must be taken to avoid 
inefficiency", (p.99-101).
78. The N.O.R.C. scale has at least six occupational titles that could . 
be covered by the term ’businessman'.
79. A study is reported by McDonagh et aJ. (1959) which asks American 
and Swedish university students to rank, on the basis of occupat­
ional prestige, a narrow range of ’professional occupations'. 
(Business Executive, Doctor, Lawyer, University Professor, Minister, 
Dentist, Civil Engineer and Grade School Teacher). There were 
significant differences between the two populations at the 5% level, 
and from my point of view it is interesting that the business 
executive was rated higher by the American sample than by the 
Swedish. Even in America however, the business executive was 
rated third behind the doctor and lawyer.
80. This can be dramatically shown by inspecting the following table. 
Salary Earners Earning over £8,000 per annum. July 1976
Sector   Number . No. per 1000 Employed
Manufacturing 31,000 3
Distributive Trades 9,(XX) 3.3
Education 7,000 4.4
Local Authority 5,000 5
Nationalised Industry 11,000 6
Professions 12,000 7
Central Government 8.000 13
Banks/Insurance 19,000 17
Soiree: Moore (1976).
81. Eric Varley, Minister at the Department of Trade and Industry, in 
evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, reported the following data. During the 1973-1977 
period, 42% of engineers and technologists accepted for university 
had worse than the equivalent of three C’s at ’A1 level. Varley 
also added that between 1971 and 1974, whilst the annual supply of 
graduates in all subjects rose by 11%, those with first degrees
in  e n g in e e rin g  and techno logy rem ained c o n s ta n t, (S ource:
Cairncross (1976)). Even those that actually get a degree in 
engineering do not necessarily go into industry. In 1974, for 
example, although 1J,000 engineers got degrees, only 5,000 went 
straight into industry or commerce, and in one category, mechanical 
engineering, the number going into manufacturing industry since 
1963 has actually declined. On the other hand the number going 
into banking, accountancy and other branches of commerce has 
trebled. (Source: Economic Trends. April 1976).
82. There have been obvious exceptions. In America Theodore Roosevelt 
and John Kennedy stand out as exceptions, whilst in Britain Harold
Wilson’s last honours list contained many businessmen.
83. As early as 1830 the private academies were denounced as ’exclusive, 
aristocratic, and un-American’ (Hofstadter (1964)). Yet by the 
1970’s 15% of elementary and secondary pupils were still in private 
schools and over one third of college enrolments were private.
84. There is no question that Turner greatly exaggerates the differences 
between Britain and America. He seems to conveniently forget the 
fate of the blacks in America, as well as failing to point out that 
America has more students attending private schools than Britain 4'
84. (see note 83 above). He also appears not to realise that Britain 
has large numbers of students in tertiary education outside the 
universities.
85. One has to be. very careful with comparisons of this sort because 
of the difficulty in defining 'higher education’ . Lipset (1963) 
claims that if one compares the number of students enrolled in
’ institutions of higher learning’ to the size of the age cohort 
20-24, then one finds that seven times as large a group was 
attending such institutions in the United States for the year 
1956/7, as in England and Wales. One way of avoiding such 
definitional problems is to count the number of years of schooling 
for the relevant age cohorts. If this iscbne, one finds that for 
the period 1964-66, 99% of sixteen year olds and 76% of seventeen 
year olds were still at school in the United States compared with 
35% and 25% respectively for England and Wales (Source: Social
Trends III II.M.S.0. 1972). Alternatively, if one takes the age 
group 25-34, in 1971 the United States population had one whole 
year more education (total 12 years) than the equivalent age group 
in the United Kingdom (total 11 years). (Source: Social Trends
II.M.S.O. 1975). Lipset (1963) also notes that, one can see 
similar differences, if one compares two major Carribean nations 
long under the hegemony of Britain and the United States, Jamaica 
and Puerto Rico. He writes, ’’Jamaica, like many other former 
British colonies in Africa and Asia, has a higher education system 
which seems premised on the belief'that only a tiny elite should 
receive such training; while the- system in Puerto Rico, like the 
one in the Philipines, clearly reflects the continued impact of 
American assumptions concerning widespread educational opportunity".
(p.261.) v
86. Hofstadter (1964) compares the acclaim given to Edison, who was ’all 
but canonized by the American public’, with the reaction to "our 
greatest genius in pure science, Josiah Willard Gibbs, who laid
the theoretical foundations for modern physical chemistry, and who 
lived and died in obscurity", (p.25).
87. Hofstadter (1964) p.356.
88. One can chart the rising level of education amongst corporation 
executives by examining the data provided in Newcomer’s 1955 
classic study. In her sample of top business executives, 39.4% 
of those chosen from 1900 had some college education; but in 
1925 this figure rose to 51.4% and in 1950 to 75.6%. By 1950 
about one in every five executives had also been to graduate school.
89. Cochran and Miller (1961) p.270-271.
90. A study by Counts (1927) of the lay boards of control confirms 
that, for the period of his investigation in the nineteenth century, 
business interests were crucially important.
91. Beck (1947) p. S3
92. bomhoff (1967) p.78.
93. The British system does not impose any test of competence before a 
man may call himself a 'skilled* worker. What counts is the number 
of years that have been spent as an apprentice, there is also 
usually a stipulation that the apprentice be under a certain age. 
Shonfield (1965) notes that ."The notion behind this form of 
tuition in a craft, which conceives of the master’s knowledge as 
being somehow rubbed off on to the pupil by constant propinquity,
is essentially pre-industrial in spirit”, (p.118).
94. There is a slight problem in defining exactly what is to count as 
’business studies’, but if one counts undergraduate degrees awarded 
in schools and departments of business, then 1'or the academic year 
1919/20 they accounted for 3% of all undergraduate degrees. By 
the year 1939/40 this figure had risen to 10%. Gordon and Howell 
(1959).
95. Business degrees include degrees in business, commerce, and 
accountancy. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States.
U.S. Department of Commerce 1974.
96. That this was indeed the case can be seen by examining this 
quotation from the Annual Report of the Stockport Sunday School.
"Are the proprietors of manufactories desirous of obtaining honest 
and industrious servants? Let them require a sound character, as 
indispensably requisite for their engagement, and the youth of 
both sexes, by availing themselves of a Sunday School education.... 
seek to possess the necessary qualification". Quoted in Fllnn 
(1967).
97. Ample evidence for the truth of this proposition is given in 
Cotgrove (1958), see particularly chapter I.
98. Coleman (1973) p.104.
99. Aldcroft (1964). p.133.
100. Cotgrove (1958) quotes several minutes from the Royal Commission on 
Technical Instruction (1884) in support of this view. (pp. 24— 25).
101. Quoted in Cotgrove (1958) p.25.
102. Not onJy were the leisured classes largely schooled in the 
classics, thus lending their prestige to this particular form 
of education, but the content of the classics, stressing such 
qualities as duty, honour etc., were the qualities traditionally 
associated with the aristocracy.
103. The Empire itself devoured a. large proportion of the output of 
these schools. Excluding business enterprises operating in the 
colonies, it must be remembered that an empire of some 750 million 
people by 1900 required very large numbers of administrators.
104. Glover (1975) reveals an interesting indication of the relatively
low status of engineering in British society. He notes that our
famous museum of industrial techniques, i.e. engineering, is in 
fact called The Science Museum. The equivalent museum in France 
is called The Museum of Techniques.
105. Cotgrove (1958) p.175.
106. To have done so would have transgressed the doctrine of laissez- 
faire. which clearly many businessmen still subscribe to. In 
1964 however, the government did intervene in the field of 
industrial training with the passing of the Industrial Training 
Act - despite the hostility of many employers.
107. In 1903 the University of Manchester established a Faculty of
Commerce and Administration/although this offered little more
than applied economics courses, which were applied as much to
local government as they were to business. In 1930 the University 
of Hull instituted a two year diploma course in industrial admin­
istration, and this was followed in 1931 by the foundation of a 
one year postgraduate course run by the Department of Business 
Administration at the L.S.E.
108. The judgment that business studies did not represent a unitary 
discipline that was academically respectable, was one that was 
endorsed by the Robbins Committee (para. 294) and has gained 
support from time to time from the U.G.C.
109. The Hudson Report (1974) was one of the last reports to offer 
such an indictment, and a whole series of articles in the Guardian 
newspaper of July/August 1976 repeated the familiar charges.
110. Despite these changes the volume of business and management 
education in Britain barely compares with the American effort.
110.. Kose (1970) calculates that in 1970 there were probably some
2,400 students on business/management undergraduate courses in 
Britain. The equivalent figure for the United States was
500,000. faking postgraduate courses, if one was to count the
D.M.S. and British one year courses as a whole as together being 
roughly equivalent to one half of the American master's degree, 
the result would be to equate the present number of postgraduate 
students in Britain with American position shortly after the 
Second World War.
111. 'Hie Royal Commission on the Trade Unions (1968) makes numerous 
references to this effect as did the important Labour Party 
document In Place of Strife (1969) and the equivalent Conservative 
Party document Fair Deal at Work (1969).
112. It is important to note that these remarks refer almost exclusively 
to the white population. In fact, fear of competition of negro 
labour prevented white trade unionists from attempting to enrol 
negroes in the unions.
113. This was the era of the private army in America. Hobsbawn (1975) 
reports that in 1865 and 1866 every railroad, colliery, iron-
■ furnace' and rolling mill in Pennsylvania was granted statutory 
authority to employ as many armed policemen as it wished to act 
as they though fit. Many, including the notorious ’Pinkertons' 
were utilised to fight labour.
114. The following table adapted from Bagwell and Mingay (1970) makes the 
point well.
Percentage of Painfully Employed Labour (excluding Agriculture) in 
Trade Unions in Britain and America.
Oreat Britain United States
1901 13.7% 1900 4.8%
1911 18.2% 1910 8.5%
1921 37.0% 1920 18.6%
1931 23.5% 1930 11.7%
1941 - 1940 27.2%
1951 43.1% 1950 31.9%
1961* 45.0% I960** 31.4%
♦Source: The Economist June 19. 1971.
**Source: U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics. 1969.
115. Bagwell and Mingay (1970) in their comparative study of Britain 
and America take this as their point of departure.
116. His own experience bore this out. In the 1870's he tried both 
the state and federal level to secure legislation to protect the 
interests of the cigar makers, but he failed against the might of 
business interests. From then on he advocated simple business 
unionism.
117. Banks (1974) p.79.
118. Hardman (1964) p.403.
119. Of course other factors account for this as well, not least the
greater geographical diversity of companies in America and the 
federal political structure, which makes national agreements more 
difficult.
120. It is common argument that American employers have utilised the 
enormous system of fringe benefits, that are commonly bargained 
with unions, for their own benefits. Initially they were often 
used as a device for thwarting unionism itself, and when this 
failed they used the benefits to buy loyalty to the firm. As 
Kroose (1970) has argued, "Most businessmen approached welfare
capitalism from the point of view of dollars and cents and profit
and loss. John J. Roskob, for example, believed that the
experiences at General Motors proved that, ’money paid in benefits
is returned in the lower costs of production'", (p.352.)
121. Merton’s (1933) observations apply just as strongly to trade
unionists as to anyone else in American society. The alleged
greater degree of corruption amongst American union leaders is
also explained in this way. The activities of the Teamster's
leader, Hoffa, who once declared that he 'feared the guy who does
not want to make money', exemplifies this point. It is interesting 
to note, that even after Jloffa's conviction for violent and corrupt 
practices, he was still very popular amongst the rank and file 
because he was above all an effective bargainer on behalf of his 
union.
122. This analysis appears to be correct, in general terms; it is 
always possible of course to find American unions and British 
unions, which, at particular moments of time have not followed these 
respective policies.
123. Exports as a Percentage of G.N.P.
G.B. 13.4%
U.S.A. 4.1%.
Source: O.E.C.D. Observer, February 1966.
124. Sturmthal (1957) p.343.
125. Lipset (1973) p.195.
126. Perkin (1969) p.336.
127. Macaulay T.U. and others (1855). ’The Indian Civil Service, Report 
to the Right Hon. Sir Charles Wood.’ Quoted in Chapman (1970).
128. Pear (1968)
129. In part of course this refelcts the different nature of the tasks 
which fall to the lot of the public administrators in Britain and 
America. The absence of a well developed welfare state in America
means that the service is much smaller and concentrated almost
solely in specialist agencies like defence, agriculture, hydro- 
electricity etc.
130. For an illustration of this process see Cochran's (1962) analysis 
of the American Telephone Company, (p.78).
131. The 1880’s saw the first manufacturing companies with capital in
excess of one hundred million dollars.
132. The early and more widespread public sale of securities in the
United States also promoted the use of control procedures inside 
American companies to ensure adequate accountability.
133. Chandler also shows however, that not all American corporations
were properly run along functional lines. Even by 1920 some
corporations, like U.S. Steel, did little more than form an office
to help set price and production schedules for the almost 
completely autonomous divisions.
134. See Wilkins (1970) p.70.
135. According to Engel's law, people do not generally consume proport­
ionately more of the same things as they get richer, but rather 
re-allocate their consumption away from old goods and towards new 
goods. This non-proportional growth of demand, implies that goods 
would tend to go through a life cycle.
136. Beard (1963) p.49.
137. Several of the most successful businessmen 'failed' several times 
before they eventually made it. R.H. Macey, for example, failed 
several times in smaller places before he eventually succeeded in 
New York. Many of the others were ready to move towards the big 
money wherever it was, Carnegie, for example, did not concentrate
137. his energies on steel until he was almost forty. Jay Gould was 
in turn cartographer and leather merchant, before discovering 
what could be done with railway stock.
138. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the financial world.
The City is still largely self controlling, relying upon codes of 
practice, some of them still unwritten. This contrasts markedly 
with America, where the Securities Exchange Commission in 
particular, possesses an enormous web of legal rules and regulations.
139. Britain was certainly ahead of America in this respect. By 1841, 
for example, the town population of Great Britain represented 
52.3% of the total.
140. Aldcroft (1964) p.132.
141. Payne (1967) p.525.
142. The'industrialisation of England had preceded without any substan­
tial utilisation of banking for long term investment purposes, and 
the banks developed most of their commercial interests in financing 
international trade. In America, because of the greater need for 
finance, partly a consequence of the fact that America developed 
later as an industrial power than England, the banks were heavily 
involved in industry from the beginning. For some interesting 
observations on the role of banking in industrialisation see 
Gerschenkron (1962), Ch. I.
143. Aldcroft (1964) p.117.
144. There was so little innovative expansion that some firms with
surplus funds rather than invest in their own business, invested
it in others (Payne (1967)). Aldcroft (1964) also concludes that, 
"Domestic capital went into gilt-edged and foreign issues not 
because of the inability of the capital market to finance home 
industrial issues but because of the paucity of domestic issues in 
which to invest or because English firms were on too small a scale 
to attract the issue houses" (p.132).
145. Lewis and Stewart (1958) p.29.
146. Shils (1956) p.49.
147. Shonfield (1960) p.100.
148. Several recent cases would appear to illustrate the general truth 
of this proposition. John Bentley, for example, was relentlessly 
hounded by the press and received a decidedly cool reception from
148. the City, for indulging in the perfectly legal and indeed highly 
capitalistic exercise known as 'asset stripping'. Asset 
stripping merely involves buying a company, at a price calculated 
on its success record in a particular sphere of business. The 
assets are then divided up and sold off for different purposes. 
Crucial to the whole operation is the ability of takeover companies 
to close their deals using share and loan stock certificates rather 
than cash. This activity involves pursuing profit as a goal above 
all others, and not being concerned with the particular products 
that a company manufactures or the industry it is in etc. The 
activities of a company such as Bentley's company, Bentley
Securities, may look rather odd by normal business standards, but
this merely reflects what the sole focus upon profit does to a 
company profile. (For an interesting American example of what can 
perhaps be termed 'pure capitalism', see kieser (1962)). The
other recent British example which illustrates the strong moral 
code of gentlemanly practice inside the upper reaches of British 
business is the Lonhro affair. Although the final report by H.M.
Inspectors from the Board of Trade did indicate that there had been
some legal transgressions, they appeared to be of a relatively 
minor kind. The great significance of the company's activities 
was that they transgressed certain important informal rules of 
conduct for British business. It was on this issue of 'business 
style' that half the directors eventually resigned and led the 
British Prime Minister at the time, Edward Heath, to talk about 
the 'unacceptable face of capitalism'. More accurately, he should 
have inserted the qualifying adjective, British, in frortof 
capitalism, for I have few doubts that such activities would have 
been perfectly acceptable in the United States. Finally, one 
should note the ultimate fate of those who play the game just a 
little too hard. Sir Arnold Weinstock; one of Britain's leading 
industrialists, had his application to join Brook's one of London's 
oldest and most exclusive clubs, blackballed. Although the club 
never divulges reasons for refusing a candidate, the Sunday Times 
correspondent wrote the following, "Judging from the grumbles
when Sir Arnold's name was first suggested, it seems that by 
cutting a rapid path through British industry Sir Arnold displeased 
some of the traditionalists" (Sunday Times 6.5.73.)
149. There are good reasons why the capitalist should turn first to 
economic causes of economic crises. Firstly, until relatively 
recently the economist has been the only person to offer diagnosis
149. and remedy. It is only recently that there has developed a 
sociology of economic life. Secondly, a social diagnosis may 
not fit very well with the interests of the capitalist himself.
For example, if it was believed that a far greater emphasis upon
achievement and universulism should be made in the education 
system, then this might have unfortunate results For his own 
children, particularly if they were unable to enter the business 
because of their special ascribed status.
150. Veblen (1915) put it in his own characteristic way: "Doubtless,
the English today lead the Christian world both in the volume of
their gentiiity and in its cost per unit", (p.141).
151. Even here one has to add ceteris paribus. In particular, one has 
to make the assumption that there is both belief and knowledge 
about what effect particular configurations of social structure 
have on the economy.
152. There seems to be general agreement amongst economists that the
rate of profit in British industry has been falling since about
1950. There are of course considerable differences of opinion 
about how this is to be interpreted.
153. The Times Educational Supplement. Ja. 27th 1956. Quoted in 
Cotgrove (1958) p.176.
154. Specifically it resulted in a government White Paper in which a 
major expansion of the technical colleges was planned. (Technical 
Education. Cmnd. 9703. H.M.S.0.)
155. Symptomatic of this scrutiny was the launching by Penguin Books
of a series of titles on ’What is Wrong with Britain?1.
156. In fact the government rejected the view that the selection of 
graduate entrants to administrative work should be deliberately 
weighted in favour of those whose university studies had been in 
subjects thought clearly relevant to civil service work.
157. Shonfield (1965) p.108.
158. I am assuming here that the existence of a welfare state,
particularly in terms of health and social security provisions,
aids the operation of the capitalist economy in a direct sense,
i.e. by providing a healthy labour force. I know of no cost 
benefit analysis however, that actually demonstrates the truth
of this proposition.
159. deveral writers, notably Shonfield (1965), Marris (1974) and
159. Winkler (1975), have developed the argument that modern capitalism, 
because of its essentially international character, requires the 
active involvement of state governments in its management. It Is 
notable that Britain and the United States, both with a political 
elite with a history of non-interference, have found it more 
difficult than most modern capitalist societies to perform well 
economically. In particular the United States in the post-war 
period has had more recessions than Western Europe, and each time 
they have cut output more sharply than in Europe. (Maddison
(1964)). Although economists have offered several explanations
of this phenomenon, it does seem likely that the reluctance of the 
federal government to intervene in the economy is a major contri­
butory factor to this result. Not only is there a strong ideolog­
ical barrier to intervention in the United States, but the actual 
institutional arrangements of government, itself a reflection of 
the ideology, make it extraordinarily difficult for the government 
to intervene. I am thinking in particular of the separation of 
powers contained in the Constitution. Although one can argue that 
a similar ideological stance has informed British capitalism, the 
fact remains that the laissez-faire doctrine has not been so import­
ant a phenomenon in post-war Britain, even in the Conservative Party, 
whilst the Labour Party has positively disavowed it. Furthermore, 
Britain's feudal legacy has equipped her with a unitary and hier­
archical form of executive government, which is capable of long term 
economic planning in the corporatist mould. Finally, as I have 
already observed, Britain's post-war economic position has forced 
both political parties, when in office, to adopt a much more inter­
ventionist strategy. -’This has not meant, as some writers seem to 
suppose, that capitalism has ceased to be the economic organising 
principle of British society.
160. The most notable event was probably the launching of the Russian 
Sputnik in 1957. This shook America ideologically, in the sense 
that Communism was seen to be superior to capitalism in an important 
symbolic area. Secondly, the launching offered certain economic 
warnings, in that it appeared to show that Russian scientific 
research and education, both economically important, were superior 
to the American. Two years later, in 1959, two influential reports 
on American business education were published almost simultaneously 
(Pierson et al. (1959), and Gordon and Howell (1959)). Their 
diagnoses were very similar: They both pointed to the poor quality 
of many of the business schools and the fact that the students
160. studying business were well towards the bottom of the ability 
range. These two events fostered certain changes inside the 
American educational system; attempts were made for example to 
improve the quality of business education by basing it more 
firmly on academic disciplines, and secondly, more attention 
was focused upon science and technology.
CHAPTER 4.
American Executives in Britain
The historical analysis of the dominant cultural themes in 
British and American society, that I have perceived relevant to the 
business world, provided the major source of hypotheses to test in the 
major sample of firms. It also seemed useful however, before the main 
research was fully underway, to tap the opinions of Crozier’s ’ men of 
action’ (see page28 ). In Other words, as a check upon the deductive 
predictions that had been made, the views of businessmen who had worked 
in both societies was sought. In order to do this a separate sample of 
American businessmen working for American firms in England was drawn and 
the businessmen interviewed. There were other reasons for the decision 
to construct a separate sample of American executives. Firstly, advice 
from the American Chamber of Commerce, as well as my own literature 
research, had indicated that the number of American nationals working for 
American businesses operating in Britain was very small, and it was quite 
possible that no Americans at all would be discovered in the American 
firms in the main sample. ^ \  This did indeed turn out to be the case. 
Secondly, I felt that it was important to try and understand the signi­
ficance of why some American firms employed American managerial personnel 
and others did not. In particular I wanted to see whether Dunning
(1970) was correct in assuming that one indication of how strongly an
American subsidiary was controlled from across the Atlantic was to see 
whether the company employed any American nationals as managers. As I 
had hypothesised that ’strength of control’ would be one of the variables 
affecting how ’American’ the company was then it was obviously vital to 
understand control relationships properly.
As the population of American businessmen working within 
reasonable proximity to London was likely to be rather small, 1 decided 
to spread the net as widely as possible and to interview respondents 
from any sphere of business activity, not just manufacturing. No 
adequate sampling frame existed for such a population, but working from 
the Anglo-American Trade Directory published by the American Chamber of 
Commerce, a list of twenty-two names was compiled. It proved possible 
to conduct interviews with nineteen of these American businessmen
giving a response rate of 86%. In fact only one man refused, there was
one no response, and the last was recalled to the United States before 
arrangements could be made lor an interview. If one considers that all 
of these Americans were very senior personnel in their respective 
companies (seven Managing Directors, one Vice President, one Deputy 
Managing Director and the rest in senior management posts) then this
response rate becomes all the more remarkable, and constitutes the first 
important research finding. I have already shown that American business
has been less concerned with secrecy than its British equivalent,
reflecting the greater openness of American society. It was to be
expected therefore that American companies and businessmen would be
more open to the research enterprise. Two other reasons for this high
response rate should be mentioned. Firstly, all of these men were well
qualified academically (see p.146), and it might be reasonable to assume
that their education had perhaps given them some understanding of
academic research. Secondly, several of the respondents themselves
profered a reason for their favourable response. They believed that
there was a certain amount of antipathy towards American executives in
Britain. They felt this both in general terms, of American multi-
(2)nationals dominating the economy, ‘American colonization' etc., as
well as in specific terms inside their own companies, employees
(3)believing that top jobs were reserved only for Americans etc. These
remarks should be set against a backcloth of several 'incidents' involving
(4)
American executives in the British economy over the last ten years,
where the cries of ‘Yanks out1 became almost a dominant refrain. I
think it is fair to conclude that some at least of these executives
were very conscious of their public image and were anxious to demonstrate
their openness and reasonableness to the host community. I thus concur
with Kincaid and Davis (1957), when they argue "Executives are not
likely to judge a request for assistance in a research project simply
on its merits alone. Rather they tend to speculate on what a refusal
(5)would cost in public relations".
Some caution must be exercised in examining the results of this 
inquiry into the attributes and views of American executives working in 
England. Firstly, the sample was drawn from men working in a wide 
range of organisations, not just from manufacturing, where the bulk of 
my analysis has been concentrated. It may well be that there are 
systematic industry differences that I have not accounted for. The 
industrial distribution of the respondents is given below, and non­
manufacturing companies are asterisked*. (Company names are given in
the restricted appendix). Secondly, I had no way of verifying any of the 
information given to me by these respondents, as I did not carry out any 
investigation into their companies. This could be a possible source of
error, because I noticed that the American executives were very
influenced by their views of the historical experience of Britain and 
America, as well as by current managerial folklore, both of which tended 
to colour certain of their observations. For example, most of them 
talked about the industrial relations problems in British society,
compared with the situation in America, and yet when I asked for 
specific examples from their own organisations, not one man was able 
to produce any concrete evidence. Most fell back upon the view that 
their organisation was the exception.
Advertising* Fork Lift Trucks
Agriculture Equipment Oil
Banking* Packaging
Chemicals Paper Products
Chemical Engineering* Publishing*
Domestic Electrical Products Records
Electrical Manufacturing . Steel Products*
Film Products* Timber Products >
Finance* Tyres
Food Products
The first question that I wanted to answer was why was it that 
some American companies employed American nationals as managers, and 
others did not. In particular could one take the presence or absence 
of American nationals as an indication of tight or loose control. One 
of the most widely accepted explanatory frameworks in this area is 
offered by Perlmutter (1969). He presents us with a three stage 
evolutionary model of the multinational company. Initially, there is 
the ethnocentric organisation, where the minimum of autonomy is allowed 
to subsidiaries. Here, tight control exercised by the parent may well 
result in the presence of American managers in the company, as well as 
a plethora of managerial controls.emanating from the United States.
This form of organisation evolves into a polycentric type, where the 
parent company recognises that local conditions are different from 
those faced by the parent company and those of other subsidiaries, 
kather more autonomy of decision taking is allowed, but in this federa­
tion of loosely connected subsidiaries it remains rare for foreigners to . 
reach top executive positions. Finally, at the top of the evolutionary 
tree, and in Perlmutter's view the most desirable organisational type, 
is the geocentric company. In this type of multinational organisation 
there is the fullest co-operation between the subsidiaries and the 
parent on the basis of full equality. The guiding principle for 
decision making is 'culture free rationality'. It follows from this 
that the management of the geocentric company is potentially truly 
international, in the sense that the best man is chosen for the job 
irrespective of his nationality.
Perlmutter can be seen to be a true disciple of the logic of 
capitalism thesis, the evolutionary mechanism (never spelled out) is 
presumably the relentless drive towards efficiency forced on firms by 
the market mechanism of the capitalist mode of production. In the 
geocentric organisation the pursuit of the goals of economic rationality 
is presumably made easier by the fact that in one sense the organisation 
is not permanently attached to any particular culture, which may exert 
a drag upon economic objectives. In other words, its personnel are 
drawn from those segments of existing cultures which are most predisposed 
towards capitalist objectives. In this sense the rationality is 
'culture free'. In a later article however, Perlmutter (1974) does 
admit that the evolutionary process is a slow one, noting the findings 
of Simmonds (1966) that in a study of 150 multinational companies, less 
than one percent of the senior headquarter positions were filled by 
foreign nationals, despite the fact that the average income generated 
overseas for these companies was at least twenty percent of their total 
income. Alongside this structural analysis, and standing in a dialect­
ical relationship to it, is a set of managerial attitudes which 
Perlmutter (1974) describes as, ethnocentric, polycentric, regiocentric 
and geocentric. Although geocentric attitudes are fashionable, he 
observes that there is not much evidence that they are being put into 
practice. There are two major criticisms that can be made of his 
approach. Firstly, it can be criticised along exactly the same lines 
as all the other arguments that adopt a micro contingency approach. 
Secondly, it does not offer a very clear analysis of either the mechanism 
of change or the complex range of variables involved.
In view of these criticisms, how useful is it to viewthe 
presence of American managers as evidence of tight control and ethnocentric 
structures and attitudes? Before it is possible to answer this question 
it is necessary to analyse the concept of control and its structural 
correlates a little more carefully. To start on a pessimistic note, I 
an inclined to agree with the findings of Alsegg (1971), who notes "One 
of the most conspicuous (findings) was that very few patterns of rules 
could be detected that govern international management relationships 
and their infinite variety. The type of industry, the age of the 
company - particularly the age of its international operations - the 
compa?iy's size and structure, its historic development and experience, 
its leading personalities, and several other factors all influence the 
functioning of a corporation's international organisation, but the
(6)
general direction of many of the cross currents is unpredictable".
In other words, although it is possible to isolate the major variables 
influencing control relationships and to determine their general
direction of influence, in any given situation it may be very
difficult to make accurate predictions about the resultant structures.
Control itself is a difficult concept with which to work. One must 
avoid the mistake of many writers in seeing it as a homogeneous entity 
in the sense that firms must be either tightly controlled or loosely 
controlled. It is much more useful to view it on a function basis, 
thus one finds that finance and production generally tend to be more 
tightly controlled in American subsidiaries than personnel (unless 
local operating conditions are very different from those prevailing 
at headquarters). Marketing tends to be tightly controlled if the 
product is a 'branded1 one, and a homogeneous image is required, and 
also if the market is realtively similar to that of the United States. 
Where these conditions do not apply, local management will be given 
more autonomy. If the company produces a wide range of products for 
a variety of markets, similarly a looser mode of control can be 
expected. The age of the subsidiary can be a variable as well; as 
a general statement it can be said that the older the subsidiary the 
more likely it will be that most of the major operating problems will 
have been solved, and tight control will be unnecessary. The
corollary is that younger organisations will need stronger control, and
this seems to hold true for subsidiaries that have been directly created 
by the American parent, although if the American firm acquires a sub­
sidiary via takeover, then relatively loose control tends to be 
exercised over the organisation in the early days. One should note the 
variable of the organisational structure of the parent, if this is 
marked by centralisation, then the mode of control will tend to spread 
to the subsidiaries as well. Finally, one comes to the varia ble of 
size, which Alsegg (1971) declares to be the most important. The 
relationship between size and control takes the form of an ' inverted U' . 
The relatively small subsidiary is often not regarded as important 
enough to warrent tight control, whilst the really big subsidiary is 
generally well organised enough to conduct its own affairs.
I want to stress over and above these relationships that have 
been specified, that the form and amount of control is not static and 
mechanistic, on the contrary, the situation is marked by dynamism and 
flexibility. There is, I believe, a general trend towards stricter 
control in American subsidiaries, despite the fact that this goes 
against much of the current managerial theory, and the philosophy of 
decentralisation. It is possible to broadly accept Chandler's (1962) 
thesis, particularly as elaborated for multinational firms by Fouracre 
and Stopford (1973), which argues that the large American firm evolves
through a series of stages, each stage reflecting a structural response 
to a set of problems. When firms expand abroad it is argued, this is 
often done by setting up an international division to handle all the 
products of the firm; this will be at the same level as the various 
product divisions of the company. This form often turns out to be 
rather unsatisfactory as it depends heavily upon the goodwill of the 
individual product divisions, which are often inclined to fill domestic 
orders before foreign ones. The response to these problems has often 
been to replace the international division with some new organisational 
structure, eg. world wide product divisions or occasionally world - 
partitioning geographic divisions, or even a combination of both. This 
thesis certainly fits in with the Perlmutter hypothesis, ip that these 
product or geographical divisions are truly geocentric in view, and will 
tend to employ people more on the basis of ability than nationality.
The logic of these arguments seems to be that there have been and will 
be movements in the direction of decentralisation and, by implication, 
similar movements in the direction of delegation of authority with the 
product or geographical divisions having a large degree of autonomy.
It seems to me that these movements have been countered by several 
important developments, some of them specific to the European situation. 
Firstly, one has witnessed the development of technologies which permit 
a greater degree of control, largely by facilitating reporting relation­
ships, e.g. development of jet transportation, telex, computer links 
etc. Secondly, there has been the development of the European sub­
sidiaries since the Second World War, many have grown from small 
isolated companies to relatively large important companies accounting for 
a considerable amount of the firm’s business. In conjunction with this 
growth one should note a third important factor, the setting up and 
development of the E.E.C. This prompted the relocation of many 
American subsidiaries, and the re-organisation of many of their 
operations to take into account the economies of the new trading area.
All these factors have made for a higher degree of control ori the part 
of American parents. Their increasing control has been heightened by 
the fact that many European subsidiaries of American firms have not
(7)
performed as well as they were expected. As I shall show, one of
the reactions of American parent firms to economic crises in their 
subsidiaries is to bring in American nationals as managers, at least 
in the short term.
I have argued above that despite the fact that the structure 
of multinationals is changing in the direction of decentralisation, in
fact control is probably increasing. Yet I have also claimed that the 
number of American managers working in the subsidiaries, at least in 
England, has been declining - is this not paradoxical? The solution 
to this apparent contradiction is that having an American manager in 
a key position in a subsidiary company may certainly be one way of 
exercising control, but it is only one way, there are other more cost 
effective ways. The presence of American managers does not 
necessarily represent an attempt at parental control, as I shall show, 
there may be other reasons for their presence. There is also another 
more theoretical point that needs to be emphasised again here, and that 
is that one must beware of falling into the trap of contingency theory.
It is simply not true that firms behave like economic models, automat­
ically evolving the best fit between the environment and organisational 
structure and strategy. As writers like Dill (1973) and Child (1972) 
have cogently argued, particular managerial philosophies may well 
structure the organisation in certain ways, or allow the organisation to 
follow certain practices that may not be particularly efficient, and the
organisation will still survive, except under certain limiting
(8)
conditions. Thus some firms may appoint American managers to their
subsidiaries for reasons only vaguely connected with-profit maximising, 
but very much connected with the firm’s basic philosophy. It may well 
be true, as I have argued, that American firms are more able to pursue 
a path of capitalist rationality, because they are part of a culture 
which offers fewer constraints to this goal. Yet they are still 
vulnerable to all the organisational constraints on maximising perform­
ance that are at least analytically separate from the constraints of a 
particular culture.
Shearer (1960) has argued that expatriate Americans are 
’second raters*, claiming that those who go overseas are largely managers 
who failed to become successful in the home business. It would seem 
very difficult to sustain this hypothesis, even accepting the fact that 
foreign subsidiaries are just that - subsidiaries, although as 1 have 
already shown, many multinational firms have evolved far beyOnd the 
domestic - foreign subsidiary stage. Hie findings of this study mirror 
those of Gonzalez and Negandhi (1967), who have conducted the major 
study of the United States executive abroad. Like Gonzalez and 
Negandhi, I found that the expatriate managers were younger than 
comparable domestic American managers, the average age of this sample 
being forty-five. One of the most striking findings however, relates 
to qualifications, all of the sample had at least a bachelor’s degree, 
almost 75% (n=14) had a master’s degree or equivalent, and 36% (n=5)
had an M.B.A. (Three from Ivy League universities). Finally, it was 
found, again reflecting the'findings'of Gonzalez and Negandhi, that the 
overseas executives tended to be company career men. They exhibited 
reduced interfinn mobility compared with their domestic counterparts, 
in fact they averaged only 1.6 companies per man. Far from being 
'second raters', this sample of American executives bore all the marks 
of being composed largely of 'high flyers'. Certainly the majority of 
the.respondents.viewed the overseas assignment as a step ahead in their 
career, one t.hut would give them increased responsibility at an earlier 
age than they could have achieved by remaining in the United States.
I have indicated that one reason why some of these Americans
came to Britain was because of perceived increased career opportunities.
Whilst this is true, in order to understand their presence here properly
it is necessary to comprehend the structures and policies of the parent
firms. Sixteen of the employing firms were multinational organisations
two were international firms,* and one just operated a sales agency here
Of the multinational firms, three would fall into Perlmutter's
category Of geocentric firms. These firms operated a policy of
employing high talent manpower irrespective of nationality. All three
firms were able to point to national firms belonging to the corporation
in a variety of countries being managed sometimes by host country
nationals, sometimes by Americans and sometimes by third country
nationals. The major point however, was that nationality was just not
considered to be relevant in making an appointment. The fact that
there were more Americans than any other nationality in the various
companies merely indicated, so the respondents claimed, that Americans
had, at the present moment in time, more expertise. Seven companies
indicated that it was not their policy to recruit Americans into the
British company, but that they were forced to do so because of the lack
of indigenous expertise. These seven executives all talked, in their
various ways, about the managerial gap' between Britain and the
United States. The biggest single deficiency, they argued* was in
marketing, broadly defined to include the whole area of sales,
advertising etc. This is in line with other available evidence, for
example Jean-Luc Rocour (1966) in his study of European firms operating
in America found that all the respondents agreed with the General
Manager of Renault, "Marketing represents the main problem, and almost
(9)the only one, for foreigners operating in this country". Duerr
*i.e. they operated in America and a very limited number of other 
countries.
and Greene (1968) in their study of American firms operating abroad 
also found that the greatest shortage.of indigenous managerial talent 
was in this area. Additionally, the results from the main sample of 
firms in this study also confirms this view (see p.186 et seq.) The 
reasons for this are perhaps relatively straightforward. As I have 
shown, the American domestic market is much more homogeneous than its 
English counterpart, and this means that it is much more important for 
manufacturers to differentiate their products from those of their 
rivals, and this is largely a marketing exercise. Secondly, there is 
reason, to believe that the American market is more competitive, this 
in part follows from the relative homogeneity of the market - all firms 
competing for the same potential market - but I have also argued that 
the American market structure is a more competitive one anyway, because 
of America’s greater commitment to the values of competition. Although 
most of the respondents in this study were in general management 
positions, turning to the functional areas of business one finds that 
more were in marketing than in any other area. (31.5/a n=6). See
table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1 U.S. Executive Sample: Distribution by Functional Area.
Function Percentage Number
General Management 42.1 8
Marketing 31.5 6
Personnel 15.8 3
Finance 10.6 2
Total 100.0 19
Finance was the other functional area that was specifically 
mentioned by the respondents as being an area of British weakness.
This is confirmed again by Dueri and Greene (1968), who also placed it 
second behind marketing. The deficiency was largely seen to be in 
applying a range of techniques, many of them derived from computer 
technology, for financial control. By and large the executives in iny 
sample believed that American business operated with more and better 
quality financial information. One can see from table 4.1 above 
however, that only 10.6^ > (n=2) Americans were specialising in this 
functional area. This anomaly can be solved when one realises that 
the managerial gap in this area is largely a technical one that can be 
bridged by the importing and installation of the appropriate systems of 
budgetary control etc. The problem permits of a relatively 
mechanistic solution. That this is in fact the case can be supported
by my previous observation that this functional area in the subsidiary 
is the most tightly controlled from'America, The case of marketing 
is rather different, whilst there may well be a deficiency of sheer 
technique which could be imported, marketing also has its more 'organic' 
side, which needs experienced practitioners.
Two executives, representing respectively a bank and 
consulting engineers in the petro-chemical industry, offered rather 
special reasons for their particular presence. The reason was that 
both companies originally came to Britain to service American companies 
already operating here. It was thought that American managers would 
probably have greater knowledge of both the needs of their American 
customers and their mode of operation. They argued that although both 
their companies had expanded beyond merely servicing American companies, 
they both still did a substantial amount of business with such 
companies, and therefore the old arguments still applied. Another 
group of companies (n=3), whose policy was also to staff key positions 
in the overseas company with American nationals, argued that this was 
done because the company product was a distinctively American one 
(Film Products, Records and Steel Products). This meant, so it was 
argued, firstly, that symbolically it was advantageous for Americans 
to be the 'front men' in the organisation. Secondly, that only an 
American could really know and understand the product he was selling, 
because it was in some sense 'part of America'. It was significant 
that all these products were largely made in America and only sold here.
The majority of the sample of American executives were not in 
a functional area of business at all, but were in general management, 
the majority of them being the Managing Director of the British sub­
sidiary. Their jobs were not, by and large, to bolster particular 
functions inside the business. It was instead to give general leader- 
hip and management to the company along the lines desired by the American 
parent. When the respondents as a whole were asked about the circum­
stances leading up to their appointment to the English company, one 
feature stood out. In over one third of all appointments there had
been a crisis in the subsidiary. The crisis had usually taken the 
form of some sort of managerial failure at the top and/or a sharp 
decline in the company's performance. It would appear that in times 
of crisis the parent company falls back on what it is certain of - 
American nationals who possess a reliable background, both in terms of 
education, and proven home country business experience. The plan is 
usually to allow the 'trouble shooter' to put the company back on its
feet, to groom a host country successor, and then return to the United 
States when this project is completed. It would appear that many 
companies are quite happy to pursue a policy of employing English 
managers in the senior positions of the English company, providing 
that they are performing adequately. The interview data did reveal 
however, that the concept of adequate performance was a contentious 
one. The majority of the American executives interviewed said that 
their companies kept detailed comparative statistics on the performance 
of the subsidiary companies in various countries. By and large the 
British Subsidiaries did not perform as well as the subsidiaries in 
some Of the other c o u n t r i e s . T w o  complaints were voiced by the 
Chief Executives of the English firms: Firstly, that even if the data
did reflect the true position then it was often for reasons beyond 
managerial control, e.g. government economic policies, British 
industrial relations problems. Secondly, several executives cast 
doubt upon the accuracy of the data, arguing that general corporate 
policies involving matters like intercompany pricing agreements or 
marketing zoning agreements produced a distorted picture of relative 
efficiency. There were finally two companies, Fork Lift trucks and 
paper products, which had policies of having American executives working 
in the foreign subsidiaries but for different reasons from the ones I 
have already mentioned. The policy was justified in both companies 
by reference to ’corporate philosophy1, ’the American way’ etc. It 
was argued that the companies had distinctive styles; styles of selling, 
types of people it wished to employ, distinctive organisational 
structures and practices. These phenomena were regarded as company 
assets and the job of the American executives was to make sure that 
they were successfully exported to the subsidiary companies. The best 
example of this was to be found in the Fork Lift Truck company, where 
the executive was director of personnel. This is a rather unusual 
function in which to find American executives and it was justified in 
this case on two gounds. Firstly, the company wished to recruit 
certain distinctive types into its management ranks. These could not 
be standardised in some mechanical way, but rather required someone 
with long experience of the company, someone who had been inducted into 
the ’company character’ to do the selecting. Secondly, the company had 
a strongly expressed (to me at least) anti-trade union policy, and 
thought that an > American executive with experience of ’ fighting the 
unions' could best resist the claims of unions to organise in their 
plants.
, 1  have examined in some detail company policies relating to 
the appointment of American nationals overseas, and these largely account 
for the number of Americans that are to be found in Britain. It is 
necessary to examine the respondents more closely however, in order to 
understand the type of American that came. 36.8% of. the sample (n=7) 
found themselves peculiarly attracted to England. To understand this 
it is necessary to place these responses in a temporal perspective.
During the period of the interviews (June 1973-April 1974) America was 
being rocked by the Watergate crisis and by a series of business 
scandals. There was a decidedly bad odour emanating from across the
Atlantic. Before that there had been the Vietnam War and the general
decline, as seen by the majority of this sample, of business values 
and with them the prestige of business. In short, many of these 
executives were disenchanted with America and were attracted to what 
they saw as the relative peace and civilisation of England. For
the three Americans who were working for firms concerned with cultural 
artifacts there were additional reasons connected with the fact that 
Britain was a potentially rich source of material. One might also 
mention that four of the respondents had seen war service in this 
country and had been favourably impressed by what they had seen of 
British society. The argument therefore, is that over and above company 
policies, and the careers of American executives, there are other forces 
at work. Overseas executives are, to some extent, self selecting.
Almost all the interviewees reported changes in the policies
and strategies of their own companies in the use of American executives
overseas. In addition to the three companies that already could be
classified into Perlmutter’s geocentric category, where nationality
was not a relevant factor in the appointment of top level staff, several
other firms reported movements in that direction. All firms, with
the exception of the two designated ethnocentric, and the bank, reported
movements away from the practice of appointing American nationals to
the British subsidiary. Their reasons were as follows, in rough order
of importance. Firstly, the managerial gap was decreasing, and there
was less need to bring ini talent from across the Atlantic. Secondly,
the cost of bringing American managers and their families to England
was increasing substantially such that the costs were beginning to
(12)outweigh any benefits that they might bring. Thirdly, many firms
were sensitive to the political arguments that ’British people should 
run British subsidiaries', as one of them put it. Yet despite these 
trends it iseems likely that there will continue to be firms that
believe in the 'American way*, there will continue to be crises that 
are seen to require ’American aid’, and there will continue to be 
American executives who are attracted to England, either because of 
career advancement, or merely because they would like to see green 
fields and Beefeaters.
NOTES
1. According to a survey carried out by the American Chamber of 
Commerce in 1967, only 421 of the 404,000 people employed by 
161 leading United States subsidiaries in Britain were American 
nationals, of whom only 229 occupied managerial positions.
Source: Dunning (1970) p.329.
2. Most of the respondents were aware of the work of Servan - 
Schreiber (1969), and were very conscious of various business 
scandals like the l.T.T. affair, that were prominent in America 
at the time of the interviews.
3. This fear is also reported by Sofer (1970) in his study of the 
American company ’Autoline’, (p.263.)
4. There have been a number of celebrated disputes involving American 
companies, where the workers believed that part of the trouble 
sprang from the fact that the companies were American. Examples 
include disputes at Roberts-Arundel, Kodak, Fine Tubes and 
Vauxhall Motors.
5. Kincaid and Davis (1957) p.305.
6. Alsegg (1971) p.l.
7. That a number of American subsidiaries have not performed as well 
as was expected is documented by several writers c.f. Newton Parks 
(1969), Alsegg (1971).
8. I have specified these limiting conditions elsewhere, see p.168.
9. Rocour, JtL. (1966) p.17.
10. It was not possible to check the truth of this proposition, although 
it is in accordance with the evidence presented in Dunning
(1970, 1971). The problems in the measurement of the performance 
of American subsidiary companies are dealt with in Ch. 8.
11. The Managing Director of the Food Products firm reported a 
considerable increase in the number of home country executives 
who were applying for tours of duty in England.
12. The cost of moving American executives to Europe and keeping them
and their families there is a popular subject in the management
journals c.f. Newton Parks (1969). These problems could be 
accentuated if the British government continues with its proposals 
to tax the overseas income of foreign residents c.f. ’The great 
American Exodous is on’ Sunday Times. 28.4.74.
CHAPTER' 5.
British and American Manufacturing Organisations: 
Organisational Structure and Process.
The results of the study of the small sample of American 
executives that was reported in the last chapter provided a useful 
background to the main study. In particular it allowed to me formulate 
my hypotheses more clearly and to understand the control relationships 
between American parents and their subsidiaries. The main study 
attempted to discover to what extent there existed any differences 
between British and American manufacturing companies, arid if there 
were differences, to what extent these could be attributed to socio­
cultural differences between the two societies. In order to answer 
these questions it was necessary to design a research strategy that 
would compare American and British firms that were exactly matched 
along all dimensions except that of nationality. The only previous 
study that has managed this difficult task in cross-cultural business 
research has been that of Richardson (1956) who, in studying British, 
and American cargo ships, managed to neatly match up type of organ­
isation, task, size, and operating environment. fhe reasons for the 
paucity of studies is unquestionably the great difficulty in getting 
the appropriate firms to co-operate in the research exercise. Granick 
(1972) is typical of researchers in this area who admit that the best 
research design would be to study ’matched firms from identical 
industries’, but who confess that such a task proved too difficult for 
them. This research met with enormous difficulties in securing an 
adequately matched sample, but eventually six American manufacturing 
companies operating in England were matched with five British manu­
facturing companies.
The research began by attempting to draw a sample of American 
manufacturing firms operating within a twenty-five mile radius of 
London, in as wide a range of industries as possible. No adequate 
sampling frame existed for such firms, and lists were compiled from 
the KOmpass Register of British Industry and Commerce as well as the 
Anglo American Trade Directory. The nationality of the firm was 
checked by consulting the U.K. edition of Who Owns Whom, and only 
wholly owned subsidiary companies were selected. The response rate 
from this sample was 38%, details are given in table 5.1 below.
Table 5.1. Responses from American firms contacted: Main sample.
N ■ %>
Firm agreed and was included in the sample. 6 16
Firm agreed but could not be matched with
British firm. 4 11 38%
Firm agreed but proved to be unsuitable
for research. 4 11
Firm refused. 9 24
Firm failed to reply to request. 15 39
Total 38 101*
*These percentages have been rounded up.
In all, six American manufacturing firms were selected for study, although 
as one can see from examining table 5.1., the figure could have been as 
high as ten, but for the difficulty of matching with comparable British 
companies. Once the American firms had agreed to co-operate in the 
research it was then possible to work out the required characteristics 
of the comparable British firms. Although I have been critical of the 
work of the Aston researchers (see chapter 2), their work has managed 
to delineate some of the determinants of organisational structure, and 
at the very least they have specified those variables which the prudent 
researcher would have to match up in order to determine whether cultural 
variables had any independent effect. As a consequence of this and 
other research an attempt was made to match the British and American 
companies Upon the following variables. Size of company; this was 
measured by the number of employees. A deliberate decision was made 
not to include any firm with more than 5,000 employees. There were 
two reasons for this: Firstly, the research instrument that was used
to measure organisational climate was found on piloting not to work 
well on firms over this s i z e ; ^  secondly, it was felt that it was 
unlikely that a single researcher with limited time and resources could 
gain an accurate knowledge of a very large organisation. Ownership; 
as all the American companies were by definition subsidiaries, an 
attempt was made to ensure that all the British companies were of the 
same status. Location: all the companies were in a twenty-five mile
radius of London. In part this was merely convenient for the 
researcher, but it also meant that the labour market was very similar 
for all the companies, and this was important when it came to testing 
hypotheses about managerial employees. Product: an attempt was made
to compare companies manufacturing the same type of product. Precedence 
was given to matching the products of the firms and their sizes, as ir\y
reading of previous research indicated that these two variables were of
(2)
quite fundamental importance. lable 5.2. below shows the response
rate from suitably matched British firms.
Table 5.2. Responses from British firms contacted; Main Sample.
N 2
Firm agreed and was used in sample 5 10
Firm agreed but proved to be unsuitable for
research. 2 4 14$
Firm refused. 8 16
Firm failed to reply to request. 54_____69
Total 49 99*
♦These percentages have been rounded.
One can see from table 5.2. that the response rate for the British firms 
was only 14$, less than half that of the American response. This is 
exactly in line with the findings of Dunning (1970), who attempted a 
similar comparative study of British and American firms from an economic 
point of view. 1 lis response rates were 8$ for the British firms and 
45$ for the American firms. This differential response rate also fits 
with the higher response rate achieved for the American executive sample 
(see chapter 4), and can be related to the enormous stress upon secrecy 
that is characteristic of British business compared with the relative
openness of American society and American business.
Full details of the main sample are given in tables 5.3 to 5.7
below. The names given to the firms are realistic but fictitious
descriptions of their main activities, real names are given in the 
restricted appendix. The linns selected are listed below:-
American Firms British Firms
U.S. Pharmaceuticals G.B. Pharmaceuticals
U.S. Print G.B. Print
U.S. Furniture G.B. Furniture
U.S. Electronics I G.B. Electronics
U.S. Electronics II
U.S. Consumer G.B. Consumer
The reason for the fact that two American electronics firms are compared 
to only one British electronics firm is that two American firms agreed 
to co-operate, and it was felt that it would be interesting to compare 
similar American firms with each other as well as with a comparable 
British firm. As it turned out, one of the American finns happened to 
be quite tightly controlled in nearly all its activities by its parent, 
whilst the other firm operated almost as an independent entity. This
chance occurence allowed me to test more rigorously the effect of 
American control on the company.
Table 5.3 Size of British and American Firms: Main Sample.
U.S. Pharmaceuticals 
U.S. Print 
U.S. Furniture 
U.S. Electronics I 
U.S. Electronics II 
U.S. Consumer
Number of 
Employees*
559 G.B. Pharmaceuticals
G.B. Print
G.B. Furniture
G.B. Electronics
587
350
2500
1300
2635 G.B. Consumer
Number of 
Employees*
750
1461
300
349
1000
Number of 
Employees
* Part-time employees were counted as half.
Table 5.4. Size of Owning Group. British and American Finns: Main Sample
Number of 
Employees
G.B.Pharmaceuticals *
G.B.Print 2128
G.B.Furniture 350
G.B.Electronics 25000
U.S. Pharmaceuticals 
U.S.Print 
U.S.Furniture 
U.S.Electronics I 
U.S.Electronics II 
U.S.Consumer
8000
15000
6000
22000
9000
25000 G.B.Consumer *
♦denotes that the firm was not a subsidiary.
Table 5.5 Main Products of British and American Firms: Main Sample.
U.S.Pharmaceuticals
U.S.Print 
U.S.Furniture 
U.S.Electronics I
U.S. Electronics.il
U.S.Consumer
P ha r mac eu t i ca1 
chemicals.
Printing
machinery.
Contract
furniture.
Electronic
control
instruments.
Electronic
control
instruments.
Plastic, 
metal and 
chemical 
products.
G.B.Pharmaceuticals
G.B.Print 
G.B.Furniture 
G.B. Electronics
Pharmaceutical 
and industrial 
chemicals.
Printing
machinery.
Contract
furniture.
Electronic
control
instnjments.
G.B.Consumer Plastic
consumer
products,
Table 5.6 Length of Operation in England of British & American Firms:
.______ Main Sample. ___________ • _____ _
(Data to 1973)
Years. Years
U.S. Pharmaceuticals 13 G.B.Pharmaceuticals 34
U.S.Print 40 G.B.Print 73
U.S.Furniture 5* G.B.Furniture 70
U.S.Electronics I 30 G.B.Electronics 50**
U.S.Electronics II 40
U.S.Consumer 37 G.B.Consumer 55
♦This firm was legally created five years ago when it was taken over by 
an American company. As a manufacturing entity however, it had existed 
for much longer. **This firm was legally created approximately five 
years ago, when it was taken over by its English parent, although it 
had existed for,fifty years. As the nationality of the- firm had not 
altered, the older date is shown.
The tables indicate, I believe, that the British and American 
firms were well matched. 'Hie matching for size is quite good, two pairs 
being of an almost identical size; only in the electronics industry 
comparison is the match less than perfect. The other important 
variable, the products of tiie companies, are also well controlled for, 
most companies are directly competing with their matched pair. Only in 
the consumer products comparison does one find a situation where one of 
the firms, U.S.Consumer, has a more diversified range of outputs than its 
British counterpart. Even here however, one of the main products of the 
American firm directly competes with the main product of the British 
firm. The preciseness of the products matching is reflected in the 
production technologies of the sample companies, see table 5.7 below.
Table 5.7. Production Technology of British & American Firms: Main Sample.
U.S.Pharmaceuticals 3 (2) G.b .Pharmaceuticals 2 C3)
U.S.Print 2 G.B.Print 2
U.S.Furniture 3.(2) G.B.Furniture 3 (2)
U.S.Electronics I 3(2) G.B.Electronics 3(2)
U.S.Electronics II 3 (2)
U.S.Consumer 3 G.B.Consumer 3
Note. The numbers refer to Woodward’s (1965) categorization of production
technology. The main figure represents the dominant production
technology, the figure in paranthesis represents any subsidiary 
production technology.
Key 2 - Unit or small batch production
3 - Large batch or mass production.
The one aspect of the matching procedure that was not entirely satis­
factory was the legal status of the companies. Whereas all of the 
American companies were subsidiaries, only three of the British firms
were. There is clear evidence to suggest that this factor can make
(3 )
a difference to organisational structure. Secondly, the size of
the parent finns, where these existed, was not well matched (see table 
5.4).
The response rate for both sets of firms was poor, and this
might be thought to raise some doubts about the validity of the findings.
However, given the small number of firms in the sample anyway compared
with the population Of British and American firms operating in Britain,
even if a one hundred percent response rate had been secured it would
clearly have been illegitimate to have made any firm inferences about
'British manufacturing industry', compared to 'American manufacturing
industry'. One of the reasons for the small sample was the rigour of
the matching process, clearly the more variables that are matched the
smaller the sample necessarily becomes, and I would contend that only
a sample matched as rigorously as this one can really test any hypotheses
about the effect of nationality upon company structure and operation.
I think it could be argued that having relatively low levels of response
actually provides for an even stricter test of the hypotheses about the
effects of socio-cultural variables. It seems a reasonable assumption
that this sample consists of relatively 'progressive' firms, that is
firms who are proud of their achievements, have a good profit record
etc. and are interested in demonstrating their 'progressiveness' to 
(4)
research workers. If this assumption is correct then one ends up
by comparing progressive American companies with progressive British 
companies, which from the point of view of comparing like with like is 
satisfactory. Furthermore, if it is possible to detect the effect of 
socio-cultural variables even amongst progressive companies, which are 
by definition more fully capitalist, then it would follow that the 
effect of such varia bles is likely to be even greater amongst the 
larger population of less progressive companies. In other words, if 
this study manages to demonstrate the importance of socio-cultural 
factors in influencing the structure and operation of the surveyed 
companies, then it could be confidently argued that such differences 
exist, in general terms, for the total population of British firms and 
American firms.
Most research that has set out to test the effect of cultural 
factors on business behaviour has tended to compare indigenous firms 
in country A with indigenous firms in country B (Nash(1968), Negandhi
(1974)). There are clearly many advantages in proceeding in this 
manner, most obviously that the respective companies will be staffed 
by nationals of the respective countries, who will be carriers of their 
culture. This study, by contrast compares American firms operating in 
Britain with British linns similarly operating here. This research 
design offers one advantage over the more usual methodology, in that 
the operating environment of the companies is held relatively constant. 
There is yet another advantage however, which again might be thought 
to produce a more rigorous test of hypotheses about the relevance of 
cultural factors. If it can be shown that the American firms, despite 
operating in England and empJoying English nationals, still exhibited 
the effects of American culture upon their structures and operations, 
then it could be safely assumed that cultural variables are relevant 
explanatory variables in the analysis of company structure and operation.
Three separate but interrelated sets of data were collected 
on all the firms in the sample. Material was collected on the organ­
isational structures of the companies and how they operated. This was 
followed by information on the managerial employees of the companies. 
Finally data was gathered on the organisational climate of the 
respective firms.
I was able to check certain of the hypotheses against another 
set of data as well. The British Institute of Management very kindly 
allowed me to reanalyse two of their surveys of member companies; one 
on the selection of managers,^ and the other on fringe benefits.^
I discarded all the sample companies which were not engaged in manu­
facturing, and then compared the American owned firms in the sample with 
the British finns, matching the respondents for size. These studies 
are referred to throughout this research as the B.i .m . data.
This chapter reports on the results of the investigation into 
the organisational structure and dynamics of the companies, whilst 
chapters 6 and 7 report on the manager.ia.1 personnel and the organisa­
tional climates respectively. The data on organisational structure 
was collected in a number of ways. After the company had replied 
favourably to the research approach letter, which set out the main aims 
of the research (for details of the approach letter, see Appendix 2), 
the researcher visited the company, explained in more detail the purpose 
of the research and gathered general information about the company.
This was followed by another interview where two senior executives helped 
the researcher complete the organisational structure schedule (see 
Appendix 2) (7). The initial purpose of the schedule was to allow 
proper matching to take place; the schedule makes use of several of the
scales developed by the Aston researchers to measure contextual
variables, viz. size, dependence and technology, as well as three
measures of organisational structure, Formalization, Organisational
(8)
Autonomy and Functional Specialization. The measure of organisat­
ional autonomy, apart from being a useful measure of an element of 
organisational structure, allowed me to probe the exact nature of the 
relationship between the American subsidiaries and their parent firms.
On the basis of this information it was possible to make an assessment 
of how tightly controlled the American firms were from the United 
States, and this in turn allowed adequate testing of the hypotheses 
that the more tightly controlled firms would exhibit more distinctly 
’American’ features. The organisational structure schedule also 
contained a variety of other questions designed to test a range of 
hypotheses, derived from the theoretical analysis, about the differences 
between British and American manufacturing industry. Some of the 
questions were designed more to open up certain topics of inquiry 
rather than to elicit pieces of formal information, e.g. the questions 
on collective bargaining were used to generate a discussion about the 
company’s attitude to and experience with trade unions. The data from 
the schedule was supplemented in three ways. Firstly, confirmatory 
material was obtained where possible from other company sources, e.g. 
company booklets, advertising and public relations material, and 
organisation charts. In addition, certain external sources were 
consulted, e.g. McCarthy Information Service, as well as material 
stored at Companies’ House. Secondly, when the managers of the 
companies were interviewed, considerable information about the structure 
and more particularly about the operation of the organisation was 
obtained. Finally, the questiOnaire sent to the managers of the 
company (see Appendix 2) contained as its last section an Organisational 
Climate Index, which contributed some data on the perception of the 
structure by the managers.
The first aspect of organisational structure that was examined
was formalization. I defined organisational formalization, following
Hall (1972) as the organisational technique of prescribing how, when,
and by whom tasks are to be performed. This is somewhat broader than
the Aston researchers, who defined it as ’’the extent to which rules,
(9 )
procedures, motivations, and communications are written”. There
were two main hypotheses regarding the degree of formalization of the 
British and American manufacturing organisations. Firstly, it was 
predicted that the American firms that were more tightly controlled 
from the United States would be more formalized. This should follow
because making the subsidiary follow standardized procedures in a 
number of areas of the business would certainly be one quite effective 
way of controlling the activities of the company. I have already 
indicated that the control relations between American parents and their 
subsidiaries were more complex than I had initially supposed, and the 
results of this investigation reflected this complexity. Hie second 
hypothesis was that American owned firms would be, ceteris paribus, more 
formalized than similar British firms. This should follow from the 
theoretical analysis, because I have argued that American culture places 
a greater emphasis unon the values of achievement, universalism and 
specificity. The achievement stress should lead to greater formaliza­
tion in selecting and appraising managers, a formal systematic approach 
being preferable to an approach which stresses vaguer and more diffuse 
personal qualities. The stress on universalism should reinforce the 
higher formalization, with American firms looking for measures of perform­
ance which are universalistic rather than particularistic. Finally, the 
greater hypothesized stress on specificity should lead to far more organ­
isational rules and controls in American organisations. These 
predictions are further supported by the work of other researchers.
Inkson et al. (1970) using an identical measure of organisational form­
alization, found in their British/American comparative study a significant 
difference in formalization between the two sets of firms - indeed this 
was the only significant difference that they found. Richardson's (1956) 
study of British and American cargo ships and Granick's (1972) cross- 
cultural study of business firms which included British and American 
examples, had similar findings.
Formalization was measured using the scale developed by Pugh 
et al. (1968) and successfully abbreviated by Inkson et al, (1970).
The results are reproduced in table 5.8 below.
Table 5.8. Organisational Structure of British & American Firms: Formalization.
Formalization Formalization
Score Score
U.S.Pharmaceuticals 10 G.b .Pharmaceuticals 8
U.S.Print 10 G.B.Print 8
U.S.Furniture 5 G.B.Furniture 9
U.S.Electronics I 4 G.B.Electronics 7
U.S.Electronics II 10
U.S.Consumer 7 G.B.Consumer 9
Note: Max. = 10 = high formalization
Min. = 0 = low "
The results of the Aston scale of formalization cannot be said to 
support the hypothesis that American firms were more formalized than 
the comparable British firms. On the other hand the data do tend to 
support the hypothesis that strong control from the American parents 
leads to higher formalization in that the most tightly controlled firms 
overall, U.S.Print and U.S.Electronics II have the highest scores.
Before I discuss these results however, it is necessary to comment a 
little upon the formalization scale developed by the Aston researchers. 
The scale score is constructed by asking key informants whether there 
exist particular documents which determine certain organisational 
procedures. This approach is quite different from that of Hage and 
Aiken (1967) or Hall (1963), who used organisation members' perceptions 
of formalization, and achieved rather different results. This is 
unquestionably because an organisation very rarely operates exactly as 
dictated by set procedures; the existence of an informal organisation 
mediates between the formal structure and the participants. This 
research attempted to look at the formalization of company structure in 
both ways: The Aston scale constituted a formal index, whilst the
participants' views that were gleaned via the management interview 
programme, as well as through the general discussion, with the key 
informants, provided the perceptual measures. The organisational 
climate index provided additional information.
This research, like that of others, did not find that the 
results of the formal measure of formalization, the Aston scale, 
correlated well with the other indicators used. More seriously, the 
Aston index did not provide any understanding of what formalization 
actually meant inside the companies investigated, although to be fair 
it does not claim to do this. In general terms I found that it was 
true that the American firms in the sample were more formalized than the 
comparable British firms. They were more formalized in the sense that 
lhere were more fixed procedures in the American firms for a wider 
range of activities than was true in the British firms. This statement 
needs considerable elaboration and refinement to do justice to the 
complexity that was discovered. The American firms in general made 
far greater use of certain techniques for greater managerial control; 
this was especially noticeable in the field of financial and budgetary 
control, and it was in this area also that the American parent exercised 
its strongest control. These findings are in line with those of Granick 
(1972). The same phenomenon was.also noticeable in the personnel area. 
All the American firms in the sample always drew up job descriptions 
when recruiting new managers, whilst this was not consistently done in
the English firms. These findings are reinforced by the reanalysis of 
the B.I.M. survey on s e l e c t i o n . T h e  B.I.M. data was analysed by 
nationality and then broken down by size: small firms were those
employing up to 1,000 persons and large firms employing more. The full 
tables are reproduced in Appendix 1, but summarizing it was found that 
holding size constant significantly more American firms drew up job 
descriptions than British firms (p<.01). The same study also showed 
that American firms were much more likely to draw up a man specification 
for managerial positions that were British firms (p<.001, when size is 
controlled for). Turning to my own sample again, it was found that 
American firms were more inclined to use some form of objective testing 
in the selection process for managers than were the comparable British 
firms, although testing was not widespread even in the American 
companies. The reanalysed B.I.M. data produced a similar result:
44.5% (n=9) of small American firms as against 27.1% (n=48) of small 
British firms sometimes used managerial selection tests. For the large 
firms the figures were respectively 38.5% (n=13) and 29.8% (n=37). 
Although all these differences are in the predicted direction, none 
reach levels of statistical significance. This data is further 
supported by the work of Seyfarth et al. (1968) in their small compara­
tive study of British and American organisations. The interviews with 
the personnel officers of the American companies however, indicated that 
there were movements away from the use of tests in the selection 
procedure, apparently because of their poor predictive power. The 
personnel area yielded yet further indications of the greater formal­
ization of the American companies. All the American companies had 
management development programmes, whilst only two ol' the British 
companies, G.B.Furniture and G.B. Electronics had. It was found that 
the personnel departments of the American companies were bigger than 
the comparable departments of the British companies, and one of the 
reasons for this was simply-that the task of the American departments 
was bigger. All the ’American* managers in the sample were being 
systematically appraised and trained, whilst this was happening in only 
two of the British firms. These findings are supported by the 
comparative observations of Stewart (1957) and Urwick (1954). Further­
more, the Action Society Trust (1956) noted the virtual absence, in 
their study, of systematic management development programmes in British 
firms. Thus as far as the personnel function was concerned the 
American firms in the sample exhibited a greater degree of formalization.
In the marketing function the same general pattern emerged, 
although the differences were not so marked. Two of the British firms, 
G.B. Burniture and G.B. Pharmaceuticals did not possess a separate 
marketing function with a force of salesmen. In the case of the 
furniture firm it was still sufficiently small for most of the sales 
work to be handled by the Managing Director and his assistant. The 
Managing Director regarded sales as his major function, and both he and 
his products were well known throughout the trade. Most of the firm’s 
business was to offices, hotels etc., and very little went to retail 
outlets; a well developed sales force was not therefore required. The 
Managing Director of the British company saw marketing in the same way 
as he saw design, indeed he did not distinguish very closely betvyeen 
them. Both functions were viewed as highly creative rather idiosyn­
cratic jobs. By comparison it is interesting to note that the American 
furniture company employed more salesmen and gave considerably more . 
emphasis to marketing its products in a much more systematic way. G.B#
Pharmaceuticals was also a relatively small firm, and it sold its main 
outputs very largely to other companies. Marketing was regarded as 
rather a routine business involving liasing with established customers. 
The company was not highly involved in the innovative end of the market 
and did not compete with other companies on the basis of new products 
and packaging, but rather on delivery and price. This meant that 
production was regarded as the key function. Again the matched American 
company provided a stark contrast, for enormous emphasis was placed 
upon the marketing of its products. The rest of the companies in the 
sample all possessed marketing/sales departments, and the predicted 
differences did emerge. Not only did the American firms put greater 
emphasis upon this business function, but the American?were very much 
more systematic and formalized about it. This manifested itself in 
several ways: Firstly, the American firms ran more and larger sales
training ’schools’ for their members - as one interviewee put it rather 
graphically, ’I seem to spend more of my time learning about selling 
than 1 do seeing customers'. This emphasis was particularly marked in 
U.S. Pharmaceuticals and U.S.Consumer. The sales training was 
formalized in the sense that salesmen were often taught from sales 
training manuals, in one case an adapted version of the one used by 
the American parent. Some salesmen likened the training to a computer 
programme, they were taught how to respond to almost every conceivable 
situation. Of course some of the British firms exhibited some of these 
features, particularly G.B. Consumer, but there did seem tp.be a
difference of degree between the American and the British respondents. 
These findings are again supported by other writers, cf. Chruden and 
Sherman (1972) and P.E.P. (19GG).
I have attempted to point out some oi' the ways in which the 
American firms in the sample were more formalized than the British 
despite the somewhat ambiguous'results of the Aston index of formal- 
ization. It is now important to attempt to resolve this discrepancy 
and to interpret the findings. At one level the different findings 
are easy to interpret, the Aston measure looks for the presence or 
absence of a limited range of documents, whilst I have looked at a far 
greater range of procedures in the organisations concerned. I would 
argue that by looking at the greater range of procedures, even if this 
is done in a somewhat less systematic fashion than the Aston scale, 
then this is Jikely to produce more reliable results. A smaller 
range is more vulnerable to chance events, and indeed 1 think there are 
some changes in the environment of British industry that make the Aston 
measure particularly vulnerable. Whilst 1 was conducting the main 
interview at G.B. Consumer, it was pointed out tome that job descrip­
tions had only recently been introduced into the firm. The pressure 
for their introduction did not arise internally out of a desire to 
develop systematic and formal manpower policy, but out of the demands of 
the Industrial Training Board. If I had arrived six months earlier 
their score on the Aston index would have been reduced by one third, 
making them the lowest scoring British firm. As it happened, this 
result would have been misleading. Inspecting the Aston formalization 
scores once more, one notices what appears to be a major anomaly, and 
that is the very high score for G.B. Furniture. This appears 
particularly surprising in view of its small size. In fact, it is 
not difficult to account for this high score, which did indeed indicate 
a relatively high degree of formalization. The answer lies in the 
character of the Managing Director of the firm. He was a firm 
believer in management science, and the value of management education.
He had attended numerous management training courses run by 
consultants, and was well versed in management techniques. Two members 
of his staff had acquired business degrees. It would be fair to say 
that the whole management of the firm was convinced of the value of the 
application of management science to the organisation. This conviction 
resulted, just as I shall argue it has done in the American firms, in a 
large number of formal systems of control and planning. It might be 
argued that this is one small idiosyncracy and that all small samples
risk turning upatypical examples, and that a fortiori larger samples 
like those gathered by the Aston researchers are to be preferred. In
some ways this is a powerful argument, and I would argue that G.B. » 
Furniture is probably an atypical firm, particularly for its size, but 
the example itself is a peculiarly revealing one in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the example does illustrate that business organisations are 
controlled by acting human beings who can influence the structure and 
strategy of the company. As I have observed, sometimes the contingency 
theorists seem to present businesses as being totally moulded by the 
external contingencies of the business environment. Here the strong 
formalization of a relatively small firm is seen to be the product of 
a conscious strategy by a dynamic Managing Director who, for a 
particular set of reasons happened to believe in the efficacy of 
management science, and therefore instituted a whole range of control 
devices in his organisation. The best example of the influence of 
this man, and his personal philosophy on the structure of the firm, 
was to be found in his views on the size of the operating units. The 
total size of the company was around 300 persons, but these were split 
up into three factories, each employing about 100 people. He explained 
that he was well aware of the economies of scale that could probably 
have been had by amalgamation into one unit, but his philosophy of 
business was that the management must know the workforce intimately, 
develop personal bonds with the workers, and he felt that this was best 
done by operating with units of about 100 men. It is probably always 
true of organisational investigators, that those who investigate a 
small number of cases are impressed by the power of the leader(s) of 
the organisation to determine policy and structure. The world of
business journalism always seems to give precedence to the acting
. . (1 2) individual at the expense of structural considerations, and this
also seems to be broadly true of business historians, although there
have been some notable exceptions. Sociologists and economists on the
other hand, by the very nature of their disciplines, tend to concentrate
on the more abstract forces of the socio-economic environment. There
does seem to be considerable evidence to suggest that organisational
leaders do make important decisions about the organisation that are not
wholly 1 determined1 by the environment. Wilson (1954) in his study of
the history of Unilever for example, states unequivocably, "I believe
that the principal reason why some firms survive, prosper and expand,
while others dwindle, perish or sell out must be sought in the person-
(13)alities of the men who manage them". It can be shown I think,
that the leaders of business organisations often make decisions that
are, from a capitalist business point of view, irrational. Mace (1966)
lor example, cites the response of a company President to the question
of why a factory was constructed in Spain. He replied, "My wife speaks
Spanish, loves Spain, and now we are able to make several trips a year
to visit the operation there". These examples are not confined to
smaller companies either, Wilkins and Hill (1964), in their study of
the Ford empire, trace the history of the siting of the Ford tractor
factory at Cork in Ireland just before the First World War. Cork,
they note was a place with a poor steamship service and lack of skilled
labour. The reasons they ultimately bring forward for the decision
were that, "Ford liked the idea of an"industrial development in Ireland.
He liked the idea of a great factory rising in the land of his
. (14)
ancestors like a creative monument to his accomplishments".
Ultimately, as I have argued, firms are bound by the logic of the 
capitalist system, and Ford eventually closed his Cork factory, the laws 
of the market triumphing over ancestral longings. For firms which are 
economically successful however, there exists a considerable margin for 
organisational manoeuvre. Burns (1974), Child (1972) and Dill (1973) 
have all shown in their different ways that the environment does not 
automatically constrain the organisation. The environment is at the 
very least filtered through organisational members (Dill), and one must 
recognise the important area of the political process inside the firm 
(Burns and Child). The Managing Director of G.B. Furniture had made 
at least one decision, the operating size of his factories, that was 
more in accord with his own philosophy of management than with strict 
business logic. Fortunately for him, the company had been sufficiently 
successful in the past to permit the exercise of his beliefs.
Although G.B. Furniture represented an exception, this study in general 
confirmed the view that the American firms were more formalized, and 
that this greater formalization was very largely a product of the heavy 
emphasis placed upon control mechanisms throughout all the areas of the 
business.
There were variations between the generally more formalized 
American companies however, as well as between them and the comparable 
British companies. Furthermore, there were important differences 
inside certain firms, and as these differences are illuminating it is 
worth pursuing them. U.S. Pharmaceuticals was one of the most highly 
formalized of all the companies studied, despite the fact that it was 
a relatively small firm, and operating in an industry which is noted 
for its high research and development element. Some research has
indicated that firms which rely heavily on research and development 
should be less formalized/ 16\ There are two major reasons for this 
company's high formalization score: Firstly, it was very tightly
controlled, as its autonomy score indicates (see table 5.15 p.195) by 
its parent company, and the parent company was quite large (8000 employees), 
the size effect was therefore felt through the parent. The second 
major reason was connected with the nature of the industry. The 
pharmaceutical industry is one that is tightly regulated by the govern­
ment. It regulates the industry, firstly by being by far its largest 
consumer, and therefore is in a position to exercise countervailing 
power (cf. the lloche affair), and secondly, by being the body legally 
responsible for the control of drugs, it exercises control via labelling, 
packaging, health and quality control legislation. Faced with so many 
external controls companies in this industry are themselves forced to 
institute a wide series of formalized controls inside their companies, 
particularly in the production departments. Finally, it should be noted, 
that although U.S. Pharmaceuticals did have a research and development 
department, it was not large; most of the basic research being performed 
by the parent company in America and exported to the subsidiary. G.B. 
Pharmaceuticals was a larger company than its American counterpart, 
although the difference was not great; its products were very similar, 
and so it was subject to the same kind of governmental constraint. It 
had a larger research and development function than its American counter­
part, although by the standards-of the industry it was not large.
The only major difference between the two was that the British firm was 
not a subsidiary, and whilst this could have accounted for the reported 
difference in formalization it is equally possible that nationality 
could also have been a contributory factor.
There was a much greater degree of formalization in U.S. Print 
compared with G.B. Print, and this was even reflected in their respective 
scores on the Aston index. The products of the two firms were 
identical, and they were operating in an identical market. The British 
l inn was a lmost twice as large as the-Amer ican, which should have lead 
to greater pressure to formalize on the part of the former. The only 
major diflerence apart from nationality that could have accounted for 
the considerable difference that was found, was the size of the parent 
companies; the American parent company was considerably bigger than 
the British one.
The comparison of the furniture firms did produce a result 
that was rather surprising. Although there was not a great deal of
difference between the two companies from the point of view of form­
alization, it is probably true to say that the British company was more 
formalized. I have already indicated that the major reason for this 
was to be found in the ideas of the Managing Director of G.B. Furniture. 
There is one other factor that is worth mentioning. The industry is 
one where the average size of firms tends to be relatively small, 
making for rather lower formalization scores. It should finally be 
noted that the American firm had come to Britian by buying into an 
existing"British firm, and this move had been accomplished within the 
last five years. The Managing Director of U.S. Furniture explained to 
me that although a lot of changes had taken place since the takeover, 
in the direction of greater formalization, the industry itself was not 
one of the most progressive, and the American parent was moving 
relatively slowly in the direction of imposing greater control 
procedures.
The comparison of British and American companies in the 
electronics industry provided a nice example of the effect of strong 
American parent control. There was a marked difference between the 
two American companies in the area of formalized managerial controls. 
U.S. Electronics I, which had been established in Britain for thirty 
years, was a very large and almost independent subsidiary of an 
American parent. In many ways the American connection was almost 
superfluous, it barely affected the operation of the company, and the 
company did not have a very high formalization score; this is even 
reflected in the Aston scale. It was certainly much less formalized 
than U.S. Electronics II, despite being twice its size and having 
a parent company more than twice as large. The British company,
G.B. Electronics, was more formalized than U.S. Electronics I, but not 
as formalized as U.S. Electronics II. Unfortuantely, the variables of 
both size and nationality both push in the same direction in this 
example, and it is thus impossible to tell whether the greater size of 
U.S. Electronics II or its nationality, or of course both, account for 
its greater formalization. If the size of the parent was an important 
variable however, one would have predicted that the relationship would 
have been reversed.
Finally there were the two firms in the consumer products 
field. Again the level of formalization is in the predicted direction, 
being higher in U.S. Consumer. In general the level of formalization 
was quite high in both companies, as both firms attempted to predict and 
control for the turbulent environment of the consumer products market.
The larger size of the American company, and in particular its large 
parent, which exerted strong control over the subsidiary, could have 
accounted for the difference independently of the effect of nationality*
Although I have described companies in terms of company X 
being more formalized, as I have defined it, than company Y, there were 
differences to be found even within companies. The differences varied 
with the function inside the company, although there appeared to be far 
less variation inside the American companies, with the exception of 
U.S. Electronics I, than inside the British companies. Fortunately, 
because the companies were so well matched, these variations did not 
affect the general conclusion that American firms were more formalized 
than the British ones. In all companies the finance and general 
administrative departments seemed the most formalized, followed very 
closely by production. In American companies this was usually followed 
by personnel and marketing together, then research and development, 
although it should be noted that the research and development function 
in several of the American companies was very small indeed, most of the 
research and development being done in the United States. In British 
companies, personnel seemed to be the least formalized function, less so 
than even research and development and much less so than marketing.
The explanation of the greater formalization of the American 
companies should be clear from the historical analaysis presented in 
Chapter 3. From the time of F.W. Taylor at least, America has been the 
home of management science and of management education. Furthermore 
management consultants, who have probably played an important part in 
diffusing managerial techniques and control mechanisms, were an American 
invention and are used much more extensively by American firms. Just 
as research and development expertise has been exported from the American 
parent to the British subsidiary, so too with managerial techniques.
This is why one finds so many formalized control mechanisms in use in 
the financial area. It is the area where the American parent tends 
to exert most control, and it is the easiest area in which to harmonize 
American/British practice. Finally, it is an area which by its very 
nature is easier to control, because it is dealing very largely with 
inanimate symbols. Once these techniques are exported across the 
Atlantic, they have to be operated by British nationals within the 
American subsidiaries. This is the main reason for another major 
finding in this study, that there is a significant difference in the 
number of managers who have undergone management training in the American 
compared with the British companies. 66,9% (n=97) of managers working
for American firms in the sample had attended management training 
courses, whilst only 48.7% (n=38) of managers working for the British 
firms had (p<.05). The American finns were also much more likely to 
use management consultants for these courses (32% n=31) than were the 
British firms (23.6% n=9). The survey also found that American linns
were rather more likely to send their managers on courses that were 
specifically designed for the needs of their firm than were the British 
finns, although the difference was not great (U.S. 18.8% n=18 - G.B.
13.1% n=5).
The possession of some form of management training, particularly 
if it stresses certain management techniques, is clearly relevant to an 
argument which suggests that American firms are differentiated from 
comparable British firms by their stress upon the application of the 
rational techniques of capitalism. In line with other studies, e.g.
Ellis and Child (1973), I also found that in general terms the managers 
working for the American subsidiaries were better qualified than their 
British counterparts, even when ’qualified' is operationalised as any 
form of post ’A’ level education. (This data is discussed more fully 
in Chapter 6). The significance of this finding, I think, is that one 
consequence of having a mass of formalized managerial controls in the 
company is that it requires personnel with a certain amount of formalized 
training to operate them.
In what sense does this evidence indicate that the American 
firms in the sample were more attached to the values of capitalism than 
the British firms? The connection is one pointed out by Weber. . The 
American firms were more rational within the context of the capitalist 
system. American firms were, by and large, good examples of organis­
ations run by professional managers, most certainly players rather than 
gentlemen. The measuring rod of profit and loss was pushed into more 
areas of the American firms, and it was pushed deeper than in the 
comparable British firms. This was possible because of the greater 
development of analytical managerial techniques like operational 
research, budgetary analysis etc. in these finns. These are of course 
mere techniques, but the unifying character of these techniques is that 
they seek to apply the principles of rational problem-solving to 
business planning and decision making. The greater application of 
these tools of business rationality has potentially two far reaching 
consequences, although I have no direct evidence of either in this 
study. Firstly, one could argue, along with Marris (1974) that once 
the necessary homological measuring rod of profitability has been well
developed for use throughout the.organisation by the creation of profit
centres and other devices* then far more decisions can be assessed in a
commensurate way. This should lead to decisions being made on more
’rational1 criteria rather than, to take Marris' example, ’’according to
( 1 7 )
the relative ’pull’ of departmental moguls”. If this condition
was met, then some of the assumptions of the contingency theorists about 
company goals might be satisfied, and the theory might find greater 
applicability. The second consequence would be that the attitudes and 
values of the employees of such companies would become increasingly less 
relevant, because the jobs inside the organisation would become 
increasingly tightly controlled, the tasks involved ever more carefully 
delimited and the performance more carefully monitored. This after all 
is one of the effects of ’Management By Objectives’, when one ignores 
its motivational aspects. Thus the individual manager, whatever his 
own particular attitudes and values might be, would have his energy 
channelled in the direction sanctioned by the system. Whether he is 
committed to the goals of the organisation or not becomes irrelevant.
To argue that the American firms Were more formalized is to 
say that those firms had a larger number of rules and procedures, of 
controls and techniques for regulating organisational tasks. While 
this was true, it does represent something of a paradox, because the 
American firms appeared, at one level, to be very informal and non- 
bureaucratic. There were several indices of this greater openness 
on the part of the United States firms. There was firstly the question 
of the research access itself, I have already noted that it was far 
easier to gain research access to the American firms than to the 
comparable British firms, and further how very easy it was to get access 
to high ranking American executives working in Britain. A second 
indicator was the physical design of the offices of the American 
companies; with the exception of U.S. Electronics I, which was not 
notably different from its British counterpart, all the American companies 
had office sections that were modelled on the open plan system. This 
finding in the main sample was reinforced by my observations in the 
American companies, where the sample of American executives was drawn 
from. There appeared to be a less rigid distinction between ’office’ 
and ’works’ in the American firms, although this was not as marked as 
I had expected it to be. The British companies were more inclined to 
spell out status differences inside the plant, for example by issuing 
keys to certain personnel for the washing and toilet facilities, but 
even where this was not done, it seemed to me that there were strong
informal norms in all plants about who was to use certain facilities.
These norms were.partially 'created, and certainly reinforced, by the
strategic siting of such facilities’. I did not find any noticeable
differences inside the production sections of the various plants; the
layout and operation of the various processes seemed almost totally
dictated by the technology, save that some of the American plants did
seem rather more modern and certainly cleaner. These observations
appear to be supported by other research. The P.E.P. investigators
into Atti.tu.des in British Management noted similar differences amongst
(18)the American owned firms that chanced to be in their sample.
Lewis and Stewart (1958) and Novotny (1964) make similar points, although 
it is not at all clear in either study where their evidence comes from. 
The best supporting evidence is provided by Richardson’s (1956) study 
of British and American merchant ships. lie notes considerable 
differences inside the ships in terms of living conditions, use of 
titles, food consumed and eating conditions - all the differences lying 
in the predicted direction. How are these differences to be inter­
preted? A simple interpretation would be that they reflected changes 
in architectural thinking over a period of time, and that American firms 
being newer than British firms, had been designed according to the new 
architectural views. This argument is insufficient on two grounds: 
Firstly, although it is true in general terms that the American firms 
in the sample had been operating here for a shorter period than their 
British counterparts (see table 5.6), the difference is not so marked, 
and anyway the period of operation is considerable (mean = 27.5 years). 
The second point is that buildings are not designed totally on the 
whims of architects, the wishes and intentions of the customer are 
clearly important. The layout of office accommodation does, I believe, 
reflect differences in the ideology and philosophy of American business, 
which itself reflects differences between British and American 
societies, particularly in the area of stratification (see Chapter 3).
In America I have argued, the values of achievement rather than 
ascription are dominant, this means that inside the firm the distinc­
tions between groups of employees, like managers and managed, should 
not be so important, because the barriers are not so rigid or permanent. 
The firm, like the society of which it is partly a reflection, will be 
more open. The authority structure within the American firms will be 
less permanent and more specific, people with particular positions and 
possessing particular expertise will hold authority within their 
particular delimited areas. The communication structure of the plant 
will reflect this openness and is, I have argued, reflected in the
physical design of the accommodation. The open plan structure 
facilitates more communication between all members of the plant and is 
a symbolic affirmation of the lack of caste like distinctions within 
the organisation.^19^
The second index of the relative informality of the American
firms in the sample is one that is of crucial importance in understanding
the nature of the formalization of the firms, and helps, I think, to
resolve the paradox. The managers working in the American firms in
the sample did not regard their organisations as being particularly
bureaucratic and hedged around with a lot of unnecessary 'red tape',
despite the fact that I have shown that there were a much larger number
of fixed procedures and controls inside these firms. The explanation
for this is to be found in the work of Gouldner (1954). Gouldner
explains in his celebrated work. Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy.
that the "sheer degree of bureaucracy was not as important in eliciting
(20)
complaints about red tape as was the type of bureaucracy". The
controls and procedures in the American firms can be seen as examples 
of what Gouldner calls, ’representative bureaucracy’, that is rules 
and regulations that are regarded as legitimate inside the company.
The procedures were regarded as wholly rational devices to maximise the 
goals of the firm. The majority of the managers in the American firms 
had been on management training courses (67%) and therefore had in some 
senses been trained to appreciate these procedures. As I shall show 
in Chapter 6, many of the 'American’ managers regarded themselves as 
’professionals’, and the range of management techniques that they had 
mastered were seen as the tools which all professional managers should 
possess. As Hall (1968) has shown, formalization of procedures and 
professionalisation are actually designed to do the same thing - organise 
and regularise the behaviour of the members of the organisation. Their 
organisations were conceived to be less bureaucratic because the control 
systems, which they found wholly legitimate, controlled their behaviour, 
rather than any individual bureaucrat. Furthermore, the American 
organisations were also very informal when it came to personal relation­
ships.
Another reason for the fact that, with the exception of U.S. 
Electronics I, the American firms felt more informal, was that the 
American firms were more decentralised. The measure of decentralisation 
used by the Aston researchers, and followed in this study, was the scale 
entitled Organisational Autonomy. (For full details of this scale see 
the Organisational Structure Schedule in Appendix 2). This scale is
probably a good measure of the dependence of the subsidiary upon its 
parent firm and as such is clearly relevant in the measurement of the 
total centralisation/decentralisation of the whole corporation. My 
purpose in using the scale was in fact to probe the amount of subsidiary 
dependence and in particular to determine how strongly some of the 
American subsidiaries were controlled (For the results of this scale 
see table 5.15 p195). From the point of view of any particular sub­
sidiary however, what is crucial is the locus of decision making inside 
the organisation under study, and it is in this sense that the American 
finns could be said to be more decentralised, again with the exception 
of U.S. Electronics I. The evidence for decentralisation was gathered 
in the interviews with the key informants and in the management interview 
programme.
In many ways one would have expected formalized organisations
to have been relatively decentralised; there is no need for detailed
control from the top if the control of the organisation is managed by
an elaborate system of procedures. This is consistent with the findings
of the Aston researchers e.g. Pugh et al. (1968), (1969), and with the
work of Hage and Aiken (1967). Apart from this purely structural
explanation from the contingency theorists, there are other reasons why
one might have expected this finding. America has for long been
regarded as the leading country in the field of management theory,
certainly this is the view from Britain as Child (1969a) has shown.
The dominant ideology in America, or at least the dominant ideology of
the management schools and the ’progressive’ companies, has been that
version of the Human Relations movement that has been termed by McGregor
(1960), theory Y. Theory Y stresses the importance of individuals
’self-actualizing’, that is, realising their own potential by being
allowed to take a whole range of decisions that would normally, i.e.
under the misguided direction of theory X, be taken higher up the
o rg a n is a t io n . A t th e  m an ag eria l le v e l  o f  th e  f ir m  t h is  has le d  to  w hat
Peter Drucker has called ’management by objectives’ in contrast to
’management by control’. U.S. Pharmaceuticals, U.S. Print and U.S.
Consumer were all operating one form or another of M.B.O., none of the
(21)
British companies were. A relatively decentralised organisational
structure is clearly consistent with the theory Y view. What is also 
important to notice is that there is a strong body of managerial opinion 
that such schemes also work in the sense that they directly produce
greater output, or by reducing such variables as labour turnover,
(22)
absenteeism etc., they reduce costs. Given my hypothesis that
American firms are likely to be more concerned with such factors, then
it is quite consistent to expect to find these schemes being implemented
in such firms, particularly as I have already argued that there are good
reasons to suppose that the firms in this sample are examples of
'progressive1 firms. I would imagine that the vast majority of American
companies, like the vast majority of British companies are completely
untouched by such theories. It is also interesting to observe that
the whole approach of the Neo-Human Relations movement fits very much
better into the social and economic structure of American society than
it does into British society. For example, it is difficult to see how
Bennis’ vision of "adaptive, problem-solving, temporary systems of
diverse specialists, linked together by co-ordinating executives into
(23)an organic flux" would fit into the British industrial structure.
The strategy of such organisational change theorists demands easy 
access and co-operation from companies and employees, which I have already 
shown is more likely to be obtained in the United States than in Great 
Britain. Their strategy of change, which concentrates on changing 
people as much as it does organisational structures, is one that it is 
difficult to see operating smoothly in Britain. Finally, some theorists 
with their T group methods stress the importance of individual 
personality and feelings, and recommend openness and authenticity as the 
root to good interpersonal relations, and to an organisational climate 
that will be ready for innovation and change. Such values are more in 
keeping with the relatively more open American society. It is likely 
that most managers in Britain would consider such strategies as an 
invasion of the privacy of their personal lives. There is in fact 
evidence to suggest that American managers make a less clearcut distinct­
ion between their work lives and their private home lives anyway 
(Child and MacMillan (1972)).
It Is difficult to get any firm supporting evidence for the 
view that American companies in general are more decentralised than 
British companies. Inkson et al. (.1970) found no difference between 
the British and American companies in their sample. They used the 
Aston scale however, which, os I have already noted above, is not 
relevant if one is interested in the locus of decision making inside 
one organisation. There is impressionistic evidence from Thomas 
(1969) that American companies in Britain allow their managers to 
participate more in the decision making of the organisation, and this 
is supported, again impressionistically, by Stopford (1972). Indeed 
Stopford quotes a British Leyland manager interviewed by the Sunday 
limes as speaking for most of British industry when he said, "Until 
four years ago we were a highly authoritarian company. The hallmark
of the company style was action; thinking was somethin] you did in
your spare time. And as all the important decisions were made by the
men at the top there really did not seem to be much point in setting
(24)
up a management development programme11. The best confirmatory
evidence I found was the work of Heller (undated), who has shown, for 
a closely matched sample of American and British companies, that 
American managers tended to have more faith in their subordinates' 
abilities than British managers. This would be consistent with a 
more decentralised structure, which would involve more participation 
by junior managers.
The final question to be answered is: Have I confused genuine
decentralisation in decision making with mere participation? It seemed 
clear to me, that with the exception of U.S. Electronics I, the 
American firms did involve their managers much more in the decision 
making process of their organisation. There were more meetings of 
managers to determine particular decisions, and to plan strategies.
(An interesting side note to this is that U.S. Pharmaceuticals decided 
to admit the researcher after a meeting of all heads of functions).
There were more formal channels of consultation in the American finns, 
as well as the general feeling that the senior executives were more 
'approachable'. This view is ..confirmed by the results of the organ­
isational climate index, particularly the Employee Involvement Scale 
(see p.284 Chapter 7). These findings were more marked in U.S. 
Pharmaceuticals and U.S. Electronics II, which perhaps reflects the 
influence of their products and consequent technology upon their organ­
isational structures and processes, cf. Burns and Stalker (1961), 
Woodward (1965), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). There is clearly no 
simple mechanical relationship between production technology and organ­
isational structure however, because the two comparable firms, G.B. 
Pharmaceuticals and U.S. Electronics I did not exhibit the same 
characteristics in such a marked way. Whether it was true that the 
American firms were genuinely more decentralised in the sense that, 
within the decision making framework that was left to them by their 
parent firms they actually did devolve more power down the organisation, 
is exceptionally difficult to say. It could well be, as Perrow (1972) 
has argued, that decentralisation is a bit of a myth. Organisations, 
particularly American ones, may well have gone in for a more partici­
pative style of management following changes in managerial ideology 
that were themselves consequent on certain socio-economic changes in 
society. Whether this has actually led to power itself being 
decentralised is extremely unclear. It may well be that the highly
formalized sets of controls that were found in most of the American 
companies effectively set limits on the sorts of decisions and the 
amount of decision making that could be made by managers at all levels.
My data do not really allow me to make any reliable judgements on this 
matter.
Several theorists have suggested hypotheses about the relation­
ship between technology, and organisational structure and process, that 
it was felt important to test. Firstly, I discussed in Chapter 3 the 
work of a large number of writers who claimed that there is a technolog­
ical gap between Britain and America. This produces a simple hypo­
thesis: it was predicted that the American firms would exhibit a more
sophisticated technology than their British opposite numbers. The 
second hypothesis derives from the work of Woodward (1965). Woodward 
argued that the most important functional area in a firm is (a) determined 
by the dominant production technology and (b) itself influences the 
structure and dynamics of the company. My hypothesis, based on the 
historical material, was that the most important functional area of the 
firm will be more a function of nationality than technology, and one 
should expect to see systematic differences between British and American 
firms, particularly in the importance given to the sales function.
Two measures of technology were used in the research (full 
details are given in the Organisational Structure Schedule in Appendix 2). 
All the firms were categorised in to one of Woodward’s four basic modes 
of production: prototype production; unit and small batch production;
large batch and mass production; continuous process production. The 
second measure of technology was the workflow integration measure, 
developed by Inkson et al. (1970) for their abbreviated replication of 
the original Aston research. This scale, apart from providing a 
further measure of the type of technology used by the company, also 
provided a good index of the sophistication of the companies’ production • 
technology.
Woodward (1965) had argued that the most important functional 
area in a firm varied with technology. Thus she argues that in mass 
production industry the critical area is production itself, for it is 
here that the all important cost reductions become possible and 
scheduling perfected for mass assembly production or large factories.
The competitive euge of these finns is based upon price and delivery. 
Woodward argues that research and development is not the crucial function, 
because these companies have passed that stage, they have generated their 
product and, on the strength of its soundness, have made' large invest­
ments in inflexible resources. Neither is marketing the fundamental 
department, the need for the product has already been determined to 
penult large scale production tobegin, and price and delivery, largely 
the province of the production department, remain the marketeers1 best 
weapon. It follows for Woodward that in these firms, with the accent 
upon production, a relatively routine activity, there will be strong 
tendencies towards bureaucratization. I have concentrated on her 
analysis of. mass production industry, because the analysis of table 5.7 
shows this to be the major mode of production in all industries except 
printing machinery. Against Woodward's work one can contrast the work 
of other writers, who have suggested that there are other determinants of 
organisational structure than technology. For example, the Aston 
school have stressed.the importance of size, Burns and Stalker (1961) and 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have stressed the importance of the level of 
uncertainty in the environment, whilst finally the Neo-Human Relations 
movement have concentrated on the role of human needs.
This study does not present confirmatory evidence for Woodward*
view that production technology has a marked effect upon organisational
structure as table 5.16 demonstrates. There is only a very weak and
rather unstable correlation between technology and structure, technology
is not significantly correlated with any aspect of structure even at
the 10% level, the closest association being with specialisation,
although even here size is a better predictor. There did appear to be
a closer association between technology and the three elements of
structure that were measured for the British firms, and I believe that
this might be a significant result. The result could not be accounted
for by the effect of size, as the British and American firms were well
(25)
matched for this variable. Rather than make deductions about the
most important functional area in the companies from the work of 
Woodward, it was decided instead to ask the firms themselves. Thus 
the key informants, and the managers that were interviewed in the 
respective companies, were asked what they thought the dominant function 
in their organisation was, i.e. the function on which the ultimate 
success of the business depended. Not surprisingly, a range of 
different answers was provided for each organisation, managers dis­
playing a touching loyalty to their own function. Greater weight was 
placed on the responses of key informants for two reasons. Firstly, 
they were probably in a better position to make such an overall judgment, 
having sight of the whole of the company’s operations. Secondly, as 
the majority did not occupy functional positions themselves, it was
assumed that they would be less influenced by partisan considerations.
A quite distinct pattern emerged from this particular enquiry. In 
general the production function was regarded as being of greater 
importance in the British firms, although there were important 
differences between the industries examined. Amongst the American 
firms a greater stress was placed upon marketing rather than producing.
It seems possible that this finding could account for the somewhat 
greater association revealed between technology and structure for the 
British firms and, following Woodward, for the somewhat greater bureau­
cratization of the British firms.
The British stress upon production, contrasted to the American 
stress upon marketing, is nowhere better illustrated than-in the 
pharmaceutical industry comparison. G.B. Pharmaceuticals, as suppliers 
of chemicals, largely, but not solely, to other firms, felt that they 
competed on price and delivery, a function of production, rather than 
on brand images etc. The main managerial effort in the company was 
devoted to production planning and control. Marketing (they called 
it sales) and research and development were both rather shadowy functions. 
It may seem surprising that in such a research based industry the 
research and development function was of such little importance, but 
this reflects the situation of this particular firm. It was not 
attempting to compete in terms of basic research with the industry 
leaders, but was instead concentrating on producing cheap specialised 
chemicals to order. The American pharmaceutical company also performed 
hardly any basic research, but for rather different reasons. The 
American parent concentrated the research activity in the United States. 
Production in this company was regarded as an important function* but 
not one that required a great deal of managerial time and effort.
Many of the production processes had been perfected in the United States, 
much of the machinery was imported from America along with many of the 
specialised semi-finished chemicals. Their only real problems, they 
claimed, were with the British suppliers who allegedly found it 
impossible to deliver to time. The company regarded itself as 
basically a marketing company, energetically selling its products to the 
Health Service via General practitioners and hospitals, as well as 
selling patent medicines to wholesale and retail outlets.
The printing machinery manufacturers presented a rather 
different case. The production of such machinery, 'and indeed the 
printing machinery itself, is very complex. These firms are examples, 
in Perrow*s terms, of companies where there are many exceptions in the
manufacturing process, no machine is ever quite like any other, as they
are made to a customer’sspecial order, but the search procedures i.e.
the procedures lor satisfying the customers’ requirements, and cons.tr-
(27)
ucting the machine are relatively routine. This categorization is
more useful than Woodward’s classification of the firms as being in the 
small batch and unit production category, because it is more informative. 
According to Woodward’s Uresis, tire dominant function in these firms 
should be research and development, and indeed this was the unanimous 
answer from both the American and the British firms. Both firms 
however, had high scores on the Aston formalization index, both were 
quite highly specialised, (see table 5.14, p.195 ). The organisational 
climate measures showed that the American .firm was felt to be more open 
and flexible, more organically organised, whilst the British firm was 
felt to be rather bureaucratized. This data indicates perhaps the 
fact that the American firm had adapted much more quickly to the 
changes which had revolutionized the industry. Up until about ten years 
ago the industry had been a relatively stable one, and the demand for 
printing machinery bouyant. The British firm concentrated upon 
production, perfecting its production techniques in the spirit of 
craftsmanship that ran deep in the industry. Its sturdy well made 
machines sold well and were backed up by a service department which the 
firm regarded as being crucial to its success. The American firm 
found itself in a similar position, priding itself on its production 
and service functions. It was the necessity to provide service 
facilities that persuaded the company to set up in Britain in the first 
place. It may well be that, the American firm placed a greater 
emphasis upon the selling of its machines than the British company, 
certainly I interviewed managers in the British company who said that in 
the ’old days’ good machinery ’sold itself’, but it is difficult to be 
certain that this difference existed. ’What is certain is that both 
firms were overtaken by advances in technology, particularly computer 
and photo-typesetting, that, were largely not of their making, and their 
market had been severely damaged. There was still printing machinery 
that needed servicing, there were still smaller printers who demanded 
their products, but the new processes were dominant elsewhere. The 
firms had reacted by channelling enormous resources into research and 
development, attempting to retain their respective positions in the 
market by diversifying into the new technology. Organisational 
structure, like social structure, does not automatically adapt itself 
to pressures from the external environment however. The new importance 
of research and development had certainly not manifested itself in the
organisational structure of the British firm. On the other hand, 
there was not much evidence to indicate that the organisational structure 
of the American firm had changed much either, it had always been a rather 
more flexible organisation. Indeed, there were signs that the American 
organisation, following poor results, was becoming more formalized, as 
pressure was exerted by the American parent for a general tightening up 
of its operations. The American company was also reacting to its 
situation by adopting very agressive and competitive selling techniques. 
This was being managed not by retraining old personnel, but by recruit­
ing new salesmen. It was clear from the management interviews that this 
new policy was resented by some of the older managers as being somehow 
inappropriate for such an industry.
The companies in the furniture industry present clearcut 
differences between the British and American situation. In the British 
company the emphasis was upon design and quality production, indeed the 
company had won awards for its innovations in both areas. The company 
had originally made its name in producing furniture in the craftsman 
tradition, and the ethos of the firm was still one where the artistic 
quality of the product was regarded as of supreme importance. In the 
American firm the accent was upon profitability at all costs, and 
craftsmanship was regarded as a rather outmoded concept, appropriate 
only for rather backward industries. The American firm saw its success 
as being based upon an efficient production system, which was in parts 
highly mechanised, and by successful marketing techniques. The 
company heavily advertised its own brand name and certain distinctive 
features of its products in an attempt to distinguish it from its 
competitors. Whereas the British firm regarded its crucial function 
as its design capability, and to a lesser extent its production 
expertise in producing high quality products, the American firm took 
production for granted and believed that its success was due to the 
efficiency of its marketing department.
The electronics industry comparison represents a different 
world to that of furniture. All three firms were engaged in selling 
their products to other companies, and so product marketing was a 
different sort of exercise to the one found in the consumer industries. 
U.S. Electronics I regarded production as the most important function 
in the firm. Its products were not quite so sophisticated as the 
other two companies in this sector, and much of its output went to 
public corporations. The company therefore competed on price and 
reliability, i.e. its ability to meet consistently stringent require­
ments from other businesses. The firm competed therefore by having
an efficient workflow organisation. The stress upon production should 
have led, according to Woodward, to a more bureaucratic structure.
The organisational structure of this firm demonstrated very well 1 
believe, many of the difficulties that researchers are likely to 
encounter with the concept of bureaucratization. In some respects the 
firm was not particularly bureaucratic, for example table 5.8 shows the 
firm to have the lowest formalization index of all the finns in the 
sample, despite its being the second largest organisation. On the 
other hand, its decision making was relatively highly centralised and 
it had a high score of functional specialization (see table 5.14). 
Finally, the relevant scales of the organisational climate index, 
showed that top management was seen to be rather more remote than in 
the other two firms in the industry (see table 7.1, Ch. 7 p.284 ). I 
think part of the explanation of this pattern lies in the following set 
of circumstances. Firstly, I have already shown that U.S. Electronics 1 
was not tightly controlJed by its American parent company, and this 
resulted in relatively low formalization scores as measured by the 
Aston index. It also meant that the firm was relatively anglicized 
in terms of its organisational ethos, i.e. it did not possess the 
informality and employee centredness that was characteristic of many of 
the American firms in the sample. One of the reasons for the lack of 
control from the American parent was the fact that the subsidiary was 
eminently successful, the average return on assets for the years 1955- 
1967 was 28%, this meant that there were no particular business reasons 
to interfere with the running of the company, which was clearly doing 
well. This led to a lack of bureaucratization in some areas, e.g. 
formal controls and, if it is accepted that-nationality is part at 
least of the explanation for organisational informality and employee 
centredness, to greater bureaucratization in other areas, e.g. high 
centralisation of decision making. The other two firms in the industry 
were involved in making rather more sophisticated control equipment for 
other companies. Despite the relatively sophisticated nature of their 
products, the basic production process lor both companies was that of 
mass production, in that basic control equipment was built for stock in 
very large numbers, and then additional more specialised pieces were 
added to suit the requirements of individual customers. Both 
companies regarded production as of central importance with research 
and development very close behind. This is perhaps reflected in the 
relatively high formalization score for both companies on the Aston 
index, although neither firm could really be called bureaucratic.
finally we come to the firms in the consumer products field. 
Although it was clear that, both finns placed considerable emphasis 
upon production as Woodward predicted, the perfecting of high volume 
competitively priced products being essential to both firms, yet it 
was also clear, particularly in the American firm, that marketing was of 
supreme importance. This was accentuated by the fact that U.S.
Consumer marketed some of the products of its parent .’firm that were not 
actually manufactured in Britain. The American finn advertised very 
heavily, traded on its brand name and attempted to build up brand 
loyalty. The British finn relied more on the price and quality of 
its products, more a function of its production department.
In conclusion it was found that Woodward’s thesis that 
production was the crucial department under mass production technology 
was quite strongly supported in the case of the British finns Studied, 
but not so for the American firms. In two clear cases, furniture and 
pharmaceuticals, marketing was thought by the firms themselves to be 
more important, and in a third case, consumer products, there was a 
marginal difference in the same general direction. In the one case of 
small batch production, in the printing machinery industry, both firms 
regarded research and development as crucial although this had not 
always been so, and there were signs that the American firm was begin­
ning to stress marketing more. These general findings fit in well 
with the data gathered from the American Executive sample. For example 
it is instructive to compare the responses of the Managing Director and 
other managers in G.B. Furniture, a firm working in an industry where 
artistic considerations might be thought to play some part, with those 
American executives working in similarly placed industries, (Records, 
Publishing and Film Products). All three of these latter respondents 
played down the importance of artistic considerations and stressed 
instead the commercial aspects of their firms. 'The Managing Director 
of the Film Products company for example, poured scorn on the alleged 
cultural concerns of the B.B.C., and suggested that it was such 
’unbusiness-like considerations’ that were at the root of its problems, 
which he described as bureaucracy, inefficiency and being ’arse-hole 
deep in people’. The Head of the American publishing company 
reluctantly agreed that literary considerations got pretty short shrift 
from his company, because of the demands from the American parent for 
profits. Finally, the record industry executive argued that economics 
and the law were the only two considerations that applied in his line 
of business, he could not afford to be interested in arguments about 
the artistic quality or otherwise of his products.
In Chapter 3 I attempted to show how the nature of the
Anerican stratification system led to a more homogenous population and
fostered the development of marketing as a crucial function in American
business, whilst Britain concentrated much more on producing for
specialised markets. There is considerable secondary evidence to
support the view that I have put forward that America possesses her
greatest comparative advantage in this area. Several of the respondents
in the American manager sample retold a story that has evidently become
part of the Anglo-American marketing folklore, about the American
salesman who went to Africa to sell shoes. A British salesman went
there too. When the British salesman arrived he immediately sent a
telegram back to his company which,read, ’Coming back at once. Nobody
wears shoes here*. The American sent a telegram saying, ’Send two
million shoes. Nobody wears shoes here1. As early as 1880 the
effects of this American marketing ability were being felt in the
pharmaceutical industry. Wilkins (1970) reports that Burroughs,
Wellcome and Company, ’’adopted aggressive sales techniques, making
personal calls on doctors and handing out samples (they were the first
to do this in the U.K.). They advertised extensively in the medical
and trade journals and with ten to twenty page adverts, instead of the
(28)
typical one page advert". 1 Kindleberger (1969) points out that it
was marketing skill that brought one of the earliest types of Anerican
investment, life insurance, to Europe. Turning to the Anglo-Anerican
Council on Productivity reports made after the Second World War, one
notes there that they frequently mentioned the "great accent on sales-
(29)manship and selling" to be found in the United States. Thomas
(1969) describes some of the leading American companies operating in 
Britain as ’Britain’s first business schools’, noting in particular 
the importance of companies like Proctoi and Gamble, and Mars in the 
field of marketing and sales training. The most impressive evidence 
however, is provided by financial results. Forbes magazine in the 
United States published a list of the top ten companies in Anerica 
judged by the business community’s own, very largely financial values.
The companies were, Avon Products, Coca-Cola, Sperry and Hutchinson, 
Heublcin, Eastman Kodak, Polaroid, Merck, Anerican Home, Magnavox and 
Xerox. Forbes magazine made the following comments: "i'hese companies
are not, generally speaking, highly diversified. They have attempted 
to stick to one line of business and to become masters at it....and 
perhaps most significantly, nearly all are what could be called 
Consumerists. That is, with two exceptions, Xerox and Merck, they 
deal mostly with the public. They are the master marketeers of our 
jtime.(30)(my emphasis). Finally Dunning (1969) notes that within
Britain, American firms achieve a considerably higher rate of profit . 
in consumer goods than, in capital goods industries.
It would seem that British firms have, in general, been slow 
to adapt to new situations. Early British expertise was in production, 
and the highly stratified horn market did not encourage marketing 
techniques. Although the characteristics of the market undoubtedly 
changed during the early decades of the twentieth century, in terms 
of it becoming less heterogeneous, other features, like the existence 
of cartels and the predominance of an essentially sellers market 
still dominated Europe. The established markets yielded relatively 
high profit margins and were capable of continued growth. Under these 
conditions marketing remained in Britain very largely the province of 
the very senior company executives, who acted in the tradition of the 
merchant traders, making alliances for marketing purposes with other 
traders, and whose main skills lay in their capacity to outbargain and 
outmanoeuvre other businesses. America, wedded more strongly to the 
capitalist ethic, ensured that its borne market was more competitive, at 
least in principle, by its Anti-Monopoly policy, One consequence of 
this difference was that in America the merchant trader practices that 
passed for marketing in England became very dangerous, and were there­
fore largely superceded by a more rigorous approach. The approach 
stressed market research, sales forecasting and a thorough training of 
the sales workforce. I have already shown that these techniques were 
more prominent in the American firms in the sample than in the 
comparable British firms. Although the post-war sellers market has 
disappeared and more anti-monopoly legislation has followed in Britain, 
the 1966 l’.E.P. report on British industry could still report that
much of British industry was still dominated by the production side of
.. . . (31)the business.
I have argued above, on the basis of my own and other data, 
that part at least of the alleged American superiority in terms of 
economic performance can be seen to lie in■ the field of marketing. A 
more traditional approach has been to argue that the ’gap’ was a 
technological one, that American firms competed on the basis of superior 
research and development, and technology. It could well be, of course, 
that the two are related; heavy research investment requires extensive 
marketing of the final products to recoup the initial expenditure. An 
attempt was made to test the hypothesis that the American firms in the 
sample were utilizing superior technology in the manufacture of very 
similar products. In order to test this hypothesis it was necessary 
to use a relatively sensitive measure of technological sophistication,
as it was felt unlikely that there would exist very great differences 
between the two groups of firms. An appropriate measure appeared to 
be the measure developed by the Aston researchers from Amber and Amber’s 
(1962) ’Yardstick for Automation’ (the scale is contained in the Organis­
ational Structure Schedule, Appendix 2). The scale attempted to do two 
things: Firstly, it attempted to measure how sophisticated the mass of
the company’s equipment was (the measure used was the mode); secondly, 
it attempted to assess how sophisticated the single most sophisticated 
piece of the equipment used in the company’s workflow was. The results 
of these two measures are presented in tables 5.9 and 5.10 below.
Table 5.9. Automacity of Production Technology of British & American Firms.
Mode Score: Main Sample.
Mode Score Mode Score
U.S.Pharmaceuticals 1 C.B.Pharmaceuticals 2
U.S.Print 1 Cl. p, .Print 2
U.S.Furniture 1 G-.B. Furniture 1
U.S.Electronics I 2 G.B.Electronics 1
U.S.Electronics II 2
U.S.Consumer 4 G.B.Consumer 1
Table 5.10. Automacity of Production Technology of British & Anerican Firms. 
Measure of Most Sophisticated Single Item: Main Sample.
Score Score
U.S.Pharmaceuticals 2 G.B.Pharmaceuticals 4
U.S.Print 4 G.B.Print 4
U.S.Furniture 3 G.b .Furniture 2
U.S.Electronics I 3 G.B.Electronics 1
U.S.Electronics II 4
U.S.Consumer 4 G.B.Consumer 3
Scoring Key for Tables 5.9 and 5.10.
Hand tools and manual machines: 0
Powered machines and tools: 1
Single-cycle automatic and self-feeding machines: 2
Automatic: repeats cycle: 3
Self-measuring and adjusting: feedback: 4
Computer control: automatic cognition: 5
The results from these two measures do not give unqualified support to 
the hypothesis. If one considers the modal scores presented in table 5.9, 
then in two industries, pharmaceuticals and printing machinery, the
British firms would appear to be using a more sophisticated technology 
overall. Only in the electronics and consumer products fields did the 
Americans possess what appears to be a technological advantage.
Table 5.10 appears to give rather more support for the hypothesis in that 
only in the pharmaceutical industry does the British firm appear to have 
a technological lead. In order to make an overall judgement however, 
individual consideration must be given to each of the cases in turn.
The American pharmaceutical company, it was Clear, was not 
competing on the basis of advanced production technology. Its main 
advantage lay in two areas, one of which, marketing, I have already 
discussed. Its other advantage was to be found in the nature of its 
products, sophisticated pharmaceutical chemicals that were' the end result 
of an intensive research and development effort, largely carried out by 
the parent company in the United States. These chemicals were, by and 
large, not difficult to produce (many of the more sophisticated inter­
mediate chemicals were anyway imported from the parent company) so that 
the company did not require a sophisticated production department.
Hie company’s products were very largely covered by patents. The 
British company, by contrast, could not afford a very large research and 
development effort, and instead it competed in a narrow range of 
chemicals, very few of which carried any patents. Its competitive edge 
depended very much on the efficiency of its.production department, and 
this is reflected in its higher score on the technology index.
In the printing machinery comparison, both firms competed on 
the basis of their technology and the abilities of their production and 
service departments. The American firm did not import any technology 
from the United States, all the research and development being performed 
in this country (the parent company was not directly involved in this 
business in the United States). As the American firm did not have any 
technological advantage over its British counterpart, indeed the index 
indicates that it was slightly inferior in this respect, it was, as 1 
have already shown, turning to aggressive marketing, where it believed 
it did have a comparative advantage.
In the three other industries that were investigated there was 
some evidence to suggest that the American finns were competing with 
more advanced technology than their British counterparts; this was 
conspicuously the case in the area with the greatest research and develop­
ment input, the electronics industry. Even in the furniture industry 
however, not an industry noted for its technological innovations, the 
Anerican company did possess two very sophisticated pieces of equipment,
one for producing felt and the other for covering the upholstery 
springs with felt. Both machines were made by 'the American parent 
and had world patents.
It should.not be surprising to find that there are a number 
of cases where American production technology does not appear to be 
Superior to the British. Firstly, as I have already shown, the 
American comparative advantage can lie in areas other than superior 
technology/research and development, e.g. it can lie in marketing 
expertise. An examination of American direct investment in the British 
economy (cf. Dunning (1969), (1970)and (undated)) shows that American 
finns are heavily concentrated in two sectors of the economy. Firstly, 
they are in the science based, research intensive industries, supplying 
both producers’ and consumers’ goods. In this sector one might 
expect to find an American technological lead. The Anerican firms 
are also concentrated in industries supplying consumer products, often 
first developed in the United States, which have a high income 
elasticity of demand. These firms tend to concentrate on marketing, 
and one should not necessarily expect to find an American technological 
lead. Even in the first category of companies, the science based 
concerns, one would not necessarily expect to find an American lead in 
production technology. Much of the American technological innovation 
is manifested in the products themselves, not necessarily in their 
production. Furthermore, although it can be shown that American 
companies spend proportionately more than comparable British companies
(32)
on research and development in the United Kingdom, there is still
evidence to suggest that American firms spend only a tiny percentage
of their research and development budget in their European subsidiaries,
(2
and this is primarily used to monitor European research and development.c 
By and large American finns prefer to carry out their research in the 
United States, where centralised laboratory facilities and the supply 
of research workers interested in applied work is much greater.
These observations would appear to fit the data produced by 
this research quite well. Thus in U.S. Pharmaceuticals and U.S. 
Electronics II, and to a lesser extent in U.S. Electronics I, much of 
the basic research was carried out by the Anerican parent company, there 
was very little research being done in the British subsidiaries. The 
Anerican pharmaceutical company, as I have shown, actually concentrated 
upon marketing, not research; successful marketing was needed to 
recoup the expensive overheads initially incurred in the development 
stage. The large and relatively stable national health service market
was an obvious attraction lor such a company. U.S. Consumer 
represented an example of a company selling products which had been 
developed first in America lor the high income consumer market. As 
Europe in general has approximated to the American consumer pattern, 
such firms, now with substantial experience in producing and marketing 
such products, moved to exploit the market. Emphasis is placed on 
trade names and trade marks in the selling process and the greatest 
effort made in the area of marketing. Research and development for 
these companies is not concentrated, as it is for the electronics and 
pharmaceutical companies, in technological breakthroughs, rather it 
concentrates on ’finding' new universal human needs and desires and on 
better ways of satisfying existing ones - it is as much related to 
marketing as it is to production.
The last area of company structure and policy that was invest­
igated, to compare the response of British and American firms, wais that 
of industrial relations. Two main hypotheses were derived from the 
comparative historical analysis in Chapter 3. Firstly, it was hypo­
thesised that the American firms would be less likely to be members of 
the relevant employers’ association, preferring the greater flexibility 
offered by company agreements, which anyway would reflect American 
practice. Secondly, it was hypothesised that American firms would 
exhibit a tendency not to recognise trade unions, particularly white 
collar trade unions, as bargaining agents.
This area of company policy proved to be the most difficult 
area to investigate, managers in both groups of companies generally 
exhibiting particular reluctance to talk about trade union matters in 
anything but the broadest and vaguest of terms. I believe that one of 
the reasons for this sensitivity was the fact that many of the interviews 
took place during the miners’ strike/overtime ban of 1973/4. Certainly 
I think this fact influenced the responses of the American executives, 
who unfailingly seized upon the English industrial relations system as 
a major cause of England’s economic problems. When this group was 
questioned about how the working, or lack of working, of the system had 
actually affected their company, only two executives could produce any 
evidence at all, and that seemed to the researcher to be largely 
trivial. Once again perhaps one can see how certain ideas about the 
differences between Britain and American have gained popular currency 
and have influenced people’s judgements, despite the fact that they do 
not have any experience themselves to support the propositions they are 
advancing.
The data presented in tables5.11 to 5.13 below do not appear 
to indicate any systematic differences in industrial relations 
practices between the two groups of firms.
Table 5.11. Membership of Employers’ Federations, British & American Firms•
Main Sample.
Members
U.S.Pharmaceuticals Yes G.B. Pharmaceuticals
U.S.Print Yes G.B. Print
U.S.Furniture Yes G.B.Furniture
U.S.Electronics I No G.B-. Electronics
U.S.Electronics II No
U.S.Consumer No G.B. Consumer
Table 5.12. Recognition of Blue Collar Unions as Bargaining Agents, 
British & American Firms: Main Sample.
Recognition Recognition
U.S.Pharmaceuticals Yes G.B.Pharmaceu ticals Yes
U.S.Print Yes G.B.Print Yes
U.S.Furniture Yes G.B.Furniture Yes
U.S.Electronics I Yes G.B.Electronics No
U.S.Electronics II No
U.S.Consumer No G.B.Consumer No
Table 5.13. Recognition of White Collar Unions and Bargaining Agents,
British & American Firms: Main Sample.
Recognition Recognition
U.S.Pharmaceuticals Yes G.B.Pharmaceuticals Yes
U.S.Print Yes G.B.Print Yes
U.S.Furniture No G.B.Furniture No
U.S.Electronics I No G.B.Electronics No
U.S.Electronics II No
U.S.'Consumer No G.B.Consumer No
The main explanatory variable would appear to be the industry in which 
the firm was located. The interview data broadly supported this 
interpretation, although iV did become clear that U.S.Electronics II 
and U.S.Consumer certainly did not encourage unionisation. Both firms 
claimed that their employees would gain no advantages from union member­
ship, because the conditions of service, pay and fringe benefits 
offered in the company were already well above the average for their
Members
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
i n d u s t r i e s . T h e  other-firms who did not recognise trade unions as 
bargaining agents, declared that the unions had never bothered to make 
an approach, but there would be no objection if they did. The only 
hostility to trade unions that was encountered came from the U.S. 
executive sample, and I have already commented on this in Chapter 4.
The main reason offered by companies for not joining the relevant 
employers' federation was that they preferred to negotiate their own 
agreements with employees, or that they could see very few benefits in 
joining.
There is not much evidence to suggest that industrial relations
policies and practices are directly a function of contextual variables
like location, technology or products, although size is probably
important. If this is correct then it follows that this particular
sample design has no particular merits when it comes to examining
industrial relations practices, yet it has all the disadvantages of being
very small. Fortunately there exists a study by Steur and Gennard
(1971), which investigated the industrial relations practices of foreign
owned firms in the United Kingdom, and which can be used to supplement
the data in this study. Although not all the firms in their sample
were American owned, it was clear that the great majority were. The
authors noted that there was a tendency for foreign firms to prefer the
autonomy of company bargaining, and they cited a large number of
American firms which had left their respective employers' federation to
bargain separately. This was by no means a universal practice however,
and seemed to vary quite widely from industry to industry. They went
on to analyse the frequently made claim that "some American owned firms
are anti-union and have refused to recognise British trade unions", and
although they had no difficulty in finding cases where this was
unquestionably true they generally found themselves in agreement with the
T.U.C.'s own findings, and suggested that, "The general conclusion is
that non-recognition of manual worker trade unions by foreign owned
(35)
firms is no worse than amongst domestic firms". They declared
that the problem seemed larger than it was, because much more publicity 
tended to be given to foreign firms that got involved in recognition 
disputes, e.g. Kodak, Mars, Heinz and Roberts-Arundel. There was some 
evidence to suggest that American firms were very reluctant to admit 
white collar unions into the firm, indeed the Association of Scientific, 
Technical and Managerial Staff complained on this very point to the 
Royal Commission on the Trade Unions ("1-968), but again Steur and 
Gennard wondered if such antipathy was really any greater than amongst 
domestic firms. Finally, oh the question of industrial disputes they 
concluded, from the data presented, that "foreign subsidiaries are less
/ \
subject to strikes than the domestic firms". 'they also noted
th a t  th e  p a t te rn  o f  s t r ik e s  appeared to  d i f f e r ,  "The com parison
suggests that the very big and very small strikes are more important
in the domestic total. The foreign owned firms are given to nice
(38)
(sic), medium-sized disputes". This finding may well suggest
differences in the personnel policies and industrial relations 
procedures of the American Companies. In particular one might suggest 
that the tendency to have' company agreements, rather than industry 
agreements would tend to mean that the procedure for settling disputes 
was much more streamlined and manageable, thus helping to cut out small 
stoppages. Similarly, the higher capitalisation of American firms may 
have led them to be wary of long drawn out stoppages, which halted expen­
sive capital equipment. At the same time, because of their low ratio 
of labour costs to capital costs, they would be in a better position to 
’buy their way out of trouble’.
This chapter has reported on the organisational structure and 
process of the matched sample of British and American firms. A number 
of differences between the two populations were established. Firstly, 
the American firms possessed in general a much greater range of 
managerial techniques for controlling the affairs of the organisation; 
to use a rather old fashioned phrase, there was more ’scientific 
management’ in these organisations. Secondly, the American firms tended 
to offset the effects of this potentially bureaucratizing organisational 
feature with a much more informal managerial style, which was even 
found reflected in the design and layout of the buildings. Thirdly, 
there was some evidence to suggest that the American firms regarded 
marketing as a rather more important function than the British firms, 
which were more inclined to concentrate upon production. All of these 
differences can be related to differences in the socio-cultural environ­
ment, past and present, of British and American societies, but to talk 
of causation would clearly be simplistic. Capitalism in both societies 
has been mediated through the web of social structure and the end result 
has clearly been rattier different in the two societies. Some of these 
differences are reflected in the comparison of the British and American 
manufacturing organisations.
Table 5.14. Organisational Structure of British and American Finns:
' Functional Specialization,
Score Score
U.S. Pharmaceuticals 9 G.B. Pharmaceuticals 8
U.S. Print 15 G.B. Print 16
U.S. Furniture 8 G.B. Furniture 3
U.S. Electronics I 15 G.B. Electronics 10
U.S. Electronics II 16
U.S. Consumer 13 G.B. Consumer 12
For Scale details see p.329 Appendix 2. A high score denotes greater 
Functional specialization. Possible range: 0-16.
Table 5.1,5.- Organisational Autonomy: British and American Finns.
Score Score
U.S. Pharmaceuticals 17 G.B. Pharmaceuticals 23
U.S. Print 19 G.B. Print 23
U.S. Furniture 16 G.B. Furniture 23
U.S. Electronics I 21 G.B. Electronics 21
U.S. Electronics II 17
U.S. Consumer 16 G.B. Consumer 23
For scale details see p.329 Appendix 2. A high score denotes greater 
autonomy in decision making. Possible range: 0-23.
Table 5.16. Product moment correlations of Elements of Context with
Structural Variables on British and American Manufacturing 
Organisations Operating in Britain.
Size of Organisation0 Formalization Specialization Autonomy
U.S. -0.28 0.64 0.24
U.B. 0.19 0.66 0.07
U.S. + G.B. -0.17 0.70* -0.29
Size of Parent0 
Organisation
U.S. -0.16 0.59 0.39
G.B. 0.88* 0.41 -0.92*
U.S. + G.B. 0.29 0.54+ -0.64*
Dependence
U.S. 0.36 -0.26 -0.02
G.B. -0.87+ -0.11 -0.87+
U.S. + G.B. -0.13 0.09 -0.60+
Operations
Technology
U.S. -0.21 0.34 -0.25
G.B. 0.22 0.58 0.61
U.S. + G.B. -0.15 0.51 -0.27
o : Logarithm of number of employees.
+ : Significant at the 10^ 6 level.
* : Significant at the 5% level.
NOTES
1. Full details of the organisational climate index are given in 
Chapter 6. When the instrument was piloted, respondents from 
firms with more than 5000 employees found themselves incapable 
of giving meaningful answers to questions about the climate of 
their organisations.
2. There seems general agreement now that size is a crucial variable 
(cf. Child (1972)). I think there is also considerable evidence 
to show that the industry that a firm is in also makes a difference 
(cf. Ellis and Child (1973)), unfortunately very few studies manage 
to match this variable adequately.
3. Pugh et al. (1969), Inkson et al. (1970).
4. Several writers have argued that American firms operating abroad 
are by definition amongst the most progressive of the total 
population of American firms (Dunning (1969), Kindleberger (1969)). 
Furthermore, it would appear to be a reasonable assumption that 
those companies which respond to research requests are by definition 
more progressive.
5. Kingston (1971).
6. British ^Institute of Management (1970).
7. In some companies these two stages were collapsed into one. The 
most usual office holders present were the company secretary and 
the personnel officer, although for some companies the Managing 
Director or his deputy attended.
8. The Aston schedules used were based on those developed by Pugh et al. 
(1968, 1969) and abbreviated by Inkson et al. (1970).
9. Hall (1972) p.196.
10. The organisational climate index does not possess a scale to measure, 
directly hovv fonnal the organisation felt to the respondents, but 
the psychological distance scale and the employee involvement scale 
both provided some indication of how formal and bureaucratic the 
organisations actually felt.
11. Kingston (1971).
12. As much research into the mass media has shown, journalists and 
others always give precedence to individual explanations of events 
rather than structural explanations. For a classic demonstration 
of this see Halloran et al. (1970).
13. Wilson (1954) p.44.
14. Wilkins and Hill (1964) p.70.
15. It could be argued that although the firm might be losing certain
economies of scale by deliberately keeping manufacturing unit size 
down, it might have gained certain economic advantages by securing 
greater loyalty from the work force etc.
16. ± am referring here to the work of Burns and Stalker (1961),
Woodward (1965) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). In contrast 
however, one might note the findings of Aiken and Ilage (1971), 
who failed to establish a correlation between formalization and 
innovation, although their sample was of health, education and 
welfare organisations. It should be noted that I have defined
formalization in a rather different way to many researchers, and
on my conceptualization it is certainly possible to be organically 
organised and yet highly formalised.
17. Marris (1974) p.240.
18. Political and Economic Planning (1966).
19. Bernstein (1967) has developed a very similar argument for the
connection between school architecture and educational ideologies, 
drawing upon the distinction made by Durkheim between organic and 
mechanical solidarity. The article is informatively entitled 
’Open Schools, Open Society?’
20. Gouldner (1954) p.219.
21. It should be noted that Management by Objectives in fact requires
that formalized job descriptions and targets be drawn up and put 
in writing.
22. Note these two quotations from leading practitioners: "Managers
with the best records of performance in American business and 
government are in the process of pointing the way to an apparently 
more effective system of management than now exists". Likert
(1961) p.1.
"To organise people for work as if they are ’mentally healthy’ 
adults seeking self-actualization is, in the long run and given 
certain qualifications the path to success of any kind, whatsoever, 
including financial success". Maslow (1965) p.41.
23. Quoted.in Kumar (1973) >
24. Sunday Times 22.3.1970. Quoted in Stopfqrd (1972) p.86.
25. The Aston researchers have convincingly shown that "structural 
variables will be associated with operations technology only 
where they are centred on the workflow11 (Hickson et al. (1969)).
It would follow from this that smaller manufacturing organisations 
should be more susceptible to these effects than larger ones.
Indeed the Aston researchers have gone on to suggest that the 
reason why Woodward found an association between technology
and structure was that she examined relatively small firms.
26. It might be argued from the following description that the two
companies were not exactly matched for their products, and there­
fore that It was not a fair comparison. This criticism has a 
certain justification, even though the products of the two firms 
were very similar.
27. Perrow (1970) Ch. 3.
28. Wilkins (1970) p.60.
29. Hutton (1953) p.47.
30. Quoted in Bower, J.Ii. ’On the Amoral Organisation’, in Marris (1974)
31. Political and Economic Planning (1966) p.187.
32. Gruba, Mehta and Vernon (1967)
33. Stanford Research Institute (1963), Quoted in Dunning (1970).
34. It was not possible to check the accuracy of these particular 
assertions. Some general evidence about relative pay and 
conditions is presented in the text.
35. Steur and Gennard (1971) p.97.
36. Donnovan (1968). Minutes of Evidence No.53.
37. Steur and Gennard (1971) p.125.
38. Steur and Gennard (1971) p.125.
CHAPTER 6.
British and American Manufacturing Organisations: 
The Managers.
In the last chapter the organisational structures of the 
British and American manufacturing organisations were compared along 
with certain aspects of the actual working of the respective companies.
An organisation is defined not only by its products and structure 
however, it is also defined by the people who create and work that 
structure - the management personnel. This chapter reports on the 
profiles of the managers employed by the two groups of companies.
There were several reasons for concentrating on the managers rather 
than the blue collar employees. Firstly, it was felt that the 
characteristics of the population of blue collar Workers were more 
likely to be ’determined’ by such factors as local labour market 
conditions, production technology etc., rather than by the operation 
of certain specific selection policies, which would hopefully reflect 
the basic goals and philosophy of the company. Secondly, it was clear 
that the research could not hope to obtain a clear grasp of the 
structures of the different companies without talking to the managers 
who had to operate those structures. -Finally,' there exists a 
considerable literature on the sorts of differences that one would 
expect to find between British and American managers and comparatively 
little on blue collar workers. In short, it seemed likely that part 
of the difference between British and American companies might be 
expected to lie in the fact that the two groups of companies selected 
different types of people to manage the companies’ affairs.
The information on company managers was collected in a 
number of ways. During the initial interview with the company it was 
explained that it was planned to collect certain information on the 
company's managers as well as its organisational structure. This was 
to be done-by distributing a questionnaire to as many managers in the 
company as possible. (The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2).
The questionnaire contained a number of factual questions about age, 
qualifications, social origins etc., as well as a number of open-ended 
questions about occupational choice, views about business etc. It also 
contained the organisational climate index which is discussed in 
Chapter 7. The questionnaire also asked for Uie manager’s name, and 
it was explained that this was because it’was planned to interview a 
sub-sample of managerial respondents. These subsequent interviews, 
which took place at either the respondent1s office or home, depending 
on convenience, attempted to elicit more general information about 
them and their organisation. The interviews lasted for between 45 mins. 
and two hours, with the average being about one hour. Full details of 
the manager sample are given in tables 6.1 and 6.2 below.
Table 6.1. American Firms; Number .of Usable-Management Questionnaires
Returned;, and Number of Managers Interviewed per Firm.
No. of 
Managers 
in Company,
No. of Usable
Questionnaires’
Returned.
No. of
Interviews
Conducted.
% of Managers 
on which data 
CollectecHCol.2
as % of Cq I^.lJ.
U.S.Pharmaceuticals 104. 51 12 49
U.S.Print do 18 8 45
U.S.Furniture 11 10 5 91
U.S.Electronics I 200 20 10 10
U.S.Electronics II 90 20 9 22
U.S.Consumer 180 2G 10 14
Total G25 145 54 23
Table 6.2. British Firms: Number of Usable '.Management Questionnaires
Returned, and Number of Managers Interviewed per Firm.
k!»
1 No. of 
Managers 
in Company
No. of Usable 
Questionnaires 
. Returned.
No. of
Interviews
Conducted.
of Managers 
on which data 
Collected (Col.2
as %  of Col. 1.1
G.B.Pharmaceuticals 56 26 10 46
G.B.Print 145 15 8 10
G. IV. Furniture 25 8 4 32
G.B.Electronics 25 12 • 8 48
G. P..Consumer 222 17 9 8 .
Total 473 78 39 16
Several comments need to be made on these tables. Firstly, only two
companies, U.S. Pharmaceuticals ;and G.B. Furniture offered to» distribute
the questionnaire to every manager, the other companies said that they
would distribute the questionnaire only to a proportion of their 
managers. The reasons given for this decision varied from, administra­
tive convenience, managerial overwork, through to a mini lecture on the 
virtues of sampling. The distribution of the questionnaire was left 
to the key informants, and in the case of those companies which were 
sampled, great emphasis was placed by the researcher on the importance 
of getting an adequate representation of different functional areas and 
authority levels. The completed questionnaires were returned directly 
to me in the stamped addressed envelope that wqs provided. It is 
impossible to know whether the resultant samples were truly representative
of the management of the companies. As a consequence of this 
methodology it is not even possible to calculate a response rate, 
because there was no way of knowing just how many questionnaires were 
ultimately distributed. The second comment that needs to be made about
tables 6.1 and 6.2 is that the total population of managers in the
respective companies is an estimate, and as a consequence of this, so
is the calculation of the percentage of managers on whom data was
collected. It was quite clear from the research that the firms
operated with different definitions of management. Somebody who would 
be classified as being a manager in one firm would not perhaps'qualify 
in another. Previous research on managers had shown this definitional 
problem to be a formidable one. McGivering et al. (1960) appear to be 
the only British researchers who operated with any form of definition.
They distinguished between ’’general or administrative or ’line1 manage­
ment.... that is, management proper as distinct from specialists within 
management ranks who predominantly may be concerned with the provision 
of an expert service rather than with the discharge of managerial 
functions as such".^ It is perhaps interesting to note that these 
writers did not actually do any primary research on managers as a group'. 
All the British empirical workers, Acton Society Trust (1956),
Clements (1958), Clark (1966), and Leggatt (1972) have accepted as 
managers those defined as such by the companies under investigation.
I have broadly followed this approach, asking the company to include 
’’Anybody who has authority in the organisation and who would be counted 
as part of management". This procedure almost certainly meant that
the populations of managers in the firms were not strictly comparable.
(2)
It seems likely from my own and other observations that the American
firms counted rather more personnel as managers than the British firms,
in particular the grade of supervisor or foreman was much more likely
(3)to be regarded as part of management.
In attempting to see whether American owned firms employed 
distinctively different persons as managers from their British counter­
parts, I adopted two strategies. Firstly, I asked a number of questions 
about the selection of managers in the various companies e.g. what 
sources were used in recruiting. What characteristics they were 
looking for etc. It was at this point that the rather loose definition 
of the term manager became a handicap, because it rapidly became clear 
that companies used different sources, and looked for different 
qualities, in different types of managers. It was found however, that 
if one excluded technical specialists, e.g. research chemists, as well
as sales managers, whom most companies regarded as being in a special
category, then it was possible for the persons responsible for 
manager selection to make a response that they regarded as reasonably 
accurate. Some sort of check on these responses was possible by 
adopting a second strategy. This involved looking at the character­
istics of the resultant population of managers. Ideally one would 
have liked to have compared those who were accepted as managers with 
those who were rejected, but such a longitudinal study was not 
possible.
In what follows I have attempted to test a wide range of 
hypotheses developed from the theoretical arguments expounded in 
Chapters 1 and 2 and informed by the historical analysis presented in 
Chapter 3. In brief the hypotheses which predict that ’American' 
managers would, on average, be younger, better qualified, have 
experienced a greater amount of inter and intra firm mobility, would 
be more likely to be female, would probably exhibit signs of being 
more ruthless or ’inner directed’, would work longer and harder and would 
in general exhibit a greater degree of commitment towards the business 
world, are closely examined. Towards the end of the chapter an attempt 
is made to draw all these different but related hypotheses together in 
a discussion about the’professionalism’ of management. As many writers 
have observed, one of the most common ways of distinguishing British 
from American management has been by reference to the concept of 
professionalism.
The first hypothesis to be tested was that the American firms 
would regard personnel selection and development as a rather more 
important function than the British films. The basis of this prediction 
was that firstly, traditional American iabour shortages had caused 
American companies to focus rather more attention upon labour product­
ivity than British firms. Furthermore, the hypothesised greater stress 
upon the values of capitalism on the part of such firms should have led 
them to concentrate upon making every area of the firm as efficient as 
possible, labour included. Finally, motivational theories of manage­
ment, management development programmes etc. are largely American 
artifacts. There was some evidence to support the hypothesis. In 
two places, printing machinery and consumer products, the American 
firms possessed a larger personnel department (size was expressed as 
the number of managers working in the department as a proportion of 
the total number of managers). There was no difference between the 
firms in the pharmaceutical comparison, and very little difference 
between the firms in the elctronics industry. Neither of the furniture
firms had separate personnel departments. These differences in size 
could not be accounted for by some of the personnel departments having 
responsibility for industrial relations matters and others not. It 
seems likely that the explanation lies in the fact that the American 
firms regarded the department with somewhat greater importance. It 
was certainly true, as I have already shown, that the American firms 
were more systematic in personnel selection, being more likely to draw 
up job descriptions and man specifications than the British firms. My 
re-analysis of the BIM study on management selection in Britain also 
revealed that, holding size of firm constant, American firms were more 
likely to spend more on the selection process; 66.7% of small U.S. 
firms (n=9) spent more than 10% of the annual starting salary of the 
prospective manager on recruiting-, as against only 45.8% (n=48) for 
British firms. The comparative figures for large firms were U.S.
61.5% (n=13), G.B. 56.8% (n=37). Although none of these differences 
are statistically significant, all the differences are in the predicted 
direction. The B.I.M. data also showed that American manufacturing 
firms were more likely to use a systematic interviewing technique in 
selection, e.g. the N.I.I.P.’s seven point plan or something similar. 
Apart from these indices of the greater importance of the personnel 
function in the American companies, there is some slight corroborative 
evidence from other studies. Roberts (1956) for example, points to 
the higher status of personnel managers, and the greater importance 
attached to personnel management in American industry. Such evidence 
does need to be treated with some caution however, my sample of 
American executives working in Britain were quick to point out to me 
several differences in the operating environment of the American firms 
in the United States, that could have accounted for such differences.
For example, the company bargaining structure of much of American 
collective bargaining, and the greater weight of legislation in the 
personnel area in America, as well as the large numberand complexity 
of fringe benefits offered by many American firms - all these Would 
tend (.o make the-personnel department of an American firm bigger and 
more important.
The second set of hypotheses about managerial personnel 
concern the criteria and methods of selection. Following my theoretical 
position .it was predicted that the American firms would use more 
achievement oriented and universalistic criteria in selection than the 
British firms. Stewart (1957) has suggested that American firms 
might place less emphasis on internal recruitment than British firms,
American firms preferring the best qualified man irrespective of whether 
he was currently inside the firm-or not. No differences were found
however, between the two groups of firms: All companies, with the 
exception of those in the consumer goods field, gave first preference 
to internal recruitment, and even in this sector it was given a very 
high preference by both companies. Newspaper advertisements were 
generally given second preference by companies, and most placed 
recruitment from the D.E.P. last, to be used only when all else had 
failed. Interesting and predictable differences occurred in the 
ranking of the importance given to personal introductions, and the use 
of selection consultants and executive searchers (headhunters) in the 
selection process. It was predicted that the British companies would 
be more inclined to use personal introductions, which stressed partic­
ularism and ascription rather than more universalistic sources, and 
this did indeed turn out to be the case. The-American companies ranked 
personal introductions 6.6 on a 1-9 scale where 1 denoted the most used 
and 9 the least used (for the exact question see the Organisational 
Structure Schedule, Appendix 2), whereas the mean rank for British 
companies was 4.2. The use of selection consultants and executive 
searchers might be thought of as utilizing the most achievement and 
universalistic oriented approaches, using as they must do, more objective 
measures. As predicted, the American firms were more inclined to use 
both sources: The mean rank order for the use of seLection consultants
was 3.16 and for executive searchers 5.6. The comparative British 
ranks were 5.0 and 7.2 respectively. These findings were reinforced 
by the re-analysed B.I.M. data, which showed that American firms of all 
sizes were more likely to use consultants in management selection 
(36.4% (n=22)) than British firms (22.4% n=85). The same data showed 
an even greater disparity when the question of the use of executive 
searchers was raised; only 3.2% (ns:7) of British manufacturing firms 
in the B.I.M. sample used them as against 41% (n=9) of American firms. 
This difference holds when size is held constant and is statistically 
significant (p<.001).
An attempt was made to determine what sorts of character­
istics were important to the company in management selection, and what 
characteristics were regarded as of little interest. This attempt was 
not altogether successful for a number of reasons. Firstly, with the 
exception of the furniture companies, up to three or four people were 
often involved in the selection process, and it was often not possible 
to see all of these people during the research. Even when this was
possible however, the selectors often found it difficult to be precise 
about the sorts of things they were looking for, and this was as true 
for the American firms, who tended to use more formalized methods, e.g. 
man specifications, as it was for the British firms. A considerable 
measure of disagreement was also often found amongst selectors about 
the qualities that were desirable in applicants. Finally, given the 
range of levels of management and the different managerial specialisms, 
e.g. production, sales etc., this research approach was not regarded
(4)
as being particularly fruitful. Even so, some tendencies were
noticed that could be interpreted as being consistent with the hypotheses. 
Using a ranking scale again, where a rank of 1 was regarded as most 
important and 10 least important, it was found that although both British 
and American firms tended to rank experience very highly in their 
applicants, the British firms placed it higher (mean rank 1.2) than the 
American firms (mean rank 2.5). This is surely consistent with the 
view that British firms tend to value the ’learning by experience’ 
strategy rather more than formal educational qualifications. If, as I 
have attempted to show, British firms do not put so much stress upon 
formal management techniques, then experience, often described as 
’intuition', ’feel’ etc., is the oniy thing left to fall back upon.
It.would follow from this argument that the American firms- would stress 
educational qualification more strongly than the British firms, it 
being a reasonable, although not necessarily correct assumption, that 
a person with such qualifications would be in a better position to use 
the range of managerial techniques possessed by many of the American 
firms. It was found that the mean rank of educational qualifications, 
as a desirable attribute, was higher for the American firms in the 
sample: Mean rank U.S. =2.5, G.B. = 3.4. It would also be consistent
with the above hypothesis to predict that British firms would be more 
concerned about references than their American counterparts. As 
Burrage (1969) has argued, in the more ascriptive British organisations, 
where it is predicted that diffuse personal qualities would be of 
relatively greater importance, personal references will tend to play a 
more important role in the selection process. There was some support 
for this prediction. The American firms' mean rank for the importance 
of references was 6.6 compared with 5.8 tor the British firms. Finally, 
it was felt that the type of school the potential recruit had attended 
would be more important for the British firms, particularly in view of 
the large body of literature which stresses the importance that much of 
British industry apparently places in the diffuse qualities conferred by 
a public school education. Surprisingly, no differences were noted in
response to this question, both groups of firms ranked type of 
schooling rather low in importance (mean rank for both groups 8.4).
None of the differences reported above are spectacularly large, but it 
should be noted, that with the exception of the question of the 
importance of the type of school attended, all the differences are in 
the predicted direction. Furthermore, where the B.I.iM. data can be 
used as a further test of the hypotheses, it tends to confirm the 
findings of this particular study.
As one can see, it was possible to gain a certain amount of 
information from the companies about the sorts of managers that were 
regarded as appropriate for the organisation. It was found to be 
rather more fruitful however, and certainly easier, to examine the 
results of the selection process over the years. In other words, it 
was possible to analyse the population of managers that had been 
recruited in the past to see whether there were any significant 
differences between the two populations. The management questionnaire 
asked the managers a range of objective questions about themselves, e.g. 
age, sex, education, career history etc. as well as a number of 
subjective open-ended questions about occupational choice, attitudes 
towards business etc. These questionnaire responses were supplemented 
by the management interviews with a sub-sample of the questionnaire 
respondents. The interview data was found to be by far the most 
illuminating source of information, both about the managers themselves 
and the companies for which they worked.
The first hypothesis about the differences between the two 
populations, was that'the ’American’ managers would be found to be 
younger. Theoretically this should follow if the American firms were 
more committed to the values of achievement than British firms.
Ability, not age should be the defining marks of recruitment and 
promotion in such firms. I have already noted that there was evidence 
to suggest that the British firms valued experience rather more than the 
Americans, and experience is clearly correlated with age. Furthermore, 
several of the American executive sample suggested that this was a 
prominent difference between the business worlds in the two societies.
On the other hand, the American Bank executive did point out that there 
were considerable obstacles in the British environment to promotion by 
ability alone. In particular he mentioned the problems of gaining 
acceptance, that the young high level managers had had, particularly in 
tire banking world. Finally, there is considerable supporting evidence 
from other writers for the hypothesis. Novotny (1964), Dunning (1970)
and Dubin (1970) all assert the existence of such a difference, 
although none of them-actually cite any evidence. Hanna (1971), 
reporting a small study of l.B.M. in Britain, notes that the median 
age for all their U.K. employees is 28. None of.this supporting 
evidence, it must be admitted, is quite satisfactory. It either amounts 
to mere assertion or there is no attempt made to properly match similar 
types of firms. Indeed the only study which does furnish evidence from 
a reasonably matched sample, Ellis and Child (1973), fails to note-any 
differences in this area. As table 6.3 below shows, this study also 
found very little difference between the two populations.
Table 6.3 Mean Age of Managers, British & American Finns: Main Sample.
Years Years
U.S. Pharmaceuticals 41.6 G.B. Pharmaceuticals 41.7
U.S. Print 41.4 G.B. Print 48.0
U.S. Furniture 36.7 G.B. Furniture 37.0
U.S. Electronics I 49.2 G.B. Electronics 42.5
U.S. Electronics II 44.7
U.S. Consumer 40.0 G.I'. Consumer 40.0
When the age of the managers was crosstabulated with their position 
within the organisation to see whether it was true that younger managers 
rose more quickly in American owned companies, no significant difference 
was found. When the data for the paired comparisons were examined 
however, in the printing, consumer and pharmaceuticai companies age was 
found to be a slightly better predictor of the managers' level in the 
British firms, but again the differences did not reach levels of 
statistical significance and were not marked. Finally, age was cross­
tabulated with the managers’ functional area in the firm. It was found 
that in the American firms there was a significant correlation between 
age and function, the younger managers tended to be in marketing, whilst 
the older ones were to be found in production, finance and general 
administration. In the British firms the connection between age and 
function was not so marked, but the younger managers tended to be in 
production rather than marketing. Finance and general administration 
were again staffed by relatively older managers. The fact that younger 
managers tended to be overrepresented in the marketing function within 
the American finns, and overrepresented in production within the British 
firms may well be a significant result. I have already shown that, 
although there were industry differences, production was regarded as of 
more importance in the British firms, and marketing in the American
firms. If this finding is valid, it should not lie surprising to find 
managers in these Key functions appointed more on the basis of ability 
than on age, and one might therefore expect to find more younger 
managers in the crucial functions.
In general the prediction about the ages of the two populations 
of managers do not seem to have been supported, despite the wide body of 
opinion that seemed convinced that these differences existed. It could 
well be of course that this-sample was not large enough to detect such 
differences. The evidence of Ellis and Child (1973) however, lends 
support to the view that, within Britain, American companies do not 
significantly depart from the norms and practices of British industry.
It is possible to argue I think, along with the American Bank executive, 
that young, high ranking managers wouid encounter considerable 
resistance inside British industry. Finally it should be remembered 
that many of the studies cited on p.208 were comparing practices across 
the Atlantic. Even if they were correct in their observations however, 
it is possible to account for the difference other than by reference to 
I he values of capitalism: It could l or example be as much a consequence
of the Second World War with its higher casualty rate amongst the 
British population.
Just as I hypothesised that in the American firms there should
have been a weaker tendency to equate organisational rank with age grade,
so too it was predicted that American firms would pay less attention to 
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that other ascribed quality, sex. In other words it was predicted that 
American firms would employ a greater percentage of women as managers 
than their British equivalents. The results of this enquiry can be 
seen in table 6.4 below.
Table 6.4. Percentage of Female Managers. British & American Firms:
Alain Sample.
No. of ~ No. of r ~ ., yo of .. /o of
Women ,, . Women ' .
ivlgt. Mgt.Managers —  Managers — °—
U.S.Pharmaceuticals 4 A G.B.Pharmaceuticals 2 4
U.S.Print 2 5 G.B.Print 4 2.5
U.S.Furniture 0 0 G.B.Furniture 1 5
U.S.Electronics I 14 7 G.B.Electronics 0 0
U.S.Electronics II 5 5
U.S.Consumer 18 10 G.B.Consumer 33 15
As one can see from table 6.4 the number of women employed as managers 
in all. the companies was low, only reaching 15>?in Cl. 11. Consumer.
Such small absolute numbers make any conclusions very tentative indeed, 
and although three of the American companies in the printing and 
electronics industries did employ more women than their comparative 
British companies, the overall picture is not one that can be said to 
support the hypothesis. The majority of women manager's in all the 
companies were heavily concentrated towards the lower end of the 
managerial hierarchy, and were largely to be found in the marketing and 
personnel functions. Respondents in the American executive sample were 
firmly of the view that there were more women employed as managers in 
American firms in America but argued that the reason for this phenomenon 
did not arise so much from internal company decision making, as from 
American anti-discrimination legislation. If companies were freed from 
these restraints then it was argued, they would probably revert back to 
their old practices. At the time of this research no such anti- 
discrimination legislation was on the statute books in England, and so 
perhaps it was not surprising to find' that there were no appreciable 
differences in this area between British and American- firms.■ Such a 
finding however hardly lends support for the view that American firms 
stress the values of achievement more strongly than those of British 
firms.
The strongest test of the hypothesis that American'firms stress 
the values of universalism and achievement more than their British counter­
parts comes in the area of qualifications lor the job. It was predicted 
that ’American* managers would be better qualified than British managers, 
and, as I have already noted in Chapter 5, this did indeed turn out to 
be the case. Table 6.5 below summarises the main data.
Stated Qualifications: Main Sample.
(Xiulificatj.on ’U.S.* Managers G.B.Managers
7° N • 0/ N
Managers with Post *A* level Ouals. 56.0 80 33.4 26
Managers with First Degree or Equiv 36.5 53 29.0 23
Managers with Management Training 66.9 97 48.7 38
Some comments are necessary on this table. Firstly, the figures are
rather flattering to the British companies because-of the contribution 
to the whole made by G.B. Pharmaceuticals, whose staff appeared to be 
particularly weir .qualified. If one discounted this contribution, then
the difference becomes even more marked. Crosstabulating qualification 
by function, it was found that production managers tended to be better 
qualified than the managers in other functions, this is particularly 
true, as one would expect, for the high technology industries of 
pharmaceuticals and electronics. As it happens however, production 
managers were found to be overrepresented in the British sample,.'and 
once this variable is controlled for, the gap between the qualifications 
of the managers working for the American firms and those working for 
the British firms widens still further. Curiously enough however, it 
is in the production area that the difference between the firms 
actually reverses itself. The British production managers tended to 
be slightly better qualified than their ’American' equivalents: 64% of
’American’ production managers (n=21) had a first degree or equivalent, 
while 75% (n=21) of British managers had. Jn all other areas the 
’American’ managers Were better'qualified and dramatically so in the 
marketing area. The British marketing managers were worse qualified, 
using either post ’A ’ level qualifications, or first degree or equivalent, 
as a measure of qualifications, than the managers in any other function; 
they also had the second smallest amount of managerial training, after 
the managers in general administration. This picture is very different 
in the American firms: Here the production managers were still the best
qualified, but the marketing managers followed closely behind, 60% (n=2l) 
of these managers possessed a first degree or its equivalent, compared 
with only (n=2)' of British marketing managers. Personnel managers 
in both sets of companies tended to be relatively well qualified, 
although better qualified in the American firms. Managers working in 
this function were also most likely to have had some form of management 
training in both the American and the British firms. In both sets of 
firms it was the younger managers who were the best qualified, and were 
rather more likely to have had some form of management training. The 
relationship between qualifications and managerial level took the form 
of an inverted U in both British and American firms. In other words, 
well qualified managers were found at both the top and the bottom of the 
organisations, with the less well qualified in the middle. This was 
more marked in the American firms than in the British; in the latter 
the top rungs of the managerial ladder were not filled with such well 
qualified personnel.
These findings, which showed the managerial personnel of the 
American companies to be better qualified than their British opposite 
numbers, are well supported by other research. Numerous studies have
pointed out the comparative deficiency of qualified manpower inside
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British managerial ranks, indeed several writers have insisted that 
the major gap between British and American industry is not a technolog­
ical one, but a managerial o n e . ^  The most interesting finding is 
not the general difference between the British and American firms 
however, which was perhaps predictable enough, but the nature of the 
observed differences. It could be argued that in the area of product­
ion the demands of a relatively sophisticated technology require well 
qualified managers, and thus the effects of culture are minimal. I 
would suggest that there are also other reasons operating in the case 
of the British companies. I have already shown that the production 
department was regarded as the most crucial area for most of the British 
firms and, if this is correct, it should follow that it was in this area 
that the firms were attempting to maximise efficiency. One of the 
ways of doing this would be to hire managers with obvious formal 
technical qualifications for the job. By contrast, an area like 
marketing was regarded by many of the British companies as something 
which did not require much, if any, technical expertise, certainly 
nothing that could be learned formally from the textbook or college.
What it did require was a creative approach, and certain personality 
features like extroversion, flair, drive, 1 feel for the product’ etc. 
These qualities were not seen by the British companies as being 
necessarily correlated with academic qualifications - much better 
correlates were experience and the ’ right type of person’. The 
American companies were in a rather different position. Production 
was regarded in most cases as being rather more routine, most of the 
processes were developed and perfected in the United States, and the 
American parent often issued strict instructions about the type of 
machinery to be used, exact product specifications, quality control 
etc. What was required at the British end of the operation was 
managers who could routinely manage the process, and this did not 
require men with the highest academic qualifications. This interpret­
ation is reinforced by Steur and Gennard (1971), who note somewhat 
similar findings in their comparative study of the production depart­
ments of the electrical engineering industry. 1’hey observed that 
"The knowledge input into the subsidiary of a foreign parent company
in )
need not all be embodied in the men on the spot". } Just as the 
British companies tended to concentrate on production, so I have argued, 
the American companies tended to concentrate upon marketing as the most 
important function. Marketing does not directly require highly 
qualified personnel in quite the same way as sophisticated technology
might require qua!ifj.ed people to manage it, and so one finds, even 
in the American companies,. that the qualifications of the marketeers 
are not so high as their fellow managers in production. Yet the 
American method of marketing does involve a whole range of sophist­
icated techniques which do require, at the managerial level, certain 
intellectual abilities, of which academic qualifications might be 
thought as good an index as any other. I think that it is in this 
area of marketing that one notices the differences between British and 
American manufacturing organisations most strongly. Whereas most of 
the marketing managers I met in the American companies would probably 
have affirmed Taylor1 s prediction made in 1913 in his classic Shop' 
Management, that, "many of the elements (of management) which are now 
believed to be outside the field of exact knowledge will soon be
standardised, tabulated, accepted and used, as are now many of the
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elements of engineering", - but I doubt if as many of the British 
managers would. Indeed most of the latter stressed the importance of 
’experience’, ’old established contacts’ and ’knowing the industry’, 
above any formalized set of techniques or qualifications. It is not 
that they were amateurs,- far from it, they gave the impression of 
knowing their business inside out, it is just that their source of 
knowledge was experiential, the trusted ’school of hard knocks’, that 
so many of them mentioned in one form or another. By contrast those 
working for the'American companies, whilst not discounting the value 
of experience, also valued more formal knowledge, that was essentially 
theoretical rather than experiential.
It is important at this juncture to make an observation on 
the trend inside British firms in general. Although I have argued that 
the forces of capitalism have been less strong in British industry, thus 
permitting the interplay of non-capitalist values; with the economic 
position of British society becoming ever more Serious, strong counter 
forces are being exerted. The trends are clear enough even in this 
sample, the younger managers are better qualified than those in middle 
management, and there is every reason to suppose that this, trend will 
continue. This trend is confirmed by looking at the studies made of 
British management over a number of years since the mid 1950’s. If 
one concentrates on the proportion of managers with university degrees 
or their equivalent, then one finds the following picture: Acton
Society Trust (1956): 19??, Clements (1958): 25%, Clark (1966):
35%, Present Study: 34%. It seems likely that these percentages
reflect a genuine rise in the qualifications of managers
rather than merely reflecting different sampling procedures and
definitions. Whether these changes are just reflecting a general
rise in the standard of education, particularly in the field of higher
education, is more difficult to say, but I would have thought that the
apparent rise in qualified managers was'.much too dramatic for this to
be the only influential factor. I think the evidence overall is
suggestive of the fact that Britain is fast approaching the situation
which America had reached by about 1950, when Newcoinber (1955) could
announce for the case of American businessmen, that the days of “the
self made man whose formal education did not extend beyond Grammar
(9)
School (have) almost disappeared”.
Another interesting feature of the difference between the 
populations of ’American* managers and British managers, in the area of 
academic qualifications, was to be found in the subjects of those 
qualifications. The majority of all the managers in both groups Of 
companies possessed natural science qualifications,* and this was 
particularly marked in the pharmaceutical and electronics firms. Yet 
one interesting difference was that the American firms tended to have 
far more managers with qualifications in administrative science.**
This was particularly noticeable in U.S. Pharmaceuticals, U.S. Print, 
and U.S. Consumer, although G.B, Furniture was also well represented 
here. One must of course be exceptionally careful about drawing any 
conclusions from this data, as the numbers involved are very small 
indeed. Even so the figures are suggestive. Most of the arts 
graduates were to be found in U.S. Consumer and U.S. Pharmaceuticals, 
their small representation overall is probably accounted for by the 
f act that there were rather few firms in the'sample that were directly 
engaged in selling consumer products,, where marketing was a dominant 
activity. Although the numbers are slight, 1 think one can tentatively 
say that the evidence does suggest that it was the American firms who 
were most interested in graduates in administrative science. This 
view is supported not only by the fact that America produces proport­
ionately far more of such graduates than Britain (see Chapter 3), but 
also by some data from the London Graduate Business School. This 
showed that the only large firms that were able to attract M.B.A.
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graduates were Esso, Ford and I.B.M. - all American owned companies.
*1 am including the' applied sciences, e.g. engineering, pharmacy in this 
category.
♦♦These were defined as degrees or recognised professional qualifications 
in economics, business/management studies, law and accountancy.
I have already noted that the management recruiters i'or the 
two groups of firms both appeared to play down the importance of the 
type of school that the potential manager had attended (see p207 ). 
Certainly the data on the school backgrounds of the managers 
reproduced in table 6.6 below seem to refute the view that a public 
school background is important in British firms. The table shows there 
to be very few differences between the school backgrounds of British 
and ’American’ managers, and certainly none that are statistically 
significant.
fable 6.6 School Backgrounds of British & ’American’ Managers: Main Sample.
’U.S.* Managers G.B. Managers
% N %■ N
Elementary School 8.3 12 6.4 5
Comprehensive School .7 1 3.8 3
Secondary Modern School 15.9 23 9.0 7
Grammar School 64.8 94 70.5 55
Private School 10.3 15 10.3 8
Total 100 145 100 78
'Hie comparatively low number of public schoolboys in both populations 
probably confirms the downward trend of this group in British manage­
ment. Clements (1958) observed that 2o^ of his sample had such a back­
ground whilst nine years later Clark!s (1966) broadly similar sample 
only contained 12/c. Holding age constant, there was a tendency in 
both groups of firms for public schoolboys to be rather further up 
the managerial hierarchy than those managers with a different type of 
schooling, but the difference was not a significant one. This group 
were also more likely to find themselves in the marketing function in 
both the British and the American firms, although the tendency was more 
marked in the British firms, again none of the differences reached 
levels of statistical significance. Perhaps the one observation that 
does stand out in table 6.6, despite the small numbers, is that there 
were proportionately twice as many secondary modern schoolboys in the 
American firms than in the British firms. This could be taken as 
evidence lor the assertion that American firms are much less concerned 
with type of schooling and rather more concerned with actual 
qualifications and performance. Secondary modern schoolboys were 
rather more likely to be found in the production departments of both 
British and American firms, although the association was not strong.
One of the most often cited differences between British and 
American industry, is the fact that American managers exhibit very much 
higher rates of inter-firm mobility than the British. Certainly this 
prediction would follow from my theoretical analysis: As Burragc (1969)
has argued, in the more ascriptive British culture one would expect to 
find rather less inter-organisational mobility, British firms preferring 
to recruit potential managers at an early age and retain them for a 
long period of service, loyalty being of crucial importance. Thus one 
would expect the more particularistic relationships in British firms to 
be far more permanent than the more universalistic relationships that 
allegedly pertain inside American firms, where anybody who fits the 
universalistic criteria could fill the role. This line of reasoning 
is pursued by Dubin (1970) as well as Burrage, although the former does 
add that a part of the reason for this greater rate of inter-firm mobility 
may simply be one of scale. The’number of business firms in the’United 
States far exceeds that of Britain, and it follows that the opportunity 
to move among organisations is correspondingly greater. A study by 
Stewart and Duncan-Jones (1957) would appear to confirm this general 
view of greater mobility in the United States. They showed that only 
27/o of top American managers in manufacturing industry had spent all of 
their working life in the same company, compared with 40/ of corres­
ponding British top managers. Yet the data in general do not present
a totally unambiguous picture. Studies by Wright Mills (1953),
Newcomber (1955) and Brua (1973) all claim to show that one of the 
distinguishing features of top management in America has been its 
conspicuous lack of inter-firm mobility. The'Editors of Fortune (1956) 
describe this second-view well when they summarise their own study of
the 900 top managers in American industry in 1952: "The typical 900
man committed himself to the ■company--'he now manages when he was between 
the age of twenty and thirty. For most industries the formula is 
start young and stick; the hiring away of executive talent is 
diminishing".^^ It could be argued that this ambiguity is the result 
of differing definitions of ’top managers’, and/or whether the studies 
bother to count the number of ’exploratory’ moves that many young 
managers make in the first few years of their business life. If one 
considers the mass of managers below the top ranks in both societies 
however, the picture is just as confused. Oranick (1972) declares, 
admittedly on the basis of one British'company- and an undisclosed number 
of American companies, that, "The British managerial turnover between
companies is even greater than the American after the first few years
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of the individual’s total career", although he does add that be has
the feeling that the British company might not he fully representative
of British industry. Sofer (11)70) reports in his study of ’Autoline’
(U.S.) and ’Octane’ (G.B.) that the ’Autoiinc’ men had experienced a
greater amount of inter-firm mobility, but on several counts this
comparison is not a good one. The best study of differential inter--
firm mobility rates of managers in British and American industry is
probably the Ohio/Midlands study of Inkson et al. (1970). They
conclude that there was only a ’'fractional difference between the two
(13)managerial samples". * One of the problems with all this 
literature, and one that is quite common in the area of British and 
American industrial differences, is that ’impressions’ are taken as 
substitutes for evidence. This fault is heightened by the fact that 
much of the literature is self-citing.
Table G.7 below summarises the data on inter-firm mobility 
for this sample of managers.
Table 6.7. Number of Firms in the Career of Managerial Respondents:
Main Sample.
No. of Finns ’U.S.’ managers G.B. Managers
N cr/A- N
1 1 7.2 25 15 12
2 - 4 56. G 82 G2 48
5 + 2G.2 38 23 18
Total 100.0 145 • 100 78
The evidence is not consistent with the view that the managerial 
employees of American firms had experienced greater mobility than the 
similar group employed in the British firms. Just as one can say that 
the qualifications of the British managers are increasing (see p.213), 
there also appears to be a trend in the direction of greater inter-firm 
mobility. This can be observed by following the trend of previous 
studies, as Table G.8 below demonstrates.
Tabic 0.8-Number of Firms in the Career of Managers: British Studies.
No. of Firms. Clements Clark Birch & MacMillan Present Study 
(.1958) (19GG) (1972)
a 0 % %
1 32. G 34.4 17.0 16.1
2 - 4 53.9 52.9 G4.0 59.3
5 + 13.5 12.7 19.0 29.G
Although one mast be careful in interpreting the table, because the 
results can so easily be skewed by. the industrial and age distribution 
of the managers sampled, even so the data would appear to be 
consistent with the view that managerial inter-firm mobility has been 
increasing in recent years. Again I take this to be evidence for the 
view that economic forces are forcing British firms to adopt more 
universalistic and achievement oriented values to maintain their 
economic position. The interviews with•the'managers responsible for 
personnel selection in the various companies in the study did reveal 
that, in general, considerable experience in other firms was regarded 
as an asset.
There did not appear to be a 'relationship between the number
of employers that a particular manager had had and his level in the
organisation. This confirms the considerable body of data that exists
to suggest that, in the long run, managers who stay put with one firm
(14)
do at least as well as those that change employers. There was a
significant relationship between age and inter-firm mobility (p < .05). 
The oldest and youngest managers had been the least mobile. This would 
appear to admit of a relatively straightforward explanation. The 
younger managers had not had enough time to have changed employers a 
very large number of times, whilst the older ones belonged to that 
generation of managers for whom inter-firm mobility was not so common. 
Large numbers of those interviewed in both groups of firms talked about 
the need for security, and how important loyalty was in the days when 
they embarked upon their managerial career. Most of these managers 
anyway had worked their way up in one company to the ranks of manage­
ment. There was also a significant relationship between education and 
mobility (p < .05). The relationship was an inverse one. The best 
qualified managers were the least mobile and the least qualified the 
most, and this relationship held for both British and American firms.
On the face of it this does not fit in with Burrage1s view that the 
more universalistic and achievement oriented the society, the greater 
the inter-firm mobility. Unfortunately there were not enough 
qualified managers in our sample to crosstabulate qualification by age 
and inter-firm mobility, but Birch and MacMillan (1972) managed this 
in their study and found that mobility rates of managers with degrees 
changed during their lifetime. Younger managers with a degree have 
changed employers less often than non-graduates, while older graduates 
have changed employers more often than managers without a degree.
Birch and MacMillan suggest that graduates change employers more
frequently than non-graduates, but because of their shorter time in the 
labour force, owing to time spent at the university, their higher 
mobility rates will only begin to show as they become older. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that managers without degrees move more 
frequently in the early part of their careers, because, without any 
training in a particular function, they may have to go through a period 
of 1 trial and error’ in order to find a suitable career path.
Graduates, on the other hand, may be expected to use some part of their 
training, and this could limit the number of fields that they try out. 
Birch and MacMillan also offer a partial test of Dubin’s thesis that 
inter-firm mobility is at least partially a function of opportunity, 
i.e. the larger the number of businesses operating in a given area, 
the greater the mobility rate. They show for example, that the 
presence of more job opportunities in an area does not necessarily 
lead to greater mobility, and that-there were no differences in the. 
number of employer changes made by managers either brought up, or 
currently living in different areas of the country. There were some 
differences in managerial mobility between the different industries 
in the sample, but when the functional distribution of managers in the 
different industries was controlled for, the industry effect rather 
surprisingly disappeared. A general finding relating to all the firms 
in the sample was that marketing managers had the highest average 
number of previous employers, whilst production managers had the lowest.
There are other sorts of managerial mobility besides inter- 
firrn mobility in which one would have expected to find differences 
between the population of British and ’American’ managers. Not only 
can managers move between firms, but they can also move between jobs 
within the same firm, and they can also move between functions during 
their careers. The managers in the sample were asked about the number 
of times they had changed jobs in their present organisations, and 
although this question did present a number of difficulties for the 
r e s p o n d e n t s , s o m e  interesting differences were found amongst the 
firms. Table 6.9 below summarises the results.
Tabic 6.9. Number of Jobs Held in Present Firm, British & ’American*
Managers: Main Sample.
No. of Jobs. ’U.S.* Managers. G.B. Managers
N '
23
47
8
% N %
1 19 28 29
1<N 60
r'-
00 61
5 + 21 30 10
These findings are predictable from'an earlier finding, that whilst 
all the American'firms-were' operating some form of management develop­
ment programme, only two of the British firms were. These management 
development programmes involved, among other things, making sure that 
each manager went through a programme of different jobs. Those that 
had only one job in the American firms were almost exclusively those 
who had only recently joined the-firm, or they consisted of some of the 
older managers who were in areas where there was very little scope for 
job movement, e.g. company secretary1 s office. These findings, which 
demonstrate considerable differences in intra-organisational job mobility 
are supported by my data from the American executives working in Britain, 
"lost of these respondents reported operating job rotation policies in 
their British organisations, and believed that the rate at which this 
was done was significantly higher in American firms than in equivalent 
British firms. They also reported that this is one of the greatest 
area of difficulty that they encountered in the British environment - 
persuading managers to change jobs, particularly if this involved a 
geographical move. They often contrasted their own career pattern, 
which had usually exhibited marked job and geographical mobility, with 
those of high ranking members of British firms that they knew of, and 
also suggested that there was still a considerable difference between 
the American parent and its British subsidiary. Other published 
studies also testify to the validity of this finding. Granick .(1962) 
and Novotny (1964) both mention this difference, although they do not 
cite any supporting'empirical evidence. On the other hand, Ellis and 
Child (1973) managed to find considerable support for the proposition 
in their comparative study of British and American firms. Finally, 
Inkson ct al. (1970) in their comparative study found that "U.S. 
managers had held significantly (p < .01) more posts within their 
organisation than had British managers".
The managers were finally asked about moves between functions 
in their business career. Granick (1972) amongst others, had pointed 
to the fact that advancement for British managers was largely within a 
single function, compared -with considerable functional movement within 
American firms. Sofer (1970) also noted how this was characteristic of 
the American firm ’Autoline’ operating in Britain, which he investigated. 
Three of the American firms, U.S. Pharmaceuticals, U.S.. Furniture and 
U.S. Consumer did practice functional rotation as part of their manage­
ment development policy, and so it was thought that there would be 
differences between the.’American- and the British managers on this
variable. The managers were asked if they had changed functions during 
their career, and the result showed there to be no differences between 
the two populations. Exactly the same percentage, 44% reported that 
they had changed functions during their career. On reflection a 
better question might have been to have asked the managers about 
functional moves within their present firm, and it is likely that this 
would have revealed differences. What is noticeable is that- the figure 
of functional moves is relatively high compared with that of other 
British studies. Glark (1966) for example, reports that only 2S% of 
his sample had changed functions during their career. Perhaps this is 
evidence to suggest that the stereotype painted by Granick, of the 
British manager who remains in one function throughout his career, is 
declining.
The analysis so far has concentrated on whether the companies 
themselves selected different ■types of personnel to be managers. It was 
felt to be just as important however, to reverse the focus, and to 
inquire whether there were any systematic differences in the features 
of the firms that attracted managers in the first place. An open- 
ended question, ’What features of the present firm attracted you to it?’, 
was used for this purpose, and the responses were followed up in the 
interview programme. There are many problems in asking question of 
this nature, which must be born in mind when the results are considered. 
■The main problems can be-summarised'as follows: Firstly, the question
assumes that the respondents were attracted to the job and the company, 
which may not have been the case. (Several of the'older respondents 
reported that when they originally got the job there was very little 
choice available, one took what was going). Secondly, the question 
does tend to force a range of ’acceptable responses’, for example, 
although chance factors were offered by very few managers on the 
questionnaire," rather more volunteered such responses during the inter­
views. Thirdly, asking the employees of an organisation to answer 
■■questions, about the initial reasons that attracted them to the firms 
runs the very considerable risk thaL their present knowledge of the 
firm may contaminate their answers. On the other hand, the fact that 
there was no association between the answers to the question and the 
managers’ function or level in the organisation, and only a very slight 
association between the oldest age category and the responses, would 
seem to indicate that this may not have been a major problem. Respite 
these difficulties, which one must remember were the same for both 
groups of firms, I think that the question did manage to tap some 
interesting differences.
As one might have expected there were considerable similar­
ities in the responses From both groups Of managers. They both cited 
perceived career opportunities, as well as the intrinsic features of the 
actual job, as very important attractions. There was one major 
difference between the two populations which I think is of importance 
and interest. A significant number of ’American1 managers cited the 
prestige of the firm, and a rather smaller number, the fact that it was 
an American firm, as a reason for joining. It is tempting to interpret 
these reponses as evidence of the prestige of American business inside 
management circles in Britain, evidence again of the very powerful 
labelling effect. It must be pointed out however, that many of the 
American firms themselves traded upon the fact that they were American, 
making a point of displaying the connection with the American parent in 
employee magazines, induction programmes etc. This clearly could have 
had an effect upon the responses obtained in the form of post hoc 
rationalisation. The reasons for these responses were pursued in the 
interview programme with interesting results. Some respondents argued 
that it was self evident that American firms were better, supplying 
evidence one more of the labelling effect. Others were rather more 
illuminating: Many of the younger managers believed that their American
firms offered a very good, and widely recognised training in certain 
areas of business, marketing and finance were particularly mentioned.
This meant that the managers added what amounted to a market qualifica-
(17)
tion to themselves. Although there were examples of this response
in every American Finn, it was only a distinctive feature in two,
U.S. Pharmaceuticals and U.S. Consumer. It should be noted that some 
of the managers in the British firms also mentioned the name and 
prestige of the organisation as an attraction for joining, although they 
were proportionately fewer.
Other reasons given for company attraction were the type of 
industry and product. These did not appear that frequently on the 
questionnaires, but were a marked feature of the interview responses, 
especially for middle management and upwards. The reason for this was 
that the majority of respondents appeared to have taken such factors 
for granted in replying to the questionnaire. Younger managers 
appeared to be less concerned about the type of product the firm 
manufactured than other managers, but excepting this group, it was clear 
that many managers do not just look for jobs in their functional area 
in any industry, but have quite clear ideas about the type of product 
they are interested in. This was most true for production and 
research men, who were presumably more strictly tied by their qualifica-
tions and experience. Very few of the managers in either groups of 
firms mentioned pay or fringe benefits as a factor attracting them to 
the firm. This was somewhat surprising as I had thought that there 
might have been some differences between the British and American firms 
on this variable* The reason for this view was the widespread belief 
that American firms pay more, and offer a more generous set of fringe 
benefits to their employees. No information on the relative pay or 
fringe benefits of the American and British firms in the sample was 
collected, because it was felt that this was too sensitive an area to 
broach in a piece of research that was already demanding a considerable 
amount of co-operation from the firms concerned. Several of the 
American executives sampled did comment on the relatively low levels of 
compensation at all levels of industry in Britain compared with the
■(18)United States, and this is confirmed by the available published data.
It is more difficult to extract evidence on the question of whether
American firms operating in Britain pay proportionately more to their
employees. Four of the American executives mentioned the existence
of management consultants, who organised a comparative salary guide,
which they subscribed to with the intention of paying at least as high
(19)
as the best firm in the survey. The Managing Director of U.S.
Furniture claimed that the company attempted to get round all the pay 
controls and high marginal rates of tax, by offering more fringe benefits, 
particularly cars, than would have been•common in subsidiaries in other 
European countries. Steur and Gennard (1971) in their case study of 
the Electrical engineering industry, offered tentative evidence to 
suggest that the foreign companies (largely American) paid more at the 
lower levels of the employment structure. There is also some evidence 
that certain American companies, like I.B.M. and Kodak do pay more than 
equivalent British companies at both the blue collar and white collar 
levels, partly to prevent unionisation in their p l a n t s . T h e  best 
evidence is supplied by Dunning (undated) however, who shows that for 
the years 1970/1 U.S. affiliates paid 23/ more wages and salaries per 
employee in U.K. firms. Only in eight of the thirty-nine industries 
investigated did the U.K. firms pay more. I attempted to see whether 
American companies were more generous with their fringe benefits than 
British companies, as it claimed for example by Seyfarth et al. (19G8), 
by reanalysing the data from a B.I.M. study on fringe benefits for 
executives.' a  total of forty-seven American manufacturing
companies were compared with 150 British manufacturing companies, 
suitably matched for size, on a variety of fringe benefits e.g. ’top hat’
pensions, bonuses, provision of company car etc. Although such a 
sample which does not match products has some limitations, it is 
interesting to note that although the American firms tended to be more 
generous in all areas, except for the provision of company cars, in no 
case did the difference reach a level of statistical significance.
Another part of the pervasive folklore about American 
companies, is that American firms are particularly good at providing 
job satisfaction for their employees. There are several reasons for 
believing that this might in fact be the case. Firstly, as I have 
already noted, America is the unquestioned home of a vast body of 
managerial theorising on the subject of the correlates of job satis­
faction. The Neo-Human Relations school of thought, heavily centred 
on the work of Abraham Maslow and his hierarchy of needs, argues that 
the need for self-actualization is crucially important for white collar 
employees, and that its satisfaction requires certain forms of organ­
isational structure. The most ’appropriate’ organisational form from 
this point of view contains several features which I have already shown 
were more likely to be found in the American firms. These include a 
more decentralised decision making structure, which stimulates more 
participation in the decision of the organisation, and from one point 
of view, a more informal managerial style. It should also be noted 
that three of the American firms were operating a managerial device, 
’management by objectives’, that was directly descended from the theore­
tical tradition of the neo-human relations movement. Finally, all the 
American firms were operating a management development programme, which 
it might be argued is more likely to consider the needs of managers than 
no programme at all. I must make it clear at this point that I am not 
arguing'that these theories are correct, indeed I find them wanting at 
both a conceptual and at an empirical level. My argument is rather 
that given the American origin of these theories, it seems not 
unreasonable to suppose that they have a much wider currency in American' 
firms. Some support for this view was gathered from the interviews 
with the American executives. The majority of this group expressed 
considerable interest in, and knowledge about, the practicial 
implications of theorists like Maslow, Herzberg and McGregor. Further­
more, there seems general agreement that the main route through which 
schemes like M.B.O. get into companies is through the-work of 
managerial consultants, and I have already presented evidence to show 
that American firms are more likely to use the services of such people. 
Finally, and of quite crucial importance, it has been suggested that 
one of the reasons why American firms perforin better than English firms,
is that they manage to motivate their employees much better. It was 
against this background that I was interested in determining whether 
the managers in the American firms were experiencing higher levels 
of job satisfaction than the corresponding British managers.
The problems of measuring job satisfaction are similar to, 
but probably rather more difficult than the problems of determining the 
choice of company that I have already examined. it lias been clearly 
shown that simple ’sponge’ '.question's about job satisfaction get answers 
which are heavily skewed towards satisfaction; indeed, as Caplow (1954) 
has noted, the curve of job satisfaction resembles very closely the 
distribution Of happiness in marriage as reported in numerous investi­
gations of marital adjustment’. lnkeles (1960) has even shown that 
this finding holds for a very wide variety of industrial societies 
including Eastern Europe. These findings might seem to indicate that 
the concept is a unitary one; that is, despite the evidence that-job 
satisfaction consists of a number of smaller components, it may be that 
all these components correlate together, and that there is a general
factor of job satisfaction rather analogous to the general factor of 
(22)
intelligence. If this was true, it would then be necessary to
argue that all the major variables influencing the general factor of
job satisfaction declined together as the occupational status scale was
descended, in order to account for the near universal finding that job
(23)
satisfaction declines with occupational status. Despite the above
use, more recent research has tended to support the view that the
(24)
concept of job satisfaction is a multidimensional one and, following 
Daniel’s (1969) criticism of Goldthorpe et al. (1968) it seems clear 
that distinctions have to be made between job choice, intrinsic job 
satisfaction and job quitting. I have attempted to assess the relative 
job satisfaction of the British and ’American’ managers in a number of 
ways. Firstly, the managers were asked a Likort type question, ”Do 
you think'that your present job gives you the opportunity to use your 
abilities to the ■'full?11 The categories ran from ’completely’ to ’not 
at all’. (Question 17 on the management questionnaire). Secondly, 
the sample was asked which of a series of statements best described how 
they felt about their job. -(Question 18 on the management questionnaire). 
Thirdly, the respondents were asked an open-ended question about what 
sorts of factors they would rank highly in making a choice of another 
firm. (Question 13 on the management.questionnaire). Finally, all 
these responses were probed and discussed further in the interview 
programme.
in broad terms the results of the inquiry into the job 
satisfaction of P.ritish and 'American’ managers in the sample did not 
reveal any notable differences. In both populations, the best 
predictor of response was the age of the respondent and his position 
in the managerial hierarchy. The results of the question on job 
fulfillment are given in table 0.10. below.
Table 6.10. Analysis of Answers to the (juestion: »p0 y0lj' Think that
Your Present Job Gives You the Opportunity to Use Your 
Abilities to the Full?". British and ’American’ Managers:
Main Sample.
Extent of Agreement 
’U.S.’Managers G.B.Managers
% N 7° N
Completely 4.0 6 5.1 4
To a major extent 58.7 85 60.3 47
To some extent 31.8 46 32.0 25
To a minor extent 5.5 8 2.6 2
Not at all 0.0 0 0.0 0
Total 100.0 145 100.0 78
One is forced to conclude from the above analysis, that despite the 
efforts of some or the American firms to apply some of the newer 
managerial devices to make the managerial jobs more fulfilling, this 
research was unable to detect any noticeable differences in job fulfill­
ment. Those firms that were applying M . u . o . ,  U .S .  Pharmaceuticals,
U.S. Print and U.S. Consumer, did not employ a managerial labour force 
that was performing jobs that appeared to them to be more fulfilling. 
There was some slight evidence of a size effect, in that G.B. Electronics 
and G.B. furniture, both very small firms, did show the highest level
of job satisfaction for their incumbent managers, but overall, there
(25)
was no consistent association with size. Job satisfaction, as
measured by the above question, was crosstabulated with the managers’ 
position In the company hierarchy,' and a significant relationship was 
found for both groups of managers (p < .01). Those at the lowest 
managerial level were the least satisfied, whilst those at the top were 
the most - this of course is an extremely common finding. There was 
also a significant relationship found when job satisfaction was cross­
tabulated with age (p < .01). Those managers under the age of 35 
were the least satisfied; managers in the middle age category, 36-50, 
were the most satisfied, followed very closely by those in the oldest
category, 51+. The' age effect was not solely an effect of -the level 
of the manager, when level was added to the prosstabulation, the-age' 
effect remained, although it was considerably reduced. During the 
interviews it was the younger managers who predominantly mentioned 
the fact that they did not fully utilise their qualifications and 
abilities. They felt that they were easily capable of tackling the 
more demanding managerial positions further up the hierarchy. The 
other two age groups tended to express greater contentment with their 
jobs. Finally, the answers to this particular question on job ful­
fillment were crosstabulated with the functional, area in which the 
managers worked. No marked differences were found between the various 
functions in any of the companies, although there were some very 
slight tendencies. The very few managers Working in the research and 
development field reported the highest job fulfillment, while those in 
general administration and finance reported the lowest - it is tempting 
to think that these findings were related up to the job task, but the 
association was so weak that it could have easily occurred by chance.
Vroom (1964) has sounded a cautionary note in regard to studies of 
managers and others that assume that differences in job satisfaction 
are exclusively the result of differences in work roles. Numerous 
studies have shown that an individual’s domestic circumstances, which 
can be associated with their position in the life cycle and the wider 
social structure, are all important considerations, particularly in so
| n o  V
far as they can be related up to an employee's 'orientation to work. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the work of Morse (1953) and others, that 
job satisfaction is a function of the relations between expectations, 
some of which are almost certainly generated outside the work place, 
and rewards. These matters were too complex for a limited study such 
as this to investigate, but there was an association between the 
manager’s social class and his answers to the question on job fulfillment. 
Managers from social classes 4 and 5 on the Registrar General's Scale 
did tend to be rather more satisfied with their jobs than managers 
from the other three social classes - the relationship did not reach 
a level of statistical significance. There was no difference in the 
social class distribution of the managers between the two populations, 
see table 6.11 below.
All the managers were also asked a further question about how 
they felt about their jobs (Question 18 on the management questionnaire) 
and .the results are presented in table 6.12 below.
Table 6.11. Social Class Composition of Manager Sample: British
anti American Firms.
Registrar General’s ’ u . s ’. Managers G.B. iManagers
Scale $ N o N .
1 8 . 3 12 5 .1 4
2 3 1 .0 45 3 3 .3 26
3 4 1 . 4 60 3 8 .5 30
4 1 3 .8 . 20 1 5 .4 12
5 3.4 5 5 .1 4
No Response 2 .1 3 2 .6 2
Total 1 0 0 .0 145 1 0 0 .0 78
Table 6.12. Relationship to the Job, Responses of British & ’American*
Managers: Main Sample.
Relationship to the Job. Percentage of Managers Agreeing
______ to Statement  __________
’U.S.’ G.B.
A dominant factor in my life and
as a primary source of satisfaction. 17 (n=24) 10 (n=8)
A distinctly interesting and
important part of my life. 74 (n=106) 78 (n=61)
An activity separate from the rest
of my life and one which must not 6 (n=9) 9 (n=7)
be allowed to dominate.
A source of demand and pressure
that threatens other activities. . 3 (n=4) 5 (n=2)
Totai 100 (N=145)» 100 (N=78)
*There were two non-respondents to this question.
Although there are some slight differences in table 6.12, one is obviously 
struck by the ovei'whelming similarity of the responses from the British 
and American managers. There is very little evidence to support the 
view of the totally committed ’organisation man1 in either the British 
or the American firms, neither is there much evidence to support the 
notion of the alienated manager whose major interests lie outside the 
field of work. There did appear to be certain similarities between 
firms in the same industry. Scoring the answers such that those 
replying that the job was a dominant factor in their lives scored 1, 
and those that replied that the job was a source of demand and pressure 
scored d, and then calculating the mean score for each firm, the 
following results were obtained: See table 6*13 below.
Table 6.15. Relationship’to the Job, Mean Score by Company:
Mean Score 
2.00 
2.10
1.75
2.75
1.90 
Scoring:
’A dominant factor in my life and as a primary source of satisfaction’} - 1
’A distinctly interesting and important part of my life* : - 2
’An activity separate from the rest of my life and one which must
not be allowed to dominate’: - 3
'A source of demand and pressure that threatens other activities': - 4
Holding the age and level of managers constant, the standard deviations 
of the scores were sufficiently small for one to be able to put certain 
credence in the above scores. It is interesting that the lowest scores 
occur in the furniture industry, the industry least dominated by the 
techniques of mass production, and with the most non-standardized 
products. There is then some evidence to support Blauner’s (1964) 
view about the relationship between product, technology and alienation, 
although clearly there are other factors to be taken into account.
Another interesting finding was the effect of a manager’s age on his 
responses to the question. The general pattern to emerge was that of 
an inverted U shaped curve of commitment. The managers in the youngest 
age category (25-35) were the least committed, the middle age category 
(36-50) the most, followed by a slight decline in the oldest category 
(51+). These results were significant at the p < .01 level.
Several interpretations of these results are possible. Firstly,
one could argue that young managers, after initial enthusiasm, get 
rapidly disillusioned with the job, and at the same time are suffering 
from the strains of pressure from outside concerns, like marriage, 
children, house buying etc. As they get older these outside consider­
ations become rather more settled, and their expectations of the job 
have declined to a more realistic level. Promotion in these middie 
years is likely to increase the role of the job in the manager’s life.
As the manager gets into his fifties however, the chances of increased 
promotion, for the majority, will start to slacken off, and many will 
not find it worth the effort to devote so much energy to work consider-
U.S. Firms 
U.S.Pharmaceu ticals 
U.S.Print 
U.S.Furniture 
U.S.Electronics I 
U.S.Electronics II 
U.S.Consumer
Main Sample,
Mean Score 
2.15 
2.00 
1.75 
1.92 
1.45 
1.96
G.B. Firms 
G.B.Pharmaceuticals 
G.B.Print 
G.B.Furniture 
G.B.Electronics
G.B.Consumer
ations. Finally, outside interests, which will on retirement become 
full time interests, will start to take on a more important role. It 
could also be argued that the relatively lower commitment of the younger 
managers reflects the alleged disillusionment of the young with the 
business world that set in during the 1960’s, and which so alarmed many 
American commentators. (These arguments are discussed later, see 
p.241 et seq.).
In the British firms there was a clear relationship between 
the level of the manager and his feelings about the job. Those near
the top of their respective organisations tended to regard their job 
as rather more important to them than those nearer the bottom; this 
result reached the p <  .01 level of significance. In the American 
firms by contrast, although there were some tendencies in the same 
direction, they did not reach levels of statistical significance.
This finding could reflect the more participative style of American 
firms, which attempted involve far more managers in the general decision 
making process of the organisation. The British firms by contrast, I 
have already shown, were in general more hierarchical. There were no 
very strong associations between the manager’s functional area and his 
feelings towards his job, although those managers working in the 
personnel departments appeared to be the least committed.
During the interview programme both groups of managers were 
asked to elaborate on their answers to the questions about job satis­
faction. One must treat these responses with extreme caution, because 
the size of the interviewee sample was even smaller than that of the 
main questionnaire sample (G.B. N=39, U.S. N=54). Although there were 
some interesting differences between the two groups of employees, again 
I was struck more by the similarities than the differences. One 
interesting general finding was the large number of managers who mentioned 
the relatively small size of their firms as an attractive feature.
Although some managers pointed out the disadvantages of this for 
promotion, most of those interviewed seemed to appreciate the more 
intimate atmosphere of the firm that small size brought. There may be 
some grounds for believing that the arguments put forward by Ingham
(1970), relating size of the firm to feelings of commitment amongst 
manual workers, may have some credence amongst managerial employees as 
well. Most of the managers in all the firms believed in their 
products as being worth while,' of high quality, and at least the match 
of their competitors. This was particularly noticeable in the furniture, 
printing machinery and consumer products industries. In the first two
one could still detect a certain amount of what C. Wright Mills called
the ’ craftsmanship ethic', even though there were precious few craftsmen
employed in any of the firms. Colleagues seemed to be mentioned equally
as a source of irritation and satisfaction, and there was very little
evidence of the ’American' managers congregating around the firms in
their social lives, living relatively close together and frequently
interacting with each other outside work, as has been suggested in the 
(27)
literature. The best predictor of this phenomenon, which was seen
to occur in U.S. Electronics II and G.B. Print, was the geographical 
locaion of the company. These companies were both located some way out 
of London, where the number of alternative entertainment outlets was 
severely limited. The firms themselves made full use of .their greater 
amount of physical space to provide social and sporting facilities on 
a generous scale, and the social pattern of the managers’ leisure 
activities reflected this. The managers in these two companies tended 
to have far more close friends inside the company, and to see company 
personnel much more frequently outside work.
The main points of contrast between the managers of the British 
and American firms in terms of job satisfaction from the interview data, 
seem to be in the areas of pressure of work, working conditions and 
level of involvement. More managers working for the .-American-firms 
complained of the pressure of work compared with the corresponding 
British firms. I think this was partly because some of the American 
firms, particularly those that were using schemes like M.B.O., had 
put a greater structure on managerial jobs, had set targets and dead­
lines on projects where none had previously existed. These feelings of
work pressure mentioned by the ’American’ managers were backed up by the 
answers that they gave to the question on how many hours they worked on 
company business per week. (Question 28 on the management question­
naire). Controlling for managerial level and the function of managers, 
those working for American firms worked longer hours than those 
working for the British firms, although the differences did not reacli a
level of statistical significance. The average hours worked per week 
by ’American’ managers oh company business was 50.85, whilst the 
corresponding figure for the British managers was 47.91. Those 
managers working for the smaller firms appeared to work the longest 
hours, which perhaps offers further support for Ingham’s thesis that 
smaller size generates a greater moral commitment on the part of 
employees. There was a predictable and significant relationship 
between the manager's level in the company and the number of hours he
worked, the higher the level the more hours worked (p < .01), and 
managers working in the marketing function tended to work longer hours 
than those working in other areas of the business (p <C .05). These 
findings, of greater pressure of work and longer hours for managers in 
American firms, find more general support in the literature. Granick 
(1972) comments upon the ’reduced pressure of work’ to be found in the 
management of British firms compared with American enterprises.
Data on the comparative length of the working week must be treated with 
a certain amount of caution however, for a number of reasons. Firstly 
the questions asked in the various studies have not always been exactly 
the same, it clearly makes a difference if you include work done at home 
as I have done. Secondly, studies often do not give enough details of 
their sample for proper comparisons to be made. This is crucial 
information, because as I have shown the function and level of the 
managers makes a difference to the result. Despite these reservations 
the available literature does strongly support the view of Child and 
MacMillan (1972), who argue that"Managers as a whole in the United
(29)
States work very much longer hours than their British counterparts".
The British managers complained more about their physical conditions of
work than their ’American’ counterparts, and as 1 have already noted,
the American firms were, by and large, much neater, cleaner and brighter
than the British firms, despite the fact that the organisations were
set up at roughly the same period of time. It could be that part of
the explanation of these differences can be found in the fact that
American companies are probably more concerned about their ’image’ than
British companies, and this concern for image manifests itself even in
(30)
physical structure. Finally, the British managers were more
inclined to complain about the remoteness of the decision making in 
their firms than the 'American' managers were, and this fits in well 
with the data on organisational structure, which showed that the 
American firms were more participative, and authority relationships 
were more informal. These differences are also supported by the 
results of the organisational climate index, see Ch. 7. There were 
some complaints in the American firms, especially from those managers 
at the top of the organisational structure, about control from the 
parent company limiting decision making, particularly in the area of 
expenditure, where elaborate formal justification had to be made for 
capital or revenue expenditure over certain limits. As one would 
expect, these complaints were greater in the more tightly controlled
companies.
I had expected that some of the managers working for the
American firms might have complained about their jobs being insecure,
but this was not the case. The reason for this expectation was that
it is often argued that American firms are more ruthless than British
firms in dealing with managerial failures’. Chruden and Sherman
(1972) talk of the 'hire and fire1 reputation of American firms in
Europe, and Sofer (1970) in his comparative study of the American firm
'Autoline'"with the British 'Octane Ltd.', notes the "unusually high
risk of becoming a casualty at some point" in the American f i r m , ■
and the propensity to "retain 'dead wood'" on the*part.of the British 
(32)
firm. These features are supported by the observations of Farmer
(1968), and Thomas (1969). I attempted to test this hypothesis by
asking the personnel managers about their policies on this matter, and 
■the-United States personnel managers did by and large give the impres­
sion of greater’ruthlessness. Analysis of the managerial labour
turnover figures for the two groups of companies however, did not 
appear to substantiate their claims. By and large the majority of 
managers in both the American and British companies said that they felt 
relatively secure, and did not feel that their companies pursued a 
'hire and fire' policy. The only exception to this generalisation 
were some of the sales managers working for the-American companies, who 
claimed that they were under considerable pressure to get results and 
reach certain targets. It could still be the case that at least some 
of the American companies were more ruthless than their British counter­
parts, and that this ruthlessness did not actually manifest itself in 
terminating the employment of managers, but in other more subtle ways 
that were impossible for an outsider to see. Alternatively, it could 
be argued that few managers were likely to admit in an interview 
situation that their employment was in any way at risk. Finally, one 
should bear in mind the buoyant employment situation at the time of the 
research, many of the firms in the sample reported difficulties in 
recruiting suitable managers to their companies. In such a situation 
firms are likely to be more reluctant to'terminate a manager's employ­
ment, and the managers are less likely to feel insecure.
When the managers were asked what factors they would rank 
highly in making a choice of another job, there were again no marked 
differences’between’the two populations. Interestingly enough, 
although salary was barely mentioned by respondents as a source of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their present job, salary was 
regarded as the most important factor by nearly all managers in the 
case of another job. The 'American' managers rated job satisfaction
the next most important' factor.followed by promotion prospects, whilst 
the British managers reversed the order. One wonders whether the 
greater exposure of the American managers to Human Relations type 
managerial training had influenced their answers to this question.
Both groups rated responsibility/authority in the company as the fourth 
most important factor, and this was followed by a great variety of 
considerations, with the geographical location of the firm getting the 
most mentions, evidence again perhaps of the importance of geographical 
area for British managers compared with those living in the United 
vita tes •
I have examined the relative job satisfaction of the two 
groups of managers, and of the sorts of qualities that they would look 
for in any new job that they might choose, and have concluded that the 
similarities between the two samples are far greater than the differ­
ences. It could be argued that these results are merely a reflection 
of the exigencies of a situation within which managers find themselves, 
and that business firms can by their very nature only offer a limited 
and rather homogeneous series of rewards within a capitalist economy. 
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between Britain and American 
might be thought to lie in the different valuation of business as an 
occupation, as I have suggested in Chapter 3. If this analysis is 
correct then one might expect to find some differences between the 
managers in the area of occupational choice. It would not be unreason­
able to hypothesize that the American firms in the sample, particularly
c
those most tightly controlled from American, would be more inclined to 
choose managers with a greater commitment towards business than their 
British opposite numbers. At the level of cross-national analysis it 
can be shown that industrial management in Britain has foiled, by and 
large, to attract the best educated and most able progeny of the 
country’s elite social groups, when compared with the United States or 
with several other European countries. It can even be shown that the 
graduates of the London Graduate Business School, an institution 
specifically set up to remedy tin; low academic quality of people entering 
business management, have not been so keen to enter the manufacturing 
sector of British industry.
The whole area of occupational choice is a difficult one, as
(34)
the literature clearly shows, and I believe that there are 
particular difficulties in the area of business management. Managers 
in the sample were asked if they had consciously chosen a career in 
business rather than one of the professions or central or local govern­
ment. (Question 8 on the management questionnaire). Of course there
are difficulties with the concept of ‘conscious choice1, as several 
managers pointed out in the interviews, even so most managers felt able 
to answer the question with a reasonable degree of assurance. The 
responses did not reveal any striking variation between the two 
populations, roughly 60$ of each group replied affirmatively, but their 
answers did reveal some interesting facts about business as a career 
choice. It became clear during the interviews that very few managers 
possessed, at the time they were thinking about their career, any clear 
conception of the occupation of ‘business manager* or ‘manager in an 
industrial firm*• Indeed, many managers denied having realistically 
thought about career choice at all, but merely about a Job. For many 
of the older managers* who began their working lives in the late 
twenties and the early thirties, this was understandable. Many in this 
group stressed that any job was welcome at that point in time, and the 
idea of a career was a luxury which they were unable to afford. Some 
managers, particularly those who were technologists, e.g. electrical 
engineers working in the electronics firms, or chemists or pharmacists 
working in the pharmaceutical companies, or accountants working in any 
of the firms, did not primarily see themselves as managers anyway.
Their self conception was much more bound up with their professional 
competence, and they stressed that they were primarily engineers, 
accountants, etc., who happened to be in a managerial position. The 
fact that they were working in a business reflected one of three 
responses. A minority had tried professional practice outside of 
manufacturing industry and had not particularly liked it. Others had 
found that there were far more openings in the business world for them, 
and once there, far more opportunities for promotion and high pay than 
they could ever have obtained in private practice. Several of the 
pharmacists were quick to point out the limited number of openings in 
the non-business world, and the relatively poor pay in the public sector 
compared with their remuneration in private industry. For those 
managers who had worked their way up from the shop floor, and who had 
initially entered manual or lowly white collar jobs, again the concept 
of career choice was a strange one. Although many talked retrospectively 
about their career, it was clear that their original conception had been 
in terms of ‘getting a job*• TTiey had not chosen a career in business 
management as much as they had been “lucky enough to work my way up 
into it”, as several put it. For the majority that did not fall into 
the ‘technologist/manager1 or ‘working class manager* categories, a 
career in the management in an industrial company seemed almost a 
residual category. Most had considered one of the professions^35  ^well
beyond the fantasy period established by Ginzberg et al. (1951), and
the major reason offered for not pursuing the professional path was
lack of qualifications. I got the very distinct impression that many
of these managers would have opted for the 1 professional occupations*,
if it had not been for academic impediments. The alternative
occupations mentioned by the respondents varied a little with social
class background and industry, e.g. many managers working in the
pharmaceutical companies had considered being pharmacists either in
their own business or in hospitals. Teaching was the most popular
alternative occupation amongst all social classes, whilst those from
the lower social classes also tended to mention occupations like the
police and the services. Those from a more middle class background
were more inclined to mention the traditional professions like law and
medicine. As those ambitions faded away, and the time for a decision
of some sort became more urgent, business was left as a large residual
category, something which provided a job, if not a career. Even so,
business proved to be too amorphous a category for most of the managers
to handle, they argued that right from the very beginning they tended
to think in terms of the functions of business - they possessed some
conception of whht sort of Job inside the business firm they wanted,
like salesman, office management, production etc. It was in the first
few years of work that these rough *job images* were put to the test
against actual experience, and they began to fit together, in so far
as opportunity and ability allowed, their own attitudes and values with
the demands of particular jobs. The managers themselves admitted in
hindsight how little information they had on which to make such choices,
and how much they were influenced by the prevailing stereotypes and
images of these occupations. Very few of them admitted to receiving
any help or advice from their schools, which perhaps supports Hooper* s
(36)
(1953) view of the image of business in this sector of education.
The respondents were asked, on both the questionnaire and in 
the interviews, about the sorts of factors which eventually determined 
their entrance into the business world. (Question 9 on the management 
questionnaire). In part I have already covered some of their answers 
in explaining that many of them went by chance into business because 
nothing else turned up that attracted them. There were also some 
difficulties with this question that need to be recognised. There are 
inevitable problems with any question which ask people to look back 
over what was to many respondents a long period of time, and discern 
reasons for actions which may not have been terribly clear, even at 
the time. Such a strategy runs the considerable risk of receiving
rationalised answers, and certainly the responses must have been
influenced by subsequent work experience. Even so the answers received
do seem to accord with what little research exists in this area. Two
major factors stood out as influences on the managers* decisions to
enter industry. More managers mentioned the high financial rewards
obtainable in industry than any other factor. Rosenberg*s (1957)
classic study of occupations and values showed that people planning
to enter business tended to place a far greater value on extrinsic
rewards like money, than those planning to enter other occupations.
This study is confirmed by the later findings of Pierson et al. (1959)
and Super and Crites (1962). The latter, summarising numerous studies,
noted that, “Business students are the only group characterised by
economic values" (my emphasis). These studies all report American
work, but similar results have been obtained in Britian using similar
(37)measures. The other factor which stood out as a determinant of an
industrial career was the perceived opportunity structure. As one 
respondent put it, "Lacking academic qualifications and having precious 
little experience of anything, there was nothing except industry that 
would allow an ambitious person like me to really progress and end up 
with a really good salary". TTiis realistic assessment of career 
opportunities on the part of rather lowly qualified people was echoed 
by many managers who had found themselves in a similar position.
Several managers who had tried other careers in the services, teaching 
or the civil service also believed that there were far greater 
opportunities for really able people to progress up the hierarchy in 
industry, than in those other fields which they had initially tried.
From the evidence that I have presented it should be clear 
that few regarded business as a vocation, certainly many had been 
called to Mammon, and business was valued as the best route to that 
particular goal. Yet despite the absence in most of a ’calling*, as 
I have shown, the great majority seemed well satisfied with their 
present jobs. Another way of measuring just how satisfied they were, 
and how committed they were to the world of industry, was to ask them 
if they would be happy if their children were to choose the same career. 
The answers to this question from both groups of managers was a pretty 
unambiguous yes: 78$ (n=117) of the ’American* managers replied in
this way, as did 80$ (n=62) of the British managers. It is true that 
the reference point for this question did differ a little from manager 
to manager, in that those that considered themselves first and fore­
most chemists, were referring to being a chemist etc. Even so, they
were referring to chemists in an industrial setting. One curious 
finding was that those managers who had apparently gained most from a 
career in industrial management, i.e. those that had worked their way 
up from rather lowly origins, appeared to be the least keen on their 
children following their footsteps. Their ambitions for their 
children were very firmly rooted in the world of the professions.
The general picture that emerges is that despite the rather 
ambiguous feelings of many who entered on the road that eventually led 
to industrial management, once there, they felt relatively well satis­
fied with their choice, and most would recommend it to their children. 
Despite these findings it was very difficult to detect any real 
enthusiasm for the business world in general. One of the outstanding 
features of the sample of American executives that I interviewed, was 
their total commitment not just to their job or their company, but to 
the world of business in general. Their general knowledge about 
management in all its dimensions - historical development, key figures, 
general trends etc. - was quite remarkable, compared with the indigenous 
managers that I interviewed. One did get the feeling with the American 
executives that for them business management was a vocation, a way of 
life. Nevins (1954), in his biography of Henry Ford, quotes Ford as 
saying "I do not believe a man can ever leave his business. He ought 
to think of it by day and dream of it by night”. I t  is quite 
possible to apply this conception of business to the American executives, 
but almost unthinkable to apply it to the managers in the main sample.
It could be argued of coarse that the American executives were, like 
Ford, either at the top or very near the top of their organisations, 
and that the perspective at this height is really rather different. 
Whilst this may be true, it should also be bom in mind that the 
American executives had experienced very little inter-firm mobility 
(average number of firms: 1.6), and yet they still managed to feel a
commitment towards business in general. Despite the greater amount 
of inter-firm mobility experienced by the main sample (average number 
of firms: 3.3), I was struck by their-parochialism compared to the
American executives. They often exhibited considerable knowledge of 
their particular industry, read the journals connected with the 
industry an<(/or their particular function, but very rarely did they 
read any general management or business material.
Another way of looking at commitment to the world of work, as 
the Ford quotation suggests, is to examine how managers fill their out 
of work time. Child.and MacMillan (1972), in their study of
managerial leisure in British and American contexts, produce 
considerable evidence to suggest that there are marked differences in 
this area. They concluded that, whilst British managers preferred to 
compartmentalise their lives so that the job was forgotten during their 
leisure time, the comparable American managers, to an important degree, 
used leisure as an extension of work. The data on the American 
executive sample presented a rather ambiguous picture vis a vis 
previous findings. The older members of the sample, especially those 
who had been *sent* to Britain, did indeed present an image of a man 
driven hard by the Protestant Ethic, who did not firmly distinguish 
between work and leisure. On the other hand, the younger members of 
the sample, and particularly those that had in some sense ’chosen* to 
come to England, tended to make a much sharper distinction between the 
world of work and the world of leisure. I think the reason for these 
differences can be found by examining the reasons given for coming to 
Britain. Those that had in some sense chosen to come, were those, as 
I have previously argued, who were attracted to what they saw as the 
British or European way of life. This was a way of life which, as far 
as they were concerned, eschewed the extreme competitiveness and work 
dominance of American society. It is hardly surprising then to find 
this group of Americans getting the most out of their leisure time by 
sharply delineating work from non-work activities. On the other hand, 
those American executives who were sent to Britain, often to solve some 
particular problem, appeared to behave in England much as they would 
have done in America, by living a work dominated existence. This 
pattern was probably accentuated by the fact that the older men were 
more likely to have been sent to deal with particular problems in the 
British subsidiary, and these probably did require rather more time 
and effort than would normally have been called for.
The leisure patterns of managers in the main sample did not 
exhibit any great differences between the British and American companies 
In general the managers exhibited the pattern which Child and MacMillan 
(1972) have suggested is dominant in Britain - leisure tended to assume 
what Parker (1965) has called a ’neutral relationship* to their work. 
Although the managers in the American firms tended to work longer hours, 
they did not appear to use their available leisure time in noticeably 
different ways. Although no systematic analysis was made of the 
leisure time pursuits of the whole sample, they were only discussed in 
the interviews, my impression mirrors that of Guzzardi (1964) in his 
study of young American executives. Although he reported that his
sample were completely job oriented which mine were certainly not, his 
description of men with a limited range of leisure pursuits or outside 
interests, of intellectual narrowness and a lack of interest in the 
humanities and the liberal arts, certainly fits the great bulk of the 
managers that I interviewed. Watching T.V., gardening and sport seemed 
to account for most of their time. There were of course exceptions to 
these generalisations: In both groups of companies there existed a
group of men who were highly ambitious and who used a considerable amount 
of their leisure time on work related activities. They were avid 
readers of a broad range of business literature, like the Financial Times 
and Management Today, and were nightly fuelled by the B.B.C. programme,
’The Financial World Tonight’ • These managers were most numerous in the 
two consumer products firms, particularly the American owned one, but 
even here they were very much in the minority.
So far in this chapter I have looked at certain features of
the two management populations for signs that would indicate that the
American companies were more committed to the values of the capitalist
economic order. The popular literature on American management always
portrays them as being more ruthless, more committed. to the goal of
(39)
profit than their British contemporaries. In order to test
directly their views on these matters, three different statements, 
derived from Nichols (1969), about the role of the company in society 
were presented to the managers, and they were asked to indicate which 
statement came nearest to their opinion. (Question 15 on the management 
questionnaire). The results are presented in table 6.14 below.
Table 6.14. Responses to statements About the Role of the Company in 
Society, British & ’American’ Managers: Main Sample.
Statement Percentage Agreeing.
A company can only have one responsibility and that 
is to maximise profit; only by doing this will the 
needs of the community, the customer and its 
employees be ultimately met.
A company conducted solely for the benefit of 
shareholders is unethical. The company must also 
consciously seek to satisfy the needs of its 
employees and the community.
A company’s first consideration must be to make a 
profit, once this is achieved, then the company 
can consider the demands of its employees, its 
customers and the community.
Total
’U.S.’ G.B.
9(n=13) 2(n=2)
52(n=75) 46(n=36)
39(n=57) 52(n»40)
100(N=145) 8 ?
The British managers working for the American companies did not appear 
to be more committed to profit maximising values than managers working 
for the British companies. Although there are some differences between 
the two populations, one is struck more by the similarities. To under­
stand such findings I think it is necessary to place them in some sort 
of perspective. Firstly, one must appreciate the political-economic 
Climate at the time the research field work was carried out. In 
1973, when the bulk of the research was done, certain aspects of the 
capitalist economic order were under clear attack. A series of 
business scandals in America , along with clear business support for 
the partial war economy generated by the Vietnam War, was followed in 
Britain by several revelations of business practice that brought wide-
(40)
spread criticism. In 1973 Mr. Heath, then Prime Minister of a
Conservative government, declared that such revelations had revealed
’the unacceptable face of capitalism*. If one adds to this the fact
that the environmental lobby was increasingly seeing the source of
ecological damage in the practices of profit maximising companies, then
it becomes clear that at the time of the research the general climate
of opinion in Britain was not one that would have given much support
for the unashamed support of classical capitalism, which is contained
in the first statement. Only a longitudinal study could demonstrate
whether these particular factors in the early 1970*s caused such a
(41)shift to the ’social ethic’, to use Whyte’s phrase, that is 
contained in the second statement, or whether any shift had occurred 
at all. I would be surprised in fact, if the events I have described 
had led to any marked shift in the values of the business community in 
such a short period. By and large I think that the evidence suggests 
that such basic values as these statements reflect do not undergo 
rapid change, unless there are quite drastic changes in the environment 
in which business must operate. I would argue that the social ethic - 
business and social responsibility, the service ethic - call it what 
you will, is not particularly new and can be seen to enjoy a certain 
currency in the business world whenever it is thouglt-it can serve a 
useful purpose. I do not want to argue that there is a simple 
mechanical relationship between such business ideologies and socio- 
economic circumstances, that would clearly be an oversimplification, 
but I do want to argue that there is some sort of relationship between 
the two. I also would not wish to argue that the business community 
is homogeneous in its attitudes, rather I subscribe to the view, 
succinctly argued by Kroos (1970) that at the very basic level of the 
role of the private company in society, there does exist a majority
or modal business view.
Kroos has shown that in the United States the non-profit
motives, like service and social responsibility first swept through
the business community in the late 1920*s. There were several reasons
for this: Firstly, it can be argued that business leaders needed to
justify the enormous profits they were making during this period. As
Weber has noted, "The fortunate (man) is seldom satisfied with the
fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has
(43)
a right to his good fortune”. It is argued that the doctrine of
service provided this legitimation. More cynically one might also 
add that the American business leaders could afford to adopt the service 
motto. When the depression came and profits shrank, the concept of
service shrank with them, and the fundamental importance of profits
once more became of central importance in the pronouncements of business­
men. Yet the business environment was never to be quite the same again; 
from that time on, massive profits needed far more justification. The 
classical stream of business ideology also found its intellectual found­
ations shaken with the decline of the classical tradition in economics.
The new breed of economists being turned out by the universities were 
stressing the imperfections of the market, the 'myth of consumer 
sovereignty', and the increasing power and size of business organisations. 
These changes in the business environment led to severe strains in the 
classical business creed, and led some of the business community to 
adopt a revised version of the creed, which Sutton et al. (1962) termed
the 'managerial* version. This particular strand of the ideology
capitalised on the thesis, which first appeared in 1932, with the 
publication of Berle and Means' classic The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, that there had been a separation of ownership from 
control. Managerial control of the firm allegedly led to a rather 
different set of policy goals, service to the community being amongst 
them. The period since the Second World War has been marked by a further 
increase in societal pressure on the classical justifications of 
company behaviour. The liberal analysis of the war itself noted the 
role of unchecked business power in Japan and Germany, whilst the needs 
of the wartime econoii\y in Britain and America demonstrated the value of 
controlling business behaviour in the context of national economic 
planning. Full employment policies, pursued with varying degrees of
success since 1944, inevitably increased the power of labour at both
(44)an ideological and an economic level. ’ In the 1960's the disen­
chantment with the business world by the young, particularly those
undergoing full-time university education, led to what Kerr et al.
(1971) called the 1 new bohemianism*• Fired by the Vietnam War and
the greater publicity given to the plight of minority groups inside
'affluent* America, the subterranean culture painted a picture of an
alternative society, whose basic values stood in sharp contrast to the
(45)old protestant ethic of the business community.v Finally, one
should note the effect of some changes in the intellectual world of 
ideas. Just as the new economics had caused some problems for the 
classical business ideology, so changes within some of the other social 
sciences offered support for the managerialist creed. The Human 
Relations Movement in social psychology and industrial sociology, 
purported to show that not only was social responsibility to one* s 
employees morally laudable, it was also more productive. Whilst I 
have concentrated this short analysis on America, the sets of circum­
stances and influences apply with varying degrees of emphasis equally 
well to Britain.
The above analysis attempts to place the responses of the
managers from British and American firms in their proper historical
context, and although it may be true that they were influenced by the
particular events of the early 1970's in Britain, the long term trend
has been in the direction of the 'social ethic'. Several writers
have argued that we are beginning to witness a middle class reaction to
(46)the values of the competitive society, and n\y data, with its large 
number of respondents opting for the 'social responsibility' statement, 
might well be taken as support for this view. Certainly iny respondents, 
sampled in 1973, showed a greater willingness to embrace the social 
responsibility view (almost 50% of them) than did Nichol's respondents 
in the late I960's (only 32.3% responded in a similar way).^^ i 
would counsel considerable caution in interpreting ray data as evidence 
for a radical shift in view; there are several basic problems to 
contend with. Firstly, one has the question of whether the managers in 
any of the studies, this included, are merely mouthing the phrases in 
common currency about the 'quality of life', 'business and social 
responsibility' etc, or whether their responses really do reflect basic 
changes of attitude. Secondly, as Nichol's observes, there is very 
little attack being made on the system itself, most of it is directed 
towards the operation of some very large individual companies. The 
third question is whether the attitudes of managers are really relevant 
in studying business behaviour anyway. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the results of question 15, on the role of the company in 
society were, at least partially, the results of management training.
Those managers who responded positively to the second statement, the
social responsibility response, were more likely to have been on a
management training course, although the association was not quite up
(48)to the level of statistical significance. In view of the stress
that such courses often place on human relations literature etc,, it is
not difficult to see the possible underlying reasons for such an assoc- 
(49)
iation. One interesting finding from table 6.14, was that far
from opting for the most capitalist approach as predicted, more 
’American1 managers opted for the social responsibility strategy than 
did the British managers. This can be partly explained by my observ­
ation above, that there was an association between management training 
and such responses, and I have already shown that the American sample 
were more likely to have had some form of management training. Another 
possible reason for this result could have been that the American 
companies were more likely to be sensitive to their position in the 
host country, and this could have rubbed off on their managers. There 
did not appear to be any association between the respondents* age or 
level in the organisation and the responses to the question about the 
role of the company in society. The managers* function was also not 
consistently associated with any particular response save that the 
small number of research and development managers (N=4) all chose the 
social responsibility statement. Unlike Nichols, I did not find that 
those managers working in the personnel function were noticeably 
different from the rest.
The managers were asked about their responses to the question 
in the, interviews, and two factors stood out. Firstly, the majority 
of managers declared that they had never really given such matters much 
thought, as one rather harassed production manager put it, these were 
hardly matters that entered into the everyday running of a chemical 
processing plant*. This brings me to the second point, when those 
managers who had indicated support for the social responsibility state­
ment were asked how their views actually influenced the way that they 
did their job, there was very little response. Some talked about the 
role of their company in the local community, gifts to charity etc., 
but none managed to demonstrate that it made the slightest difference 
to the execution of their daily managerial tasks. This is hardly a 
surprising finding, because it is indeed difficult to understand, as 
Mason (1958) has argued, how resources are allocated to their most 
productive use, prices and wages fixed etc., if the goal of profit 
maximization is abandoned and replaced by some other goal like social 
responsibility.
Whilst support for the classical model of capitalism might 
be taken as one index of the hypothesised more aggressive American 
business style, another way of testing this view was to compare the 
opinions of the two groups of managers on what qualities they thought 
necessary for success in business. Yet when the question is phrased 
in this way, the literature itself reflects an ambiguous view of the 
American business manager. On the one hand, one has a body of 
material tracing its descent from the protestant ethic, which, it is 
claimed, became firmly established in New England around the middle of 
the seventeenth century, and gradually permeated its way through the 
rest of America, eventually breaking through into the South at the time 
of the Civil War (see Ch. 3). This historical legacy, the hypothesis 
States, can still be seen in the * inner directed* American businessman 
devoting most of his energies to the pursuit of economic success.
This view is challenged, in general terms, by David Riesman (1961) in 
his celebrated essay, The Lonely Crowd, and developed more specifically 
in the business environment by W.H. Whyte (1963) in his treatise 
The Organisation Man. Here the thesis is advanced that individuals 
are becoming increasingly * other directed*, that is, the approval of 
others is becoming more important than the pursuit of individual 
selfish goals. These apparently contradictory hypotheses can be 
welded together, if one attempts to locate them in periods of historical 
time. Indeed one does not have to look much further than Max Weber 
to see the intellectual origins of such theorising, and what arguably 
might pass for a theory of h i s t o r y . R i e s m a n * s  three categories 
of * directedness* are nearly identical with Weber* s types of orientation 
of social action. Riesman*s tradition directed type is identical with 
Weber*s traditional orientation, whilst the inner directed person 
follows closely Weber's value rational category. The other directed 
person, who chooses a given way of acting because he is anxious to 
receive the approval of others, is demonstrating at least one kind of 
purposive-rational (zweckrational) conduct. Finally, Riesman emphasises 
that his concepts are constructs, types, which appear to be identical 
in logical structure to Weber* s concept of the * ideal type'• Riesman's 
attempt to build a theory of history around these concepts by linking 
them to three major phases of population movement does not directly 
concern me, although one might note in passing that he is rather less 
cautious and less successful here than Weber. Riesman*s claim is that 
changes in the structure of the society are bringing about changes in 
the 'character* of the American population, tradition and inner directed 
people are declining at the expense of the other directed. It is
left to Whyte to directly apply these ideas to the business world.
Although Whyte uses the term 'organisation man1 instead of other 
directed, the similarity between the views of Whyte and Riesman seems 
obvious. From their respective viewpoints, the adaptable, socially 
attuned individual is going to succeed in business, while the creative, 
independent individualist is in for .difficulties*.
There are obvious difficulties in attempting to test such 
expansive theories, even so it did seem worthwhile to attempt to see 
whether the managers in the respective groups of companies perceived the 
qualities necessary for success in business in systematically different 
ways. Following Porter (1963), ten traits relating to business 
success were derived from the Riesman-Whyte hypothesis, and the managers 
were asked to rate them on the basis of how important they thought they 
were for success in business (question 16 on the Management questionnaire). 
The traits are listed below,
Inner-Directed Other-Directed
Forcefulness Tactfulness
Imagination Agreeableness
Independence Cautiousness
Self Confidence Adaptability
Decisiveness Co-operativeness
The mean rank order of these traits for the British and 'American’ 
managers are shown in table 6.15 below.
Table 6.15. Mean Rank Order of Traits Thought Necessary for Success
in Business, British & ’American* managers: Main Sample.
Trait Mean Rank Order Mean Rank Order
* U. S,« ’ Managers. G.B.Managers.
Inner-Directed:
Forcefulness * 5 7
Imagination 3 6
Independence 9 9
Self Confidence 2 2
Decisiveness 1 1
Other-Dijrectedj^
Tactfulness 6 5
Agreeableness 8 8
Cautiousness 10 10
Adaptability 4 3
Co-operativeness 7 5
The first conclusion that can be drawn from table 6.15 is that the 
responses of the British and 'American* managers could clearly have 
been drawn from the same population. Although the 'American' managers 
did rate 'forcefulness' rather more highly than the British, whilst the 
British rated 'co-operativeness' rather more highly than the Americans, 
the results in general hardly lend support for the hypothesis that 
managers working for American firms felt that they had to adopt a more 
aggressive strategy to be successful. All managers seemed to believe 
that being decisive and self confident were the two most important 
qualities for success, whilst being cautious and agreeable were not so 
important. Crosstabulations between the rankings of traits and the 
manager's position in the company failed to reveal any significant 
differences, although there was a slight tendency for those at the 
higher levels of the organisation to put an even greater emphasis upon 
traits like ' decisiveness', * forcefulness' and 'self confidence*, whilst 
those at the bottom tended to take rather more notice of traits like 
* co-operativeness* and 'tactfulness'. In general however, one was 
struck by the very low standard deviations of the results, and the 
consequent picture of considerable homogeneity of feeling inside the 
various companies on what it took to be a successful manager.
Such results should lead one to think very hard about the 
value of Whyte's thesis, certainly in the form in which it is usually 
discussed. Ellis and Child (1973) have shown that although some 
stereotypes of managers may have a certain amount of empirical backing, 
most are rather clumsy conceptually, and in great need of being limited 
by a range of conditioning statements. Thus one wants to know exactly 
what are the basic features of the organisation man? What limits are 
imposed by his position in the organisation, managerial function etc.? 
When such analyses are done, one often finds that the sterotypes melt 
away. Kohn (1971) for example, investigated that close cousin of the 
organisation man, 'bureaucratic man', and found that men working in 
bureaucracies tended to be intellectually more flexible, more receptive 
to new experiences and more self-directed in their values than those 
employed in non-bureaucratic organisations, and these findings were 
broadly supported by Ellis and Child (1973). These findings, of course, 
completely contradict the usual stereotype of the bureaucratic 
personality.
By and large, cross-cultural studies of managerial attitudes 
of the kind contained in question 16, have failed to note many 
differences. Haire, Ghiselli and Porter (1966) in their study of
‘managerial thinking*, which covered fourteen countries, found that
they could explain only about 25% of the variance by reference to
national differences, and the rest was accounted for by organisational
differences. Studies which have focused more directly upon the Anglo-
American dimension, including those of Heller and Porter (1966) and
Heller (1968) have stressed the similarity of British and American
managers, rather than their differences. One major problem with all
these studies is the source of their samples. They were all drawn
from institutions where managers were attending management training
courses, and I have already indicated that this training itself may
account for some of the similarities found. Haire et al. (1966) even
admit that one interpretation of some of their findings "is that it
reflects a sort of partial digestion of the exhortations of group-
oriented consultants and professors of management during the past 
(52)decade". Yet even these studies do note some differences that can
be accounted for by reference to cultural differences. Haire et al.
did find that American managers had a more favourable attitude than
British managers towards the average person*s capacity for leadership
and initiative, whilst Heller and Porter found that American managers
ranked ‘aggressive* as a fairly important personality trait for
success in one*s job, whilst British managers ranked it last on a list
of thirteen. It seems to me quite probable that the ‘organisation
man* syndrome is a product of a rather special set of circumstances
that will be most common in certain segments of the United States
business population. The key features of such a characterisation, to
use Riesman* s term, will be a large proportion of managers working for
(53)
large corporations, as well as a greater amount of geographical
and job mobility than one would expect to find in England. These
factors will tend to create a situation where, "one does not know from
what kind of family one*s neighbours or one*s colleagues come, or to
what social class their parents belonged, or what they themselves have
done in the past. They cannot be placed in a familiar social category
except by observing and evaluating their manifest conduct or overt 
(55)behaviour". These strains may well lead to the other-directedness
of the organisation man, which Riesman and Whyte both found so striking, 
but I doubt whether their observations are common even in America.
There is some evidence to suggest that the counter stereotype of the 
inner-directed businessman is just as illusoi'y.
One other feature of table 6.15 stands out, and that is that 
the items clearly do not fall neatly, as far as the respondents were
concerned, into packages of ‘inner* or * other* directed items.
Although the original article by Porter (1963) made no mention of the 
fact that the items drawn from Whyte and Riesman did not appear to form 
two scales, this was almost certainly the case. A review of the 
research in this area seems to indicate that human behaviour and 
attitudes are sufficiently complex to defy researchers* attempts to 
dichotomize them simply as inner- or other-directed. It would appear 
that for the attitudes and behaviours sampled, most people rely on 
criteria other than those hypothesised as the underlying dimension, 
or that they are employing a mixed strategy, i.e. applying an * inner* 
orientation to some items, and an * other* orientation to other items, 
and completely independent orientations to the rest. Thus Peterson
(1964) subjected a scale developed by Kassarjian (1962), as well as 
several other similar scales that purported to measure inner- and other- 
directedness, to factor analysis, and discovered eight separate dimen­
sions in the scales. These findings should serve as warnings to those 
who search for single * basic* ideological dimensions on which people*S 
attitudes and behaviours can be easily classified and predicted. If 
such single dimensions do exist, then empirical research into attitudes 
and values has surely been unsuccessful in locating them.
One concept which the management questionnaire used generated 
a considerable amount of interest amongst the managers sampled: The
concept was that of the ‘professional*. At one point in the question­
naire the respondents were asked whether they had consciously chosen 
a career in business, and to clarify the definition of business, the 
following sentence was added: "By a career in business we mean a job
in the general management of a profit oriented company rather than as a 
professional man, e.g. doctor, lawyer, or as an employee of central/ 
local government etc." (See question 8 in the management questionnaire). 
A number of managers reacted against this wording and claimed that they 
were professionals - professional managers; still others claimed that 
they too were professionals, as chemists, pharmacists, accountants etc., 
who happened to be working in a business environment. These comments 
were pursued in the interviews with a view to finding out how many of 
the managers considered themselves to be professional managers when 
asked directly, and exactly what their conception of the term 
professional was.
Part of the literature which purports to explain the relative 
success of American industry over its British counterpart has in fact 
made considerable use of the distinction between professional and
amateur. Burrage (X969) noted that.'amateurism* was probably the 
single most popular explanation of British economic failings. Granick 
(1962) talked of the two traditions of business, the amateur and the 
professional, and found that Britain was a country where the amateur 
dominated. Wilkinson (1964) came to very similar conclusions and was 
followed by Dubin (1970). The Fulton Report on the British civil 
service in 1968 also detected the 'philosophy of the amateur', whilst
"what was now required from all administrators was a 'fuller profess-
(57)ionalisra". Despite this apparent agreement amongst a number of
writers, the concepts of amateur and professional are not totally self 
explanatory, indeed different writers seem to operate with rather 
different reference points. Lack of professionalism in British manage­
ment seemed for Granick and Dubin to lie in lack of relevant technical 
education; Wilkinson on the other hand, possessed a much broader
conception of traits, not all of them entirely consistent with one
(58)another, as Burrage showed. At the level of the popular manage­
ment magazines the term ' professional manager* is often used to denote 
the collection of traits that I have searched for in the 'American' 
manager sample e.g. high academic qualifications, high inter-firm 
mobility etc. In short the popular image of the American manager 
compared with his British counterpart, is that he is more 'professional*•
Clearly there is a good deal of confusion about the meaning
of the term professional. This confusion can also be found in the 
sociological literature on professionalisation. This confusion should 
not be entirely surprising to anybody who is familiar with the socio­
logical literature on professionalisation. The 'trait theory' of the 
professions, which has long dominated sociological thinking in this 
area, consists of attempts by various writers to delineate the main 
features of a p r o f e s s i o n . T h e  major traits listed usually include
the following: A profession must involve a special skill based on
theoretical knowledge which requires special training and education. 
Furthermore, the professional must be able to demonstrate his competence 
by passing a special test or examination. The profession will be 
organised in the form of a professional group or association, which will 
administer the required education and training, as well as regulate the 
conduct of members of the profession to make sure that professional 
members continue to render a service to the public in the appropriate 
manner. If the trait theory is accepted as legitimate for one moment, 
it should be clear that business management has difficulties in 
qualifying. Writers have generally found it quite difficult to isolate
the special skill that managers allegedly have - it is clearly not so
obvious as that possessed by a doctor or lawyer. The problem has a
long historical ancestry, one even finds Socrates trying, in his usual
patient way, to explain to Xenephon the general qualities that managers
have: "Whatever a man controls", explains Socrates, "If he knows what
he wants and can get it he will be a good controller, whether he
controls a chorus, an estate, a city or an army".^60  ^ It would not
(61)seem that a lot of progress has been made since that time, Henri 
Fayol in 1916 suggested that managers basically, 'planned, organised, 
co-ordinated and controlled', and these shibboleths have been often 
repeated despite, or perhaps because of, their vague generality. Of 
course some managers are 'experts' in a particular area of knowledge 
in that they are accountants or market researchers or production 
engineers, and this would appear to solve some of the problems. To 
some extent the solution is an illusory one, because many of the 
managers in this sample, although not all, did not conceive of them­
selves as managers anyway. They were more inclined to view themselves 
as accountants or engineers etc. Some did feel that they were just 
managers, and although they had some difficulties in explaining just 
what it was that distinguished them as managers, the most usual arguments 
were that they had general knowledge about the business process, and they 
possessed a series of techniques which provided them with the relevant 
information on which to base decision making. These arguments were 
more often advanced by managers located towards the top of the organis­
ation, who had worked in several business functions. The claims of 
this group of managers were that they were, 'specialists in generality1, 
to use Sutton et al.'s (1962) phraseology.
This confusion about the special area of competence that
business managers possess has led to problems over management education
and training. If one of the marks of the professional is that he
possesses a specialised training based on theoretical knowledge, then
clearly business management has its problems. This should hardly be
surprising in view of my remarks on the difficulties of determining
what the central, task of business management is. If one is uncertain
of the content of the job, then it is clearly difficult to know what to 
(62)
teach. It is in the light of these considerations that one should
view the data on the qualifications of managers. The data on the 
professional qualifications of British managers in general, and this 
sample in particular, were reviewed on pp.210 -214 , and even though 
the percentage of managers possessing academic qualifications relevant
to business management* was rather higher in this study than has 
previously been found by other researchers on British management, 51% 
of British managers and 33% of 'American' managers were without any 
directly relevant education at all. Far from decrying such a situa­
tion, until quite recently several influential bodies concerned with 
such matters felt that this was as it should be. The Urwick Committee, 
sitting in 1947 to consider a national scheme for management education, 
felt It right to begin its report with the declaration that "There is 
no implication in this report that young men and women can be trained
as managers in industry and commerce by following certain courses of 
( 63 )
study". Even as late as 1954 the Federation of British Industry
felt obliged to comment upon "the dangerous and unproved assumption 
that the development of management ability lends itself to formal 
instruction".^^ Nichols (1969) reported that these views seemed 
quite widespread amongst his sample of practising managers, and the 
study by P.E.P. in 1971 of prospective employers of students with 
business qualifications showed them to be equally sceptical of their 
value. Of course most of the 'recognised professions' like
medicine, the law and even accountancy insist on a period of practical 
training on top of the prescribed theoretical elements, and only after 
the successful completion of such a period can the prospective candidate 
be considered 'fully qualified'. The real difference between these 
occupations and business management, is that many practitioners of the 
latter deny the importance of any theoretical knowledge, and stress 
that the only worthwhile training is practical experience. Many even 
go so far as to claim that each business, or at least each industry, is 
unique, thus denying the importance of any formal universal knowledge 
of business subjects. Needless to say, there is no special test of 
competence, or examination of an academic nature, that business managers 
need to pass before practising.
Special tests of competence are usually organised by the 
professional association of the occupation, as in the case of lawyers or 
accountants, and theorists of the professions who utilize the trait 
approach, have nearly always stressed the importance of the professional 
association. Reader (1966) for example, declares that "an occupation's 
rise to professional standing can be pretty accurately chartered by 
reference to the progress of its professional institute or association".
♦Economics, business/management studies, accountancy and law.
Child (1969a) notes that the foundation of specialised institutes 
catering for a specifically managerial membership date in Britain from 
1911, with the founding of the Sales Managers Association. In 1920 
the first institute specifically created for all industrial managers 
was formed with the foundation of the Institute of Industrial Admin­
istration. Yet these organisations never attained a very high density 
of membership, indeed the Institute of Industrial Administration 
actually collapsed for a few years after 1924, apd Child reports that
the Works Management Association had by 1939 only about 900 members
(67)
out of a possible 250,000. This lack of professional consciousness
on the part of managers, can also be seen in the progress of the British
Institute of Management, which was established after the Second World
War. Granick (1962) notes that it was established, "with a hefty
government subsidy...(and) in frank emulation of the American model....
(but) it could not rouse sufficient business support throughout the
(68)
1950's to take it off the government dole". Finally, Hickson and
Thomas (1969) in a typical trait study attempted to measure the degree 
of professionalisation of a large number of occupations by seeing how 
many 1 professional characteristics' the relevant professional bodies 
possessed. It is perhaps significant that the British Institute of 
Management came second to last, being kept off the bottom by the 
Institute of Company Accountants apparently because the former had more 
members. One of the greatest problems for the professional associa­
tions in the area of business management would appear to be the fact 
that they formed before a clear area of technical competence was 
delineated and, given that there is still considerable debate over 
exactly what it is that managers do, one can expect their problems to 
continue.
The final characteristic of the professions that is usually 
mentioned by the trait theorists, is that of the professional code of 
conduct that ensures that the 'service ethic', or the doctrine of 
altruism, is maintained in the practice of the occupation. Several 
writers have claimed this as the most important mark of the professional 
for reasons that are not altogether clear. Lewis and Maude (1952) for 
example, conclude that, "a moral code is the basis of professionalism"!**^ 
and Donhain (1965) in his well known article, 'Is Management a 
Profession?', agrees that the 'motive of service' is the fundamental 
criterion. There are two basic problems involved here: Firstly, as
there is/are no professional association (s) to which most managers 
belong, the job of policing unethical conduct would be difficult; even
those organisations that can claim to represent some segment of the 
management population do not make any attempts to regulate their 
member's code of c o n d u c t * S e c o n d l y ,  many writers seem to think 
that the very idea of the 'service ethic' is a complete contradiction 
of the rationale of private business in a capitalist economy. Parsons 
(1939) for example, points out that the dominant keynote of the modern 
economic system is almost universally held to be the high degree pf 
free play that it gives to the pursuit of self interest, whilst Donham
(1965) approvingly quotes Rostow, who argues that the exercise of social 
responsibility as an end in itself by business executives 'constitutes 
deleterious tampering with the functions assigned the competitive market 
in a capitalist free economy*. The key phrase here is, '.as an end in 
itself*, because as I have already shown, the classical version of 
business ideology did attempt to demonstrate that the natural operation 
of the capitalist economic system automatically brought about the 
welfare of all. Such attempts were largely buttressed by the assump­
tions of perfect competition, and with the decline in the use of this 
model, even by popular economists, this particular argument itself fell 
into decline. Business managers, or their intellectual apologists, 
who still wished to claim that management was a profession, now had to 
show that social responsibility was somehow built into the goals of the 
firm itself, and this was a more difficult task.
This analysis, from the perspective of a trait theory of the 
professions, has demonstrated, I think, that business management's claim 
to professional status is not a strong one. Yet the trait approach is 
itself open to a number of fundamental criticisms, that render it 
unacceptable as a theory, as Johnson (1972) has persuasively shown. 
Firstly, the theory begs the question, because in order to determine 
what the defining marks of a profession are, one must have some 
conception of what a profession is, and this of course is the very 
issue under consideration. It is quite clear that most of the trait 
theorists were working from an implicit model of the professions based 
upon the 'ancient professions'. Secondly, there is no theory which 
explains why particular traits are necessary for an occupation to be 
called a profession - why for example is the service ethic important? 
Thirdly, trait theory very easily falls into the error of accepting 
the professionals* own definition of themselves. Johnson quotes with 
approval the comments of a correspondent of the London Times, who, 
noting the conclusions of the Monopolies Commission's Report on Profes­
sional Services, was led to the conclusion that a number of the
restrictive practices carried on by professional groups and justified 
on the basis of community welfare looked in fact "rather (like) arrange­
ments for making life easier for practitioners at the expense, one way 
or another, of their clients’*. Finally, the historical nature of
the trait approach should be noted, there is no view of what traits 
came first, or even how they came.
Although there are considerable difficulties with the trait 
approach from the standpoint of sociological theory, the managers in 
the main sample clearly adopted a rudimentary form of the theory, when 
they talked about the idea of being professionals. Two groups of 
managers operated with the idea of their being professionals. The 
first group, consisting of (about) forty managers*, considered themselves 
to be professional in the sense of having a specific expertise based on 
some particular area of knowledge that they had acquired in a (usually) 
public education institute. Into this category came the chemists, 
pharmacists, engineers, accountants etc. Very few of these managers 
appeared to fall into the category that Gouldner (1957) has designated 
as cosmopolitan however. Although they tended to conceive of them­
selves as professional accountants etc., their reference group was not 
that of their fellow professionsals working for other companies or in 
private practice, but was rather of other members of their own company. 
They very rarely attended meetings of their professional body, and 
although they nearly all read their relevant professional journal, 
usually taken by the company, their main interest in them was technical 
developments relevant to their field, job advertisements and salary 
reviews. The distribution of this group of managers was quite even 
between the British and American companies.
A second group of managers also considered themselves 
professionals, but their conception was not solely that of a functional 
specialist, they also had a conception of themselves as professional 
managers. Certainly this group was rather small, consisting of only 
twenty managers,* but it was considerably larger proportionately than 
the group of managers interviewed by Nichols (1969) in ’Northern City*. 
Two features of this group stood out. Firstly, these managers were 
rather more likely to be towards the top of their organisation than at 
the bottom and, secondly, they were much more preponderant in the
* Estimated from the interview sample.
American firms than in the British. An examination of this last point 
reveals some interesting differences between the American and the 
British conception of managers, and it confirms some of the previous 
research findings.
The heart of the matter of professionalism as far as most of 
these managers were concerned, was technical competence. this trait was 
seen as absolutely fundamental, indeed hardly any other consideration 
was mentioned, and only one senior manager seemed to be aware of the 
debate about the service ethic. Their conception was very similar to 
the one noted by Pahl and Winkler (1974) in their study of British 
directors. The abilities they stressed were a command over a range of 
techniques that would allow them to set and reach particular goals.
They, also stressed their ability to provide a whole range of information 
which would allow decisions to be taken with considerable accuracy and 
certainty. These managers were particularly likely to be located in 
the financial and marketing functions in the American firms, although 
even the personnel managers stressed the great battery of techniques 
at their disposal for manpower forecasting, management selection etc.
If these were the key elements for the managers* conception of profes­
sionalism, it is easy to see why more of the managers working for the 
American companies conceived of themselves as professional, for as I 
have already shown, they were much more likely to possess such 
techniques. Allied with this point is the fact that the *American' 
managers were much more likely to have undergone some form of management 
training than their British counterparts, and this potentially has a 
double significance. Firstly, it is on such training courses, often 
designed specifically for the company, that the managers would have 
acquired such techniques. Secondly, the courses themselves may well 
have had some labelling effect, in that they introduced the notion of 
'professional management techniques', such that managers emerging 
successfully from such courses would be more likely to conceive of 
themselves as professionals. The abilities that these managers 
possessed were not, so far as I could judge, based on a conception of 
theoretical knowledge that would have satisfied the trait theorists.
On the contrary, most of the managers were suspicious of theory and 
anything that did not have a fairly immediate practical benefit.
Those managers who had attended some of the broader management courses, 
often those run in the public sector of education, were particularly 
scornful of subjects like economics, which they believed to be too 
theoretical. They reserved their greatest scorn however, for the
human relations type courses, that many had been ■.’subjected1 to, and 
there was general consensus that these were a waste of time,
A sharp distinction was made by these managers between 
practical knowledge and academic knowledge. This distinction is a 
readily comprehensible one if one thinks about the demands of a manager*s
job. As several writers have pointed out, one of the key features of a
-
managers’s job is ’decision making*, yet this decision making does not 
bear much resemblance to decision making as depicted in classical economic 
theory, where the businessman faces a set of alternatives, and because 
he knows the consequences of each, is able to rank the utility of all 
the possible alternatives in order to arrive at the decision which will 
maximise this utility. What Simon (1966) has convincingly shown, is 
that the business manager works within a ’bounded rationality’, not 
knowing all the alternatives or all the consequences. What is 
required in this situation are people who can make relatively quick 
assessments of the major alternatives, use their knowledge of managerial 
techniques to acquire approximate knowledge of outcomes, and then make 
a decision. The requirements are rather different from those of the 
academic world, where a'greater range of alternatives is often investi­
gated, often using concepts with no direct empirical referent, and with
(73)
far greater time allocated to data gathering. On this analysis it
is easy to see how the academic can be contrasted with the practical
man. The distinction is not totally unlike the distinction made
between ’gentlemen and players', which was discussed in Ch. 3, and yet
some aspects are different. The new gentlemen are more likely to have
had some form of managerial education, yet it is not the same as the
training received by. the players. The Administrative Staff College at
Henley is a good example of the maintenance of the old tradition.
Founded in 1948, Granick (1962) described it as an institution where,
’the cult of the amateur reigns supreme', and Life (1970) remarks that
the college ’’resembles more than anything else a residential
'progressive school’”/ 74  ^ In other words, it does not concentrate so
much upon technical knowledge, but rather on "a critical re-evaluation
(75)of personal values, motives and role playing capacities”. The
practical men are more likely to be trained in specific skills on 
courses designed by management consultants, although some will also 
attend courses like the Diploma in Management Studies at technical 
colleges and polytechnics in the public sector. The contrast between 
the gentlemen and the players may have narrowed, it has almost
certainly changed its form, but in a moderated way it stlil continues;
The key feature of the professionalism of this small group 
of managers in the sample, was their technical knowledge of large 
aspects of the business process. This ’ technicality’ has been stressed 
by both Parsons (1939) and Johnson (1972) as being a crucial element in 
any knowledge based occupation. By concentrating on this element, 
Parsons in his celebrated essay on business and the professions, 
attempted to argue that in certain respects these occupations were very 
similar. They were both marked by 1 rationality, functional specificity 
and universalism*, and both strove for the same goals of success: the
differences lay in the different situations in which the two occupa­
tions found themselves. It is by concentrating the analysis at this 
level that Parsons managed to show that there were no systematic 
differences between the motivations of businessmen and professional men. 
Thus the typical motivation of professional men was not in the usual 
sense ’altruistic1 anymore than was the typical motivation of the 
businessman, ’egoistic’. The behaviour of the two groups is determined 
by the institutional structures within which they reside, and once this 
is conceded any simple distinction between the professions and business 
management collapses. The managers in the sample who considered them­
selves professional managers, certainly possessed technical competence. 
The source of this technical competence however, was not by arid large, 
acquired by sitting an examination of an external professional body, 
which also regulated entry into the occupation. On the contrary, the 
source of much of their technical knowledge was, at least indirectly, 
the company which they worked for. It was often the company that 
organised the management training courses, or instructed the management 
consultants on what type of course they wanted. One should not assume 
from this however, that the knowledge was entirely parochial, because 
although it was often tailored to the needs of the particular firm, the 
techniques themselves were quite standard and, because of the high 
esteem of ’American management methods’, were qualities that were often 
bought and sold on the open market in the form of distinctive varieties 
of managerial experience. What does follow from this analysis however, 
is that business management as an occupation possesses no ’occupational 
control*, the managers were controlled by the companies for which they 
worked. Their special area of expertise did not insulate them from 
this control, because the source of expertise was in many ways the 
company itself. In other words, the occupation did not possess any 
barriers to intervention, there was no n^ystique which would create the 
conditions of uncertainty, or what Johnson called ’ indetennination’ - 
the occupation was totally controlled by the authority of the employer.
Yet this does not mark them off from other professional. Johnson
has argued that many ’so called’ professionals are also subject to
similar controls, e.g. from third parties (state or church) or corporate
patronage (accountants). Indeed, in a later paper Johnson (1975)
argued that the situation where the profession controls its members and
their work activities, ”can arise only where the ideological and
political processes sustaining indetermination coincide with the
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requirements of capital”. In other words, all occupational groups
serve the ’ rationality’ of the capitalist system, and there are not 
systematic differences between business managers and other professionals.
An enduring problem remains: Why is the proclaimed altruism
of the professional considered to be such a distinguishing feature of 
the ’true professional*? As I have already shown, the idea of an 
ethic of service as an inbuilt part of the profession of management 
was not one that received much recognition from my sample of managers, 
and yet it is one that is central to the academic debate about the 
profession of management. I think that the solution to this problem 
is to locate the different occupations firmly in the structure of 
British society. Business management is inextricably bound up with 
the operation of the capitalist economic order in that, in some senses, 
business managers are the agents of such an order. Their activities 
are closely controlled by the central mechanism of such an econoiay - 
the market; as they put it themselves, their master was that sternest 
of all masters, the balance sheet. Their professionalism was one 
based upon their technical ability to serve that master well. It was 
not based upon their membership of occupational associations, although 
62$ (n=90) of the ’American* managers and 55$ (n=43) of the British 
managers belonged to some professional association. These associations 
did not exert any control over the behaviour of the members, and were 
valued primarily for their ability to disseminate technical information. 
Similarly, the large number of managers in both populations (about 75$) 
who read a professional journal did so largely for the technical data 
which it contained. In so far as the values of capitalist society 
and with them the occupation of business management are perceived to 
go unchallenged, then the professional claim is largely technical in 
character. In so far as it possesses a moral element, then it is 
the morality of the balance sheet. Thus Dibble (1962) has argued 
that businessmen in American have attempted to promulgate the ethics 
of business to the whole society. The particular kind of responsibility,
and the concomitant ethic of self reliance and accountability, to which
businessmen are subjected, has become a generalised ethic rather than
simply an occupational morality for use on the job. If the businessman
finds the discipline of the balance sheet an exacting one, he likes to
believe that a similar discipline should, and ultimately does, govern
affairs outside the business enterprise. This business ideology is
positively evangelical, and it attempts to legitimate the actions of
business management by making their particular morality the morality.of
all. At times, when capitalism itself, or at least certain aspects of
it, are brought into question, then this defence becomes vulnerable.
I have already argued that one can trace a connection between business
ideologies and the socio-economic situation of the business community,
and the doctrine of management as a profession has been a powerful
weapon in the defence of business. By claiming professional status
for management, the leaders of the business community can, by implication,
claim some of the ideals of service that the more traditional professions
are assumed to have, as well as reinforcing their claims of technical
competence. Because these traditional occupations like the law and
medicine do not operate directly in the central economic core of
capitalist society, the connection between their activities and the
fundamental operation of the capitalist system is more obscure, and so
their claims of service to a professional ideal that is far removed from
(7 7 )
the morality of the balance sheet tend to carry more weight.
The ideological attack on certain aspects of the business 
world that has certainly occurred since the mid I960’s in Britain has 
probably had some effect on the managers in the sample, as the answers 
to the question on the role of the business firm in society would seem 
to indicate. In general however, the interview data would seem to 
indicate that much of the controversy had passed them by. Their main
concerns were with the technical aspects of their jobs, and their 
conception of professionalism reflected this concern. It is only at 
the very top of the company, where individuals see themselves, and are 
seen by others, as symbols of business, or in the ranks of management 
intellectuals and apologists, that the need to defend business manage­
ment as an occupation is really felt, and the broader conception of 
professionalism utilised.
The traditional image of the professional is probably still 
somebody who, apart from a certain technical skill, also possesses a 
certain autonomy. A popular image of the professional with the 
managers interviewed was of the self-employed, or at least the self-
regulating individual, like the dentist, solicitor etc. This image 
is now largely a mistaken one, for even the traditional professional 
now often works inside a bureaucracy, thus making the professional 
managers in the sample even more typical of professional men in general. 
The autonomy of the traditional professions was a distinct attraction 
for these men, who were, to use C. Wright Mills’ phrase, ’somebody 
else* s men*• Going into business on one* s own was also something 
that roughly 50$ of the sample had claimed that they had seriously 
thought about (for exact wording, see question 19 on the management 
questionnaire). Of course it is one thing to say that one had 
seriously thought about such a venture, and quite another to have 
actually done anything about it, and very few of the managers inter­
viewed claimed to have actually taken any positive steps to fulfill 
their aspirations. The most interested seemed to be the least well 
qualified academically, and those from the lower social classes, 
although of course there was considerable overlap between the two 
categories. Salesmen also seemed the most attracted of all the 
business functions, and accountants the least. Perhaps the least 
qualified still see individual business enterprise as their traditional 
symbol of opportunity, and are becoming increasingly aware of the fact 
that progress inside the company will increasingly depend upon quali-
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fications. In general terms however, I think that these results
are to be interpreted not so much as reflecting greater interest in 
business enterprise per se, but in the vision of autonomy that such 
enterprises hold out for the managers.
This chapter has reported on the characteristics of the 
managers in the two groups of firms. A range of hypotheses were 
tested which predicted that the ’American managers would differ in 
certain important ways from their British opposite numbers. In partic­
ular it was predicted that the ’American* managers would, on average, be . 
younger, better qualified, have experienced a greater amount of inter 
and intra-firm mobility, would be more likely to be female, would 
probably exhibit signs of being more ruthless or * inner-directed*, 
would work longer and harder, and would in general exhibit a greater 
degree of conmitment towards the business world. In summary, it was 
predicted that the ’American* managers would more nearly exhibit signs 
Of being ’professional managers’, as I have defined that term.
It was obviously ambitious to expect to find statistically 
significant differences on all these variables, when all the firms were 
located inside one society, and one particular segment of the society
at that - a small segment of S.E. England. As I have noted before, 
this study represents a particularly stringent test of the hypothesis 
that socio-cultural factors influence company structure and process. 
Even so, it did seem possible, as much of the popular literature had 
suggested, that American firms located in Britain would carry with 
them certain patterns of behaviour, derived from their North American 
base, which would manifest themselves in their personnel. In 
particular it was felt that American firms might have attempted to 
select from the general population of actual or potential British 
managers, those individuals who best fitted their distinctive model 
of a manager. In other words, even if one assumed that the population 
of indigenous British business managers differed in important respects 
from the population of Indigenous American managers, the distribution 
of such characteristics within British society would still be such that 
it might be possible for the American firms to select those British 
managers who possessed the characteristics that I have denoted as 
'American*. Alternatively it could be argued that certain types of 
managers, who possessed certain qualities popularly believed to be 
typical of indigenous American managers, might be attracted to American 
companies operating in Britain. Finally, there was the possibility, 
that any observed differences were not to be accounted for by the 
selection process as such, but were the result of the effect of being 
employed by the American companies.
Very few differences were noted that reached levels of 
statistical significance, indeed only on two variables, the qualifica­
tions of the managers and the amount of intra-firm mobility were there 
significant differences between the two populations. There were some 
tendencies in the predicted direction in some of the other areas, but 
overall I am forced to conclude that the data could have been drawn 
from the same population. As a consequence of this finding I have 
spent much of this chapter inecplaining what differential response 
there was to the various questions in terms of individual and organ­
isational variables, like position in the 'life cycle, functional 
location, position in the organisational hierarchy etc. - factors which 
clearly explain far more than any cultural variable. It is difficult 
to know which of the three explanations offered above account for those 
differences that were observed. It would be a mistake. I believe, to 
consider them as alternatives, because I found evidence of all three 
processes at work. There was some evidence from my examination of the 
personnel departments to suggest that the American firms did have
somewhat different priorities in selecting personnel than the British 
companies, e.g. they tended to stress qualifications more than the 
British firms, but it would be difficult to substantiate the view that 
their ideal-typical manager was markedly different from the * British 
model'. Secondly, I did find evidence, in a small number of cases, 
which showed that certain managers were attracted to the company because 
of the image they had of American companies. Thirdly, there was 
evidence that being employed in American companies actually did make a 
difference to the managerial profiles, for example, the American 
companies were more inclined to send their managers on management 
training courses and to initiate job moves inside the firm.
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particularly strong in the ’City1, where the fear of government 
intervention is felt to be greatest. Here the claim to be 
professional is allied with the view that as the City is largely 
run by 'gentlemen*, no state policing is necessary. For an 
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CHAPTER 7.
British and American Manufacturing Organisations 
Organisational Climates.
In the last two chapters I examined the British and American 
firms in the sample on the basis of their organisational features and 
management. It also seemed to be a useful exercise to merge the two 
together and to consider whether there were any marked differences in 
the organisational climates of the two groups of firms. Although the 
term organisational climate is one that many social scientists from a 
variety of disciplines and theoretical standpoints have used, as well 
as being one that is phenomenologically real to many people that work 
in organisations, including the managers in this study, it is one that 
has caused considerable conceptual problems. In order to understand 
these problems and to place my use of the concept in context, it is 
necessary to briefly trace its history.
Early organisation theory, in the hands of formal theorists 
like Taylor and Fayol rendered a concept like organisational climate 
unnecessary, because their view of human behaviour was the rather 
mechanical one that had descended from the world of classical economic 
theory. As soon as the psychologists began to interest themselves in 
the world of the organisation however, these assumptions were shown to 
be simplistic. Armed with one of the key postulates of psychological 
theory, that behaviour is a function of the interaction of an organism 
and its environment, there was room for the concept of organisational 
climate to act as part of the environment. Certainly much psychology, 
particularly the 'rat psychology' of the behaviourist school, was not 
much interested in dealing with such complex stimuli as those presented 
by a real organisation, but social psychology soon began to take on 
such problems. It was not very long before Elton Mayo and his 
colleagues were presenting the results of their Hawthorne studies, 
which among other things talked about the 'climate* of the Relay Assembly 
Test Room and the Bank Wiring Observation Room. This was followed in 
1939 by the publication of Lewin, Lippitt and White's (1939) classic 
study on leadership climates. These two publications were important 
in forming what today is usually called the human relations tradition 
in organisation theory, which stresses the importance of leadership 
style or managerial style in affecting the morale and very often the 
productivity of members of the organisation. Further support for this 
theoretical tradition has come from group experiments of communication 
networks.^ Studies in this tradition have two major weaknesses: 
firstly, they concentrate on a rather narrow range of variables, many 
assuming rather then demonstrating that managerial climate is the 
crucial explanatory variable. Secondly, many of these small group ■*
experimenters have extrapolated a little too readily from such small
group studies to large organisations* The psychological dimension of
organisational climate was developed considerably in the 1950*s by a
series of studies in America on the climate of schools, colleges and 
(21universities. ' This research initially accepted a totally psycho­
logical dimension: Pace (1968) for example, argued that, "the atmosphere
of a college may largely be determined by the types of students who 
(3)enrol in it"* Using this view Pace and Stem (1958) proceded to
conceptualise organisational climate as a reflection of human person­
ality traits. Thus, just as human personality was conceptualised as 
being made up of physical facts, abilities, skills, attribute values, 
interests etc., and these were combined to produce measures bf traits
or general characteristics and finally personality types, so too with
(4)
organisational personality or climate. In their later work both
Pace and Stern began to move away from the direct concern with 
individual personality and its perception of the environment, and 
developed an interest in the nature of the educational institution per se. 
The first industrial study to specifically use the concept of organ­
isational climate, stripped of its exclusively psychological qualities, 
was Argyris (1958) in his study of a bank. This interesting study 
noted the need for a concept to integrate the 1 buzzing confusion* of 
an organisation, which he observes is a mixture of the formal structure, 
the informal structure and different individual personalities. As he 
wrote, although organisations are very complex the complexity is not 
limitless, at some point the variables do connect with one another and 
form a finite boundary maintaining system.
This very limited review of the history of the concept does
indicate, I think, that a considerable number of writers have found the
concept of organisational climate a useful one, and one that stands in
(5)a long line of similar concepts in social science. To note this is
not to admit that there are not still considerable problems with the 
concept. These problems can best be considered in terms of the 
operationalisation of organisational climate. The first problem that 
should be noted is the debate about whether organisational climate 
should be conceived in objective or subjective terms. Evan (1968) 
for example, argues in favour of operationalising the concept in terms 
of objective measures, and in this he is followed by Barker (1962) in 
his analysis of school climates, and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) for 
industrial organisation climates. Such indices as the number of levels 
of authority, quantity of formal rules, behaviour episodes, critical
incidents, labour turnover etc. are included. There are two problems 
with this objective conceptualisation: Firstly, there is always the
possibility that the objective qualities of the environment will be 
interpreted differently by different people; this after all is the 
thrust of iV.I. Thomas's famous 'definition of the situation*. The 
second problem is that it does seem useful to distinguish organisational 
structure, which is what some of the above theorists seem to be talking 
about, from organisational climate. It would seem reasonable to 
suppose that the two concepts are related in some way in the sense that 
structure influences climate, but in order to pursue this hypothesis 
it would clearly be necessary to distinguish them at an analytical 
level. A much larger groups of researchers have attempted to opera­
tionalise organisational climate in terms of participant perceptions 
of different aspects of the work organisation. This strategy does 
avoid the criticism that can be levelled at those who concentrate upon 
objective measures of climate, and it has the advantage that these 
perceptions are based upon experience that is both more extensive and 
more involved than that of an outside observer. This approach is also 
not without its problems however; Sells (1963, 1968) pointed out that 
if one concentrates upon an individual's perception of his environment, 
then it is formally necessary to identify variations in each phenomenon.
In other words, the organisational climate results not only from 
variations in the structure of the organisation, but also from variations
in individual personality, as well perhaps from 'definitions of the
(6)situation*, which are 'imported' from outside the organisation.
Another problem which arises from the participant perception approach 
is highlighted by Johannesson (1973), who argues that there is 
potential redundancy between measures of organisational climate and 
measures of job satisfaction. The problem is twofold'. Firstly, he 
notes that perceptual researchers have tended to use methods of measure­
ment which are identical to those employed by job satisfaction 
researchers (e.g. both use questions like 'describe your work situation*)• 
He then asks, "If feelings heavily influence descriptions of perception, 
or the perceptions themselves, how can derivatives of them be called
satisfaction dimensions at one point in time and climate dimensions at
(7)another?". The problem is compounded by the fact that many of the
climate researchers utilise many of the same measures and items used by 
the old job satisfaction researchers, and Johannesson*s own research 
shows that most of the variants in a perceptual measure of the organis­
ation's climate could be subsumed in factors traditionally found in 
satisfaction research. Finally, two more potential hazards in the
utilisation of the concept should be noted. If Johannesson is correct 
in his assertions about the similarity of job satisfaction and organ­
isational climate measures, then it is highly likely that members of 
the organisation differentially located within the structure will 
perceive the climate in rather different ways, thus vitiating the whole 
idea of an organisational climate. Even if there is no close assoc­
iation between a member* s position in the organisation and his perception 
of its climate, it is still possible to doubt whether a single, dominant, 
unidimensional climate will emerge from investigation. Both these 
matters are of course open to empirical investigation.
The problems outlined above are indeed formidable and yet
many of them can be surmounted by a carefully devised methodology.
It was decided to use an instrument to measure certain aspects of the
climate of the companies under investigation, which used the perceptions
of the managers of those companies. There were a number of reasons
for that decision. Firstly, given the limited time available, I felt
that people who had worked in the companies for a number of years were
more likely to have a veridicial picture of the company's climate than
a short stay outside researcher. Secondly, I had already collected
some objective measures of the organisations' structures via the Aston
scales (see Ch.5), and further had considerable information upon the
managers themselves (see Ch.6). Thirdly, Payne and Pheysey (1971)
had managed to reconceptualise Stern* s organisational climate index,
and had applied it to business organisations in the form of a Business
Organisation Climate Index (BOCI). This instrument had several
important qualities that made it particularly valuable for this research.
Firstly, Payne and Pheysey showed that BOCI was a psychometrically sound
(8)instrument, which had a reasonable degree of construct validity.
Secondly, they also managed to show that there was very little variation 
between the top managers and the rest of the organisation with respect 
to scores on the index, and concluded that "It would thus seem a valid 
procedure to take the mean score of the individuals in the organisation 
as an indication of the general climate in the organisation, at least
(9)
at the managerial level".' Although the two organisation on which 
they tried the index were rather small, 350 and 412 people respectively, 
this did seem a hopeful finding. BOCI was composed of twenty scales, 
each containing eight items. This I believed was too big an imposition 
for me to place on the sample of managers, and so six scales were 
selected from BOCI that, on the basis of previous research findings and 
my own theoretical analysis, should have discriminated between British
and American firms. The BOCI scales chosen were the following:
1. Leaders' psychological distance - a scale designed to measure the 
degree to which senior managers maintain psychological distance 
from their juniors.
2. Egalitarianism - a scale designed to measure the degree to which the 
organisation is felt to be egalitarian.
3. Employee involvement - a scale designed to measure the degree to 
which senior management is felt to show concern for employees.
4. Scientific and technical orientation - a scale designed to measure 
the degree of concern with scientific and technical matters.
Innovation - a scale designed to assess the degree to which there 
is felt to be a readiness to innovate in the organisation.
6. Community - a scale designed to test the degree of concern for 
relations with the wider community.
Full details of these scales can be found in Appendix 2.
The use of scales to measure specific aspects of organisational 
climate would seem to surmount the problems encountered by Johannesson, 
in that the organisational climate is not being conceptualised as a 
unidimensional whole in the way that some job satisfaction studies have 
conceptualised that phenomenon. One final reason should be mentioned 
which influenced the decision to use some of the BOCI scales. In the 
original article by Payne and Pheysey reporting the use of the scale, 
very little information on the two firms investigated was reported, but 
in a later article by Pheysey, Payne and Pugh (1971), it was revealed 
that one of the two firms was American. Thus the original study had 
tested BOCI in a way that provided a useful comparison to this research. 
Unfortunately, although the two firms, Aston and Brum, were well matched 
for size, they had very different products (details not specified), 
which made the study rather less than perfect from the standpoint of 
this research.
The results of the specified aspects of organisational climate 
as measured by certain of the BOCI scales are detailed in table 7.1 p.284 
The first point to examine is whether it was legitimate to use the 
aggregate score of individual managers to represent the climate of the 
firms in the sample. In general terms the findings of this study 
coincide with those of Payne and Pheysey (1971), in that there were no 
significant differences on any of the scales between managers located 
at the top of their organisations and those at the bottom, despite the
fact that the organisations in this study were, on average, considerably 
larger than those used in the latter study. Inspection of the 
standard deviation scores also shows that the amount of variation is, 
in general, sufficiently small to permit the use of the term organ­
isational climate. It should be added however, that although there 
were no significant differences between the level of the respondents 
and their responses to the scale, there was a greater association in 
the British companies, particularly G.B. Print Ltd., than in the equiv­
alent American companies. This may well reflect the greater sense of 
community that existed in the American firms consequent upon their more 
participative style of management. Further evidence for this can be 
drawn from the Payne and Pheysey study, which consistently showed lower 
standard deviations for the American firm, even though it was slightly 
larger than the British firm in the study. No association was
found between the managers' functional area and their response to any 
of the organisational climate scales.
The scale entitled 'Leaders Psychological Distance'was 
intended to measure the degree to which the senior members of the organ­
isation maintained social distance between themselves and the more 
junior members of the organisation. A typical item from this scale 
was, 'Senior personnel rarely refer to one another by their first names1• 
The results of this scale represent an interesting test of effects of 
formal structure as against managerial style. AS I have already shown, 
the American firms were in many ways more formally structured, in that 
there were a larger number of rules and procedures than in the British 
firms. On the other hand, I have also stressed that, in terms of 
'managerial style', the American firms were more 'open'. It was 
predicted that the less formal style of the American firms would be more 
important than the structure, and that the British firms would have an 
organisational climate that reflected greater social distance within the 
organisation. fhe results of this scale are not entirely unambiguous.. 
Ihe hypothesis is upheld in the case of the pharmaceutical and printing 
machinery firms. The large difference in the printing machinery 
comparison should not be surprising, in that I have already shown that 
the British firm was far more formalized and did not permit much 
participation. The furniture industry comparison is the one case 
where one would not have expected a very great difference between the 
British and American companies because of the great emphasis placed upon 
participation by the Managing Director of the British firm, and the 
table reveals that the scores are identical. The scores in the
electronics and consumer goods industries cannot be taken as support 
for the hypothesis. Inspection of these scores would seem to indicate 
that the size of the organisation is probably an important variable, 
and this view throws more light on the larger gap between the British 
and American firms in the printing machinery comparison. It would 
seem reasonable to suppose that the larger the firm the greater the 
degree of psychological distance between the top and the bottom of 
the managerial hierarchy, ceteris paribus. In the printing machinery 
case the effect of nationality and size are both in the same direction, 
and so the difference between the two firms is magnified. In the 
electronics industry the largest firm, U.S. Electronics I has the highest 
score, yet the other American firm, U.S. Electronics II, although bigger 
than the British firm has an identical score. In the Consumer products 
comparison the larger American firm has a very slightly higher score 
than its British counterpart. A further indication of the effect of 
size can be gained from the fact that the average scores for all the 
firms in this study are larger than the scores for the smaller firms 
investigated in the Payne and Pheysey (1971) study. It would seem 
reasonable to conclude that from this data that nationality via its 
effect on 'managerial style', and the size of the organisation, both 
have their independent effects on the managers' responses to the 
leaders' psychological distance scale.
The BOCI scale entitled 'Egalitarianism' was designed to 
measure the degree to which the organisation was felt to be egalitarian. 
By egalitarian was meant that the values of achievement and universalism 
were stressed rather than those of ascription or particularism. Typical 
items were; 'Family, social or financial status are necessary elements 
for advancement or success', and, 'As long as you are good at your job 
you will get ahead here'. It was predicted that the American firms 
would tend to score higher on this scale, although given that all the 
firms in the sample were probably 'progressive' it was not thought that 
the differences would be great. The hypothesis was supported in the 
pharmaceutical, printing machinery and electronics industries, but not 
upheld in the furniture and consumer products companies. The results 
for the furniture industry are not that surprising in view of the 
analysis of the disposition of the Managing Director of that company, 
with his considerable stress upon egalitarianism. The results of the 
consumer products comparison are more remarkable however. Compared with 
the other firms in the sample, U.S. Consumer Products has a high score, 
and so perhaps it is British Consumer Products which is the exceptional 
firm. Analysis of performance of this company in terms of growth or
profitability certainly indicates an exceptionally dynamic company 
(See Ch. 8). All the firms in the sample, with the exception of 
British Print, recorded a higher score on this scale than both the 
American and British firms in the Payne and Pheysey (1971) study, 
which is perhaps further evidence of the 1 progressive' nature of the 
firms in this sample.
The 'Employee Involvement' scale was designed to measure the 
extent to which the managerial controllers of the organisation were 
perceived to concern themselves with the needs of the other managerial 
members of the organisation. Typical items were, "Policy, goals and 
objectives are carefully explained to everyone" and, "Senior personnel 
have little tolerance for complaints and protests". It was predicted 
that the more open and informal structure of the American organisations, 
that was reflected in the physical layout of some of the offices, and 
the more accessible management of these firms would result in higher 
scores for the American firms. The prediction was confirmed in the 
pharmaceutical, printing machinery and consumer products comparisons, 
but not for the electronics and furniture industry comparisons. The 
reversal of the predicted results in the furniture firms once more 
can be safely accounted for by reference to the managerial style of the 
Managing Director of British Furniture, and It is tempting to account 
for the difference in the electronics industry by reference to the much 
smaller size of the British firm, which would tend to make the manage­
ment more employee centered, if only because the relatively small 
number of managers involved meant that everyone knew everybody else 
resonably well. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that 
the larger of the two American electronics firms scores lower on this 
scale than its compatriot.
The scale entitled 'Scientific and Technical Orientation' was 
intended to measure the degree of concern with scientific and technical 
matters that existed within the organisation. It was predicted that
the firms in the pharmaceutical and electronics industries would score 
highest on these scales irrespective of nationality. American firms 
were predicted to score higher than their comparable British firms 
reflecting the supposedly greater stress that American firms place upon 
applied scientific knowledge. The industry predictions are largely 
supported, although British Electronics appears to have rather a low 
score. The effects of nationality are less clearcut. In the 
pharmaceutical, electronics and consumer products industries the 
relationship is as predicted, but the prediction is not upheld in the 
printing machinery and furniture firms. British Furniture once again
proved to be an exception, but one that is not altogether surprising, 
as the British firm is an acknowledged industry leader in technology, 
whilst its American counterpart received all of its technology 'ready 
made* from its American parent. The relatively low score of American 
Print reflects, I think, its precarious position at the time of the 
research. The American company's products had been overtaken by new 
technology, and the low perception of the company's scientific and 
technical orientation might well be taken to be both a result of its 
poor performance and possibly even a contributory cause.
The BOCI scale, 'Readiness to Innovate*, is designed to 
assess the extent to which the organisation is perceived to be willing 
to bring in innovation. Examples of items include, "Policy changes 
occur slowly here and only after considerable deliberation" and, 
"Programmes here are quickly changed to meet new conditions". It was 
predicted that the American firms in the sample would have an organ­
isational climate that was more conducive to innovation than the 
comparable British firms. There were several reasons for this 
prediction: Firstly, the more open structure of most of the American
firms should have made them more receptive to new ideas; secondly, 
many of the innovations would come from the American parent, which 
should be in a powerful position to impose such innovations on its 
British subsidiary. Thirdly, the greater use of management consultants, 
management development programmes and job rotation on the part of the 
American companies, should all provide powerful spurs to the acceptance 
of innovatory behaviour. The prediction finds broad support in the 
pharmaceutical, printing machinery and consumer products industries.
In the electronics industry the strongly American controlled firm, 
American Electronics II, is found to have the most innovative climate, 
and this is followed by the comparable British firm. One can perhaps 
explain the rather low score of the other American company by reference 
to the fact that it was only very loosely controlled from the United 
States, and therefore largely cut off from the powerful innovative 
forces emanating from its American counterpart. ?Yie other exception 
is once more to be found in the furniture industry, where the British 
firm, organised along very organic lines and noted in the industry for 
its innovative designs and technology, scores considerably higher than 
its American counterpart.
The last element of organisational climate to be examined 
was the BOCI scale entitled 'Orientation to Wider Community'. Typical 
scale items were, "Service to the wider community is regarded as a
major responsibility of this organisation” and "The activities of
charities and social agencies are strongly supported”. It was
predicted that the American firms would stress this trait more strongly
than the British firms. The major reasons for this prediction were
(12)the greater public relations consciousness of American firms, 
allied with the greater sensitivity of American firms operating as 
foreigners in the British economy (see p. 141 ). In only the pharm­
aceutical and consumer products industries is the prediction upheld, 
in all the other cases the British companies score higher on this trait. 
It is interesting to note that in the Payne and Pheysey (1971) study 
the British firm also scored significantly higher than the American firm 
on this scale. At one level it is difficult to square these results 
with the responses the managers made to the question about the role of 
the company in society. Here a greater percentage of 'American* 
managers opted for the * social responsibility' response. I think this 
can be resolved if one realises that the organisational climate 
questions specifically referred to the managers' company rather than 
companies in general. Inside the American companies the managers 
experienced the full thrust of capitalist rationality that left little 
room for concern with the wider community - these concerns were the 
responsibility of a particular official, the Public Relations Officer, 
or sometimes an Outside consultant, but their activities did not
permeate the inside of the firm, they were strictly for external consum-
(13)ption. This is not to argue that such firms did not contribute to
the wider community in a variety of ways; many did, but these 
activities did not permeate the organisation in any noticeable way.
The other factor that clearly had some explanatory power was the 
location of the company. If the company was located in an area where 
it was a major employer and thereby a publicly conspicuous firm in the 
eyes of the local community, as in the case of U.S. Pharmaceuticals 
and British Print, then more general attention appears to be paid to 
the wider community. There appeared also to be an industry effect in 
that those firms which dealt directly with the public, for example,
U.S. Pharmaceuticals, and both the consumer products companies, appeared 
to have higher scores than the majority of other companies. British 
furniture again stands out as an exception to this statement, and 
illustrates once more the power of the ideas of a particular man in a 
small company.
It would have been naive to have expected a simple correlation 
between the nationality of the company and its organisational climate, 
even where the concept of organisational climate is conceptualised in
the rather limited manner of this study. There are numerous factors 
which must contribute, in one way or another, to a manager's perception 
of the organisational climate of his company, and Argyris (1958) in his 
pioneering study did well to stress the complexity of the total system 
that constitutes an organisation, and which contributes to its climate. 
In particular one should notice the case of British furniture, which 
was consistently different from the other British firms on the majority 
of the dimensions of organisational climate that were tested. This 
indicates once more the enormous power and influence that the leader of 
an organisation, or in some cases a ' dominant coalition’, can have upon 
the organisational structure and climate of a company. It was pointed 
out in the theoretical analysis that measuring the organisational 
climate via the perceptions of members of the organisation logically 
entailed attempting to account for the resultant climate, not only in 
terms of organisational structure and managerial style, but also in 
terms of individual personality and 'definitions of the situation* that 
are imported from outside the organisation. This research has made no 
attempt to analyse personality traits, but some considerable attention 
was paid to whether the American firms systematically recruited 
different types of people to be managers in their firms, as much of the 
popular management literature insists. The only differences that were 
found were in the educational qualifications of the managers; those 
working for the American companies were better qualified. There was 
also a greater degree of internal job mobility in the American firms.
No other differences in terms of age, social class background, or 
attitudinal differences were detected,* and although this evidence is 
not conclusive, it does seem likely that one needs to account for 
differences in organisational climate largely by reference to the 
internal variables of the companies. Finally, there did not appear 
to be any direct relationship between organisational structure and 
organisational climate, although the contextual variable of size did 
appear to account for some of the variance on some of the measures.
This is exactly in line with Pheysey, Payne and Pugh (1971), who 
attempted to examine the influence of organisational structure on the 
climate of a British (Brum) and an American firm (Aston), They report, 
evidently with some surprise, the following: "It was hypothesised that
Aston's more mechanistic structure, associated with greater formality 
at the group level, would be associated with lower group involvement,
* None at least which reached levels of statistical significance
but the hypothesis was not supported". They concluded that, "Any
organisation with quite extreme scores on some aspects of bureaucracy
could produce a stimulating and progressive climate, given the support
of other aspects of its structure. For example, Aston had management
appraisal and promotion procedures expressly oriented towards the
(14)development of its members".
The evidence from this study and from Pheysey, Payne and 
Pugh (1971) would seem to indicate that American firms do seem to 
generate an organisational climate that does differ, in important 
respects, from that to be found in comparable British companies. There 
is nothing mystical about how this is done. The more informal style 
of management, in terms of personal relationships, combined with a 
whole range of policies which focus upon the development of the managers 
themselves, all contribute towards certain aspects of the climate. Ihe 
stress on formal managerial techniques and the constant labelling of the 
companies as progressive in the employee magazines, induction and 
training programmes, all helps to contribute towards the 'progressive1 
feel of the company. Clearly such features are not the exclusive 
property of American firms, but it seems likely that they are more 
preponderant in American firms operating in Britain than in their 
British counterparts.^^^
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Scoring for Table 7.1.
Leaders' Psychological Distance - A high score denotes more remote
top management. Possible range 0 - 8
Egalitarianism - A high score denotes greater egalitarianism.
Possible range 0 - 8 .
Employee Involvement - A high score denotes greater employee involvement.
Possible range 0 - 8 .
Scientific - Technical Orientation - A high score denotes greater
scientific technical orientation. 
Possible range 0 - 8.
Innovation - A high score denotes greater willingness to innovate. 
Possible range 0 - 8.
Community - A high score denotes greater concern with the wider 
community. Possible range 0 - 8.
NOTES
1. For a summary of much of this material see Glanzer and Glaser (196l).
2. See for example Pace and Stem (1958).
3. Pace (1968) p.134.
4. Note also the work of Halpin and Croft (1963), who explicitly 
utilise the metaphor of personality in their study of the 
organisational climate of schools.
5. Although I have largely used the term organisational climate, a 
range of very similar conceptions exist, e.g. organisational culture, 
organisational personality, executive/managerial climate. These 
concepts belong to the same conceptual family, as the-concepts of 
social field, behaviour setting, and life space.
6. See for example Goldthorpe et al. (1968).
7. Johannesson (1973) p.120.
8. For full details of its psychometric qualities, see Payne and 
Pheysey (1971). pp. 78-83.
9. Payne and Pheysey (1971) p.83.
10. Payne and Pheysey (1971) reported a higher standard deviation in the 
British firm for 21 out of the 24 scales of BOCI (p.89). It should 
be pointed out however, that on only one scale was a significant 
difference found between these two firms as regards differences 
between the top and the bottom of the organisation, and this 
difference was found in the American firm.
11. For a development of this argument, see Haige and Aiken (1971).
12. See Burrage (1969) p.123.
13. This can be related up to one factor of organisational structure, 
that ot functional specialisation. The American firms were more 
likely to have a separate Public Relations Officer, and this 
compartmentalised the function.
14. Pheysey, Payne and Pugh (1971) p.71.
15. It seems also quite possible that these differences may also reflect 
the fact that American companies were subsidiaries of quite large 
parents, whilst the British firms were not all subsidiaries. Further, 
the size of the British parent firm tended to be smaller than its 
American counterpart.
CHAPTER 8. 
Economic Performance.
The majority of the literature that I have surveyed which 
attempted to compare the socio-cultural structure of Britain and 
America at the macro level, as well as the literature which compared 
the structure and operation of British and American companies, has been 
interested in the relative economic performance of the two units.
There has been remarkably little analysis that has been content just to 
note differences in culture, structures or processes. In view of the 
fact that both countries are dominated by the capitalist inode of 
production, which makes the economic framework the dominant one, 
perhaps this observation should not be surprising. Bourgeois 
economists do have a branch of their discipline devoted to essentially 
social benefits, welfare economics, but this is still set within the 
basic capitalist framework, and anyway suffers from a wide range of 
conceptual and theoretical problems. The bulk of the literature 
emanating from management theory, industrial psychology, and industrial 
sociology, has also largely accepted the notion of private efficiency, 
which the owners of capital themselves necessarily use. There have of 
course been exceptions; Marxist writers, from whatever discipline, 
have been anxious not to accept such internal definitions, and have 
attempted to raise the question of for whose benefits the firm or 
society is organised. It is probably true to say that this question 
has been raised with increasing frequency since the middle of the 
1960's, for reasons that I have already discussed (see p.241 ). It 
Is now increasingly rare, at least in the behavioural sciences, for 
research workers not to include some notion of ' individual self 
development', or 'social health', even in their analysis of capitalist 
business enterprise.^
This study has been primarily concerned to explore the ways in 
which cultural factors might have affected the operation of the 
capitalist economic system in Britain and America. I have undertaken 
a general macro analysis of the interplay between culture and 
capitalism in Britain and America, in the belief that only by doing 
such an analysis can one understand the structure and operation of an 
important constituent part of the system - business organisations. I 
have taken for granted, at least.for the purposes of this analysis, 
the goals of the economic system that I have been describing, and I 
have deliberately suspended any judgements about the effects of such 
a system on the individual or the society in general. Given that 
capitalism has its own in built goal of profit, it seems reasonable to 
try to make some attempt to assess the effects that cultural factors
might have had upon the economic efficiency of Britain and America at a 
macro level, as well as on the relative efficiency of British and 
American companies. Such an enterprise is fraught with formidable 
difficulties. Firstly, although in principle there exists a compara­
tive unit of measurement, which can be used as an invariant measuring 
rod of performance, i.e. monetary return, in practice the concept of 
economic performance is a very difficult one to use. Secondly, even 
supposing that one can solve the problems of measurement, one is faced 
with the even more difficult problem of causally relating differential 
performance to specific socio-cultural factors. Socio-cultural 
factors are particularly intractable variables in this context, because 
they are not, by and large amenable to precise numerical measurement. 
Furthermore, relatively little is known about the economic, let alone 
the non-economic correlates of economic growth. As Habakkuk (1968) 
puts it, "The conditions favourable to growth are so varied, and 
combined in so many different ways, that it is not possible to give a
(2)
list of essential requisites that is more than a string of platitudes".
If one accepts this statement, then it clearly follows that the 
possibility of assigning any precise weights to the importance of 
particular socio-cultural variables is quite impossible. The reaction 
of many economists to this state of affairs has been to abandon the 
attempt to relate non-econondc and non-quantifiable variables to 
economic growth altogether. It does seem worthwhile to me however, to 
indicate in broad terms at least, the direction of influence, and some 
of the possible mechanisms, that the socio-cultural variables I have 
concentrated upon have had on the general economic performance of 
Britain and America.
There seems to be a pervasive view among popular journalists 
and lay commentators that American economic growth has been considerably 
in excess of that of Britain. Indeed it is this supposed fact that 
has been partially the cause.of all the post hoc ' theorising' that has 
gone on about the reasons for this difference. Analysis of the 
available economic data does not wholly support this view however. If 
one looks at the annual growth rate of total output, a measure of gross 
domestic product, one finds the following figures, see table 8.1 below.
Table 8.1. Annual Rate of Growth of Total Output United Kingdom
and United States.
1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1960
United Kingdom 2.2 1.7 2.6
United States 4.6 2.9 3.2
Source: Maddison (1964) p.28.
This table shows that the United States has grown at a greater rate than 
the United Kingdom for a long period of time, although the gap has 
narrowed. It might be thought more reasonable however, to concentrate 
the analysis upon Industrial output, rather than the output of the 
whole community, as it is upon manufacturing industry that this research 
has concentrated. Table 8.2 below presents the results of this 
comparison.
Table 8.2 Annual Rates of Growth in Industrial Output 1860-1958 per cent.
(compounded).
* Period United Kingdom United States
1860-1880 2.4 4.3
1880-1900 1.7 4.5
1900-1913 2.2 5.2
1913-1938 1.4 1.7
1938-1958 2.9 5.3
Source: Patel (1961) p.318.
Ignoring the period which covers the depression, this table shows that
the gap between American and British productivity was even wider on this
narrower measure. One has to ask a fundamental question about this type
of comparative data however, that is, is it reasonable to compare the
economic growth of countries of such different economic situations? In
other words, to make an assessment of the effect that socio-cultural
variables might have on economic growth, the very least that could be
done is to attempt to match some of the economically relevant variables
like size, geographical position, natural resource endowment etc.
Clearly it is quite possible for a country to grow comparatively quickly,
and yet possess a socio-cultural structure which does not *fit* at all
well with the needs of the economy, even if one assumes that such socio-
(3)cultural factors have some importance in economic growth. Presumably 
it might be technically possible to construct a table of economic growth 
rates for Britain and America that did attempt to control for naturally
occurring economic factors like resource endowment, geographical 
location etc., but this is clearly beyond the scope of this research.
It is common in economic statistics to control for population however, 
and to express the growth of output per head of population. Table 
8.3 below show the result of this analysis.
Table 8.3. Rate of Growth of Output per Head of Population:
United Kingdom and United States.
1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1960
United Kingdom 1.3 1.3 2.2
United States 2.2 1.7 1.6
Source: Maddison (1964) p.30.
One can see immediately that the higher economic growth rate of America 
evaporates entirely after the Second World War, because the United 
Kingdom has had a relatively lower post-war population growth.' As I 
have indicated above however, unless one believed that socio-cultural 
variables are the most decisive influence on economic growth, in that 
they account for most of the variance in the economic data, then whether 
America has grown faster than Britain is not really a relevant 
consideration, given the obvious fact that the economic factors are 
clearly poorly matched between the two societies. The classical 
economists had a relatively simple theory of growth in that they viewed 
capital accumulation as of decisive importance. Few economists today 
however, would agree that growth is only determined by essentially 
economic factors. Most would concede that a variety of essentially 
social factors, particularly perhaps the quality of capital, human as 
well as physical, have played a large role in economic growth.
It seems probable that America's relatively high growth rate 
compared with that of Britain, in the fifty years from 1870 can at 
least be partly accounted for by the late development effect. For 
each new entrant to the ranks of * industrial* nations, there was already 
an accumulated body of technological progress to assimilate. America, 
like any newly industrialising country did not have to follow 
religiously the slow and necessarily step by step developments in 
techniques common to the countries which set out early on the road to 
industrialisation. This was by no means the whole story however, as 
I have already shown, America made her own unique contribution to 
manufacturing technique, at an early period, with what was known as the 
'American system of manufacture'. The development was influenced by
some structural features of the labour market, that was also influenced,
as I have shown, by the structure of American culture. It is my
contention that the greater stress upon the values of achievement,
affective-neutrality, specificity, universalism and self-orientation,
is likely to lead, ceteris paribus, to a better economic performance
(4)
than a stress upon their opposites. I think this can be observed
even within the United States, where, as Rothbarth (1946) has shown, 
the industries of the Southern States, where the values of capitalism 
have been less strongly embedded, have not been as efficient as those 
of the North, despite the fact that both have had as easy an access to 
the large American market. In chapter 3 I discussed the greater 
institutionalisation of the capitalist pattern of values in America as 
compared to Britain, both at the societal, or macro level, and at the 
level of business organisations, or micro level. I shall follow this 
procedure in considering the possible economic consequences for each 
society of this differential value stress, although this is for 
analytical convenience only. Clearly the institutions and values of 
the society largely have their effect upon the nation's economic 
performance, by becoming inputs to the nation's economic organisations. 
For example, the structure of the nation's education system makes itself 
economically felt by producing a certain number of people with a 
certain quality at the level of the individual economic enterprise.
In my analysis of the historical development of Britain and 
America I placed a considerable amount of emphasis on differences that 
were to be found in the respective systems of stratification. There 
are a number of ways in which the nature of the stratification system 
in America is likely to be comparatively economically advantageous. 
Firstly, one can note the connection between the stratification system 
and the structure of the domestic market: Because status differences
are felt to be less important, this makes for a relatively more 
homogeneous market structure, and this in turn means that firms can 
benefit by securing all the advantages of mass production and 
consequent longer production runs. There are signs, I think, that 
markets in the developed world are becoming rather more homogeneous - 
in this sense perhaps one can subscribe to the mass society thesis.
Of course there are plenty of specialised markets left, which the 
structure of the British economy might be thought better fitted to 
serve, but these appear to be declining as fast as the mass markets are 
growing. The greater success of the American economy has its own 
effect on the domestic market structure. It means, for example, that
income per head is much higher than it is in Britain, and higher 
amounts of disposable income means that the public spend more of their 
money on consumer durables with a.high elasticity of demand. As 
American manufacturers take the lead in the production of these sorts
of goods, they are able to keep selling them in foreign markets, as
those consuming publics reach American levels of income.
Another important feature of the American stratification 
system is the widespread belief in the possibilities of upward social 
mobility for the individual. This might be thought to have several 
effects. Firstly, it might be thought to lead to a greater competit­
iveness in American society, where more people believe they have a
chance to become really successful.^ This could easily lead to 
greater effort on the part of many (accounting perhaps for the claim 
that American businessmen work longer hours), as well as a greater 
desire for people to get on in the business world, where the greatest 
monetary rewards are to be had. In an institutional sense the
economic system of the United States is more competitive, as one can
see by examining my analysis of the amount and type of anti-monopoly
legislation between the two societies.' I have also indicated
that the style of competition is more aggressive in America, there 
being relatively few ’gentlemen’s agreements’, and informal codes to 
hold back the full effect of economic forces. The stress on money 
as the mark of success may also have its economic advantages, because 
it means that companies are less likely to remain in a particular line 
of business if it ceases to be profitable. If one accepts the thesis 
that the economic world is becoming ever more volatile, because of the 
speed of technological advance, the development of the third world, etc., 
this would place societies like America at a comparative advantage.
The stratification system manifestly also has an effect upon 
the type and structure of the industrial relations sytem in the two 
societies, as I have already shown. There are a number of ways in which 
it can be argued that the American system might lead to higher rates of 
economic growth. Firstly, the American union strategy of ’attacking1 
the most efficient, most profitable firm, and then attempting to 
spread the bargain, has obvious beneficial consequences when compared 
with the widespread British practice of industry bargaining, which 
tends to protect the marginal firm. This bargaining strategy may well 
not protect union members from unemployment as well as the British 
strategy, but this is probably easier for the American system to
withstand, and arguably beneficial for economic growth. The ideology 
of individualism in the United States means that unemployment is less 
likely to be seen as caused by system failure, the oppression of the 
proletariat by the bourgeoisie, it is more likely to be viewed as 
individual failure. Furthermore, unemployment is always markedly 
higher amongst the black population, the American underclass, who are 
relatively unpoliticised, and who have not formed effective pressure 
groups to remedy their situation. Yet this higher level of unemploy­
ment in the United States means that American industry rarely finds 
itself in the situation that British industry often finds itself in. 
British industry, particularly that section of it whose demand peaks 
tend to be simultaneous with those of the general business cycle, finds 
itself unable to take on additional labour when required. Companies 
facing such a constraint are both reluctant to dismiss labour during 
periods of the business cycle downswing, hence the alleged British 
overmanning practice, and are reluctant to invest in expensive capital 
equipment unless it is likely to be permanently manned. Labour 
expenditure in much of British industry therefore becomes a relatively 
fixed cost. This situation is greatly ameliorated in America both by 
the higher rate of unemployment even at the peak of the business cycle, 
the lower level of unionisation, the greater regional mobility of 
labour, and by the greater willingness and ability of American workers 
to commute long distances. It is also argued that the British 
industrial relations system is inefficient from the point of view that 
it causes more costly stoppages (Garbarino (1969)). It certainly 
cannot be argued that America has a better strike record than Britain, 
if one uses the more reliable index of the number of working days lost 
rather than the actual number of stoppages. Yet Garbarino argues 
persuasively that the, "concept of ’managing1 industrial conflict,
(however), includes affecting the character of the 'quality' of
(7)conflict as well as its quantity". He goes on to argue that the
fact that Britain would appear to have far more 'unofficial* stoppages,
which are relatively unpredictable, is far more damaging than the less
(8)frequent, more predictable but longer conflicts in the United States; 
Against these arguments one needs to balance two countervailing forces. 
Firstly, one must take account of the fact that the direct costs of 
running the British industrial relations system, particularly from the 
trade union side, are very small indeed. As Turner (1969) points out, 
unpaid union officials are cheap compared to high price lawyers. 
Secondly, the greater political involvement of the British trade unions 
has encouraged the development of the British welfare state. The
provision of facilities like the National Health Service, which, from 
the point of view of capitalism, secures an able bodied and healthy work 
force, as well as more general measures of social welfare, arguably 
provide oil for the working of the economic system, which America does 
not possess in anything like the British form. Whether the costs of 
the British welfare state are recouped by the benefits, in purely 
economic terms, is difficult to say.
Considerable differences were noted between Britain and 
America in the field of education. To summarise the differences: 
America had a greater percentage of her population undergoing education 
and training, the differences being most marked at the tertiary stage; 
there was a greater provision of educational opportunity in America than 
in Britain, although the differences in this area have probably been 
exaggerated; there was a difference in pedagogic style, America adopt­
ing more 'progressive1 methods; finally, education in America appeared 
to be more vocational, in particular there was a greater provision of 
management and business education, and, until the recent past probably 
a greater emphasis upon applied rather than pure science. (See note 
15 p. ). There are probably as many studies on the role of 
education in economic growth as there are of any other strictly non­
economic variables, with the possible exception of science and 
technology. The reasons for this are that economists have found it 
easier to quantify educational inputs to the economy and to calculate 
economic 'outputs'. Denison (1962) for example, calculated that 
education accounted for 23% of the growth in total national income and 
42% of growth in per capita income in the United States from 1929 to 
1957. This is in close agreement with the classic study of Schultz 
(1963). Certainly such results appear to be adequate at the level 
of meaning. Collins (1971) has dubbed this line of approach the 
'technical-funetion theory*, and has attempted to enumerate its basic 
propositions. Firstly, the skill requirements of jobs in industrial 
society constantly increase because of technological change. Secondly, 
as a consequence of the first change, formal education provides the 
training necessary for these more highly skilled jobs. It follows 
from these two propositions, that as educational requirements for 
employment constantly rise, increasingly larger proportions of the 
population are required to spend longer and longer periods in education.
If the 'human capital* economists are correct, then because 
America invests proportionately more in education than Britain, she 
should get higher returns in terms of greater economic growth.
Unfortunately, the assumptions ancl calculations on which this economic 
reasoning is based, are so unsound that very little credence can be 
placed in t h e m . T h e  only proposition that clearly stands up to 
research findings is that the main economic effect of education appears 
to occur at the level of transition to mass literacy and not significantly 
beyond this level. This does not mean to say that investment in other 
types of education has no economic effect, but that the effect is not so 
marked as to be easily identifiable. The American system of education 
is, as I have observed, more opep and meritocratic than the British 
system. This is not to argue that the American system completely 
reflects the values of achievement over ascription, far from it. decent 
studies in America have repeatedly shown that social origins have a direct 
effect on occupational success, even after the completion of education.
Yet it does seem likely that the American system is more achievement 
oriented than the British. It is interesting to note, that whilst the 
American system has undergone very little structural change in the last 
twenty five years, the English system has moved in the direction of being 
more meritocratic.^^ I would argue that one of the reasons for this 
is the pressure of economic circumstances; Britain’s poor economic 
performance has resulted in pressure upon the social structure to 
conform more to the needs of the economy.
In the general analysis of the education systems of Britain 
and America two other major differences were noted that could be 
relevant to economic performance. Firstly, there was the difference 
in pedagogic style; America tended to use more student oriented, 
’progressive* methods, whilst England was more wedded to the more formal 
’traditional* methods. Considerable controversy surrounds the effects 
that these methods might have upon even such a narrow variable as 
educational achievement, and I know of no direct evidence that links 
them in any way to economic performance. In the work context however, 
the Human Relations theorists have argued that the more 'participative* 
style leads to higher morale which very often leads to greater 
productivity. I have commented on some of these studies on pp.176-7, 
and although the results are by no means unequivocal, within the context 
of Anglo-American culture there undoubtedly is a relationship for a 
wide range of tasks. On a more theoretical level, it might be possible 
to argue that the more person centred learning, based as it is upon 
learning by discovery, does result in a better grasp of fundamental 
principles, which, in a world which is becoming more and more marked by 
change, is a more appropriate form of education. This statement 
cannot be rated as any more than a tentative hypothesis however. The
other major difference that was noted was in the content of education, 
the American education system tended to stress the more practical, 
vocational subjects, whilst in Britain there was a relatively greater 
stress upon subjects that had no clear vocational aim. The problem 
is which pattern of educational provision is likely to be most 
economically productive? There is once again very little direct 
evidence on the matter, although opinions lie thick on the ground. It 
is widely assumed, for example, that a stress upon business and manage­
ment education rather than say, classics, must pay economic dividends. 
There are at least two separate issues here. Firstly, one has the old 
argument about what sort of education offers the best ’training for the 
mind’? The concept of training for the mind is such an elusive one 
however, that it is doubtful whether such a hypothesis is in practice 
testable. Much must depend anyway on the content of what is taught, 
particularly in the area of business/management studies. There is some 
reason to doubt whether the content of much business/management education 
does in fact offer much of a training for the mind. The two major 
reports on business education in the United States that appeared in 1959,
both commented unfavourably on the poor quality of the staff, the
(12)content of what was taught and the students. There have been no
directly comparable reports on the British situation, partly because 
this educational sector is so poorly developed on this side of the 
Atlantic. The Solomons Report (1974) on the British accountancy 
profession did conclude however, that British accountancy education ’’has 
been too much concerned with the mechanical application of well-tried
(13)
procedures to stereotype situations”, a criticism which mirrors the
American reports on the education of American businessmen. Presumably
there is no inherent reason why the content of business and management
education should be so descriptive rather than analytical, and if this
apparent deficiency could be remedied there is no reason why such an
education should not offer just as good a training for the mind as any
other sort of education. If the analytic content of the subjects were
the same, it would not seem unreasonable to conclude that a more
business orientated education would be more economically productive, if
only because the use of business and managerial inodes of analysis and
techniques are more likely to bring economic success, via their effect
( 1 4 )
on the quality of decision making, than the neglect of their use.
The second point one can raise in this context is the effect that the 
ethos of a business education has upon those that undergo it, compared 
with the set of values associated with an education in the classics or 
the humanities. It is possible to argue of course, that the content
of education will merely tend to confirm existing attitudes and values 
that led students to choose business rather than classics in the first 
place. In this context the really significant fact perhaps, is that 
English students tend not to choose business oriented subjects to start 
with, compared with American students.
There is rather more evidence on the relative economic merits 
of a scientific education. One persistent theme expounded by Britain’s 
post-war leaders, is that technology can be its major resource, the 
twentieth century equivalent of nineteenth century coal. In a pioneer­
ing paper, Solow (1957) estimated a 'technical change* factor that 
contributed about four times more than capital accumulation to the 
growth of output per head in the United States. The question as far 
as the education system is concerned is, does one get a greater amount 
of economically relevant innovation by concentrating on pure science, 
which is assumed to be the British pattern, or is it more profitable to
concentrate upon applied science, which is assumed to be the American
(15)pattern? No clearcut conclusions to support either view emerge
from the evidence. After a comprehensive review of previous studies,
Langrish et al. (1972) conclude, "Science probably does work economic
miracles, but it acts in rather mysterious ways its wonders to 
(16)
perform . In other words, considerable evidence can be found to
support either view. Science and technology are by their very nature
intimately connected, and it must be impossible to know for future
development what the most profitable mix would be. As I have shown
above (see note 15), there is some debate in Britain on what the mix
actually is*. Furthermore, it is difficult to directly link the
production of scientists and technologists or research and development
(17)expenditure with economic growth.
fhe final difference between Britain and America at the macro 
level that I wish to consider is probably one of the most difficult and 
certainly one of the most contentious. It is the role of the govern­
ment in the management of the economy. I have argued that the history 
of both societies has predisposed the political elites towards a 
laissez faire policy in economic affairs, but that since 1900, the more 
business oriented government in the United States has pursued such a 
policy with greater thoroughness. In Britain, as both Shonfield (1965) 
and Winkler (1975) have shown, the government has taken an increasingly 
larger role in the management of the economy. I do not think that it 
makes any sense to argue that state planning necessarily leads to 
higher rates of growth or not. A very great deal must depend not only
on the quality of the planning, but on the position of the economy. I 
am persuaded by the arguments of Landes (1963) for example, that given 
the structure of the French economy after the Second World War, with its 
very large number of cultural and structural impediments to growth, 
government intervention in the form of nationalisation and planning in 
the area of prices, raw materials, labour etc. was probably beneficial 
to that economy. There are some structural factors which would seem 
to indicate, in general terms, that a degree of state planning was 
economically desirable for all 1 advanced1 industrial societies.
Firstly, one has been able to talk of a global industrial econon\y from 
about the 1850*s, and since that time the economies of the industrialised 
and capitalist West have become increasingly intertwined. As a 
consequence of this, several writers have talked about the change from 
economic to political capitalism, recognising the crucial significance 
of political decisions both in foreign and domestic affairs, for the 
operation of the economy (e.g. Tourraine (1974), Winkler (1975)). The 
growing percentage of world trade transacted by multi-national companies 
has merely accentuated these existing tendencies. It can be argued 
that all this is more significant for Britain than America. Britain’s 
exports contribute a far higher proportion to her G.N.P. than American’s 
exports do to her G.N.P. (see note 122, p.133 )• Secondly, the British 
government is far more involved in the British economy in terms of 
employment and investment than the American government is in the American 
economy, even so the activities of the American government are still 
highly significant in the domestic economy of that country. Finally,
I have argued throughout this thesis that the socio-cultural structure 
of British society acts as a greater impediment to economic performance 
in this society, than does the American socio-cultural structure to 
American society. If this argument is correct, then it would follow 
that if the leaders of British society wished to pursue economic growth 
as a major goal, then a considerable degree of state intervention would 
be necessary, far more so in fact, than would be necessary in the 
American situation.
I have argued above that although the economic performance of 
the nation must be related in some way to the performance of the 
individual business firm, the relationship is by no means a simple one, 
and for the purposes of analysis, the two problems can be separated.
If this is done, one can avoid getting involved in discussions about 
the relative economic performance of Britain and America, and turn
instead to the comparison of the relative performance of British and
(18)American companies. In view of the great weight of sociological,
psychological and management literature on the subject of organisational
(19)effectiveness or performance, there is surprisingly little agreement 
between writers on how it should be conceptualised or measured.
Campbell (1973) identified nineteen different variables that have been 
used, the most widely univariate measures being the following: Overall
performance measured by employee or supervisory ratings; productivity 
measured typically with actual output data; employee satisfaction, 
measured by self-report questionnaires; profit or rate of return, based 
on accounting data; withdrawal based on archival turnover and absent­
eeism data. Some studies, although ostensibly about the relationship 
between particular internal company variables and performance, seem to 
operate with only a sketchy view of performance. Burns and Stalker 
(1961) in their classic study on the Management of Innovation, inform 
the reader in a footnote that the efficiency of the firm was judged by 
the "opinion of other individuals acquainted with the firm* especially 
of competitors11. Other important studies like that of Bur rage
(1969) concentrate upon indirect variables like the ’rate of innovation*, 
although in this case no attempt was made to measure this rate.
Business firms themselves have their own measures of perform­
ance, that of profit, i.e. return on assets, or occasionally return on
(21)sales, or growth in assets. In a market economy business firms
must be able to show a profit or, in the long run, they will go out of 
business. As this study has been concerned with the effect that socio­
cultural variables might have had upon economic performance, it seems 
wholly appropriate to take an economic measure of performance rather 
than something like employee satisfaction, or even perceptions of 
performance. This procedure might be thought to have several advantages 
Firstly, there would appear to be universal* measures of performance, i.e 
return on assets or growth in assets. Secondly, these figures are 
publicly available. Two major problems remain however: Firstly, there
are considerable problems with the published data themselves, problems 
of such complexity that they have led some experts to decide that they 
are effectively insurmountable. Secondly, there are problems in 
causally relating variations in internal company variables like the 
structure of the organisation, managerial attitudes etc., with perform­
ance data.
* Taking the universe of capitalist countries.
It is traditional accounting practice to measure profitability 
by taking the operating profit of the company plus other income, after 
depreciation, but before tax and interest. All this data is readily 
available from published accounts. It is acknowledged that the main 
difficulty arises over the valuation of assets and the rate of 
depreciation. There was recently a salutary warning in the government 
publication Economic Trends, which underlined the problems: "Figures
taken from companies1 accounts do not always provide a wholly satis­
factory basis of measurement; in particular the book values of fixed 
assets, and the depreciation on them, are based on valuations determined 
at different dates in the past and so at varying price levels. This
factor can effect balance sheet data, and is particularly relevant to
—  *
measures of profitability" (my emphasis). As the rate of
inflation in Great Britain has accelerated into 1 two digit inflation*
since 1970, these problems have become accentuated as some companies
have attempted to adopt some form of inflation accounting provision,
(23)
and others have not. ' These problems refer to the published accounts 
of British companies, but if one turns to the accounts of subsidiaries 
of American companies, the category which contains all the American firms 
in this study, then the problems are compounded. There are three main 
problems which can be identified. Firstly, there is the problem of 
accounting conventions; if it could be shown that accounting conventions 
differed systematically between the two groups of firms, then this 
might have the effect of distorting the performance figures. The main 
danger here would appear to be that American tax laws might encourage 
American firms to shift profits either to or from United Kingdom 
subsidiaries. The second main problem is that of concealed subsidies 
to American subsidiary companies operating in Britain. Dunning (1970) 
observes, "Undercharging for products and services purchased from the 
U.S. parent provides a concealed subsidy. A particular form of this 
is the access which U.S. Subsidiaries have to the benefits of research, 
development and design and, in some cases, marketing expenditures under­
taken by the U.S. parent. In so far as this access is not charged at
cost at the appropriate rate, U.S. subsidiaries operating in the U.K.
(24)will enjoy higher profits than they otherwise would". The final
problem is that of dollar conversions - since the pound has been 
allowed to float against the dollar, the timing of dollar conversions 
becomes an important factor in the company*s balance sheet and can 
affect performance figures irrespective of any changes in the actual 
efficiency of the firm. These problems have led many writers to 
conclude that comparing the efficiency of two groups of firms, when one
of the groups represent subsidiaries of foreign parents, is too hazardous
to be worth the effort. Wilkins (1970) argues, "...that the errors in
the statistics may be immense, because they are based on nonanalogous
(25)information”. Dunning, who has spent a large number of years
attempting to compare the economic performance of British and American 
companies in England and elsewhere, concludes in a recent publication 
that, ’’Without detailed knowledge of the process and practice of intra­
group pricing, accounting conventions and the extent to which market 
prices are distorted by market imperfections, it is difficult to imply
anything from performance ratios about the efficiency of two groups of 
/ \
firms”. It was not possible in this research to make any assess­
ment of these highly technical matters in the firms that I investigated, 
and indeed I know of no such attempt ever having been made. From 
other published evidence it would seem that, because American firms have 
tended to expand rather faster than British firms in recent years, then 
it would seem likely that the book values of their assets would corres­
pond more closely to current replacement value, in which case their 
published accounts would tend to underestimate their profitability 
(Dunning (1970)). Against this the Committee of Public Accounts in 
1960 calculated that in two of the industries relevant to this study, 
pharmaceuticals and electronics/industrial instruments, there were very 
considerable concealed subsidies in the American firms. Indeed they 
argued that in the pharmaceutical industry the bias in the accounts
(27)
amounted to about one half of the recorded rate of profit on capital.
If one accepts the arguments that I have outlined above, then
there would clearly be no sense in examining the published accounts and
comparing records of growth and profitability between the British and
American companies in the sample. Furthermore, there would certainly
be no justification in attempting to correlate certain distinctive
aspects of structure or management in the two groups of companies with
performance, because not only are the performance figures themselves of
doubtful validity, but the problems Involved in post hoc causal theor-
(28 )
ising of this nature are truly formidable. A brief summary of the
profitability figures of the sample firms is included in the restricted 
appendix, but I place very little reliance on the data for the reasons 
that I have indicated. They show that for a recent six year period 
(approximately end of 1966 to end of 1972) the published accounts 
indicated that U.S. Pharmaceuticals was generally more profitable than 
G.b . Pharmaceuticals; that apart from one disastrous year, U.S. Print 
was more profitable than G.B. Print; that U.S. Furniture was more 
profitable than G.B. Furniture; that G.B. Consumer was more profitable
than U.S. Consumer. No conclusion could be drawn in the electronics 
industry comparison, because the accounts of the British subsidiary 
had been consolidated with those of the parent firm. By the standards 
of the industry however, both the American firms published above 
average figures for profitability, with U.S. Electronics I doing 
noticeably better than U.S. Electronics II. There does seem some 
general agreement amongst economists that, on average, American firms 
are more profitable than British firms if One holds geographical 
location and industry constant. Dunning (1970, undated) has shown 
this to be the case for American and British firms operating in any 
country in the world, and although one might have considerable reserv­
ations about the actual figures, the trend is clear enough, and the 
evidence of the performance of both groups of firms in third nations 
particularly impressive. Another piece of data that is often used 
to compare the relative efficiency of British and American firms is 
data on comparative levels of output in the two societies. Table 8.4 
below confirms the greater efficiency of American manufacturing 
companies.
Table 8.4. Comparative Levels of Output: United Kingdom and
United States 1960.
Output per Man-Hour
U.S. Relative Prices European Relative Prices 
U.S. = 100 U.S. =100
47 38
100 100
Source; Maddison (19S8) p.40.
On aggregate it seems likely that American manufacturing firms probably 
are more efficient than equivalent British firms; although the published 
data is of a very poor quality, it has consistently pointed in the same 
direction over a long period of time and in a variety of locations.
If one accepts this propostion as being true, the question arises of 
to what extent it can be accounted for in terms of socio-cultural 
variables. This study has shown that when American manufacturing firms 
are carefully matched to British manufacturing firms, in order to 
eliminate the effect of variables like size, product differences and 
geographical location, then many of the alleged differences between 
British and American firms evaporate. One must bear in mind however, 
that because the comparison is between American and British firms
United Kingdom 
United States
operating in England, this study represents a particularly stringent 
test of the power of cultural variables to affect'business behaviour; 
it is almost inconceivable that some adaptation to the culture of the 
host society has not occurred, not least because American firms largely 
employ British subjects in their organisations. Despite the test 
being a stringent one, some of the hypothesised differences between 
British and American firms were confirmed, and it is important to 
enquire whether, on the basis of available evidence, these differences 
were likely to result in differences in economic performance.
It is possible to summarise the observed differences between 
the two groups of firms under two main headings; differences relating 
to the personnel area, i.e. the importance attached to the human capital 
of the organisation, and secondly, differences in the broad area of 
decision making inside the companies. These two areas are closely 
related, but for analytical purposes they can be treated separately.
The evidence from this study and from my re-analysis of the B.I.M. data 
indicates that American firms are likely to regard personnel as a more 
important function than the British firms. Their personnel departments 
were bigger, they spent more money and effort upon recruitment, and 
they organised the careers of the managerial recruits in a broader and 
more systematic way than the British companies. The American personnel 
departments appeared to use more universalistic criteria in selection 
than the comparable British firms, and one result of this was that the 
'American1 managers were significantly better qualified than their 
British counterparts. On the face of it one would have thought that 
several of these differences would have led, at least indirectly, to 
higher productivity. The available evidence is not wholly convincing. 
Berg (1970), disputes the view that better educated employees are 
necessarily more productive, when productivity is measured directly, 
although his review of evidence did not contain the occupation of 
business management. Perhaps this view should not be too surprising 
in view of the fact that Gordon and Howell (1959) had already shown 
in their important survey of business employers in the United States, 
that such employers regarded college degrees as important in hiring 
potential managers, not because they were thought to ensure technical 
skills, but rather to indicate 1 motivation* and 'social experience*. 
Similarly they showed that a business school education was regarded 
less as evidence of necessary training than as an indication that the 
college graduate was committed to business values. Against these 
findings one can place the work of Collins (1971), who argues that
there is a relationship between educational qualifications of the type 
under consideration, and the demands of the managerial occupation, 
although he concedes that the relationship is not so close as is 
generally assumed. There are two other factors about the qualifi­
cations of the American managers that might be thought to offer some 
grounds for believing that they would perform more productively.
Firstly, a greater percentage of the 'American* managers had qualifi­
cations in * administrative science', a subject which, as I have already 
argued, embraces techniques which a wide variety of managers would 
normally be expected to be familiar with in most modern firms.
Secondly, and probably of greater importance, a significantly greater 
number of the American managers had attended management training 
courses, where they had been exposed to the managerial techniques I 
have referred to above. It has often been argued that many of the 
courses are too general to be of any use, and if one accepts this 
argument it is perhaps significant to note that the American firms 
were more likely to send their managers on courses that were specific­
ally designed for the needs of the company. I think my evidence 
supports the view that British firms are more likely to encourage 
management training because of a general feeling that it is 'worthwhile1, 
whilst American firms have a more precise view of what they actually 
require, and tend to send their managers on courses tailor made for 
their needs.. Whilst I found that the American firms in the sampie 
were more likely to send their managers on training courses, I also 
found that the whole area of what can be called 'management development* 
was given greater importance in these firms. The managerial resources 
of the finn were more likely to be systematically appraised within a 
management development programme. Furthermore, I have shown that 
three of the American companies were operating some form of 'management 
by objectives', a scheme which, so its practitioners argue, by its 
systematic attempts to match managerial abilities with job content, is 
likely to produce higher Output. One direct consequence of the 
management development programmes was a greater degree of movement from 
one job to another inside the firm. Granick(1972), amongst others, 
has argued that this practice is likely to have beneficial consequences 
for companies in that it prevents departmental parochialism,, forces the 
manager to perform well in the 'market place of the whole company', 
rather than attempting just to please his superior, and finally aids 
the cross fertilisation of ideas throughout the company. I have no 
direct evidence of the effect of these schemes on managerial performance
in the firms I studied, although there was a general feeling amongst
some of the managers that it did make them work harder. Certainly I
found that more 'American* managers complained of the pressure of work
than did comparable English managers, and the 'American' managers did
work longer hours, although the differences were not statistically
significant. It is possible that the longer hours of the 'American'
sample reflected a greater commitment to their firms, as Child and
MacMillan (1972) have argued, possibly as a consequence of the M.B.O.
schemes, although the absence of any differences in the job satisfaction
findings do not encourage such an interpretation. Against these views
of the potentially beneficial consequences of schemes likeM.B.O., one
must also note that such schemes could lead to sub-optimizing behaviour 
(29)
within the firm.' 7
The other area of organisation that I have singled out as 
being significantly different between the two groups of firms is the 
area I have labelled 'decision making' . In the final analysis the 
performance of particular companies must be a function of the quality 
of the decision making inside the firm, if only because the structure 
and activities of organisations are 'man made', they are not the result 
of autonomous forces outside the firm. In view of the crucial nature 
of managerial decision making it is disappointing that there exist so 
few studies of the process at work, although the reasons for this are
obvious enough. This study is no exception to the rule, the data
I have is relevant only to the environment of decision making, not to
the process itself. The most crucial difference that was observed 
between the two groups of firms in this area can be expressed in terms 
of information flow. The American firms had on average more and better
quality information on which to base their business decisions. This 
was particularly true in the areas of marketing, personnel and finance. 
The range of techniques for acquiring information and processing it was, 
in general terms, more sophisticated than the comparable range amongst 
the British companies. In the personnel area this meant that in the 
selection process, job descriptions and man descriptions were nearly 
always drawn up, 'objective* testing was more common, systematic inter­
viewing more likely. Once recruited it was more likely in the American 
firms that the career of the recruit would be monitored more system­
atically, and promotion and training done on the basis of more detailed 
and objective assessment. In marketing, areas like customer behaviour, 
product policy decision (in so far as these were not controlled directly
by the parent), pricing decisions, promotional decisions and marketing 
control, were also subject to more objective and 1 rational* analysis 
than were the comparable activities in the British firms, although 
interestingly enough some of the British sample did not even possess 
some of these activities. Finally, in the area of finance, there 
appeared to be a far greater reliance on sophisticated control 
techniques than was apparent in some of the British firms. One 
consequence of this difference, that I have already noted, was that 
the 'American' managers needed much more training to allow them to cope 
with the techniques that were employed in these particular areas of the 
company. It was because the 'American* managers possessed a larger 
armoury of such control devices that I described them as being more 
professional than their British counterparts. From the point of view 
of the internal processes of the firm, the American firms were by and 
large much richer in information, yet it can also be argued, I think, 
that they were also much more receptive to information flow from 
outside the organisation as well. I have already shown that it was much 
easier to carry out research upon American linns, because they were more 
open to the research enterprise, and this is symptomatic of their general 
receptivity to new ideas and research findings from the wide field of 
management studies. I think one can illustrate this point from the 
area of industrial relations, where American firms have certainly been 
in the forefront of new types of wage payment schemes and industrial 
relations practice, reflecting their quicker response rate to the
(3,)
findings of research. The better qualifications of the 'American'
managers, themselves partly a function of the need to generate accurate 
information Inside the organisation, also made them more receptive to 
outside information in the form of academic research findings etc.
One must also note in this connection that American firms were more 
likely to attach themselves to sources of innovatory practices like 
management consultants. I am assuming that there is a relatively 
straightforward relationship between industrial efficiency and the 
quantity and quality of information available to decision makers.
Other things being equal, decision makers with more relevant information 
will tend to make better decision than those with less information. If 
it is correct, as writers like Bennis(1966) and Bell (1974) are anxious 
to argue, that the environment within which all firms are having to 
operate is becoming more ' turbulent*, more marked by change, then it 
follows that decision makers who rely on experience or some other 
variety of the inductive process, will increasingly be at a disadvantage, 
compared with those who are attempting to monitor environmental changes.
The same arguments about the advantage that American firms 
probably have at the level of decision making can be pursued when the 
structures of the two sets of firms are compared. One indication that 
the Americans were monitoring the external environment of their firms 
more closely than the comparable British firms, was that the American 
firms in general scored higher on the functional specialisation index 
(see table 5.14 p.195). In other words, the American finns were more 
likely to appoint a particular manager to investigate and provide 
information on a particular aspect of the external world than were the 
British firms. Although I have shown that the American firms were in 
general both more formalised, in the sense of having more set procedures 
for things like personnel selection and development, financial control 
etc., as well as having a greater degree of functional specialisation,
I have also argued in chapter 5 that in some senses the American firms 
were also more organically organised. The informal feel of the organ­
isations, reflected in the generally high scores of the American firms 
on the relevant organisational climate indexes ('Leader's Psychological 
Distance', 'Egalitarianism', and 'Employee Involvement') was a function 
of the fact that the American firms tended to adopt a more 'open door' 
policy towards their managerial employees, and tended to encourage the. 
horizontal flow of ideas and information. These are structural 
conditions which are likely to produce greater information flow and aid 
efficient decision making. Furthermore, as far as decisions relevant 
to the internal working of the company are concerned, this participative 
style of management is likely to meet with success in securing the 
acceptance of such decisions.
There exist a large number of studies which purport to show
that more organically structured finns are likeiy to be more innovative
(32)and usually more profitable. There are a number of difficulties
with such views however. Firstly, as I have already noted, many of 
these studies do not actually measure innovation or. profitability in 
any direct way, or if they do, their measurements are rather slack and 
vague. Secondly, there is debate about whether it makes sense to 
conceptualise the organisation as a totality, in terms of organic or 
mechanistic structures, or whether it is better to look at different 
segments of the organisation, cf. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Child 
(1970). Thirdly, one has the debate about whether organically 
structured organisations are always more efficient (cf. the 'Theory Y' 
approach of the Neo-IIuman Relations movement) or whether it depends on 
the nature of the operating environment (cf. contingency theory). I
think this study demonstrates the futility of conceiving of organisations 
as being organically or bureaucratically structured in toto. In certain 
respects the American firms were more bureaucratic than the British firms, 
in that they were more formalised; on the other hand, they also 
exhibited some organic features, e.g. in certain respects they were 
decentralised and were marked by a degree of personal informality. 
Organisations are totalities however, and it is important to realise 
that one must consider how all the various elements of organisational 
structure blend together and produce a functioning company. It is 
tempting to argue that the majority of the American companies had 
produced a particular combination of elements that was likely, on the 
basis of previous research, to be particularly productive. On the One 
hand they were bureaucratised in the sense of structuring the organ­
isation, designing jobs in such a way that each task could be easily 
identified, separated and quantified. This could easily have produced 
a rather rigid, soulless organisation of the sort that is predicted to 
occur under 'Theory X’. Yet this formalisation was at least partially 
offset, as the organisational climate scores indicate, by the more 
informal managerial style, and decentralisation of the organisational 
structure. It seemed clear to me that the first element, the exercise 
of control via bureaucratic procedures was a conscious policy decision 
on the part of the various companies; it was much less clear to me than 
the second element, the decentralisation and the informal managerial 
style, was. I am inclined to believe that the less formalised British 
organisations needed, as a consequence of their lack of formalisation, 
to centralise decision making, and this 'solution' fitted in much better 
with the stock of values in British society. By contrast, not only did 
the higher degree of formalisation in the United States companies permit 
decentralisation, but the informal managerial style reflected American 
cultural values as well.
I attempted to show in chapter 5, that the organisational 
structures of the two groups of companies were partly related up to 
the dominant function inside the firm, marketing tending to dominate in 
American firms and production in the British firms. Despite the 
arguments of Woodward (1965) I am not convinced that it is possible to 
say, with any certainty, which function is economically more important, 
it obviously depends so much upon the structure of the market that the 
firm is operating in. However, I would wish to reiterate the 
argument that the 'choice* of dominant function is partly a reflection 
of socio-cultural differences between the two societies.
In this chapter I have made some attempt to assess whether, 
on the basis of the available evidence, the differences that have been 
noted between British and American society on the one hand, and British 
and American manufacturing companies on the other, are likely to have 
led to different levels of economic performance. Several things have 
stood out from this analysis: Firstly, how little is known about the
social or organisational correlates of economic success. Secondly, 
how difficult it is to get reliable data, at the level of the firm, 
about company performance. Thirdly, how perilous an exercise it is 
to indulge in post hoc theorising about the correlates of performance.
At the level of the society, I have attempted to isolate a 
number of elements that I believe reflect a distinctive and different 
pattern of socio-cultural values in the two societies, and to show 
their economic influence. I have argued that certain distinctive 
features of the stratification system, the industrial relations system 
and education in American society, as well as the structure of business 
and the business environment, have probably all led in the direction of 
superior economic performance, when compared with the comparable 
British sub-systems. I have made no attempt to suggest the relative 
weight of such factors, either absolutely or relatively, because I know 
of no way of calculating it. All that is known is that if we take the 
data of national accounts and fit them to various production functions, 
then the conventional economic inputs do not account for all economic 
growth by a very wide margin. On the other side of the scales, I 
think that Shonfield (1965) has put forward a convincing case to 
suggest that the non-interventionist stance of the United States govern­
ments, compared with that of British governments, has probably been 
detrimental to economic growth in America.
At the level of the company it is just as difficult to make 
firm statements about the correlates of performance. The published 
company accounts are only very crude approximations of the companies1 
economic position, as I have indicated, and any thorough study of 
company performance would have to examine company accounting practice 
in order to determine a truly comparable set of business ratios.
Ignoring any problems of access, such a task would be a massive under­
taking if American subsidiaries were to be included, and would 
certainly require the services of a trained accountant. I have already 
indicated in this chapter how hazardous an exercise it is to attempt 
to correlate organisational and attitudinal attributes with company
performance, and indeed the literature is marked by remarkably few 
serious attempts to do this. In recent years only P.E.P. (1966)
and Child (1974, 1975) have made attempts in Britain. The P.E.P.
report was, in n\y view, rather disingenuous, in that not only was it
not made clear where the performance data were generated from, but
neither were any of the problems of making such correlations even
discussed. Chilcfs studies did fully discuss all the problems and
concluded, tellingly enough, "The research that has been reported does
not demonstrate very strong relationships between managerial and
(33)organisational variables and company performance1. I have not
attempted any correlational analysis, because I am convinced of the 
arguments about the futility of such a practice; instead I have 
attempted to point out the possible consequences for performance of 
some of the differences that I have found between British and American 
manufacturing firms. I am aware however, that such a theoretical 
exercise is no substitute for properly designed empirical work.
NOTES
1. I am thinking in particular of the Neo-Human Relations movement 
that dominates management theory and much of industrial psychology.
For most of these theorists there is not a clash between individual 
’self actualisation’ and company performance, because the former is
thought naturally to lead to the latter. It is possible to find
exceptions even to this stance however. The later work of Argyris
(1972) for example, takes on an almost Marxist flavour, when he 
extolls the virtues of individual self actualisation with very 
little reference to economic goals, but largely as an end in itself.
2. Habakkuk (1968) p.30.
3. Take for example the case of the newly rich oil producing states.
The demand for oil is so great that these countries can achieve 
high rates of growth with almost any configuration of superstructure.
4. For example, appointing people to positions on the basis of certain 
technically relevant qualifications is, within a capitalist economic 
system, more likely to bring success, than appointing people on the
basis of certain ascribed qualities like family connections.
5. Most measures of the alleged greater competitiveness of Americans 
are indirect. A study by Turner (19G0a), which attempted to 
measure whether American students were more competitive than similar 
British students, concluded that there were no measurable differences.
6. The underlying assumption here is that the greater the amount of 
genuine competition the greater the private efficiency of the 
economic unit. Arguably this may not be the case in certain circum­
stances. For example, because of the force of international 
competition, it may be beneficial for a country like England to 
allow oligopolies or monopolies to form, because only companies of
a certain size will be able to compete in the.international market, 
and the domestic market cannot take more than one or two large firms.
7. Garbarino (1969) p.333.
8. It would be very difficult to compare the economic loss caused by a 
larger, yet more predictable number of days lost as against a 
smaller but.less predictable number of days lost. An added
complication is that not all writers agree that Britain has a 
larger number of days lost through unofficial strikes than 
America, cf. Turner (1969).
9. This at least Is the necessary if not the sufficient condition.
The actual precipitating ’cause’ of the human capital approach 
in economics was probably the launching of the Russion Sputnik
in 1957, and the consequent concern about the economic and defence 
implications of the heavy investment by the Russions in scientific 
manpower, cf. Berg (1970) p.26.
10. Very briefly the major failings of this approach are as follows, 
although not all researchers in this field are guilty of every 
failing. Most of the studies use aggregate data, i.e. correlations 
between aggregate levels of education in a society and a measure 
like G.N.P. Sometimes the growth in G.N.P. is attributed to 
education merely because conventional inputs of labour and capital 
cannot account for it. The assignment to education is thus quite 
arbitrary. Very rarely is an attempt made to measure the link 
between education and productivity directly, usually a proxy measure 
is taken, e.g. income of persons receiving x amount of education, 
the argument then becomes entirely circular. A study by Berg
(1970) using direct measures of productivity at the level of the 
individual, fails to support the conclusion that the better educated 
are more productive in a wide range of jobs. Education is often 
assumed to be a continuous variable, approximately the same marginal 
differences in the economic values are assumed to exist between any 
two successive years’ schooling - the available evidence does not 
support such an assumption, cf. Berg (1970). p.43. It is possible 
to find quite impressive correlations between education and level
of economic development, and such studies show that the higher the 
level of economic development of a country, the higher the proportion 
of its population in elementary, secondary and higher education 
(Harbison and Myers (1964)). Such correlations beg the question 
of causality however. Collins (1971) argues that there are 
considerable variations in school enrollments among countries at 
the same economic level, and anyway many of these variations are 
explicable in terms of political demands for access to education. 
Time-lag correlations of education and economic development do 
indeed show that increases in the proportions of population in 
elementary school precede increases in economic development after 
a take-off point at approximately 30^-50^ of the seven to fourteen 
year old age group in school. A pattern of advances in secondary 
school enrollments preceeding advances in economic development is 
found only in a small number of cases, only twelve of the thirty-
10. seven examined in Peaslee (1969). Finally, a pattern of growth 
in university enrollments and subsequent economic development is 
found in twenty-one of thirty-seven cases, but as Collins (1971) 
notes, the exceptions, including the United States, France, Sweden, 
Russia and Japan are of such importance as to throw serious doubt 
on any necessary contribution of higher education to economic 
development.
11. I am thinking in particular of the move towards comprehensive 
education. Formally this means that all children have an equal 
chance of success, in line with Turner’s (1960) concept of contest 
mobility. In practice of course this is unlikely to happen.
12. The two reports were Gordon and Howell (1959) and Pierson et al. 
(1959). Gordon and Howell concluded, "The simple fact of the 
matter is that academic standards are too low in most of the 
business schools in the United States....The problem is a twofold 
one. Admission standards are too low, with the result that too 
many students are accepted who do not have either the background 
or the innate ability to survive a rigorous college program.
On top of this, most schools do not attempt to offer a rigorous
program, in part because of the high attrition rates that would 
result, in part because the faculty is not motivated to insist on 
high standards", (p.136). The Pierson Report concurred and
noted significantly, "...that too much emphasis is placed on practical 
techniques, too little on analytical methods useful in all kinds of 
situations", (p.24).
13. Solomons (1974) p.100.
14. It is interesting to note that Shonfield (1965) claims that the 
quality of economic information supplied to the British government
by its civil service has lagged behind that of America. It is
interesting to speculate whether this is related to the educational 
backgrounds of those that enter the British Civil Service.
15. The reasons for these assumptions should be clear enough from n\y
historical analysis presented in chapter 3. Furthermore, the 
assumptions were supported throughout the I960’s by the influential 
Committee on Manpower Resources for Science and Technology, first 
under Zuckerman and then Jackson. The analysis claimed that not 
only was Britain producing too many pure scientists and not enough 
applied scientists, particularly engineers, but the engineers were
’draining’ away to other countries, especially America. There
15. seems little doubt that this picture of Britain and America was 
correct, probably as late as the beginning of the Second World 
War, but despite the prevalent Government assumptions the reverse 
is probably the case now. The influential O.E.C.D. Report Gaps 
in Technology (O.E.C.D. (1970)) showed that the opposite picture 
was true. The report declared that, "In relation to the size of 
the age group the U.K. is training AOfo more technologists than 
the U.S." (p.37). This view was supported by Gannicott and 
Blaug (1969) who demonstrated that the ‘shortage of engineers* was 
illusory, a function of the power of the engineering Lobby in 
British society combined with the use of discredited manpower 
forecasting techniques by the Committee on Manpower Resources.
This view now seems quite widely accepted cf. Wilkinson and Mace
(1973). On the other hand the O.E.C.D. report does claim that 
there is evidence to suggest that the United States is using its 
scientists and technologists more productively, for more of its 
engineers are to be found in manufacturing industry, for example. 
Peck (1968) even shows that despite the large supply of engineers 
certain industries still find it difficult to attract them.
16. Langrish et al. (1972) p.39.
17. Williams (1964) notes that there is only a poor relationship 
between different countries' research and development expenditure 
and economic growth rates. Secondly, although there is clear 
evidence that the United States spends proportionately much more 
than Britain on such expenditure, not all of it is directly 
relevant to economic growth, indeed defence spending consumes by 
far the largest proportion of the American research and development 
budget.
18. It is curious that the debate between Burrage (1969) and Rudd 
(1969) about the way cultural factors allegedly affected company 
performance, was conducted with reference to the figures of 
national performance, i.e. G.N.P.
19. for a review of some of this literature, see Steers (1975).
20. Burns and Stalker (1961). Footnote, p.90.
21. Evidence from Dunning (1970) clearly shows that managers working 
in both British and American firms operating in Britain attached 
primary importance to the rate of return on total assets as the 
main measure of the private efficiency of a company (p.351).
22. Economic Trends (1973). No.238, August. London: H.M.S.O. p.vii.
23. Even the accounting profession has tacitly admitted that the
standards of accounting and auditing in Britain are too variable. 
Following the accounting scandals at Pergamon and Associated Fire 
Alarms in the late I9601s the profession established the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee in 1969 to try to get 
greater uniformity of practice. The result of this, and one 
might add, of further scandals in the 1970's, has been that more 
and more company reports have been qualified by the auditors.
24. Dunning (1970) p.386.
25. Wilkins (1970) p.xi.
26. Dunning (undated), p.69.
27. Committee of Public Accounts 1959/60.
28. 1116 most usual form of investigation is to examine the company
structure/management at time 1, and at the same moment look at 
its financial results. This would be a valid procedure only 
if one assumed that company structure/management had retained 
the present configuration for a considerable period of time and 
were therefore responsible for current performance. Many writers 
have disputed this assumption, Granick (1972) for example, argues 
"...that it is the top management of ten to twenty years ago which 
is most responsible for the financial results currently achieved"
(p.30). Secondly, as Child (1974) argues, it is quite erroneous
to make the assumption that performance is just an end product,
a dependent variable. Indeed performance data are likely to be 
important inputs into the information system of the company and 
may themselves cause changes in the structure or management of the 
firms. Only highly detailed case studies of particular companies 
are likely to reveal such processes at work. Thirdly, there is 
the problem of how one shows that particular features of organisation/ 
structure have actually contributed to performance. The fact is 
that very different patterns of organisation structure and manage­
ment seem to be equally successful/unsuccessful in a range of 
situations.
29.. Unless there is a very well worked out overall company plan, with 
objectives clearly stated for each unit of the company, in itself 
a very difficult exercise, then M.B.O. could lead to 'overproduction* 
in certain areas, to the detriment of the company as a whole.
29. As Winkler (1972) has pointed out, it is very difficult to get 
knowledge about 'productive capacity' at either the level of 
the company or the individual, and without it exercises like 
M.B.O. become meaningless.
30. The basic problem is one of access. It is not just academic 
researchers who realise the crucial nature of the decision 
making process, and one consequence of this is that business 
firms are reluctant to allow outsiders to witness this most 
vital part of the organisation. Further, to get anything out
of such research, the researcher would need access to the inform­
ation upon which decision making is based, and the research would 
have to be of considerable duration.
31. Several writers report that American firms have been the first to 
see the disadvantages of 'payment by results' schemes in certain 
industries, and have noted the research findings in this area.
As a consequence there has been a greater tendency for American 
firms to abandon these systems as antiquated, and to introduce 
schemes like measured daywork etc. (Marriott (1961), Turner et al. 
(1967), Seyfarth et al. (1968)). Furthermore, Steur and Gennard
(1971) report that American firms were more likely to feel that 
employers' associations in Britain constrained new ideas and 
practices. As a consequence many American firms like Chrysler 
(U.K.), Fords, Vauxhall, Esso, Mobil, Brown and Poison, Heinz, 
Kellogs, Kodak and Woolwo rths have left these associations to 
pursue their own company bargaining with the unions. Finally, 
it should be noted that American firms were in the forefront of 
developments in the area of productivity bargaining, beginning 
with the first scheme at the Fawley works of Esso in 1960.
32. See the review of studies in Aiken and Hage (1971).
33. Child (1975) p.25.
CONCLUSION.
In November 1971 B.B.C. T.V. presented a play by Michael 
O'Neil and Jeremy Seabrooke entitled 'Skin Deep'. The play depicted 
the operations of an American cosmetics firm operating in Britain and 
was a perfect reflection of the popular image of the clash between the 
formal rationality of American capitalism and the inhibiting culture of 
British society. In the end the cultural constraints proved to be too 
much for 'Lorraine Inc.', and the plant was moved to another European 
location. These images are very powerful ones and I constantly came 
across them in the course of this research. They represent the stereo­
types held by Crozier's 'men of action', and indeed the respondents in 
the American Executive sample by and large held this image of British 
society and British culture, although they were rather more critical 
of the prevailing image of the American company. This study has 
attempted in some small way to probe and test these popular pictures 
and, almost inevitably, has found them wanting.
The research design of this study, has been a particularly 
rigorous one in that it has compared American firms operating in England 
with similar British firms; clearly if^American firms operating in 
England and employing English managers still managed to exhibit 
differences from their British counterparts then this would have been 
strong evidence in favour of cultural values influencing business 
structure and behaviour. In view of the popular stereotypes about 
American firms and their employees the number of differences discovered 
was rather small. The American executive sample had initially led me 
to believe that there might be considerable differences between British 
and American companies. As a sample they had a noticeably different 
profile from the profiles of similarly placed British executives, as 
revealed by previous research findings. In particular they were 
younger and much better qualified than equivalent British executives.
On the other hand, many had been sent to Britain to solve a particular 
crisis and this may have made them exceptional in certain ways. In 
retrospect two features stood out about this group: Firstly, they were
markedly different as a group from all the other managers that I 
interviewed, their enthusiasm and knowledge of the business world was 
not matched by any manager that I interviewed in the main sample of 
firms. Secondly, they subscribed, by and large, to the popular image 
of the differences between British and American companies, despite 
possessing very little first hand experience of such differences. What 
they told me was very much the picture that they had digested over the
years from an avid reading of the business and popular press on both 
sides of the Atlantic, literature X might add, which is very largely 
devoid of hard evidence, and self citing.
This study, which compared American manufacturing firms 
operating in Britain with their British counterparts, largely failed 
to confirm many of the predicted differences. It is worthwhile 
summarising the differences that were detected. Firstly, the view 
that American companies would reflect the more open culture of American 
society, and would be more willing to disclose information about them­
selves, was confirmed. The response rate from the American Executive 
sample was exceptionally high (86%), and the response rate from the 
American firms in the sample was over twice that of the British firms. 
Four major differences were noted in the structure and operation of 
the two groups of companies. Firstly, the American firms tended to 
give greater importance to the human capital of their organisation than 
did the British firms. They took more care in the selection and 
appraisal of managers, and were more inclined to train their personnel. 
Secondly, the American firms made far greater use of a wider range of 
techniques for managerial control, this was particularly true in the 
areas of personnel, marketing and finance. Thirdly, the American firms 
tended to possess an organisational climate that was more informal and 
employee centred, status distinctions were less evident in most of the 
American organisations. Fourthly, whereas the British firms were 
inclined to stress production as being the most crucial area of the 
firm, and the ethos and methods of this function tended to influence 
the whole structure; in the American firms the stress was more likely 
to be placed on marketing. These four areas of difference all refer to 
the organisation of the company; interestingly enough, fewer 
differences were found amongst the managers in the two groups of 
companies, and perhaps this indicates that it was easier to mould company 
structure from across the Atlantic than it was the management personnel, 
especially when they were the nationals of another country. Only two 
major differences were observed between the British and the 'American1 
managers. The outstanding difference related to qualifications; the 
managers working for the American companies were significantly better 
qualified than their British counterparts, this difference related both 
to formal academic qualifications and to management training. Secondly,
the 'American' managers had experienced significantly more internal job 
mobility in their companies.
The important question to be answered is to what extent these 
observed differences can be explained by reference to the variable of 
national differences or culture. It has been a common practice in 
cross-cultural management research to separate cultural values from 
other variables that might be thought to influence business structure 
and behaviour, e.g. economic variables, technology. Although this 
practice might have considerable analytic use, in practice it remains 
to be seen just how useful it is. What I have attempted to show in 
this thesis, particularly in my historical analysis in chapter 3, is 
that the economic mode of production is inextricably entwined with the 
superstructure of the society, each influences the other in a variety 
of complex ways, although eventually the economic demands are strongest. 
To take a practical example, is the more informal, employee centred 
structure of American companies to be explained by reference to the lack 
of status distinctions inside American society, themselves a reflection 
of the values of achievement, universalism etc., which had the sorts of 
historical origins that I have described? Or alternatively, is one to 
argue that such an organisational strategy is adopted by many American 
firms, particularly perhaps the more 'progressive1 ones, because it is 
believed to be more efficient and profitable? i.e. the explanation is 
couched in terms of the demands of capitalism. I hope that this 
example demonstrates the futility of counterposing culture or capitalism. 
The demands of the capitalist economic system are mediated through the 
web of the socio-cultural structure, which is a historical product.
It has also been traditional in much socio-economic writing 
to try to separate out the effects of the culture of the society (or the 
values, or 'national character') from the structure of the society.
Thus the distinction is made between the structure of the society, which 
is denoted by such things as the system of stratification, the family 
etc., and some notion of the values, or 'ways of seeing the world' or 
some other sort of mental construct. I am uncertain whether this 
distinction between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' can be held 
even at the analytical level, and its use for the empirical researcher 
is even less clear - after all at one level the family is no more than 
a set of rules of behaviour. I have taken a rather behaviourist 
stance on these matters in the course of this research, in that I have 
stuck very firmly to observable features of the two societies and the 
two groups of companies and their managers. There may be a sense in 
which culture exists as an entity separate from the social structure,
as Parsons wishes to maintain, but in this particular research project 
it did not seem to be a useful exercise to distinguish between culture 
and structure. I have talked throughout this thesis therefore of
the socio-cultural structure and its influence upon economic behaviour.
I feel that it is also necessary for more to be said about my 
use of the pattern variables to 1 describe*’ the socio-cultural structure, 
and more particularly about my claim that the pattern of affective 
neutrality, specificity, universalism, achievement and self orientation 
are in some sense the *values of capitalism*. Firstly, I must reiterate 
the point I made in chapter 2, that for comparative analysis to be 
possible, one must have what Sjoberg refers to as * certain invariant 
points of reference' . Although the Parsonian pattern variables are 
clearly not 'universal categories' and certainly not culture free, it 
seems to me that they are appropriate for a comparison of two Western 
industrial capitalist societies, because the pattern variables represent 
the value choices faced by such societies. Secondly, the inbuilt 
goals of the capitalist mode of production do set up certain pressures 
towards formal rationality. As I argued in chapter 2, in the ideal- 
typical model of capitalism it is necessary to relate to people on the 
basis of their achievement rather than their ascribed qualities.
Decisions cannot be made on the basis of emotional considerations 
(affectivity), but rather on the basis of rational calculation (affective 
neutrality). Relations inside the ideal-typical capitalist economy 
are dominated not by ill defined obligations to people (diffuseness), 
but on the basis of the specific roles they play in the division of 
labour (specificity), and a response is made to people on the basis of 
their membership of specific categories (universalism) like employee or 
consumer. Finally, the ideatetypical model stresses self orientation 
for its harmonious working. There are two powerful objections to this 
line of reasoning. Firstly, although it might be possible to argue 
that capitalism, via its inbuilt goal of profit, does set up certain 
distinct strains towards the pattern of values that I have suggested, 
indeed I think this point is largely conceded even by the critics of 
such a system, cf. Gunder Frank (1971), it can be argued with equal 
force that, at the same time, such a system sets up counterforces, 
which tend to stress the opposite pattern of values. These opposing 
forces represent the contradictions of capitalism. Thus the forces 
of 'efficiency' which are released by such a mode of production are 
held in check by the need for the capitalist class to reproduce itself, 
the strain towards the value of achievement for example, is checked at 
a certain point to allow the bourgeoisie to remain in control. This
is a very strong argument, particularly if one accepts that capitalism 
has changed from its highly competitive stage in the nineteenth century, 
where some of the values of capitalism were relatively strong, to a 
less competitive form, even perhaps monopoly capitalism, where the 
counterforces offer powerful checks to such a set of values. As many 
writers have pointed out, it is hardly difficult to see the effect of 
values like ascription and diffuseness in either Britain or America 
today. If these arguments are accepted, then there would appear to be 
a fundamental problem in the explanatory paradigm of this research. I. 
have argued that the extent to which the values of capitalism are held 
in check can be put down to the socio-cultural structure of the society, 
and that the structure of British society offers more of a check on the 
private economic efficiency of capitalism than does the comparable 
structure of American society. In fact there is no necessary contra­
diction here: In Britain the values of capitalism have always been
faced with the opposite.set of values emanating from the landed aristoc­
racy; not only did these offer a check to capitalist rationality in 
the nineteenth century, but their existence has always made it easier 
for the capitalist class to draw upon that tradition to protect their 
own interests. In America, on the other hand, the relative absence of 
such a tradition has made it more difficult for American capitalists to 
resist the forces of efficiency generated by the capitalist mode of 
production - they lack a cultural tradition to fall back on to protect 
their own interests. Again it needs to be stressed that one cannot 
counterpose culture or capitalism, the two forces are inextricably 
entwined. What one can do however, and what I have attempted to do 
in this thesis, is to show that certain solutions to the problems of 
particular groups, in this case the capitalist class, are made easier 
by the prevailing socio-cultural structure in some societies than in 
others.
To talk of the capitalist class as I have done above raises 
another important issue. The empirical part of this study has not of 
course examined the capitalist class as such, it has only examined the 
operation of certain privately owned companies. Whilst a pervasive 
case can be made out for the contradictions of capitalism at the level 
of the owners of the means of production, there is very little reason 
why the values of capitalism that stress efficiency should not be 
unleashed on the operation and organisation of those businesses. It 
is at this level in particular where the cultural values of society 
can be seen to have their major effect. I think I have shown that in
the case of the American firms there were signs that the firms did, in 
certain respects at least, stress the pattern of values that I designated 
as capitalist, more strongly than did the comparable British firms.
As I put it in chapter 5, "The measuring rod of profit and loss was 
pushed into more areas of the American firms....'This was possible 
because of the greater development of analytical managerial techniques... 
the unifying character of these techniques is that they seek to apply 
the principles of rational problem-solving to business planning and 
decision making" (p. 172). This pattern of management is consistent 
with the demands of capitalism and is sanctioned by the cultural values 
of American society. The only point at which the counter values 
emanating from capitalism were noted in this study was in the data on 
performance. Capitalism generates inequality, and inequality sets up 
barriers to its own description; despite the relative 1 openness1 of 
American society and the American firms, it was very difficult to get 
adequate data about the economic performance of such companies. It is 
at this level of course that the interests of the bourgeoisie do oppose 
the cultural tradition of openness in American society. In England, 
on the other hand, both culture and capitalism push in the same 
direction - towards secrecy.
I have argued above that the socio-cultural structure of the 
society can check the operation of formal rationality by providing an 
alternative set of values and traditions which the bourgeoisie can use 
for their own ends. At the level of the firm these cultural traditions 
can permeate right the way through the organisation, but they will 
probably only be very strongly maintained right at the top. In Britain, 
because of her socio-cultural structure, one is more likely to find the 
values of affectivity, diffuseness, particularism, ascription and a 
collective orientation pervading further down the firm. In American 
firms such a value set will tend to be maintained only near the top of 
the organisation, and even here it may be difficult to observe them 
directly, because they are not culturally legitimate. There is a 
sense however, as Marx pointed out (see chapter 1), in which capitalism 
tends to dissolve such cultural constraints. One can see this most 
clearly when an economic crisis occurs in either the society or the 
firm. The demands of the balance sheet exert considerable pressure 
upon the ’managers of the economy’, micro or macro, to adjust the 
structure to the demands of the economic system. As the British 
economy and British firms have faced such a crisis in the last two 
decades, one result has been an ever greater stress on the values of
capitalism, both in the society and in the firms. To take two 
illustrative examples; at the level of the society one can see this in 
the ever more strident demands that the English education system provide 
the econoii\y with the manpower that it requires. At the level of the 
firm, this research confirms the continuing trend to the selection of 
managers by merit, rather than on some ascribed characteristic. The 
’old’ values deriving from the domination of the landed aristocracy are 
being dissolved, and are being replaced by the values of capitalism.
That process can only go so far of course, eventually such abrasive 
values will be checked by the capitalist class.
Even in a country like America, where I have argued the socio­
cultural system is more in accordance with the demands of ideal-typical 
capitalism, there are checks exerted by such a structure, indeed the 
structure of any particular nation state is likely to exert a certain 
drag upon the econoir\y. It is because of this factor that one has seen 
the development of the corporation that attempts to free itself from 
the constraints of the culture of any particular nation state - the 
multinational company. There is a sense in which such companies are, 
at least potentially, ’culture free’. In the sample of American 
executives that I interviewed, three were drawn from what Perlmutter 
(1969) calls ’geocentric’ firms (see chapter 4, p. 142 ), and although 
such firms are still relatively rare, they can be said to represent 
the ultimate stage of capitalist rationality. Such a stage is a 
natural evolution for those American firms which have allowed the 
fullest play for the values of capitalism inside their home based 
organisations, but are still constrained by the activities of their 
own nation state. Multinational companies, because they are not 
attached to any particular country also offer further advantages to 
the capitalist class; it is difficult both to observe their activities 
in detail, and to control them.
The managers in  th ese  g e o c e n tr ic  f irm s  re p re s e n t th e  ep itom y
of professional management: highly mobile; technically well qualified
in an extensive range of managerial techniques; possessing few loyalties
except to formal rationality itself - as Webber (1969) puts it, the
(2)
international executive is a ’man for all countries’. It is to
these sorts of men that the label ' professional managers’ was applied 
by some of the managers in my main sample of firms. As I attempted to 
show in chapter 6 , as capitalism increasingly forces firms to apply 
formal rationality to the business of profit making, technocrats 
become more prominent inside business organisations. As the techniques
of administration become more specialised and increasingly require 
formal training, it becomes ever more difficult to distinguish between 
business managers and other ’professionals*. There is probably now no 
more guesswork and hunch involved in running a large geocentric multi­
national corporation, than there is in running a medical practice. One 
possible consequence of this fact is that the image of ’business manager’ 
may become much more clearly defined, the job may entail a certain 
minimum of technical knowledge, and this may take the occupation out of 
the category of ’residual occupation’ in terms of career choice, that 
it still seems to be in, in Britain. Indeed, as the activities of the 
state and the large corporations become ever more closely entwined, and 
business bureaucracy becomes increasingly indistinguishable from state 
bureaucracy, then the job of ’administrator’ could emerge clearly for 
the first time. Of course there is still some way to go before this 
becomes a reality; the British civil service is still a curious 
mixture of ascription and achievement, particularism and universalism, 
diffuseness and specificity, whilst the American civil service, although 
it is more ’professional’ in one sense, is still tainted by relatively 
low status. On the other side, American business would appear to be 
more professional than British business practice, although I think that
the new predictive tools of management science, particularly techniques
(3)
like operational research, could soon transform even British business. 
Again I must stress that given the present structure of the capitalist 
mode of production, this formal rationality is likely to be checked when 
it reaches the owners of the enterprise.
One of the problems of a value system which stresses affective
neutrality, specificity, universalism, achievement and self orientation,
as both Weber and Durkheim were well aware, is that it can lead to a
sense of alienation. Although the American firms in the sample were in
general marked by a greater degree of formal rationality, their managers
did not exhibit any more signs of alienation than the British managers.
The reason for this was that the formal rationality was embedded in a
set of infonnal personal relationships. This informal style is clearly
partly to be explained by the value structure.of American society; as
Sutton et al. (1962) put it, "If ’capitalism’ is still respectable in
the United States, the fluidity of ’informal’ social relations has
(4)
greatly contributed". ' It could be argued anyway, that the cultural 
values of American society, by offering greater legitimation to the 
protestant values of hard work in a business setting, would be less 
likely to produce feelings of alienation amongst such managers. In
Britain there might be a greater problem: ignoring any difficulties
involved in the application of the formal techniques of managerial 
control in British business, the greater formality of British society 
and hence British business life could well lead to 1 soulless corpor­
ations’ . Furthermore, as I noted in chapter 6 , several writers have 
claimed to have detected a ’middle class reaction to the values of the 
competitive society’ within Britain (see p.243 ). Certainly there is 
a strand in the culture of British society that would legitimate this 
adaptation, although it is not strong, and the fact that almost 50$ of 
all managers in the sample opted for what I called the ’social 
responsibility* response, when asked about the role of the company in 
society, is food for thought. Perhaps the most dramatic -evidence for 
this view is that business itself is not a high status and popular 
career choice in England anyway.
These are large speculations for such a small study and! am 
acutely aware of the difficulties involved in generalising about 
British and American industry on the basis of this study. Indeed one 
of the findings of this study has been the variation within the 
American and British firms as well as between them. Even though iny 
sample of firms was rather small, there was one firm in each group 
that did not fit the general pattern: G.B. Furniture and U.S. Electronics
I. Business organisations are influenced not just by the economic and 
cultural framework of the society of which they are a product, but also 
by contextual variables like size, product and technology. The example 
of G.B. Furniture also stresses the enormous importance that a key 
figure or a dominant coalition of managers can have upon the structure 
and climate of a firm. Similarly the characteristics of the managers 
in the two groups of firms were to be explained more by reference to 
variables like position in the life cycle, functional location, position 
in the organisational hierarchy etc., than by reference to the fact that 
they worked for British or American firms. It would be interesting to 
replicate a study such as this in a third country i.e. to compare 
British and American manufacturing countries operating outside of Britain 
or America. Such a study design would get round the problems that this 
study has had whereby both groups of firms had to draw upon the same 
population of managers. Studies like the one reported, which attempt 
to carefully match up companies on a range of variables will be 
increasingly difficult to do however, as companies increasingly diversify 
their product ranges, making industry and product matching extremely 
difficult.
NOTES
1. One of the most interesting attempts to distinguish culture and 
structure is that of Bernstein (1971) (especially chapters 7 and 8 ). 
Drawing on the work of Weber, Durkheim and Marx, Bernstein attempts 
to sketch the way in which linguistic codes ’ transmit the culture 
and so constrain behaviour’. This way of viewing culture as being 
embodied in language is one that could well prove to be a very 
fruitful line of enquiry, particularly if it was linked to some of 
the current work in semiotics.
2. Webber (1969) p.9.
3. I do not wish to argue that we will see ’rule by technocrats' 
merely that these more formal methods are likely to be used by the 
bourgeoisie because they are more efficient. The incentive to use 
such methods will be provided by falling rates of profit (cf. Glyn 
and Sutcliffe (1972)).
4. Sutton et al. (1962). p.315.
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Table A.I. Number of Manufacturing Firms which used Job Descriptions
in Management Recruitment: B.I.M. Sample (1971)
Small (1- 1 0 0 0 employees) Large (1000+ employees)
U.S. Firms G.B. Firms U.S. Firms G.B. Firms
% N %  N %  N % N '
33.3 3 54.2 26 100 13 54.4 19
Table A.2. Number of Manufacturing Firms which used Man Specifications
in Management Recruitment: B.I.M. Sample (1971)
Small (1- 1 0 0 0 employees) Large (1000+ employees)
U.S. Firms G.B. Firms U.S. Firms G.B. Firms
%  N % N % N % N
33.3 3 18.8 9 76.9 10 24.3 9
Table A.3. Number of Manufacturing Firms which used Tests in Management
Recruitment: B.I.M. Sample (1971)
Small (1 - 1 0 0 0 employees) Large (1000+employees)
U.S. Firms G.B. Firms U.S. Firms G.B. Firms
%  N % N % N % N
44.9 4 27.1 13 38.5 5 29.7 11
Table A.4. Number of Manufacturing Firms which used Selection Consultants
in Management Recruitment: B.I.M. Sample (1971)
U.S. Firms G.B. Firms
% N % N
36.4 8 22.4 19
Tabic A.5. Number of Manufacturing Firms which used Executive Searchers
in Management Recruitment: B.I.M. Sample (1971)
U.S. Firms G.B. Firms
% N 
40.9 9
% N 
8.2 7
Table A.6. Amount Spent on the Management Selection Process as Percentage
of Starting Salary, British and American Manufacturing Firms* 
B.I.M. Sample (1971)
% of Starting 
Salary
Up to \Qffo 
11-25$ 
26-5($
Small (1-1000 employees) 
U.S. Finns G.B. Finns
Large (1000+ employees)
% N
33.3 3
55.6 5
11.1 1
% N
54.2 26
37.5 18
8.3 4
U.S. Firms 
% N
30.8 4
46.2 6
23.1 3
G.B. Firms 
% N
37.8 14
40.5 15
16.2 6
APPENDIX 2
The following letter was sent to all firms that were asked to 
co-operate in the research.
Dear Sir,
I am currently engaged in research to see how organisations 
differing in size, product and technology, differ in their organisational 
structure, and what impact these different structures have on managers 
themseJves. The current managerial literature on this subject offers 
a range of confusing answers based on very little research.
The research is being conducted by myself and is being directly 
supervised by Professor Asher Tropp of the University of Surrey. The 
research also has the backing of Mr. M.A. Pocock, the Chairman of the 
Business Studies panel of the Council for National Academic Awards, 
the largest degree awarding body in Britain, and of the Business Studies 
department of Ealing Technical College, where I am currently employed 
as a lecturer.
I am writing to ask you whether it would be possible to carry 
out the above mentioned research in your organisation. Before reaching 
a decision on this matter you will perhaps want more information, and I 
would welcome the opportunity, at your convenience, of coming to see you, 
or some other member of your organisation, to discuss the research in 
detail and show you the research instruments.
At this stage I may, perhaps, anticipate some of the questions 
and mention a few points about the research:
The information relating to the structure of the firm is being 
collected by means of a questionnaire which can be completed by any 
executive placed in the organisation so as to have the appropriate 
information. In general, we have found that a senior member of the 
personnel department is best placed. The information required does 
not demand detailed research on the part of the respondent and the 
questionnaire is completed in the presence of the researcher.
The information relating to the impact that the structure of 
the firms has on managers is being collected by means of a short 
questionnaire which the managers in the organisation can complete in 
their own time and return to me by post.
All the material being gathered is completely non-controversial 
no member of any company has ever suggested that the information 
required was "delicate” in any way.
The information collected will be aggregated in such a way 
that complete annonymity is guaranteed both to the company and to any 
employee who takes part in the research.
For your interest, the completed research findings will be sent 
to you so that you may see how your organisation compares with others, 
although it will not, of course, be possible for you to discern which 
other companies are involved.
Finally, may I say that I believe that this research is 
important, and I would very much appreciate it if it was possible 
to use your company in my study.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Yours faithfully,
I .M. Jamieson (Mr.)
NOTES:
1. No mention was made of the fact that the research was comparing 
British and American companies, because it was felt that this 
would be introducing another variable into the responses.
CONFIDENTIAL
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE SCHEDULE
lari Jamieson
University of Surrey and 
School of Business 
Ealing Technical College
What is the status of this organisation? 
(Please tick appropriate category)
1. Principal unit —
2. Subsidiary (with legal identity)  -- — -
3. Head Branch (with headquarters
on same location) — - -- -
4. Branch — ■ 1 —
How long has this unit of organisation been in operation? — -----  years
a. If this unit of operation is not the Principal Unit,
how long has the Principal Unit been in operation? — ---  years
How many employees does this unit of organisation employ?
(Part-time employees count as half) • , -—  --- -
Total number of employees in ultimate owning group?   -
Could you list all the main outputs produced by this 
organisation.
(Examples: cakes, biscuits, milk products, etc.)
FORMALISATION
(Please tick appropriate answers 
Is there an organisation chart for this company? YES NO
(If the answer is fN0’, please move to question 3)
Is the organisation chart given to:
Chief Executive only, — — — ■—
Departmental Heads — — ----
All senior executives ----- --
Are there written operating instructions for direct 
workers? YES NO
Are there written terms of reference or job descriptions 
for direct workers? YES NO
Are there written terms of reference or job descriptions 
for line (workflow) superordinates? YES NO
Are there written terms of reference or job descriptions 
for staff (other than line superordinates)? YES NO
Are there written terms of reference or job descriptions 
for the Chief Executive? YES NO
Are there written policies for the organisation as a 
whole? YES NO
Is there a workflow (Production) schedule or programme? YES NO
ORGANISATIONAL AUTONOMY
DECISIONS
1. Supervisory establishment.
2. Appointment of supervisory staff from outside the organisation.
3. Promotion of supervisory staff.
4. Salaries of supervisory staff.
5. To spend unbudgeted or unallocated money on capital items.
.6 . To spend unbudgeted or unallocated money on revenue items.
7. What type or what brand new equipment is to be.
8 . To determine a new produce or service.
9. To determine marketing territories covered.
10. The extent and type of market to be aimed for.
11. What shall be costed.
12. What shall be inspected.
13. What operations shall be work studied.
14. Dismiss a supervisor.
15. Training methods to be used.
16. Buying procedures.
17. Which suppliers of materials are to be used.
18. What and how many welfare facilities are to be provided.
19. The price of the output.
20. To alter responsibilities/areas of work of specialist departments
21. To alter responsibilities/areas of work of line departments.
22. To create a new department.
23. To create a new job.
FUNCTIONAL SPECIALISATION
A function is specialised when at least one person performs that 
function and no other function, and when that person is not in the 
direct line command.
Please tick those activities that on the above definition are 
specialised in this company,
ACTIVITIES TO;
1. Develop, legitmise and symbolise the organisation charter.
(public relations, advertising, etc.)
2. Dispose of, distribute and service the output.
(sales and service, customer complaints, etc.) \
3. . Carry outputs and resources from place to place.
(transport)
4. Acquire and allocate human resources.
(employment, etc.)
5. Develop and transform human resources.
(education and training)
6 . Maintain human resources and promote their identification
with the organisation.
(welfare, medical, safety, magazine, sports and social,etc.)
7. Obtain and control materials and equipment.
(buying, material control, stores, stock control, etc.)
8 . Maintain and erect buildings and equipment. .
(maintenance, works engineer, etc.)
9. Record and control financial resources.
accounts, costs, wages, etc.)
10. Control the workflow.
(planning, progressing, etc.)
11. Control the quality of materials, equipment and output.
(inspection testing, etc.)
12. Assess and devise ways of .producing the output .
(work study, O.R., rate fixing, methods study, etc.)
13. Devise new outputs, equipment and process.
14. Develop and operate admin, procedures.
(registry, filing, statistics, 0.& M.)
15. Deal with the legal and insurance requirements.
(legal, registrar, insurance, licensing, etc.)
16. Acquire information on the operational field.
(market research)
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TECHNOLOGY : MODE OF PRODUCTION
Tick the production technology that is central to the company.
If the firm uses a mixed type tick all the appropriate categories.
If the company uses a mixed type but one is clearly subsidiary 
to the other tick the main one twice.
1. Production of prototype units only.
2. Production of units or parts of units to
customers individual requirements.
Single units or very limited runs only.
3. Production of batches of units in very
large numbers.
4. Continuous flow production of liquids,
gases and crystalline substances.
TECHNOLOGY : AUTOMACITY RANGE AND AUTOMACITY MODE
RANGE is defined by the Highest .Scoring piece of equipment the organisation 
is known to use. (Ignore thermostatic governors).
MODE is determined by assessing the bulk of the equipment used by the 
organisation on its workflow.
. PLEASE TICK 
MODE RANGE
HAND TOOLS AND MANUAL MACHINES
These give mechanical advantages, but do not
replace man's energy or control. — --- —   ■—
Examples: Shovel, Hammer, Wrench, File,
Jack, Handsaw.
MODE RANGE
POWERED MACHINES AND TOOLS    "
Muscles are replaced for the basic machine 
function. Machine action and control
completely dependent upon operator.--------------------— ------  - ■
Examples: Electric Drill, Air Hammer,
Spray Gun Belt Sander.
11QPH jEMSL’
SINGLE CYCLE AUTOMATICS AND SELF-FEEDING MACHINES
Completes an action when initiated by an operator.
Feeds tool to the work by power. ---- -
Examples: Piper threading Machines, Machine tools '
such as Grinder, Planer, Mill Shaper, Lathe.
MODE ... RANGE
AUTOMATIC: REPEATS CYCLE
At this level all energy is mechanised. Carries 
out routine instructions without aid of man.
Starts cycle and repeats cycle automatically. —---------
Examples: Engine Production Lines, Automatic copying 
_________  lathe, Automatic assembly of switches.
MODE RANGE
SELF-MEASURING AND ADJUSTING: FEEDBACK
Measures and compares result to desired size or
position and adjusts to minimize any error.   1-----  ■
Examples: Automatic sizing grinders, dynamic balancing,
colour matching or blending, pattern tracing 
flame cutter
COMPUTER CONTROL : AUTOMATIC COGNITION
MODE RANGE
Is cognizant of multiple factors on which machine 
or process performance is predicted, evaluates 
and reconciles them by means of computer 
operations to determine proper control action
1. Before an executive is recruited into the firm is a job 
description formally drawn up?
Always Sometimes Never
2. Here is a list of the various sources of recruitment that a firm 
might use in recruiting new managers. Ignoring recruitment at 
the Boardroom level and the recruitment of technical specialists, 
would you rank them, from 1 to 9, in the order in which you use 
them. For example, if you use newspaper advertisements more than 
any other source place the number 1 next to it; if you use the 
services of the D.E.P. less than any other source place the number 9 
next to it,etc.
Internal promotions n
Personal introductions -
Newspaper advertisements ■...-
Journal advertisements -•
Selection consultants -
Executive searchers .
Executive registers and agencies
Professional associations -
Department of Employment —  - ..... .i, ■
Any others (please specify)
3. Does the company use any TESTS in its selection procedure?
Always Sometimes Never
If *never1, please pass to Question 6.
Does the company use intelligence tests?
Always Sometimes Never
5. Does the company use personality tests?
Always Sometimes Never
6 . Here is a list of attributes and qualities that might be considered 
important in selecting management personnel. Ignoring recruitment 
at the Boardroom level and the recruitment of technical specialists, 
would you rank them from 1 to 10 ..in the order of importance that the 
the company gives to them. For example, if the company takes least 
notice of educational qualifications place the number 10 next to this 
quality; if the company takes most notice of appearance then place 
. the number 1 next to this quality.
Educational qualifications —— — — — —
Appearance —--- -— — —
Type of school attended —-
References — — — ——
Interests ------- -
Speech ->
Performance on selection tests (I.Q., ,
personality, etc.) —  -
General attitudes
Experience .  ----- --
Manner —  "
7. Is there a formal system of assessing the progress of 
executives? (e.g. annual reports, appraisals,etc.) YES NO
8 . Is it a. matter of company policy to move management 
personnel around the various departments of the 
firm? (e.g. from marketing to personnel) YES
9. How many administrative staff are there in this
organisation? (Note: for the purpose of this question, 
count administrative staff as anybody who has authority 
in the organisation and who would be counted as part 
of "management". Take 'organisation1 to mean the 
unit for which this personnel department is responsible)
10. What percentage of the administrative staff, as defined 
above, are female?
11. How many administrative staff, on average, leave each year?
12, How many administrative staff are there working in the 
Personnel department?
13. Does the Personnel department in this organisation also have 
responsibility for industrial relations matters?
YES NO
14. Does the company belong to an employers association? YES
NO
PARTIALLY
NO
15. Does the company recognise any blue collar Trade 
. Unions as bargaining agents? YES NO
ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
You are being asked to complete this questionnaire as part of a survey 
being carried out on a number of organisations* The researchers are 
interested to see how organisations, differing in size,product,technology, 
etc*,differ in their organisational structure, and we are particularly 
interested In the impact that these different structures have on managers 
themselves•
The questionnaire comes in two parts: in the first part you are asked to 
answer questions about your job, your career, your education and a small 
number of personal details* The second part asks for your attitude towards 
various aspects of the organisation*
You will find that in many of the questions you are given a number of 
alternative answers and have to choose one of them* This simplifies the 
questionnaire for you so that it will take less time to complete; indeed 
it is not as long as it looks* We realise that often this may have the 
effect of over-simplifying your ideas, and that in some cases there may be 
no alternative answer which expresses exactly how you feel; we hope that 
you will bear with us in choosing the answers nearest to your feelings*
Please complete the questionnaire without consulting any of your colleagues* 
When you have finished, put it in the enclosed stamped addressed envelope 
and return it by post.
The first question asks for your name, this is because it is intended to 
interview a small sample, randomly chosen, of those who complete our 
questionnaire. If you do not wished to be interviewed, please leave this 
question blank* The information you supply is just as valuable to us 
without the name. Every answer will be treated in the strictest confidence, 
and all information given to us will be used in such a way as to preserve 
oomplete anonymity.
Finally, we would like to thank you for completing this questionnaire and 
hope you will find it of interest.
Ian Jamieson.
University of Surrey and 
School of Business 
Ealing Technical College*
1 . Name
1a. When did you join this firm?
2. How many firms or organisations have you been employed by during your
career?
3* Have you e v e r changed fu n c tio n s  d u rin g  yo u r c a re e r?  ( e .g .  from  p ro d u c tio n  
to  s a le s  e t c . )  P le a s e  c i r c le  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  answer YES NO
I f  y e s , p le a s e  s p e c ify :
4* What is your job title?
5 . Below is  a l s i t  o f  v a r io u s  a u th o r i ty  le v e ls  in  an o rg a n is a t io n . P le a s e
in d ic a te  th e  one n e a r e s t  to  yo u r own le v e l  by p la c in g  a t i c k  in  th e
a p p ro p r ia te  box.
A A person at this level is in charge of the whole unit of organisation,
i.e. he is the Chief Executive of this unit of organisation.
B A person a t  th is  le v e l  is  in  charge o f  a whole segment o f  th e  o rg a n is a t io n ,
e .g .  Works Manager o r  a manager in  charge o f  a l l  th e  T e c h n ic a l /S c ie n t i f ic  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  o rg a n is a t io n .
C A person a t  t h is  le v e l  is  in  charge o f  a s m a ll segment o f  th e  o rg a n is a t io n ,
e .g .  a d e p a rtm e n ta l manager o f  p ro d u c tio n , s a le s , ac c o u n ts , method s tu d y ,  
e tc .
D . A person a t  th is  le v e l  is  in  ju n io r  management, he m ig h t s u p e rv is e  p eo p le  
w o rk in g  d i r e c t l y  on p ro d u c tio n  i f  he is  in  l i n e  Management.
6 . How did you enter your present firm? (Please tick).
Advertisement.
Personal approach.
Family contact.
Ministry of Labour.
Other Agency (Selection 
Consultants, University 
Appointments Board, etc.)
7. What features of the present firm attracted you to it?
8 . Did you consciously choose a career in business? By a career in business 
we mean a job in the general management of a profit oriented company 
rather than as a professional man, e.g. doctor, lawyer, or as an employee 
of central/local.government, etc. Please circle appropriate answer.
YES NO
9* What were the most important influences determining your decision to 
enter business?
10. Did you ever Consider other careers? Please circle appropriate answer.
YES NO
If YES, please specify;
11. Would you be happy if your children chose the same career?
Please circle appropriate answer.
YES NO
1 2 . At What age did you firmly decide upon your career?
'If you were looking for a new job, what factors would you rank highly
in making your choice?
14# What factors would you rank of low importance?
15* Here are three statements about the role of the company that have been 
made by various businessmen. Please tick the statement nearest to your 
own opinion.
A A company can only have one responsibility and that is to maximise profit 
for its shareholders; only by doing this will the needs of the community, 
the customer and its employees be ultimately met.
B A company conducted solely for the benefit of shareholders is unethical. 
The company must also consciously seek to satisfy the needs of its 
employees, its customers and the community.
C A company's first consideration must be to make a profit, once this is 
achieved, then the company can consider the demands of its employees, 
its customers and the community.
16. We would like you to rank these ten traits on the basis of how important 
you think eaoh trait is for success in business. Hank them by placing a 
number from 1 to 10 beside each trait. For example, if you think that 
^A.CT is the most important trait for success in business, place the 
number 1 next to it. If you think that IMAGINATION is the least important. 
place the number 10 next to it.
FORCEFULNESS 
. TACTFULNESS 
IMAGINATION 
AGREEABLENESS 
INDEPENDENCE 
CAUTIOUSNESS 
SELF CONFIDENCE 
ADAPTABILITY 
DECISIVENESS 
COOPERATIVENESS
17» Do you th in k  th a t  yo u r p re s e n t jo b  g iv e s  you th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  use yo u r  
a b i l i t i e s  to  th e  f u l l ?  (P le a s e  t i c k  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  c a te g o r y ) .
Completely 
To a major extent 
To some extent 
To a minor extent 
Not at all
18. Which of these statements best describes how you feel about your job? 
(please tick the appropriate category).
A dominant factor in my life and as a primary source of satisfaction.
A distinctly interesting and important part of my life.
An aotivity separate from the rest of my life and one which must not be 
allowed to dominate.
A source of demand and pressure that threatens other activities.
19* Have you seriously thought of going into business on your own?
20. Do you find this idea attractive? (Please tick appropriate category). 
Very attractive.
Quite attractive.
Indifferent.
Not very attractive.
Not attractive at all.
21. Do you belong to a professional association? e.g. B.I.M., I.P.M. 
(Please circle appropriate answer). YES NO
If 'NO* pass to question 24>
22. How often do you attend meetings of this professional body?
(Please tick appropriate category).
Regularly.
Quite often.
Seldom.
Never.
23* Do you hold, or have you ever held, office in this professional body 
(at local or national level)? YES NO
If YES, please specify.
24* Do you regularly read a professional journal? YES NO
If YES, which one(s)?
25. Are most of your friends outside or inside the company?
(Please circle the appropriate answer) OUTSIDE INSIDE
26. How many of your colleagues at work would you call close friends?
27* Do you discuss matters other than business with your colleagues? 
(Please tick appropriate category).
Regularly.
Often.
Seldom.
Never.
zw. now many hours would you say you worked on company business per week? 
(include work at home in the evenings and at weekends and count lunch 
breaks etc.)•
29* What type of school did you last attend full time?
(Please tick appropriate category).
Elementary school.
Maintained secondary school.
(excluding grammar)
Comprehensive school.
Grammar school.
Private school. '
30. At what age did you leave school?
31# Did you attend university or college?
University or College(s) Degrees/Diplomas Subjects
32 . Have you e v e r a tte n d e d  any management t r a in in g  courses? YES NO
I f  YES, where?
What was th e  course?
3 3 . Y ear o f  b ir th ?
34* M a r i t a l  s ta tu s ?
I f  SINGLE, p le a s e  pass to  q u e s tio n  36.
3 5 . How many c h ild re n  have you?
3 6 . What was yo u r f a t h e r 's  p r in c ip a l  occupation?  (P le a s e  be s p e c i f i c ) .
The second part of this questionnaire consists of 48 statements. They are 
statements which refer to the enviroment in which people work. The 
statements refer to daily activities, to rules and regulations and policies, 
to typical interests and projects, etc. You are asked to indicate which 
statements are characteristic of YOUR ORGANISATION and which are not. Your 
answers should tell us what you believe your institution is like rather 
than what you might prefer. You may not have a certain answer to many of 
these statements, because there may not be any really definite information 
on which to base your answer. We would like you to answer all the questions, 
however. Your response will simply mean, that in your opinion, the statement 
is probably true or probably false about your organisation.
Beside each statement there appears the letters 'Tf for TRUE and 'F* for 
FALSE.
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER.
.».<£/is.*. u s u -u  c* j .  »<ci.,y o  a u u x c s a e u  cifcJ ' DJ.X' ' 'JL' i?'
2 It's Important here to /be in the right club or group T F
3 Policy, goals and objectives are carefully explained to
everyone T F
4 Applications of research, experimental analysis and other
forms of scientific method are encouraged T F
5 Policy changes occur slowly and only after considerable
deliberation T F
6 The organisation's activities are often featured in the
newspapers T F
7 It's necessary to be polite under all circumstances to
stay out of trouble T F
8 Personality and pull are more important than competence
in getting on T F
9 C r i t ic is m  o r  a d v ice  from  a s u p e r io r  is  u s u a lly  welcomed T F
10 Discussions about the latest technical developments are
not uncommon T F
11 Quick decisions and actions are not characteristic of this . 
organisation T F
12 This place has a reputation for being indifferent-to the
needs of the wider community T F
13 Senior personnel rarely refer to one another by their first
names T F
14 F a m ily , s o c ia l  o r  f in a n c ia l  s ta tu s  a re  n ecessary  e lem ents
for advancement or success T F
15 Regulations are interpreted and enforced in an understanding
manner T F
16 Few people would be interested in attending a lecture by
an outstanding scientist T F
17 Thinking of alternative ways in which problems might be
solved or things done differently is discouraged T F
18 The activities of charities and social agencies are strongly 
supported by this organisation T F
19 The important people in this firm expect others to show
proper respect for them T F
20 There are no favourites in this organisation; everyone gets
treated alike T F
21 There are few opportunities for informal conversation with
senior personnel T F
22 Few people in this organisation have any background in
science T F
23 The l a t e s t  s c i e n t i f i c  d is c o v e r ie s  make few changes in  the  way 
t h is  o rg a n is a t io n  is  run
24 S e rv ic e  to  th e  w id e r community is  regarded as a m a jo r  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  th is  o rg a n is a t io n
25 People  h e re  a re  a lw ays lo o k in g  f o r  com plim ents
26 Anyone who knows th e  r ig h t  peop le  h e re  can p ro g ress  q u ite  
q u ic k ly
27 T h is  o rg a n is a t io n  does n o t concern i t s e l f  w ith  the  p e rs o n a l 
problem s o f  th e  peo p le  who work here
28 A d is c u s s io n  about th e  la t e s t  s c i e n t i f i c  in v e n tio n s  would 
n o t be uncommon h ere
29 New id e a s  a re  alw ays b e in g  t r i e d  o u t h e re
30 I t * s  easy to  f in d  p eo p le  h e re  to  g iv e  t a lk s  to  c lu b s  and
s o c ia l  groups
31 S e n io r  p e rso n n e l a re  f re q u e n t ly  je a lo u s  o f  t h e i r  a u th o r i t y
32 Everyone has the  same o p p o rtu n ity  to  do w e l l  h ere
33 S e n io r p erso n n e l have l i t t l e  to le ra n c e  f o r  co m p la in ts  and 
p ro te s ts
34 M agazines about new developm ents in  sc ien ce  and management
techn iques  a re  read  by many peop le  who work h ere  •
35 Unusual o r e x c i t in g  p la n s  a re  encouraged h ere
36 S p e c ia l even ts  a re  g iv e n  a g re a t  d e a l o f  p u b l ic i t y
37 People h ere  a re  v e ry  d e f e r e n t ia l  to  t h e i r  s u p e r io rs
38 S e n io r  p erso n n e l w i l l  go ou t o f  t h e i r  way to  h e lp  you w ith  
your work
39 As lo n g  as you a re  good a t  yo u r job* y o u ' l l  g e t  ahead h e re
40 S e n io r  p ersonnel h e re  a re  cons idered  e x p e rts  in  t h e i r  
re s p e c t iv e  f i e ld s
41 There a re  c o n v e n tio n a l ways o f  doirg. th in g s  h ere  w hich a re  
r a r e ly  changed
42 Any form  o f  p u b l ic i t y  is  frowned upon h ere
43 There  is  a recogn ised  group o f  le a d e rs  in  the  o rg a n is a t io n  
who re c e iv e  s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s
44 I f  you fa c e  f i t s ,  y o u 're  a l r ig h t  h e re
45 S e n io r  p erso n n e l a re  p rep ared  to  l i s t e n  to  peop le  as w e l l  as 
d i r e c t  them
46 T h is  o rg a n is a tio n  is  re s e a rc h  conscious
47 Programmes h ere  a re  q u ic k ly  changed to  m eet new c o n d it io n s
48 S o c ia l  issu es  a re  r a r e ly  d iscussed h ere
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